DCS-MS-016

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Chairman, ASLAB
Gray File-4
E. REEVES
J. SHUM
M. FIELDS W. PASSAGAG

Docket Nos. 50-317
and 50-318

Mr. A. E. Lundvall, Jr.
Vice President-Supply
Baltimore Gas & Electric Company
P. O. Box 1475
Baltimore, Maryland 21203

Dear Mr. Lundvall:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 65 and 47 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-53 and DPR-69 for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, 2. These amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated December 7, 1981.

These amendments to the Technical Specification address the operability and test requirements for the containment purge intake and exhaust isolation valves.

With issuance of these license amendments, we have concluded our review of the generic concerns relating to the purging and venting of the Calvert Cliffs containments. In addition, we have concluded our review of Item II.E.4.2, "Containment Isolation Dependability," of NUREG-0737. With regard to Item II.E.4.2(5), "Minimum Containment Pressure Setpoint," of NUREG-0737, our evaluation presented in Enclosure 6 of our letter of October 29, 1981 provided a limit of 3.0 psias a limit on setpoint margin to account for total loop error. This margin is a maximum value. Our position remains that the containment pressure setpoint that initiates containment isolation for nonessential system containment vessel penetrations be at, or reduced to, the minimum compatible with normal operating conditions. We therefore request that you implement your commitment, as presented in your letter of December 30, 1980, to set the containment isolation signal (CIS) setpoint at 2.8 psig, or the minimum value compatible with normal operating conditions within 30 days following recipt of this letter. It is our position, however, that no additional margin is required for this setpoint (i.e. the setpoint need not be established below 2.8 psig to assure that this setpoint is not exceeded).

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PDR ADOCK 05000317
P PDR

II.E.4.2
B-24 LEAD PM
ORB #1
EReeves
1/19/82

no legal objection to FR Notice Amend only

OFFICE	ORB#3:DL	ORB#3:DL	ORB#3:DL	ORB:AD	OELD	CSB	CSB
SURNAME	PMKreutzer	DJaffe/dd	RAClark	TNovak		D. Shum	MFields
DATE	1/18/82	1/19/82	1/19/82	1/21/82	1/25/82	1/19/82	1/19/82

Copies of our Safety Evaluation and the Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

David H. Jaffe, Project Manager
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 65 to DPR-53
2. Amendment No. 47 to DPR-69
3. Safety Evaluation
4. Notice of Issuance

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

OFFICE ▶							
SURNAME ▶							
DATE ▶							

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

DISTRIBUTION:
Docket File
ORB#3 Rdg
PMKreutzer

Docket No. 50-317/318

Docketing and Service Section
Office of the Secretary of the Commission

SUBJECT: BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units Nos. 1 and 2

Two signed originals of the Federal Register Notice identified below are enclosed for your transmittal to the Office of the Federal Register for publication. Additional conformed copies (12) of the Notice are enclosed for your use.

☐ Notice of Receipt of Application for Construction Permit(s) and Operating License(s).

☐ Notice of Receipt of Partial Application for Construction Permit(s) and Facility License(s): Time for Submission of Views on Antitrust Matters.

☐ Notice of Availability of Applicant's Environmental Report.

☐ Notice of Proposed Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License.

☐ Notice of Receipt of Application for Facility License(s); Notice of Availability of Applicant's Environmental Report; and Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Facility License(s) and Notice of Opportunity for Hearing.

☐ Notice of Availability of NRC Draft/Final Environmental Statement.

☐ Notice of Limited Work Authorization.

☐ Notice of Availability of Safety Evaluation Report.

☐ Notice of Issuance of Construction Permit(s).

☐ Notice of Issuance of Facility Operating License(s) or Amendment(s).

☒ Other: Amendment Nos. 65 and 47.
Referenced documents have been provided PDR.

Division of Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:
As Stated

OFFICE→	ORB#3:DL					
SURNAME→	PMKreutzer/pn					
DATE→	2/ 1 /82					

NRC FORM 102 7—79

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

February 1, 1982

Docket Nos. 50-317
and 50-318

Mr. A. E. Lundvall, Jr.
Vice President-Supply
Baltimore Gas & Electric Company
P. O. Box 1475
Baltimore, Maryland 21203

Dear Mr. Lundvall:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 65 and 47 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-53 and DPR-69 for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. These amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated December 7, 1981.

These amendments to the Technical Specifications address the operability and test requirements for the containment purge intake and exhaust isolation valves.

With issuance of these license amendments, we have concluded our review of the generic concerns relating to the purging and venting of the Calvert Cliffs containments. In addition, we have concluded our review of Item II.E.4.2, "Containment Isolation Dependability," of NUREG-0737. With regard to Item II.E.4.2(5), "Minimum Containment Pressure Setpoint," of NUREG-0737, our evaluation presented in Enclosure 6 of our letter of October 20, 1981 provided a limit of 3.0 psi as a limit on setpoint margin to account for total loop error. This margin is a maximum value. Our position remains that the containment pressure setpoint that initiates containment isolation for nonessential system containment vessel penetrations be at, or reduced to, the minimum compatible with normal operating conditions. We therefore request that you implement your commitment, as presented in your letter of December 30, 1980, to set the containment isolation signal (CIS) setpoint at 2.8 psig, or the minimum value compatible with normal operating conditions within 30 days following receipt of this letter. It is our position, however, that no additional margin is required for this setpoint (i.e. the setpoint need not be established below 2.8 psig to assure that this setpoint is not exceeded).

Copies of our Safety Evaluation and the Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

David H. Jaffe, Project Manager
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 65 to DPR-53
2. Amendment No. 47 to DPR-69
3. Safety Evaluation
4. Notice of Issuance

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company

cc:
James A. Biddison, Jr.
General Counsel
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
P. O. Box 1475
Baltimore, MD 21203

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Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge
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Mr. R. C. L. Olson, Principal Engineer
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Mr. Leon B. Russell
Plant Superintendent
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
Maryland Routes 2 & 4
Lusby, MD 20657

Bechtel Power Corporation
Attn: Mr. J. C. Judd
Chief Nuclear Engineer
15740 Shady Grove Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20760

Combustion Engineering, Inc.
Attn: Mr. P. W. Kruse, Manager
Engineering Services
P. O. Box 500
Windsor, CT 06095

Public Document Room
Calvert County Library
Prince Frederick, MD 20678

Director, Department of State Planning
301 West Preston Street
Baltimore, MD 21201

Mr. R. M. Douglass, Manager
Quality Assurance Department
Fort Smallwood Road Complex
P. O. Box 1475
Baltimore, MD 21203

Mr. T. L. Syndor, General Supervisor
Operations Quality Assurance
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
Maryland Routes 2 & 4
Lusby, MD 20657

Ms. Mary Harrison, President
Calvert County Board of County Commissioners
Prince Frederick, MD 20768

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Region III Office
Attn: Regional Radiation Representative
Curtis Building (Sixth Floor)
Sixth and Walnut Streets
Philadelphia, PA 19106

Mr. Ralph E. Architzel
Resident Reactor Inspector
NRC Inspection and Enforcement
P. O. Bos 437
Lusby, MD 20657

Mr. Charles B. Brinkman
Manager - Washington Nuclear Operations
Combustion Engineering, Inc.
4853 Cordell Avenue, Suite A-1
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Mr. W. J. Lippold, Supervisor
Nuclear Fuel Management
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P. O. Box 1475
Baltimore, Maryland 21203

Mr. R. E. Denton, General Supervisor
Training & Technical Services
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
Maryland Routes 2 & 4
Lusby, MD 20657

cc w/enclosure(s) and incoming
dated: 12/7/81

Administrator, Power Plant Siting Program
Energy and Coastal Zone Administration
Department of Natural Resources
Tawes State Office Building
Annapolis, MD 21204

Regional Administrator
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-317

CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 65
License No. DPR-53

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Baltimore Gas & Electric Company (the licensee) dated December 7, 1981, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-53 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 65, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Robert A. Clark, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the
Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 1, 1982

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 65

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-53

DOCKET NO. 50-317

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

Pages

3-13
3/4 6-9a (new)
3/4 6-18
3/4 6-19
3/4 6-20
3/4 6-21
3/4 6-22
3/4 6-23
3/4 6-24
3/4 6-25

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
6. CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVES ISOLATION ##					
a. Manual (Purge Valve Control Switches)	2/Penetration	1/Penetration	2/Penetration	5, 6	8
b. Containment Radiation - High Area Monitor	4	2	3	6	8
7. LOSS OF POWER					
a. 4.16 kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage)	4/Bus	2/Bus	3/Bus	1, 2, 3	7*
b. 4.16 kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage)	4/Bus	2/Bus	3/Bus	1, 2, 3	7*

Containment purge valve isolation is also initiated by SIAS (functional units 1.a, 1.b, and 1.c).

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
8. CVCS ISOLATION					
a. Manual (CVCS Isolation Valve Control Switches)	1/Valve	1/Valve	1/Valve	1, 2, 3, 4	6
b. West Penetration Room/Letdown Heat Exchanger Room Pressure - High	4	2	3	1, 2, 3, 4	7*
9. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER					
a. Manual	2	1	2	1, 2, 3	6
b. Steam Generator Level - Low	4	2	3	1, 2, 3	7

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

b. Removing one wire from each of a dome, vertical and hoop tendon checked for lift off force and determining that over the entire length of the removed wire that:

1. The tendon wires are free of corrosion.

2. There are no changes in physical appearance of the sheathing filler grease.

3. A minimum tensile strength value of 240 Ksi (guaranteed ultimate strength of the tendon material) for at least three wire samples (one from each end and one at mid-length) cut from each removed wire. Failure of any one of the wire samples to meet the minimum tensile strength test is evidence of abnormal degradation of the containment structure.

4.6.1.6.2 End Anchorages and Adjacent Concrete Surfaces The structural integrity of the end anchorages and adjacent concrete surfaces shall be demonstrated by determining through inspection that no apparent changes have occurred in the visual appearance of the end anchorage concrete exterior surfaces or the concrete crack patterns adjacent to the end anchorages. Inspections of the concrete shall be performed during the Type A containment leakage rate tests (reference Specification 4.6.1.2) while the containment is at its maximum test pressure.

4.6.1.6.3 Liner Plate The structural integrity of the containment liner plate shall be determined during the shutdown for each Type A containment leakage rate test (reference Specification 4.6.1.2) by a visual inspection of the plate and verifying no apparent changes in appearance or other abnormal degradation.

4.6.1.6.4 Reports Any abnormal degradation of the containment structure detected during the above required tests and inspections shall be reported to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.1. This report shall include a description of the tendon condition, the condition of the concrete (especially at tendon anchorages), the inspection procedure, the tolerances on cracking, and the corrective actions taken.

CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.7 The containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves shall be closed by isolating air to the air operator and maintaining the solenoid air supply valve deenergized.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4

ACTION:

a. With one containment purge supply and/or one exhaust isolation valve open, close the open valve(s) within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. With one containment purge supply valve inoperable due to high leakage, repair the valve(s) within 24 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.7 The 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves shall be determined closed at least once per 31 days, by verifying that power to the solenoid valve is removed.

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.2.1 Two independent containment spray systems shall be OPERABLE with each spray system capable of taking suction from the RWT on a Containment Spray Actuation Signal and Safety Injection Actuation Signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a Recirculation Actuation Signal. Each spray system flow path from the containment sump shall be via an OPERABLE shutdown cooling heat exchanger.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3*.

ACTION:

With one containment spray system inoperable, restore the inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.2.1 Each containment spray system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by:

1. Verifying that upon a Recirculation Actuation Test Signal, the containment sump isolation valves open and that a recirculation mode flow path via an OPERABLE shutdown cooling heat exchanger is established.

2. Verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path is positioned to take suction from the RWT on a Containment Pressure-High test signal.

*With pressurizer pressure $\geq$ 1750 psia.

3/4.6.4 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.4.1 The containment isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE with isolation times as shown in Table 3.6-1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the isolation valve(s) specified in Table 3.6-1 inoperable, either:

a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or

b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or

c. Isolate the affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange; or

d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.4.1.1 The isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of a cycling test and verification of isolation time.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.6.4.1.2 Each isolation valve specified in Table 3.6-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by:

a. Verifying that on each containment isolation Channel A or Channel B test signal, each required isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

b. Verifying that on each Containment Radiation-High Test Channel A or Channel B test signal, both required containment purge valves actuate to their isolation position.

c. Verifying that on each Safety Injection Actuation Channel A or Channel B test signal, each required isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

4.6.4.1.3 The isolation time of each power operated or automatic valve of Table 3.6-1 shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Technical Specification 4.0.5.

4.6.4.1.4 Containment purge isolation valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once every 6 months by verifying that when the measured leakage rate is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Technical Specification 4.6.1.2.d for all other Type B or C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less than or equal to 0.60 La. The leakage rate for the containment purge isolation valves shall also be compared to the previously measured leakage rate to detect excessive valve degradation.

TABLE 3.6-1

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

PENETRATION NO.	ISOLATION CHANNEL	ISOLATION VALVE IDENTIFICATION NO.	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME (SECONDS)
1A	SIAS A	CV-5465	R.C. and Pressurizer Sampling	≤7
	SIAS A	CV-5466		≤7
	SIAS A	CV-5467		≤7
	SIAS B	CV-5464		≤7
1B	SIAS A	CV-2180	Containment Vent Header to Waste Gas	≤7
	SIAS B	CV-2181		≤7
1C	SIAS A	CV-506	RCP Seals Controlled Bleedoff	≤7
	SIAS B	CV-505		≤7
1D	SIAS B	SV-6529	Oxygen Sample	≤7
2A	SIAS A	CV-515	Letdown Line	≤13
	SIAS B	CV-516		≤13
	NA	7M3-1		NA
	NA	7M3-1		NA
2B	NA	CV-517	Charging Line	NA
	NA	CV-518		NA
	NA	CV-519		NA
	NA	SP-210M3-2		NA
	NA	210M3-2		NA

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

PENETRATION NO.	ISOLATION CHANNELS	ISOLATION VALVE IDENTIFICATION NO.	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME (SECONDS)
7A	NA NA	Blind Flange 19-1	ILRT	NA NA
7B	NA NA	Blind Flange 19-1	ILRT	NA NA
8	SIAS A SIAS B	MOV-5462 MOV-5463	Containment Normal Sump	≤13 ≤13
9	NA NA	238M3-1 238M3-2	Containment Spray	NA NA
10	NA NA	238M3-1 238M3-2	Containment Spray	NA NA
13	SIAS A, CRS A SIAS B, CRS B	CV-1410 (3) CV-1411 (3)	Purge Air Inlet	≤7** ≤7**

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

PENETRATION NO.	ISOLATION CHANNELS	ISOLATION VALVE IDENTIFICATION NO.	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME (SECONDS)
14	SIAS A, CRS A SIAS B, CRS B	CV-1412 (3) CV-1413 (3)	Purge Air Outlet	≤7** ≤7**
15	SIAS A SIAS B	CV-5291 CV-5292	Purge Air Monitor	≤7 ≤7
16	CIS A	CV-3832	Component Cooling Water Inlet	≤18
18	CIS B	CV-3833	Component Cooling Water Outlet	≤18
19A	NA CIS A	223-1 MOV-2080	Instrument Air	NA ≤13
19B	NA NA	19-2 * 130-1 *	Plant Air	NA NA
20A	NA NA NA NA NA	223-1 CV-612 * CV-622 * CV-632 * CV-642 *	Nitrogen Supply	NA NA NA NA NA

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

PENETRATION NO.	ISOLATION CHANNEL	ISOLATION VALVE IDENTIFICATION NO.	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME (SECONDS)
20B	NA NA	223-1 223-2	Nitrogen Supply	NA NA
20C	NA NA	223-1 223-2	Nitrogen Supply	NA NA
23	SIAS A	CV-4260	R.C. Drain Tank Drains	≤ 7
24	SIAS B	SV-6531	Oxygen Sample Line	≤ 7
37	NA NA	29-1 142-1	Plant Water	NA NA
38	NA	CV-5460 *	Demineralized Water	NA
39	NA NA	130M3-1 130M3-2	Safety Injection Tank Test Line	NA NA
41	NA NA	MOV-652 (2) MOV-651 (2)	Shutdown Cooling	NA NA

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

PENETRATION NO.	ISOLATION CHANNEL	ISOLATION VALVE IDENTIFICATION NO.	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME (SECONDS)
44	NA NA NA	238-1 238-1 MOV-6200 *	Fire Protection	NA NA NA
47A	NA NA	SV-6540A SV-6507A	Hydrogen Sample Outlet	NA NA
47B	NA NA	SV-6540E SV-6507E	Hydrogen Sample Outlet	NA NA
47C	NA NA	SV-6540F SV-6507F	Hydrogen Sample Outlet	NA NA
47D	NA NA	SV-6540G SV-6507G	Hydrogen Sample Return	NA NA
48A	NA NA	MOV-6900 MOV-6901	Hydrogen Purge Outlet	NA NA

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

PENETRATION NO.	ISOLATION CHANNEL	ISOLATION VALVE IDENTIFICATION NO.	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME (SECONDS)
48B	NA NA	238-1 MOV-6903	Hydrogen Purge Inlet	NA NA
49A	NA NA	SV-6540B SV-6507B	Hydrogen Sample	NA NA
49B	NA NA	SV-6540C SV-6507C	Hydrogen Sample	NA NA
49C	NA NA	SV-6540D SV-6507D	Hydrogen Sample	NA NA
50	NA NA	Blind Flange Blind Flange	ILRT	NA NA
59	NA NA	29M3-1 29M3-1	Refueling Pool Inlet	NA NA
60	NA NA	130-2 19-1	Steam to Reactor Head Laydown	NA NA

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

PENETRATION NO.	ISOLATION CHANNEL	ISOLATION VALVE IDENTIFICATION NO.	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME (SECONDS)
61	NA NA NA NA	76Y-1 293M-1 293M-1 293M-1	Refueling Pool Outlet	NA NA NA NA
62	SIAS A	MOV-6579	Containment Heating Outlet	≤13
64	NA	238-1	Containment Heating Inlet	NA

(1) Manual or remote manual valve which is closed during plant operation.

(2) May be opened below 300°F to establish shutdown cooling flow.

(3) Containment purge isolation valves will be shut in MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 per TS 3/4 6.1.7.

* May be open on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

** Containment purge isolation valves isolation times will only apply for MODES 5 and 6 during which time these valves may be opened. Isolation time is NA for MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 per TS 3/4 6.1.7 during which time these valves must remain closed.

3/4.6.5 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL

HYDROGEN ANALYZERS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.5.1 Two independent containment hydrogen analyzers shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

With one hydrogen analyzer inoperable*, restore the inoperable analyzer to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.5.1 Each hydrogen analyzer shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION using sample gases containing:

a. Zero volume percent hydrogen, balance nitrogen, and

b. Three volume percent hydrogen, balance nitrogen.

* Until August 1, 1982, one hydrogen analyzer may be made inoperable, at any given time, for the purpose of performing modifications relating to TMI Action Plan Item II.F.1.6. During this time, Specification 3.0.4 is not applicable to this requirement.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-318

CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 47
License No. DPR-69

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Baltimore Gas & Electric Company (the licensee) dated December 7, 1981, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-69 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 47 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Robert A. Clark, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the
Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 1, 1982

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 47

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-69

DOCKET NO. 50-318

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

Pages

3-13
3/4 6-9a (new)
3/4 6-18
3/4 6-19
3/4 6-20
3/4 6-21
3/4 6-22
3/4 6-23
3/4 6-24
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TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
6. CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVES ISOLATION ##					
a. Manual (Purge Valve Control Switches)	2/Penetration	1/Penetration	2/Penetration	5, 6	8
b. Containment Radiation - High Area Monitor	4	2	3	6	8
7. LOSS OF POWER					
a. 4.16 kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage	4/Bus	2/Bus	3/Bus	1, 2, 3	7*
b. 4.16 kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage)	4/Bus	2/Bus	3/Bus	1, 2, 3	7*

Containment purge valve isolation is also initiated by SIAS (functional units 1.a, 1.b, and 1.c).

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
8. CVCS ISOLATION					
a. Manual (CVCS Isolation Valve Control Switches)	1/Valve	1/Valve	1/Valve	1, 2, 3, 4	6
b. West Penetration Room/Letdown Heat Exchanger Room Pressure - High	4	2	3	1, 2, 3, 4	7*
9. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER					
a. Manual	2	1	2	1, 2, 3	6
b. Steam Generator Level - Low	4	2	3	1, 2, 3	7

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.6.1.6.3 Liner Plate The structural integrity of the containment liner plate shall be determined during the shutdown for each Type A containment leakage rate test (reference Specification 4.6.1.2) by a visual inspection of the plate and verifying no apparent changes in appearance or other abnormal degradation.

4.6.1.6.4 Reports Any abnormal degradation of the containment structure detected during the above required tests and inspections shall be reported to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.1. This report shall include a description of the tendon condition, the condition of the concrete (especially at tendon anchorages), the inspection procedure, the tolerances on cracking, and the corrective actions taken.

CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.7 The containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves shall be closed by isolating air to the air operator and maintaining the solenoid air supply valve deenergized.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4

ACTION:

a. With one containment purge supply and/or one exhaust isolation valve open, close the open valve(s) within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. With one containment purge supply valve inoperable due to high leakage, repair the valve(s) within 24 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.7 The 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves shall be determined closed at least once per 31 days, by verifying that power to the solenoid valve is removed.

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.2.1 Two independent containment spray systems shall be OPERABLE with each spray system capable of taking suction from the RWT on a Containment Spray Actuation Signal and Safety Injection Actuation Signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a Recirculation Actuation Signal. Each spray system flow path from the containment sump shall be via an OPERABLE shutdown cooling heat exchanger.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3*.

ACTION:

With one containment spray system inoperable, restore the inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.2.1 Each containment spray system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by:

1. Verifying that upon a Recirculation Actuation Test Signal, the containment sump isolation valves open and that a recirculation mode flow path via an OPERABLE shutdown cooling heat exchanger is established.

2. Verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path is positioned to take suction from the RWT on a Containment Pressure-High test signal.

*With pressurizer pressure $\geq$ 1750 psia.

3/4.6.4 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.4.1 The containment isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE with isolation times as shown in Table 3.6-1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the isolation valve(s) specified in Table 3.6-1 inoperable, either:

a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or

b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or

c. Isolate the affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange; or

d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.4.1.1 The isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of a cycling test and verification of isolation time.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.6.4.1.2 Each isolation valve specified in Table 3.6-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by:

a. Verifying that on each containment isolation Channel A or Channel B test signal, each required isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

b. Verifying that on each Containment Radiation-High Test Channel A or Channel B test signal, both required containment purge valves actuate to their isolation position.

c. Verifying that on each Safety Injection Actuation Channel A or Channel B test signal, each required isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

4.6.4.1.3 The isolation time of each power operated or automatic valve of Table 3.6-1 shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Technical Specification 4.0.5.

4.6.4.1.4 Containment purge isolation valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once every 6 months by verifying that when the measured leakage rate is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Technical Specification 4.6.1.2.d for all other Type B or C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less than or equal to 0.60 La. The leakage rate for the containment purge isolation valves shall also be compared to the previously measured leakage rate to detect excessive valve degradation.

TABLE 3.6-1

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

PENETRATION NO.	ISOLATION CHANNEL	ISOLATION VALVE IDENTIFICATION NO.	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME (SECONDS)
1A	SIAS A	CV-5465	R.C. and Pressurizer Sampling	≤7
	SIAS A	CV-5466		
	SIAS A	CV-5467		
	SIAS B	CV-5464		
1B	SIAS A	CV-2180	Containment Vent Header to Waste Gas	≤7
	SIAS B	CV-2181		≤7
1C	SIAS A	CV-506	RCP Seals Controlled Bleedoff	≤7
	SIAS B	CV-505		≤7
1D	SIAS B	SV-6529	Oxygen Sample	≤7
2A	SIAS A	CV-515	Letdown Line	≤13
	SIAS B	CV-516		≤13
	NA	7M3-1		NA
	NA	7M3-1		NA
2B	NA	CV-517	Charging Line	NA
	NA	CV-518		NA
	NA	CV-519		NA
	NA	SP-210M3-2		NA
	NA	210M3-2		NA

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

PENETRATION NO.	ISOLATION CHANNELS	ISOLATION VALVE IDENTIFICATION NO.	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME (SECONDS)
7A	NA NA	Blind Flange 19-1	ILRT	NA NA
7B	NA NA	Blind Flange 19-1	ILRT	NA NA
8	SIAS A SIAS B	MOV-5462 MOV-5463	Containment Normal Sump	≤13 ≤13
9	NA NA	238M3-1 238M3-2	Containment Spray	NA NA
10	NA NA	238M3-1 238M3-2	Containment Spray	NA NA
13	SIAS A, CRS A SIAS B, CRS B	CV-1410 (3) CV-1411 (3)	Purge Air Inlet	≤7** ≤7**

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

PENETRATION NO.	ISOLATION CHANNELS	ISOLATION VALVE IDENTIFICATION NO.	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME (SECONDS)
14	SIAS A, CRS A SIAS B, CRS B	CV-1412 (3) CV-1413 (3)	Purge Air Outlet	≤7** ≤7**
15	SIAS A SIAS B	CV-5291 CV-5292	Purge Air Monitor	≤7 ≤7
16	CIS A	CV-3832	Component Cooling Water Inlet	≤18
18	CIS B	CV-3833	Component Cooling Water Outlet	≤18
19A	NA CIS A	223-1 MOV-2080	Instrument Air	NA ≤13
19B	NA NA	19-2 * 130-1 *	Plant Air	NA NA
20A	NA NA NA NA NA	223-1 CV-612 * CV-622 * CV-632 * CV-642 *	Nitrogen Supply	NA NA NA NA NA

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

PENETRATION NO.	ISOLATION CHANNEL	ISOLATION VALVE IDENTIFICATION NO.	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME (SECONDS)
20B	NA NA	223-1 223-2	Nitrogen Supply	NA NA
20C	NA NA	223-1 223-2	Nitrogen Supply	NA NA
23	SIAS A	CV-4260	R.C. Drain Tank Drains	≤ 7
24	SIAS B	SV-6531	Oxygen Sample Line	≤ 7
37	NA NA	29-1 142-1	Plant Water	NA NA
38	NA	CV-5460 *	Demineralized Water	NA
39	NA NA	130M3-1 130M3-2	Safety Injection Tank Test Line	NA NA
41	NA NA	MOV-652 (2) MOV-651 (2)	Shutdown Cooling	NA NA

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

PENETRATION NO.	ISOLATION CHANNEL	ISOLATION VALVE IDENTIFICATION NO.	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME (SECONDS)
44	NA NA NA	238-1 238-1 MOV-6200 *	Fire Protection	NA NA NA
47A	NA NA	SV-6540A SV-6507A	Hydrogen Sample Outlet	NA NA
47B	NA NA	SV-6540E SV-6507E	Hydrogen Sample Outlet	NA NA
47C	NA NA	SV-6540F SV-6507F	Hydrogen Sample Outlet	NA NA
47D	NA NA	SV-6540G SV-6507G	Hydrogen Sample Return	NA NA
48A	NA NA	MOV-6900 MOV-6901	Hydrogen Purge Outlet	NA NA

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

PENETRATION NO.	ISOLATION CHANNEL	ISOLATION VALVE IDENTIFICATION NO.	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME (SECONDS)
48B	NA NA	238-1 MOV-6903	Hydrogen Purge Inlet	NA NA
49A	NA NA	SV-6540B SV-6507B	Hydrogen Sample	NA NA
49B	NA NA	SV-6540C SV-6507C	Hydrogen Sample	NA NA
49C	NA NA	SV-6540D SV-6507D	Hydrogen Sample	NA NA
50	NA NA	Blind Flange Blind Flange	ILRT	NA NA
59	NA NA	29M3-1 29M3-1	Refueling Pool Inlet	NA NA
60	NA NA	130-2 19-1	Steam to Reactor Head Laydown	NA NA

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

PENETRATION NO.	ISOLATION CHANNEL	ISOLATION VALVE IDENTIFICATION NO.	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME (SECONDS)
61	NA	76Y-1	Refueling Pool Outlet	NA
	NA	293M-1		NA
	NA	293M-1		NA
	NA	293M-1		NA
62	SIAS A	MOV-6579	Containment Heating Outlet	≤13
64	NA	238-1	Containment Heating Inlet	NA

(1) Manual or remote manual valve which is closed during plant operation.

(2) May be opened below 300°F to establish shutdown cooling flow.

(3) Containment purge isolation valves will be shut in MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 per TS 3/4 6.1.7.

* May be open on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

** Containment purge isolation valves isolation times will only apply for MODES 5 and 6 during which time these valves may be opened. Isolation time is NA for MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 per TS 3/4 6.1.7 during which time these valves must remain closed.

3/4.6.5 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL

HYDROGEN ANALYZERS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.5.1 Two independent containment hydrogen analyzers shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

With one hydrogen analyzer inoperable*, restore the inoperable analyzer to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.5.1 Each hydrogen analyzer shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION using sample gases containing:

a. Zero volume percent hydrogen, balance nitrogen, and

b. Three volume percent hydrogen, balance nitrogen.

*Until August 1, 1982, one hydrogen analyzer may be made inoperable, at any given time, for the purpose of performing modifications relating to TMI Action Plan Item II.F.1.6. During this time, Specification 3.0.4 is not applicable to this requirement.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NOS. 65 AND 47 TO

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-53 AND DPR-69

BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-317 AND 50-318

Introduction

By application dated December 7, 1981, the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BG&E) requested changes in the Technical Specifications for Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2. The changes in the TS address the operability and test requirements for the containment purge intake and exhaust isolation valves. These requirements were submitted in response to our letter of October 20, 1981 which addressed generic concerns associated with containment purging and venting and the related issues of Item II.E.4.2, "Containment Isolation Dependability," of NUREG-0737, the TMI Action Plan. We herein present an evaluation of the status of the purge and vent issue, and Item II.E.4.2, for Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2, as reflected by the BG&E submittal of December 7, 1981.

In addition to issues associated with the above topics, BG&E has proposed additional requirements which address channel-specific surveillance requirements for containment isolation valves.

Discussion and Evaluation

In our letter of October 20, 1981, we indicated our concern that the Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 containment purge inlet and exhaust valves might not be capable of closing under post-LOCA conditions. In addition, we requested specific information concerning the ability of these 48", resilient seal, valves, to close under post-LOCA conditions.

In the BG&E submittal of December 7, 1981, the licensee indicated the purge air inlet and exhaust isolation valves were maintained in the closed position during plant operation, with air to the air operator isolated and the solenoid air supply valve deenergized. These measures effectively prevent operation of the valves and thus these valves would not be exposed to post-LOCA conditions when in the open position. Proposed TS 3.6.1.7 requires the purge supply and exhaust valves to be maintained in the closed position, with the air to the air operator isolated and the solenoid air supply valve deenergized, in all reactor operating modes except modes 5 and 6, cold shutdown and refueling modes, respectively. The corresponding surveillance requirement, proposed TS 4.6.1.7, requires that the purge supply and exhaust isolation valves be verified to be in the closed position at least once per 31 days.

Our review of the licensee's proposed TS 3.6.1.7 and 4.6.1.7 indicates substantial conformance with the model TS which were contained in our October 20, 1981 letter. In addition, the licensee has proposed changes to TS Table 3.3-3, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation," in order to provide consistency between the operational requirements for the containment purge valves, proposed TS 3.6.1.7, and their manual and high radiation actuation devices. We find these changes to be acceptable in that the actuation devices should not be required to be operable under conditions for which the actuated equipment is not required to be operable.

The proposed TS 3.6.1.7 and 4.6.1.7 effectively resolve our concerns regarding post-LOCA mechanical performance of the purge inlet and exhaust valves. Should BG&E desire to utilize the purge inlet and exhaust isolation valves during reactor operation, a submittal would be required which responds, at a minimum, to our request for information contained in Enclosure 3 of our letter of October 20, 1981. In addition, since the purge isolation valves are closed during reactor operation, our review of the adequecy of closure of these valves on high radiation is no longer required (Item II.E.4.2(7) of NUREG-0737). Our review of item II.E.4.2(7) will be reinitiated should BG&E desire to utilize the purge isolation valves during reactor operation.

An additional concern presented in our letter of October 20, 1981 involves the deterioration of the purge isolation valve resilient seals. In Enclosure 1 of our October 20, 1981 letter, we indicated that industry experience has shown some unsatisfactory performance associated with the resilient seal material utilized in containment purge isolation valves. We further indicated that purge isolation valves that are closed during reactor operation should be leak tested at least every six months. In addition, a requirement for periodic replacement of the purge valve seals should be established.

In response to the above concern, the BG&E submittal of December 7, 1981 proposed that the containment purge isolation valves be leak tested at least every six months. This test is described in proposed TS 4.6.4.1.4. In addition, proposed TS 4.6.4.1.3 requires that containment purge isolation valves, and all other specified isolation valves, be response time tested as part of the Inservice Test Program. With regard to replacement of the valve seals, the December 7, 1981 BG&E submittal indicates that no failure or unacceptable leakage of containment purge isolation valve seals has been observed. For this reason, no seal replacement program has been proposed.

We have reviewed the test methods described in Enclosure 5 of the licensee's December 7, 1981 submittal, and proposed TS 4.6.4.1.3 and TS 4.6.4.1.4 and find these to be acceptable. With regard to valve seal replacement, we conclude that as a result of acceptable valve seal performance at Calvert Cliffs, and due to a lack of guidance from the valve vendor, no seal replacement frequency can be established. Should seal failure occur, the six month test program to be established in conformance with TS 4.6.4.1.4 would detect such failure.

Should a purge isolation valve exhibit excessive leakage, TS 3.6.1.7 would require the leakage to be repaired within 24 hours or the reactor would be placed in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours. A period of 24 hours to perform repairs is justified due to the conservative nature of the purge isolation valve test. Since air is injected between the isolation valves, the air pressure tends to unseat the valves providing a conservative indication of valve leakage.

The licensee has further indicated that should a seal replacement recommendation be established by the purge isolation valve vendor, the licensee will evaluate this recommendation and propose a TS change, if appropriate.

Based upon the information presented in the December 7, 1981 submittal from BG&E, we conclude that the proposed Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements associated with the containment purge isolation valves provide resonable assurance that these valves will not compromise containment integrity. This evaluation satisfies our requirements concerning Item II.E.2.(6), "Containment Purge Valve operability, and Item II.E.2(8), "Containment Purge Valve Technical Specifications," of NUREG-0737. In addition our review of purge and vent issues for Calvert Cliffs is concluded.

The final issue addressed in the December 7, 1981 BG&E submittal relates to the testing of containment isolation valves via the various isolation signals. At the present time, TS 4.6.4.1.2 requires isolation valve testing via a containment isolation test signal and a containment high-radiation test signal. The proposed TS 4.6.4.1.2 provides for isolation valve testing via the following test signals: (1) containment isolation Channel A or Channel B, (2) containment high-radiation Channel A or Channel B, and (3) safety injection actuation Channel A or Channel B. The identification of the isolation valves, TS Table 3.6-1, is proposed for modification to include a description of the test signal and channel that actuates each valve. A clarifying note is also proposed for the containment purge and isolation valve entries of TS Table 3.6.-1 to indicate that the operability and isolation times for these valves are only applicable during reactor Modes 5 and 6, consistent with the material presented previously, herein. We have reviewed the proposed modifications to TS 4.6.4.1.2 and TS Table 3.6-1 and conclude that the proposed changes represent an improvement to the containment isolation valve surveillance requirements. The changes require the containment isolation valves to be tested via the function that would actuate these valves under accident conditions. Thus, the proposed changes increase the assurance that the containment isolation valves will automatically respond to the appropriate signals, when required.

Environmental Consideration

We have determined that the amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendments involve an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendments do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and do not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: February 1, 1982

Principal Contributor:
David Jaffe

7590-01

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NOS. 50-317 AND 318

BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO FACILITY

OPERATING LICENSES

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment Nos. 65 and 47 to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-53 and DPR-69, issued to Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units Nos. 1 and 2 located in Calvert County, Maryland. The amendments are effective as of the date of issuance.

The amendments to the Technical Specifications address the operability and test requirements for the containment purge intake and exhaust isolation valves.

The application for the amendments complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendments. Prior public notice of the amendments was not required since the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission has determined that the issuance of these amendments will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of the amendments.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated December 7, 1981, (2) Amendment Nos. 65 and 47 to License Nos. DPR-53 and DPR-69, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D.C. and at the Calvert County Library, Prince Frederick, Maryland. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Licensing.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 1st day of February, 1982.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Robert A. Clark, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Licensing