



**Northeast  
Nuclear Energy**

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The Northeast Utilities System

**Docket No. 50-336**  
**B18316**

**RE: 10 CFR 73.71**

**FEB - 6 2001**

**U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Attention: Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555**

**Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2  
Licensee Event Report 2001-001-00  
Vital Area Security Breach in the Auxiliary Building Roof  
Without Compensatory Security Measures**

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report (LER) 2001-001-00, documenting an event that occurred at Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, on January 7, 2001. This LER is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71.

There are no commitments contained within this letter.

Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. David W. Dodson at (860) 447-1791, extension 2346.

Very truly yours,

**NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY**

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
C. J. Schwarz

**Master Process Owner - Operate the Asset**

**Attachment (1): LER 2001-001-00**

**cc: H. J. Miller, Region I Administrator  
J. I. Zimmerman, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 2  
S. R. Jones, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit No. 2**

*IE 74*

Docket No. 50-336  
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Attachment 1

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2

LER 2001-001-00

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

<b>FACILITY NAME (1)</b> Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2	<b>DOCKET NUMBER (2)</b> 05000336	<b>PAGE (3)</b> 1 OF 3
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**TITLE (4)**  
Security Event Report: Vital Area Security Breach in the Auxiliary Building Roof Without Compensatory Security Measures

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
01	07	2001	2001	-- 001	-- 00	02	06	2001	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
<b>OPERATING MODE (9)</b> 1 <b>THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)</b>										
			20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)	
<b>POWER LEVEL (10)</b> 100			20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		X 73.71	
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		OTHER	
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		Specify in Abstract below in NRC Form 366A	
			20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)			

**LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)**

<b>NAME</b> David W. Dodson, Regulatory Compliance Team Lead	<b>TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)</b> (860) 447-1791 Ext. 2346
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**COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)**

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

<b>SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)</b>				<b>EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)</b>		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X	NO						

**ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)**

On January 7, 2001 at 0300, the Millstone Unit No. 2 Shift Manager questioned the lack of compensatory measures in place for a 20 inch x 20 inch hole in the Auxiliary Building roof. No security guard or fire watch was posted at the hole. The Shift Manager contacted Protective Services at 0500 with what he felt was a potential fire issue. A Security Shift Supervisor was dispatched to the scene. The Security Shift Supervisor determined that a breach in a vital area boundary existed at 0514 due to the size of the hole, which could potentially have allowed undetected access into the area, and remained at the scene until another guard was formally posted. An immediate (1 hour) notification was made on January 7, 2001, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1) and 10 CFR 73.71 Appendix G, "Reportable Safeguards Events."

The cause of the event was that the planner did not include the necessary structural barrier breach notification requirements or security guard requirements in the automated work orders (AWOs) in accordance with the established procedures.

As a result of this event training will be given to all planners and team leaders to re-enforce the requirement to use the Millstone work control procedures during the preparation and review of AWOs. An interim compensatory action was implemented requiring AWOs that breach a system or boundary to receive a peer check by a qualified planner to ensure that all design functions are considered and proper implementation requirements are incorporated into the AWO. The interim compensatory action will be terminated upon completing the training of the planners and team leaders.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**  
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2	05000336	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2 OF 3
		2001	-- 001	-- 00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

I. Description of Event

On January 7, 2001 at 0300, the Millstone Unit No. 2 Shift Manager questioned the lack of compensatory measures in place for a 20 inch x 20 inch hole in the Auxiliary Building roof. No security guard or fire watch was posted at the hole. The Shift Manager contacted Protective Services at 0500 with what he felt was a potential fire issue. A Security Shift Supervisor was dispatched to the scene. The Security Shift Supervisor determined that a breach in a vital area boundary existed at 0514 due to the size of the hole, which could potentially have allowed undetected access into the area, and remained at the scene until another guard was formally posted. An immediate (1 hour) notification was made on January 7, 2001, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1) and 10 CFR 73.71 Appendix G, "Reportable Safeguards Events." At the time of this event, the plant was in Mode 1 at one hundred (100) percent power.

On November 28, 2000, Design Change Request (DCR) M2-00023 was issued addressing Millstone Unit No. 1 Building 105 and common area heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) separation project. The DCR stated on page 26 that: "preparations in the MP2 Spent Fuel Building (Auxiliary Building) for the installation of the vertical legs to the Chemistry Lab duct run will be larger than 96 in<sup>2</sup> therefore, security requirements are to be established." It also stated on page 27 that: "Appropriate security measures shall be taken during implementation when the penetration is created for MP2 HVAC Equipment Room." AWOs were prepared by the planner in the time period from December, 9, 2000 to December 18, 2000. Although the DCR did state clearly the need for establishing security measures, the planner did not include the necessary structural barrier breach notification requirements or security guard requirements in the AWOs in accordance with the established procedures.

On January 6, 2001 Auxiliary Building roof cutting began with no compensatory security measures established. On January 7, 2001 at 0300, the Millstone Unit No. 2 Shift Manager questioned the lack of compensatory measures in place for a 20 inch x 20 inch hole in the Auxiliary Building roof. No security guard or fire watch was posted at the hole. The Shift Manager contacted Protective Services at 0500 with what he felt was a potential fire issue. A Security Shift Supervisor was dispatched to the scene. The Security Shift Supervisor determined that a breach in a vital area boundary existed at 0514 due to the size of the hole, which could potentially have allowed undetected access into the area, and remained at the scene until another guard was formally posted.

This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71(d), which refers to Appendix G, "Reportable Safeguards Events," Section I.(c), which requires that, "Any failure, degradation, or the discovered vulnerability in a safeguards system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a vital area for which compensatory measures have not been employed" be reported.

II. Cause of Event

The cause of the event was that the planner did not include the necessary structural barrier breach notification requirements or security guard requirements in the AWOs in accordance with the established procedures.

III. Analysis of Event

There were no safety consequences from this event in that unauthorized intrusion into the Auxiliary Building vital area did not occur. During the period no evidence of contraband or sabotage was found within the Auxiliary Building.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**  
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2	05000336	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	3 OF 3
		2001	-- 001 --	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

This event has low safety significance because there was no undetected access to the vital area nor was there any evidence of contraband or sabotage in the vital area. Among the major equipment within the Auxiliary Building is the Spent Fuel Pool [DA]. Undetected access could have allowed damage or sabotage of this or other vital plant equipment.

**IV. Corrective Action**

As a result of this event training will be given to all planners and team leaders to re-enforce the requirement to use the Millstone work control procedures during the preparation and review of AWOs.

An interim compensatory action was implemented requiring AWOs that breach a system or boundary to receive a peer check by a qualified planner to ensure that all design functions are considered and proper implementation requirements are incorporated into the AWO. The interim compensatory action will be terminated upon completing the training of the planners and team leaders.

**V. Additional Information**

Additional information required for Security Events. (Item Number from Regulatory Guide 5.62, "Reporting of Safeguard Events, provided below.):

- 5. Type of Security Force Onsite: Contract
- 6. Number and Type of Personnel Involved: One Security Officer
- 7. Method of Discovery: Security Guard Observation
- 8. Procedural Errors Involved: Failure to follow Millstone Unit No. 2 work control procedures
- 11. Local, State, or Federal law enforcement agencies contacted: None
- 12. Description of media interest and press release: None

**Similar Events**

None

**Manufacturing Data**

None

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].