

May 31, 1985

Docket Nos. 50-317
and 50-318

Mr. A. E. Lundvall, Jr.
Vice President - Supply
Baltimore Gas & Electric Company
P. O. Box 1475
Baltimore, Maryland 21203

Dear Mr. Lundvall:

DISTRIBUTION:

<u>DOCKET FILE</u>	JPartlow
NRC PDR	WJones
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On June 6, 1984, the Commission issued Amendment Nos. 94 and 75 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-53 and DPR-69. On page 3/4 6-9b of Amendment No. 75, the new amendment number was omitted. Please substitute the enclosed page 3/4 6-9b for the previously transmitted page.

On January 14, 1985, Amendment Nos. 97 and 79 were issued for the operating licenses. Page 3/4 7-65 of Amendment No. 79 was mistakenly given a new amendment number though it was unchanged. The backup or changed page, 3/4 7-66, correctly carried the new number. Enclosed is a replacement page 3/4 7-65 showing the correct amendment number.

Amendment Nos. 98 and 80 were transmitted to you on February 14, 1985. These amendments allowed completion of the third containment integrated leak rate test prior to the 10-year inservice inspection outage. Page 3/4 6-2 of Amendment No. 98 contained a typographical error. That error has been corrected and the replacement page 3/4 6-2 is enclosed herewith.

Please accept our apologies for any inconvenience these errors may have caused you.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

David H. Jaffe, Project Manager
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:

- (1) Page 3/4 6-9B (Unit 2)
- (2) Page 3/4 7-65 (Unit 2)
- (3) Page 3/4 6-2 (Unit 1)

cc w/enclosure
See next page

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PDR ADOCK 05000317
P PDR

ORB#3:DL
PKreutzer
5/3/85

ORB#3:DL
DHJaffe:dd
5/3/85

ORB#3:DL
EGTourigny
5/3/85

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT VENT SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.8 The containment vent isolation valves MOV 6900 and MOV 6901 shall be maintained closed by tagging the motor power supply breakers open and maintaining the keyed hand switches locked in the closed position.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one or both containment vent isolation valves open, close the open valve(s) within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.8 The containment vent isolation valves shall be determined closed at least once per 31 days by verifying that power to the motor operators is removed and the valves indicate shut.

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations* not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions, except as provided in Table 3.6-1 of Specification 3.6.4.1.
- b. By verifying that each containment air lock is OPERABLE per Specification 3.6.1.3.
- c. By verifying that the equipment hatch is closed and sealed, prior to entering Mode 4 following a shutdown where the equipment hatch was opened, by conducting a Type B test per Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50.

*Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment and are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to:

- a. An overall integrated leakage rate of:
 1. $\leq L_a$ (346,000 SCCM), 0.20 percent by weight of the containment air^a per 24 hours at P_a , 50 psig, or
 2. $\leq L_t$ (61,600 SCCM), 0.058 percent by weight of the containment air^t per 24 hours at a reduced pressure of P_t , 25 psig.
- b. A combined leakage rate of $\leq 0.60 L_a$ (207,600 SCCM), for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests when pressurized to P_a .

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With either (a) the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceeding $0.75 L_a$ (259,500 SCCM) or $0.75 L_t$ (46,200 SCCM), as applicable, or (b) with the measured combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Types B and C tests exceeding $0.60 L_a$, restore the leakage rate(s) to within the limit(s) prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200°F.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.2 The containment leakage rates shall be demonstrated at the following test schedule and shall be determined in conformance with the criteria specified in Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50* using the methods and provisions of ANSI N45.4 - 1972:

- a. Three Type A tests (overall Integrated Containment Leakage Rate) shall be conducted at 40 ± 10 month intervals during shutdown at either P_a (50 psig) or at P_t (25 psig) during each 10-year service period. The third test of each set shall be conducted during the shutdown for the 10-year plant inservice inspection.*

*The third test of the first 10-year service period shall be conducted during spring 1985 Unit 1 refueling outage.

PLANT SYSTEMS

FIRE HOSE STATIONS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.11.4 The fire hose stations shown in Table 3.7-6 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever equipment in the areas protected by the fire hose stations is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

- a. With one or more of the fire hose stations shown in Table 3.7-6 inoperable, route an additional equivalent capacity fire hose to the unprotected area(s) from an OPERABLE hose station within 1 hour. Restore the fire hose station(s) to OPERABLE status within 14 days, or prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the fire hose station(s) to OPERABLE status.

The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

b.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.11.4 Each of the fire hose stations shown in Table 3.7-6 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE;

- a. At least once per 31 days by visual inspection of the station to assure all required equipment is at the station. Hose stations located in the containment shall be visually inspected on each scheduled reactor shutdown, but not more frequently than every 31 days.
- b. At least once per 18 months by:
 1. Removing the hose for inspection and re-racking, and
 2. Replacement of all degraded gaskets in couplings.
- c. At least once per 3 years by:
 1. Partially opening each hose station valve to verify valve OPERABILITY and no flow blockage.
 2. Conducting a hose hydrostatic test at a pressure at least 50 psig greater than the maximum pressure available at that hose station or replacement with a new hose.

TABLE 3.7-6
FIRE HOSE STATIONS
UNIT 2

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>ELEVATION</u>	<u>NUMBER OF HOSE STATIONS</u>	
1. Containment	10'	2	
	45'	2	
	69'	2	
2. Auxiliary Building	-15'*	1**	
	-10'*	2**	
	5'	3	
	27'	2	
	45'	4	
	69 ⁿ *	3	
3. Turbine Building, Heater Bay Outside Service Water Pump Rooms and Aux Feedwater Pump Rooms	12'	2	
	Outside Switchgear Room	27'	1
	Outside Switchgear Room	45'	2
	4. Intake Structure	10'*	1

*Fire Hose Stations required for primary protection to ensure the OPERABILITY of safety related equipment.

**Hose Stations which serve both Units 1 and 2.

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