



AP1000 Pre-Certification Review Review of Applicability of AP600 Analysis Codes to AP1000

January 10, 2001 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Agenda



9:00 AP1000 Pre-Certification Review Overview	Mike Corletti
 9:45 AP1000 Plant Description Overview 	
• 10:30 LOFTRAN	Uriel Bachrach
 AP1000 Transient Analysis Results 	
 Code Documentation – Phase 2 	
• 11:15 NOTRUMP	Andre Gagnon
 AP1000 Small Break LOCA Results 	•
 Code Documentation – Phase 2 	
• 12:00 Lunch	
• 1:00 WCOBRA-TRAC	Robert Kemper
 AP1000 Long Term Cooling Analysis Results 	·
 Code Documentation – Phase 2 	
 Large Break LOCA Approach 	
• 1:30 WGOTHIC	Richard Ofstun
 AP1000 Containment Analysis Results 	
 Code Documentation – Phase 2 	
 2:00 Discussion of Logistics 	All

the the transfer to the transf



AP1000 Pre-Certification Review Overview

Mike Corletti Passive Plant Projects (412) 374-5355; corletmm@westinghouse.com



• OBJECTIVE

- Obtain agreement on how AP600 Certification can be used as a basis for AP1000 Design Certification
 - Improve efficiency of licensing process
 - Identify potential barriers to leveraging AP600 Certification to AP1000
- How do we plan on meeting this objective?
 - 3 Phase Approach Suggested by NRC
 - Phase 1 Identify issues to evaluate in Pre-certification review
 - Issues that potentially have a large impact on design certification licensing cost and schedule

- Phase 2 Pre-certification review of the issues identified
- Phase 3 Design Certification

Phase 1 Review Summary



- W identifed 5 items for NRC to consider
- NRC staff evaluated issues and identified an additional item
 - Provided a cost estimate to resolve each issue
 - Identified detailed technical issues that should be considered for each item
- ACRS provided 2 letters during Phase1 providing their insights and guidance
- W has selected which items to pursue under Phase 2
 - Two items deferred due to W budget constraints
 - Deferred items considered during Phase 3 Design Certification

(()



- 1. Sufficiency of AP600 Test Program to meet 10 CFR Part 52 requirements for AP1000
- 2. Applicability of NRC-approved AP600 analysis codes for AP1000 Design Certification
- 3. Acceptability of using Design Acceptance Criteria in selected areas
- 4. Applicability of Exemptions granted to AP600

Determinations in Phase 2 Test and Code Issues



- Determine the applicability of the AP600 Test Program to AP1000
- Determine applicability of AP600 codes and models for AP1000
- What does applicability mean?
 - Tests:
 - No additional tests are required to be performed by Westinghouse for AP1000 design certification
 - Codes:
 - Agreement on the basis for applying AP600 codes to AP1000 Design Certification

- Phase 2:
 - Determine the basis for applying AP600 codes to AP1000 Design Certification
 - AP1000 phenomena similar (or different) than AP600
 - AP600 tests scale similarly (or differently) to AP1000
 - AP1000 safety margins are similar (or different) than AP600
 - Based on these comparisons, specify in Phase 2 the required changes to safety analysis codes, models, or methodologies to be implemented for AP1000 in Phase 3

and the state of t

• Phase 3:

the first states of the second states of the second

- Review application of the codes to AP1000
 - Review and approve safety analysis results
 - Review and approve application of codes

W Deliverables in Phase 2 Tests and Code Issues



- AP1000 Plant Description and Analysis Report
 - Overview Plant Description
 - Emphasizes AP600 and AP1000 design differences
 - Design margins assessments
 - Safety Analysis Assessments
 - Preliminary AP1000 design information
 - NRC-approved AP600 analysis codes

Report provides the basis for Phase 2 review of AP1000 design features and safety margins

W Deliverables in Phase 2 Tests and Code Issues



- AP1000 Scaling Assessment and Analysis Plan
 - Applicability of AP600 Test Program to AP1000
 - Comparisons of AP600 and AP1000 PIRT
 - Scaling studies to compare scalability of test programs to AP600 / AP1000
 - Demonstrate AP600 Test Programs scale sufficiently in areas where scaling was the basis for acceptability of AP600 analysis codes
 - Applicability of AP600 Analysis Codes to AP1000
 - Acceptability of AP600 Analysis Codes
 - Acceptance of Codes for Operating Plants
 - Validation of AP600 Codes Against AP600 Test Program for passive plant design differences

 $(4, \dots, 4) = (1, \dots, 2) = (1, \dots, 2) = (1, \dots, 2)$

Large safety margins where appropriate

Report provides the basis for applicability of AP600 codes for AP1000

Objectives of this Meeting



- Consider what is necessary for Phase 2 applicability review
 - Determine schedule and logistics for additional review of AP600 codes for applicability to AP1000
 - Guidance taken from DG-1096
 - ACRS / NRC staff concerns that staff should "exercise" AP600 analysis codes
- Planned Deliverables
 - Analysis Codes and Code Documentation
 - Source codes and executable
 - AP1000 analysis models
 - Most code documentation previously submitted as part of AP600 Design Certification
 - Users Guides and Manuals



Approach for Code Review in Phase 2

- Basis for AP600 Acceptability
 - NUREG-1512 AP600 FSER
- AP1000 Design
 - Similarities and differences to AP600
- Scaling of AP600 Tests to AP1000
 - Confirm AP1000 scalability where scaling was important for code acceptance
- AP1000 safety margins
 - Confirm adequate margins where margins were important for code acceptability

NRC will exercise codes as necessary to assess applicability of approved AP600 codes to AP1000

Overview of Pre-Certification Review



- Phase 1 review identified significant issues to consider during pre-certification review
 - Identified major barriers to leveraging AP600 Certification to AP1000
- Phase 2 review to begin in February
 - Acceptability of AP600 Test Program
 - Acceptability of AP600 Analysis Codes
 - Determine the basis for their application to AP1000
 - AP600 analysis codes will be provided to the NRC as necessary for their review
- Phase 3 Design Certification
 - Review of AP1000 Application under guidelines agreed upon during Phase 2



AP1000 Plant Design Description Report Overview



AP600 Major Uprate - Objectives

- Increase Plant Power Rating to Reduce Cost
 - Obtain a capital cost that can compete in U.S. market \$900-1000/KW for nth twin plant
- Retain AP600 Objectives and Design Detail

- Retain AP600 Licensing Basis
- Retain AP600 Risk Basis

A 6 6 6 6

AP600 Major Uprate



- Design Approach
 - Increase the capability/capacity within "space constraints" of AP600
 - Meet regulatory requirements for Advanced Passive Plants
 - Retain credibility of "proven components"
 - Retain AP600 plant design (footprint)
 - Retain the basis for the cost estimate, construction schedule and modularization scheme



Comparison of Selected Parameters

PARAMETER	AP600	AP1000
Net Electric Output, MWe	610	1090
Reactor Power, MWt	1933	3400
Hot Leg Temperature, °F	600	615
Number of Fuel Assemblies	145	157
Type of Fuel Assembly	17x17	17x17
Active Fuel Length, ft	12	14
Linear Heat Rating, kw/ft	4.10	5.71
R/V I.D., inches	157	157
Steam Generator	∆75	∆125
Reactor Coolant Pump Flow, gpm	51,000	75,000
Pressurizer Volume, ft ³	1600	2100
Core Makeup Tanks # / Volume, ft ³	2 / 2000	2 / 2500
Containment Diameter / Height, ft	130 / 190	130 / 215

AP600 Major Uprate to 1000 MWe



- Select proven core design
 - Doel 3, Tihange 4
 - 3000 MWt
 - 14 ft active fuel length; 17x17 fuel
 - 157 fuel assemblies
 - 3400 MWt option using core power density similar to operating 3-loop plants
 - North Anna, V.C. Summer, Vandellos II, ASCO
- Size key NSSS components
 - Reactor Vessel/Head 3-Loop with reflector
 - Steam Generator Δ 125 similar to ANO replacement
 - Reactor Coolant Pump increase capacity
 - Pressurizer increase volume


Core Design

. (




AP600

AP1000



- Number of Fuel Assemblies Increased from 145 to 157
- Active fuel length increased from 12 ft to 14 ft



- Active fuel length increased from 12 ft to 14 ft
- Overall dimension same as South Texas fuel



Reactor Vessel Design Overview

- Reactor vessel
 - Maintains key AP600 design features
 - No bottom-mounted instrumentation
 - 60 year design life
 - Longer to accommodate longer fuel assemblies
- Lower internals


(


- AP600-type internals
- Lower core support plate thickness increased to accommodate heavier fuel
- Integrated Head Package
 - Modified to accommodate longer fuel
 - Additional control rods

Reactor Vessel

with Integrated Head Package

AP600








Steam Generator




- Δ 125 Steam Generator
 - Based on W / CE Designs
 - ∆75 Standard Replacement SG for Model F - AP600
 - △94 South Texas Replacement SG
 - ANO (Arkansas) Replacement SG
 - 1500 MWt per SG
 - Inconel 690 thermally treated tubes
 - Inconel 690 TT tubes



Steam Generator





(1) - S/G DUTLET NOZZLE TO RCP CASING WELD




- AP600 RCP based on proven motor design
- Increase capacity for AP1000
 - AP1000 higher power density core requires longer flow coast down more pump inertia
 - Pump flow requirements increased to accommodate higher core power
- Impacts to pump design minimized
 - Use motor rating at hot coolant condition
 - Variable speed controller added to reduce motor power in cold coolant conditions

- Use high-efficiency hydraulics scaled from Tsuruga 3/4
- Canned motor similar to AP600 size

Reactor Coolant Pump





Parameter	<u>AP600</u>	<u>AP1000</u>
Design Flow, gpm	51,000	75,000
Design Head, ft	240	350
Rotating Inertia, lb-ft ²	5,000	15,000
Motor Rating, Hp	3200	6000

AP600 AP1000 EL. 170'-9.51" EL. 159'-5.7" øÅc 50'-7.11" 30, M σ M Ы EL. 107'-2"

• Pressurizer volume increased from 1600 ft³ to 2100 ft³

Pressurizer

{

Passive Safety Systems Resized for AP100

- AP1000 Design Approach
 - Maintain safety margins
 - Consider both deterministic and probabilistic criteria
 - Meet deterministic safety criteria
 - Maintain PRA success criteria
 - Level 1 and Level 2
 - Maintain AP600 configuration / arrangements
 - Design changes only to address increased core power



AP1000 Passive Core Cooling System


IRWST

1

- System Configuration Retained
- Capacities Increased to Accommodate Higher Power
 - CMT Increased 25%
 - IRWST Injection Increased 84%
 - Sump Recirculation Increased 131%
 - ADS 4 Increased 89%
 - PRHR HX Capacity Increased 72%
- System Performance Assessed
 - No core uncovery for SBLOCA
 - DVI line break

1

• Large margin to PCT limit expected



AP1000 Passive Containment Cooling




Containment

Height increased 25 feet Natural convection air discharge Volume increased 20% PCCS gravity drain water tank Design pressure increased Water film evaporation PCS Capacity Increased Outside cooling air intake Higher flow rate / tank capacity Internal condensation and Steel containment vessel natural recirculation **AP1000 DECL LOCA Containment Pressure** Response Air baffle **Containment Pressure** 80 Design Pressure 70 (psia) 60 50 40 30 10 1000 100 10000 Time (sec)

Containment Vessel

() (






and the second of the second of the second second

PCS Water Storage Tank



AP600

AP1000




• Passive Containment Cooling Water Storage Tank volume increased from 519,000 to 800,000 gallons

Passive Decay Heat Removal

ţ ,

1 1




and the second second

Passive RHR Heat Exchanger



AP600




AP1000

• PRHR Heat Transfer Capacity Increased 72%




AP1000 Passive Safety Injection



ne a ser en la ser (ε τη χρηγια en en en traverse forse (ε U. 2.) en en en en

Accumulators






• Accumulator volume is 2000 ft³ for both plant designs



Core Makeup Tanks




- Core Makeup Tank volume and flow rate is increased 25%
 - 2000 to 2500ft³

and the second second second second

• Maintains AP600 margins for multiple failure events


Comparison of IRWST Injection/DVI Line








Comparison of 4th Stage ADS



AP1000



AP600

and the second second


AP1000 General Arrangement

Plan at Elevation 135'



AP600

AP1000




AP1000 General Arrangement

Containment Section View

AP600

AP1000

en presenta de la construcción de l







Preliminary AP1000 Transient Analyses Using LOFTRAN Codes

Uriel Bachrach Senior Engineer Containment and Radiological Analysis (412) 374-4454; bachrau@westinghouse.com



- Non LOCA Events
 - Loss of forced reactor coolant flow
 - Loss of AC Power to the plant auxiliaries
 - Loss of Normal Feedwater Flow
 - Feedline Rupture
- Steam Generator Tube Rupture

Non LOCA and SGTR Analyses



Support and verify the following:

- Demonstrate Acceptable DNB Margin
 - Reactor coolant pump coast down
- Demonstrate RCS Heat Removal
 - Passive RHR Heat Exchanger
 - Steam Generator Inventory
- Pressurizer Performance
 - Margin to overfill
- Interaction Between Passive Systems

Complete Loss RCS Flow



- Same assumptions and methods as AP600
 - Revised Thermal Design Procedure
 - Rod Drop Times → Longer
 - Longer Fuel
 - Higher RCS Flow
 - Pump Coastdown → Longer
 - Pump inertia increased by a factor of 3 over AP600 / EP1000

Acceptance Criteria

- RCS and SG pressures < 110% of Nominal
- DNBR within acceptable limits

Complete Loss RCS Flow Sequence of Events



Preliminary analysis show DNBR margin is similar for both plants

	AP1000	AP600
DNBR Limit (typical cell)	1.24	1.24
Minimum DNBR	1.447	1.484
DNBR Margin	13.6%	15.8%
Mass Flow (Ibm/hr-ft ²)	1.11 x 10 ⁶	0.78 x 10 ⁶



- AP600 mass velocity below limit of WRB-2 correlation (<0.9x10⁶ lbm/ft²-hr)
 - DNB testing conducted
 - Multiplier developed to extend WRB-2 to lower flows
- AP1000 mass velocity above limit of WRB-2 correlation
 - Higher initial reactor coolant flow
 - Increased reactor coolant pump inertia
 - WRB-2 correlation can be applied with no penalty

and the following the following the following the following following following the following following

Complete Loss RCS Flow DNBR Correlation



- Revised Thermal Design Procedure (RTDP) used in conjunction with WRB-2 to calculate DNBR
- RTDP Quality limit of 25% exceeded for AP1000
- Existing test data available to extend RTDP application of WRB-2 for higher quality
 - Tests used to develop WRB-2 performed for quality up to 35%, but not used in formulating correlation
 - Extension of correlation planned prior to Design Certification of AP1000

Complete Loss RCS Flow Transient

1 7

. + t f

1 (



AP600 AP1000 1.2 Core Mass Flow (Fraction of Initial) .8 .6 .4 .2 0 -, Ż 6 8 10 Time (s)

1 1 1

A CONTRACT OF


τ

Loss of AC Power




- Same assumptions and methods as AP600
- Acceptance Criteria
 - RCS and SG pressures < 110% of Nominal
 - No Fuel Failure
 - No Pressurizer Overfilling

Loss of AC Power - Transient



Loss of AC Power - Transient







Loss of AC Power - Transient

(i (v


1 1

(()

4

(

1 1 1 1



1 1 1 L

Loss of Normal Feedwater



- Same assumptions and methods as AP600
- Transient similar to Loss of AC Power
- Acceptance Criteria
 - RCS and SG pressures < 110% of Nominal
 - No Fuel Failure
 - No Pressurizer Overfilling
- Results and phenomena similar to Loss of AC Power

Feedline Rupture




- Same assumptions and methods as AP600
- Acceptance Criteria
 - Feedline Break is a Condition IV event
 - Heat Transfer Capability (SG + PRHR) must assure

the transformation to the term of term

- RCS and SG pressures < 110% of Nominal
- Core Cooling


Feedline Rupture - Comparison






Feedline Rupture - Comparison





57

Feedline Rupture - Comparison





Transient Analysis Conclusions

- The transients analyzed show that the AP1000 plant response is very similar to AP600
- Large pressurizer steam volume and steam generator inventory provides margin for initial portion of the transients analyzed (before PRHR actuation)
- PRHR heat transfer increase assures the residual heat removal function and provides RCS cooldown and depressurization similar to AP600
- CMTs provides RCS boration following the RCS cooldown

the the construction of the the termination of the second se

• Safety margins are equivalent to AP600

Steam Generator Tube Rupture



- The purpose of the SGTR analysis performed is to demonstrate the ability of the passive safety systems to mitigate the consequences
 - Offsite doses within acceptable limits



Steam Generator Tube Rupture


- Response similar to AP600
 - Passive systems terminate break flow
- Increased releases resulting from higher power
 - Consistent with results of uprating operating plants

Plant	Time Break Flow Flashing Stops	Total Flashed Break Flow After Trip	Total Ruptured SG Steam Releases After Trip	Total Break Flow
AP1000	000 3407 sec 7351.0 324600 lbn		324600 lbm	427300 lbm
AP600	3216 sec	5052.4 lbm	144800 lbm	264900 lbm

and the state of t

SGTR - Transient






SGTR - Transient

A CARLER AND A CARLER AND A





() (

(())

L.

Steam Generator Tube Rupture



- Off-site doses are well within established limits
 - Increase by approximately a factor of 1.65 due to increased break flow and releases (and higher initial noble gas activity in coolant)

	AP600 Calculated TEDE Dose (rem)	AP1000 Estimated TEDE Dose (rem)	AP600 Reported TEDE Dose (rem)	TEDE Dose Limit (rem)
Accident-initiated iodine spike		.		
Site boundary	0.54	0.9	1.5	2.5
Low population zone	0.08	0.13	0.3	2.5
Pre-accident iodine spike				
Site boundary	0.85	1.4	3.0	25
Low population zone	0.13	0.21	0.45	25



- The transient analyzed shows that the AP1000 plant response is similar to AP600
- Higher power results in expected increase in releases
- Safety margins are maintained



- LOFTRAN approved by NRC for licensing basis analysis in 1983
- LOFTRAN nodes "hardwired" in a PWR configuration with pre-set protection system
 - User input controls everything else
 - Geometric data
 - Plant conditions
 - Protection system setpoints
- LOFTRAN is used for 2,3 and 4 loop operating plants
 - Flexibility of user controlled modeling allows analyses of plants with significantly different sizes and power levels



- Modified LOFTRAN code (LOFTTR2) approved by NRC for licensing basis SGTR analysis in 1987 (WCAP-10698)
 - New SGTR break flow model
 - Updated secondary representation
 - Operator action, PORV, SI and AFW controls



• LOFTRAN codes modified for AP600 (described in WCAP-14234)

- Additional protection system controls
- PRHR and CMT models
 - Preset connections to RCS
 - User controls everything else
 - Geometric data
 - Conditions
 - Actuation setpoints
 - Correlations



- AP600 analyses of non-LOCA and SGTR performed with modified LOFTRAN codes accepted by NRC (NUREG-1512)
- CMT model did not need adjustments to match test data
- PRHR correlations set based on PRHR tests
 - Verified against ROSA tests in blind calculations

general de la construcción de la c



- AP1000 configuration easily modeled with AP600 LOFTRAN version
 - Similar to using standard LOFTRAN for 2, 3 and 4 loop operating plants at different power levels etc.



- Documentation to be provided to NRC for running AP600 versions of LOFTRAN codes
 - Description of input/output variables in standard LOFTRAN
 - Description of input/output variables added for standard LOFTTR2
 - Description of input/output variables added in AP600 LOFTRAN versions
 - Preliminary LOFTRAN base input listing developed for AP1000
 - Input listings for sample transients



AP1000 SBLOCA Scoping Analysis w/NOTRUMP-AP600

Andre F. Gagnon Advanced Technical Engineer LOCA Integrated Services (412) 374-5574; gagnonaf@westinghouse.com



- Provide an overview of the preliminary SBLOCA analyses results
- Provide a synopsis of the applicable documentation associated with the NOTRUMP version approved for AP600 application
- Discuss the code transmittal effort and associated documentation

AP1000 SBLOCA Overview



- Same assumptions utilized as for AP600
 - 10 CFR Appendix K based analyses
 - NOTRUMP code validated against AP600 tests
- Acceptance Criteria
 - Peak Clad Temperature < 2200 °F
- Additional Passive Plant Considerations
 - Results should exhibit similar behavior as AP600
 - Large margins over operating plants

AP1000 SBLOCA Overview



- AP600 plant model modified to reflect design changes
 - Geometrical changes to reflect component sizing
 - Initial conditions changed

A A

- Core nodalization changed to represent 14 foot core
- Lack of momentum flux model in NOTRUMP addressed differently
 - AP600 model utilized IRWST level penalty approach
 - AP1000 model utilizes ADS-4 flow path resistance Increase during the non-critical flow period
 - Results demonstrated to be comparable
 - ADS-4 resistance increase based on AP600 detailed momentum flux model assessments
 - AP1000 model resistance increase expected to be smaller due to design modifications


and the second second



- Several SBLOCA analyses were performed to compare the AP600 and AP1000 plant performance
 - 2-Inch Cold Leg Break
 - Reference case
 - Double-Ended DVI Line Break (4-Inch Vessel Orifice)
 - Most limiting accident scenario due to loss of a PXS train
 - Double-Ended DVI Line Break At Elevated Containment Pressure
 - Demonstrate impact on IRWST injection characteristics
 - Inadvertent Actuation Of The Automatic Depressurization System (a.k.a. Inadvertent ADS)
 - Places greatest demand on plant ADS performance




2-Inch Cold Leg Break - RCS Pressure



AP1000 SBLOCA Results Overview


2-Inch Cold Leg Break - Core/Upper Plenum Mixture Level





2-Inch Cold Leg Break - RCS Inventory


 $|||_{\mathcal{L}_{2}} = \left\{ |||_{\mathcal{L}_{2}} = \left\{ ||||_{\mathcal{L}_{2}} = \left\{ ||||_{\mathcal{L}_{2}} = \left\{ ||||_{\mathcal{L}_{2}} = \left\{ |$



is a former of the former for the former former the former of the former




AP1000 SBLOCA Results Overview DE-DVI (Base) - RCS Pressure





DE-DVI (Base) - Core/Upper Plenum Mixture Level

a ()




 $(1) \quad (1) \quad (1)$

AP1000 SBLOCA Results Overview

DE-DVI (Base) - Downcomer Mixture Level









DE-DVI (Base) - RCS Inventory

1












DE-DVI (Elevated Pressure) - Core/Upper Plenum Mixture Level




and the second second

AP1000 SBLOCA Results Overview

DE-DVI (Elevated Pressure) - Intact IRWST Injection








DE-DVI (Elevated Pressure) - RCS Inventory

1 ; , () , (() (


(



a contract for the Child and the second




AP1000 SBLOCA Results Overview Inadvertent ADS - RCS Pressure






Inadvertent ADS - Core/Upper Plenum Mixture Level



the test of te

89

Inadvertent ADS - RCS Inventory





- Scoping AP1000 transient results indicate comparable margin to AP600
 - AP1000 plant physical size results in breaks acting like smaller breaks when compared to AP600
 - No core uncovery observed
 - No new phenomena observed

AP1000 NOTRUMP Documentation



- NOTRUMP approved by NRC for licensing basis SBLOCA in 1985
 - Meyer, P. E., "NOTRUMP A Nodal Transient Small-Break and General Network Code," WCAP-10079-P-A, (Proprietary) and WCAP-10080-A (Non-proprietary), August 1985.
 - Lee, N., Rupprecht, S. D., Schwarz, W. R., and Tauche, W. D., "Westinghouse Small-Break ECCS Evaluation Model Using the NOTRUMP Code," WCAP-10054-P-A (Proprietary) and WCAP-10081-A (Non-proprietary), August 1985.

AP1000 NOTRUMP Documentation



- AP600 SBLOCA Evaluation Model Licensing Basis
 - Kemper, R. M., "Applicability of the NOTRUMP Computer Code to AP600 SSAR Small-Break LOCA Analyses," WCAP-14206 (Proprietary) and WCAP-14207 (Non-Proprietary), November 1994.
 - Kemper, R. M., "AP600 Accident Analyses Evaluation Models," WCAP-14601, Revision 2 (Proprietary), June 1998.
 - Fittante, R. L. et al., "NOTRUMP Final Validation Report for AP600," WCAP-14807, Revision 5, (Proprietary), August 1998.
 - Includes SBOCA PIRT, NOTRUMP code modifications employed for AP600 and model validation

AP1000 NOTRUMP Transmittal



- Documentation to be provided to NRC for running AP1000 NOTRUMP code
 - Source code and executable associated with NOTRUMP-AP600 for HP-UX 10.20
 - Description of input/output variables for AP1000 plant model
 - NOTRUMP steady-state and transient modeling methodology for AP1000
 - NOTRUMP steady-state and transient input decks for the AP1000 plant



WCOBRA/TRAC Preliminary Safety Assessment of AP1000 LOCA Events

Robert M. Kemper Senior Engineer LOCA Integrated Services (412) 374-4579; kemperrm@westinghouse.com

Long-Term Cooling Analyses



- The purpose of long-term cooling analyses is to demonstrate the long-term stable performance of passive safety systems post-LOCA
 - WCOBRA/TRAC Model Validated against OSU Long-Term Cooling Tests for AP600 (WCAP-14776)
 - To demonstrate stable IRWST injection
 - To demonstrate stable containment recirculation flow
 - To demonstrate core cooling is maintained indefinitely
- AP1000 preliminary analysis completed
 - Similar performance to AP600
 - 10CFR50.46 Acceptance Criteria are satisfied


and the second second


AP1000 long-term core cooling



- The limiting AP600 SSAR case (DEDVI break, with its early switchover to containment recirculation) is analyzed for AP1000 in WCAP-15612:
 - increased ADS Stage 4 valve and line sizes
 - increased DVI piping sizes
 - increased core power and active fuel length
- WCOBRA/TRAC is executed continuously during the longterm cooling phase from the beginning of IRWST injection
- A "window mode" case is performed with WCOBRA/ TRAC at the switchover to containment recirculation








DVI-A Mixture Flow Rate





Collapsed Level of Liquid in Downcomer




÷.




1 (

Collapsed Level of Liquid Over the Heated Length of Fuel









Long-Term Cooling Conclusions



- No new phenomena relative to the AP600 SSAR cases are predicted for AP1000
- Equivalent predictions of long-term core cooling for a DEDVI break are predicted by WCOBRA/TRAC in a continuous calculation and a window mode analysis
- The WCOBRA/TRAC long-term cooling methodology approved for AP600 analyses may also be applied to AP1000 analyses

Approval History of WCOBRA/TRAC



- In 1996, the WCOBRA/TRAC Code Qualification Document (WCAP-12945) and the large break LOCA best-estimate analysis methodology were approved for Westinghouse 3-loop and 4-loop plants
- AP600 approvals were obtained in NUREG-1512
 - for large break LOCA analysis
 - for post-LOCA long-term cooling analysis

and the term of the term of the second se

WCOBRA/TRAC Items in Phase 2



- Source/executable of the AP code version, WCOBRA/TRAC Mod7A Rev4AP
- AP1000 DEDVI break long-term cooling analysis initial and restart input decks
- NRC already possesses the following pertinent and approved documents:
 - WCOBRA/TRAC CQD
 - WCAP-14776, Rev 4 (OSU Test simulations)
 - WCAP-14171, Rev 2 (AP600 LBLOCA report)
 - WCAP-14601, Rev 2 (AP600 Accident analysis models)
- WCOBRA/TRAC Code User's Manual



AP1000 Large Break LOCA Analysis

- Will use a simplified version of the conventional plant best-estimate methodology (as approved for AP600 in WCAP-14171)
- No validation was necessary against any of the AP600 tests because the accumulators are the only passive safety system that affects large break LOCA ECCS performance
- Therefore, AP1000 results should exhibit similar behaviors to the AP600 SSAR results; they are not affected by any scaling issues that may arise for the passive safety systems in the AP600 test facilities
- PCT Acceptance Criterion remains PCT< 2200F

AP1000 Large Break LOCA Analysis



- AP600 Exhibits Large Safety Margin
 - 500F in PCT margin to the regulatory limit with the approved bestestimate methodology
 - 95% PCT value, including the statistical uncertainty
- AP1000 LBLOCA Assessment
 - Higher core linear power will result in a higher calculated PCT than AP600
 - The increases are estimated as 120F for the blowdown peak value and 300F for the reflood peak value
 - Therefore, AP1000 will retain margin to the regulatory limit
 - In Phase 3 the AP1000 Design Basis LBLOCA Analysis will be performed in accordance with NUREG-1512 restrictions
 - There is no need to consider LBLOCA in Phase 2 of the AP1000
 review



AP1000 Containment Scoping Analyses using WGOTHIC 4.2

Rick Ofstun, PE Senior Engineer Containment and Radiological Analysis (412) 374-4430; ofstunrp@westinghouse.com



- Purpose of the containment scoping analyses:
 - Estimate the required increase in the containment height for AP1000
 - Estimate the margin to the containment design pressure for the DECL LOCA and MSLB events using the same bounding methodology that was used for AP600
- Analysis Acceptance Criteria
 - The calculated peak pressure must be less than the AP1000 containment design pressure

 $(x_1, y_2, y_3) = (x_1, y_2, y_3) + (x_2, y_3) + (x_3, y_3) + (x_1, y_2) + (x_2, y_3) + (x_1, y_3) + (x_2, y_3) + (x_3, y_3) + (x_3,$




- The AP600 containment model noding structure was revised to use a single lumped parameter volume above the operating deck to represent the dome.
- The number of climes for PCS heat and mass transfer was reduced from 8 to 2, 1 wet and 1 dry.
- Confirmed same response for AP600 LOCA and MSLB transient events
- A preliminary model of the AP1000 containment was constructed using this revised noding structure
 - Increased shell height and surface area
 - Increased the corresponding dome and PCS volumes
 - Changed the PCS water flow rate vs. time



{ {

1

AP1000 Containment Model Noding Diagram







- A preliminary RCS model of the AP1000 was constructed using the existing AP600 SATAN model to calculate the DECL LOCA blowdown M&E release
 - Increased pressurizer, SG, and CMT volumes
 - Increased power level
 - Changed initial temperatures
- New post-blowdown DECL LOCA mass and energy releases were calculated using a conservative, but more realistic time for the SG secondary energy release (5 hours vs. 1 hour)
 - ADS-4 and passive RHR essentially isolate the SGs from the RCS
 - Results from mechanistic models indicate the SGs retain energy for several hours after event initiation



DECL LOCA Mass and Energy Comparison Blowdown








 $\{1,\dots,n\} \in \{1,\dots,n\}$




AP1000 DECL LOCA Containment Pressure Response



1 1



SG Energy Release Sensitivity






- A preliminary AP1000 model was constructed using the existing AP600 LOFTRAN MSLB model to calculate the MSLB M&E releases
 - Increased pressurizer, SG, and CMT volumes

the second s

- Increased power level
- Changed initial temperatures






1 (i (


ŕ





i construction de la construction de








(() (

١



i de la composición d

. 1



- Conclusions
 - AP1000 containment transient response for the DECL LOCA and MSLB events was similar to AP600
 - No new phenomena were observed
 - The AP1000 has a larger margin to the containment design pressure than the AP600

WGOTHIC 4.2 Code



- Code Development Overview
 - GOTHIC version 4.0 developed, qualified and maintained by NAI/EPRI
 - WGOTHIC 4.0 Westinghouse added subroutines for PCS heat and mass transfer and PCS film tracking (Climes)
 - WGOTHIC 4.1 corrected Clime dryout error and other minor changes (see WCAP-14967 for details)
 - WGOTHIC 4.2 added a new Clime-specific cellcentered velocity subroutine and other minor changes (see WCAP-14407 for details)

WGOTHIC 4.2 Code



- Code Licensing Basis
 - GOTHIC 4.0 Code Manuals: NTD-NRC-95-4563
 - WGOTHIC Comparison to GOTHIC: NTD-NRC-95-4595
 - PCS Heat and Mass Transfer Correlations: WCAP-14326
 - WGOTHIC Clime Description and Qualification: WCAP-14382, WCAP-14407, WCAP-14967
- AP600 Containment Evaluation Model Licensing Basis
 - Containment PIRT/Scaling: WCAP-14845, WCAP-14812
 - Input Description(including PCS water coverage, internal mixing and stratification, initial conditions): WCAP-14407



• WGOTHIC 4.2 Code Usage

- The pre-processor creates a solver input file (.SIN file) and a graphics input file (.GIN file)
- The solver solves the transient T/H calculations and produces the solver and clime output files (.SOT, .CLM files) and output graphics data file (.SGR file)
- The post-processor creates an output plot data file (.GOT file) and the updates the plots in the preprocessor file

WGOTHIC Code



- GOTHIC 4.0 code documentation was previously sent to NRC in 1995 (NTD-NRC-95-4563)
- AP600 containment evaluation model description was previously sent to NRC (WCAP-14407)
- Deliverables to NRC
 - WGOTHIC 4.2 source and executable code
 - AP1000 pre-processor input files for the LOCA and MSLB scoping analyses
 - WGOTHIC Clime Users Manual

Code Review Meeting Summary



• Phase 2 Review

- Determine the basis for applicability of AP600 codes for AP1000
 - Basis for AP600 acceptability
 - Review AP1000 design differences / margins
 - Scalability of Tests where important for code validation
 - Exercise code to assess applicability
 - Westinghouse will provide codes beginning in March
 - Detailed schedule will be provided
 - Westinghouse will provide analytical support to improve efficiency of review