



**UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION IV  
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400  
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064**

January 26, 2001

Gregory M. Rueger, Senior Vice President  
and General Manager  
Nuclear Power Generation Bus. Unit  
Pacific Gas and Electric Company  
Nuclear Power Generation, B32  
77 Beale Street, 32nd Floor  
P.O. Box 770000  
San Francisco, California 94177

**SUBJECT: DIABLO CANYON INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-275/00-15; 50-323/00-15**

Dear Mr. Rueger:

This refers to the integrated routine resident and regional inspection conducted from November 5 through December 30, 2000, at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 facility. The enclosed report presents the results of this integrated inspection, which was discussed with your staff on January 5, 2001.

This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your licenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Since the completion of this inspection period, circumstances affecting the financial viability of Pacific Gas and Electric Company have evolved. Actions have been initiated by the State of California and Pacific Gas and Electric Company to address the impacts of these financial challenges. The NRC has exercised communications channels to better understand your planned and implemented actions, especially as they relate to your responsibility to safely operate the Diablo Canyon reactors. NRC inspections, to date, have confirmed that you are operating these reactors safely and that public health and safety is, thus far, assured.

In response to these conditions of economic stress, there will be two differences in how the Region communicates its inspection findings. First, we will continue the 6-week periodicity of our integrated inspection reports (the other reactors in Region IV will be transitioning to a quarterly report frequency with the exception of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station). Second, the description of the scope of the individual inspection activities will be significantly more detailed. This is being done to keep the public more fully informed of the breadth and depth of the NRC's inspection and oversight activities.

Based on the results of this inspection, a violation of NRC requirements for failure to control personnel access at the plant warehouse was identified. Because this violation was determined to be of very low safety significance and has been entered into your corrective action program,

the NRC is treating the issue as a noncited violation, in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. If you deny this noncited violation, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant facility.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

*/RA/*

William B. Jones, Chief  
Project Branch E  
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-275  
50-323  
License Nos.: DPR-80  
DPR-82

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NRC Inspection Report No.  
50-275/00-15; 50-323/00-15

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-4-

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Electronic distribution from ADAMS by RIV:

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- Senior Project Engineer, DRP/E (**GAP**)
- Branch Chief, DRP/TSS (**PHH**)
- RITS Coordinator (**NBH**)

Only inspection reports to the following:

- Scott Morris (**SAM1**)
- NRR Event Tracking System (**IPAS**)
- DC Site Secretary (**AAJ**)
- Dale Thatcher (**DFT**)

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RIV:SRI:DRP/E	C:DRS/PSB	PE :DRP/E	C:DRP/E
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**ENCLOSURE**

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket Nos.: 50-275  
50-323

License Nos.: DPR-80  
DPR-82

Report No.: 50-275/00-15  
50-323/00-15

Licensee: Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Facility: Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 and 2

Location: 7 ½ miles NW of Avila Beach  
Avila Beach, California

Dates: November 5 through December 30, 2000

Inspectors: D. L. Proulx, Senior Resident Inspector  
D. G. Acker, Resident Inspector  
T. W. Jackson, Resident Inspector  
W. A. Maier, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector, Region IV  
A. B. Earnest, Senior Safeguards Inspector, Region IV  
J. F. Melfi, Project Engineer, Region IV

Approved By: W. B. Jones, Chief, Project Branch E  
Division of Reactor Projects

**ATTACHMENTS:**

Attachment 1: Supplemental Information

Attachment 2: NRC's Revised Reactor Oversight Process

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

### Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant NRC Inspection Report 50-275/00-15; 50-323/00-15

IR 05000-275-00-15, IR 05000-323-00-15, on 11/5/00 to 12/30/00; Pacific Gas and Electric Co.; Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 and 2. Integrated Resident & Regional Report. Maint. Rule Impl., Access Control.

This report covers an 8-week routine resident inspection, a project engineer inspection, a safeguards inspection, and an emergency preparedness inspection during November 5 through December 30, 2000. The inspection identified one green noncited violation (NCV). The significance of most issues is indicated by their color (green, white, yellow, red) and was determined by the Significance Determination Process (SDP) in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609. Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by "no color" or by the severity level of the applicable violation.

#### A. Inspector Identified Findings

##### **Cornerstone: Physical Protection**

- Green. The licensee's secondary alarm station operator failed to use closed-circuit television cameras to determine that the warehouse access control security officer was present prior to opening the protected area personnel access door for an NRC inspector in the plant warehouse. In addition, the operator failed to determine that the security officer was not under duress prior to opening the personnel access door. The failure to adequately control personnel access was a violation of Paragraph 3.2.1.1 of the Physical Security Plan (Revision 18, Change 18). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy (275; 323/0015-01). The licensee entered the violation into the corrective action program as Action Request A0522821.

This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance (green) by the significance determination process because there were not greater than two similar findings in the last four quarters (Section 3PP2).

## Report Details

### Summary of Plant Status

Diablo Canyon Unit 1 began this inspection period in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) in Refueling Outage 1R10. On November 5, 2000, Unit 1, after taking the reactor critical, operators received urgent rod control failure alarms and manually tripped the reactor. After replacing the faulty rod control cards, operators took the reactor critical on November 6 for low power physics testing. On November 7, operators manually inserted the control rods to complete secondary plant work activities. On November 13, operators commenced a reactor startup and entered Mode 1 (Power Operation) on November 15. On November 17, operators synchronized the main generator to the grid, ending Refueling Outage 1R10.

Power ascension continued until November 20, 2000, when the reactor was at 46 percent power, an automatic reactor trip occurred because of faulty test equipment installed during nuclear instrument calibrations. Operators restarted the reactor later on November 20, and synchronized to the grid on November 21. Unit 1 achieved 100 percent power on November 29.

On December 14, 2000, operators continued to gradually decrease power because of elevated stator cooling water differential temperatures, such that on December 19, Unit 1 was at 83 percent power. Following on-line chemical cleaning of the stator cooling water system, operators returned Unit 1 to 100 percent power on December 20.

Diablo Canyon Unit 2 began this inspection period at 100 percent power. On December 8, 2000, operators decreased power to 2 percent and removed the main generator from the grid, to clean the circulating water system tunnels and repair a main generator hydrogen leak. After repairs were completed, operators began increasing power on December 10 and synchronized the main generator to the grid and achieved 100 percent power on December 11.

On December 22, 2000, operators in both units reduced power to 50 percent in anticipation of high Pacific Ocean swells and further decreased power to 20 percent because of high kelp loading on the traveling screens. After the high energy swells subsided, operators returned both units to 100 percent power on December 23. Unit 1 and 2 continued to operate at 100 percent power until the end of this inspection period.

#### **1. REACTOR SAFETY**

##### **Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness**

#### **1R04 Equipment Alignments (71111.04Q)**

##### Partial System Walkdowns

##### a. Inspection Scope

On November 30, 2000, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the charging line up for centrifugal charging Pump 2-1 while charging Pump 2-2 was



inoperable for planned maintenance. The inspectors verified the control room indications and availability of electrical power. Also, since centrifugal charging Pump 2-1 operated in a degraded state because of elevated vibration, the inspectors verified that the licensee checked the pump's vibrations level every 4 hours.

On December 13, 2000, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the auxiliary feedwater Pumps 1-2 and 1-3, while auxiliary feedwater Pump 1-1 was inoperable for planned maintenance. The inspectors verified the control room indications and availability of electrical power.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

Monthly Routine Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed fire protection walkdowns to assess the material condition of plant fire detection and suppression and proper control of transient combustibles. Specific risk-significant areas inspected included the intake structure, the radiological controlled area of the auxiliary building, and the diesel generator rooms in the turbine building.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's heat sink monitoring program associated with Work Order R0208964, "Component cooling Water Heat Exchanger 2-1 Clean/Inspect Seawater Side," on November 7, 2000. The inspectors examined the sea water side of the heat exchanger and witnessed the licensee actions to clean and inspect the heat exchanger. The inspectors also reviewed the completed work order and macro/micro fouling reports.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)

.1 Routine Reviews

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's maintenance rule implementation for equipment performance problems associated with the following action requests (ARs):

- AR A0518697      Check Valve for Diesel Engine Generator 1-3 not Reseating
- AR A0518696      Failure of Shaft Driven Lube Oil Pump on Component Cooling Water Pump 2-2
- AR A0508831      Maintenance Rule Goal Setting Review for Centrifugal Charging Pump 2-1

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Review of Control Room Ventilation System

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's maintenance rule implementation for equipment performance problems. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed AR A0508990, "Exceeding Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria for Unit 2 'B' Train Control Room Ventilation." associated with the Unit 2, Train B, control room ventilation system:

In addition, the inspectors interviewed the cognizant engineer regarding the systems 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) monitoring status and maintenance history.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

.1 Risk Assessments

a. Inspection Scope

Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed daily and weekly work schedules to determine when risk-significant activities were scheduled. The inspectors reviewed selected activities regarding risk evaluations and overall plant configuration control. The inspectors verified that the applicable contingencies were in place as

discussed in the risk assessments. The activities reviewed were associated with the following:

- Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-2 inoperable concurrent with Diesel Fuel Oil Pump 0-1, November 22, 2000
- Residual Heat Removal Pump 2-2 inoperable concurrent with Diesel Fuel Oil Pump 0-1, November 22, 2000
- Centrifugal Charging Pump 2-1 outage, November 30, 2000
- Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-1 outage, December 12, 2000
- Battery Charger 1-2 inoperable concurrent with Control Room Ventilation System Compressor CP-35, December 14, 2000

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Nonroutine Evolutions (71111.14, 71153)

.1 Reactor Trip During Startup (Unit 1)

a. Inspection Scope

On November 5, 2000, during a Unit 1 reactor startup with power stabilized at 1E-8 amperes on the intermediate range detectors, operators received a rod control urgent failure alarm. After trouble shooting, technicians replaced a card in the logic cabinet. Upon insertion of a control bank, rods continued to move inward with no demand. The operator tripped the reactor. The inspectors responded to the control room and reviewed plant conditions to determine if the unit was stabilized following the trip. The inspectors also evaluated the posttrip review.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Reactor Trip During Flux Mapping (Unit 1)

a. Inspection Scope

On November 20, 2000, Unit 1 tripped from 46 percent power. One half of the trip logic had been made up because one of the nuclear instruments had previously failed, requiring operators to trip the channel. Calibration was in progress on a second channel, when technicians operated a switch on the test equipment. Because of an electrical short in the test equipment, a spurious high rate of change in power trip signal was generated in the second channel tripping the reactor. The inspectors responded to

the control room and reviewed plant conditions to determine if the unit was stabilized following the trip. The inspectors also evaluated the posttrip review.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Dual Unit Down Ramps

a. Inspection Scope

On December 20, 2000, the licensee was informed that high Pacific Ocean swells had been predicted. In anticipation of heavy kelp loading on the traveling screens, operators decreased power to 50 percent on both units. With reactor power at 50 percent, both operating units simultaneously experienced high differential pressure on the traveling screens. The operators tripped circulating water Pumps 1-1 and 2-1, then decreased power on both units to 20 percent. The inspectors responded to the control room and monitored the operators' response to the transient and reviewed plant conditions to determine if both units had stabilized.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following operability evaluations and supporting documents:

- AR A0520582 Evaluate Incorrect Fuses in Containment Fan Cooler Units Electrical Circuits
- AR A0521760 Diesel Engine Generator Failed to Achieve Stable Voltage in Required Time
- AR A0521970 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Operability Determination
- AR A0521226 Unit 1 Generator Stator Cooling Water Alarming

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Postmaintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed and evaluated the following postmaintenance test activities to determine if the test adequately demonstrated that the equipment was capable of performing its safety functions:

- STP P-AFW-AM Performance Test of Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-1, Revision 5A, performed on November 17, 2000
- STP P-AFW-12 Performance Test of Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-2, Revision 5, performed on November 17, 2000
- STP M-12B Battery Charger Performance Test, Revision 11, performed on December 14, 2000
- STP P-CCW-23 Routine Surveillance Test of Component Cooling Water Pump 2-3, Revision 7, performed on December 21, 2000

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

Routine Observations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed all or part of the following surveillance and inservice test procedures:

- STP M-11B, "Measurement of Station Battery Voltage and Specific Gravity," Revision 20, performed on October 17, 2000
- STP M-12A, "Vital Station Battery Modified Performance Test," Revision 10, performed on October 17, 2000
- STP R-6, "Low Power Reload Physics Tests," performed on November 5-7, 2000
- STP I-38-A.1, "Solid State Protection System Train A Actuation Logic Test in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4," performed on December 4, 2000

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Temporary Modification/Plant Jumper Log Entry 00-12, "Ultrasonic Monitor for Residual Heat Removal to Safety Injection Cross-Tie." The inspectors reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screening, verified that the applicable drawings were annotated, observed that the necessary tags were in place, and that the transient combustible administrative controls were properly implemented. This temporary alteration was performed in accordance with Procedure CF4.ID7, "Temporary Modifications - Plant Jumpers and Measuring and Test Equipment," Revision 7B.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Revision 3, Change 19, to the Diablo Canyon Emergency Plan to determine if the revised plan met NRC requirements.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

**3. SAFEGUARDS  
Cornerstone: Physical Protection**

3PP1 Access Authorization (71130.01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors:

- Reviewed licensee event reports and safeguards event logs to identify problems in the access authorization program.
- Reviewed procedures, audits, and self-assessments of the following programs/areas: behavior observation, access authorization, fitness-for-duty, supervisor and escort training, and requalification training.
- Interviewed five supervisors/managers and five individuals who had escorted visitors into the protected and/or vital areas to determine their knowledge and understanding of their responsibilities in the behavior observation program.

- Reviewed condition reports, licensee event reports, safeguards event logs, audits, selected security event reports, and self-assessments for the licensee's access authorization program to determine the licensee's ability to identify and resolve problems.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3PP2 Access Control (71130.02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors:

- Reviewed licensee event reports and safeguards event logs to identify problems with access control equipment.
- Reviewed procedures and audits for testing and maintenance of access control equipment and for granting and revoking unescorted access to protected and vital areas.
- Interviewed security personnel concerning the proper operation of the explosive and metal detectors, X-ray devices, and key card readers.
- Observed licensee testing of access control equipment and the ability of security personnel to control personnel, packages, and vehicles entering the protected area.
- Reviewed procedures to verify that a program was in place for controlling and accounting for hard keys to vital areas.
- Reviewed the licensee's process for granting access to vital equipment and vital areas.
- Reviewed condition reports, licensee event reports, safeguards event logs, audits, selected security event reports, and self-assessments for the licensee's access control program in order to identify the licensee's ability to identify and resolve problems with the access control program.
- Interviewed key security department and plant support personnel to determine their knowledge and use of the corrective action reports and resolution of problems regarding repair of security equipment.
- Observed two vehicles processed through the vehicle access portal.
- Observed the operation of the warehouse search process for delivery of packages and material delivered to the plant.

b. Findings

Paragraph 3.2.1.1 of the Physical Security Plan (Revision 18, Change 18) states that the secondary alarm station operator will assess the person to gain access to the protected area by utilizing the closed-circuit television cameras and ensure that the person requesting access is with the armed security officer. Further, the secondary alarm station operator will utilize the closed-circuit television cameras to determine if the armed security officer is under duress. Both assessments are required before remotely opening the protected area door that grants personnel access to the protected area at the plant warehouse.

Contrary to the above, on December 20, 2000, the NRC inspector requested a demonstration of protected area access at the plant warehouse by approaching the door alone and causing a radio call to the secondary alarm station requesting the door be opened. The secondary alarm station operator opened the door without assessing the situation with closed-circuit television cameras. The door was opened without the armed security officer being on camera with the NRC inspector. Further, an assessment to ensure the armed security officer was not under duress was not completed as the armed security officer was not within the view of the closed-circuit television. The failure to adequately control personnel access at the plant warehouse access control point was a violation of Paragraph 3.2.1.1 of the Physical Security Plan (Revision 18, Change 18). This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy (275; 323/0015-01). The licensee entered the violation into the corrective action program as AR A0522821.

This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) by the significance determination process because there were not greater than two similar findings in the last four quarters.

3PP4 Security Plan Changes (71130.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed the following actions:

- Reviewed the Physical Security Plan, Revision 18 (Change 17), dated February 9, 2000, and Revision 18 (Change 18), dated December 1, 2000, to determine if requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 (p) had been met.
- Reviewed the previous year's safeguards event logs and interviewed security personnel to determine their knowledge and use of the corrective action program and resolution of problems as it relates to making changes to the licensing documents.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.



#### 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

##### 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

###### .1 Reactor Safety Performance Indicator Verification

###### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following performance indicators for the period from the first quarter of 1999 through the second quarter of 2000 to assess the accuracy and completeness of the indicator. The inspectors used NEI 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Verification," Revision 0, as guidance for this inspection.

- High pressure coolant injection systems availability
- Safety system failures

###### b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

###### .2 Security Performance Indicator Verification

###### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the program for collection and submittals of performance indicator data. Specifically, a random sampling of security event logs and ARs were reviewed for the following program performance areas:

- Protected area security equipment
- Personnel screening
- Fitness-for-duty personnel reliability

###### b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

##### 4OA3 Event Followup (71153)

(Closed) Licensee Event Report 2000-S01 The licensee identified an incident involving a fake bomb discovered in the protected area.

On November 5, 2000, a security officer on patrol discovered a device that resembled an explosive device in a nonvital building in the protected area. The NRC was notified within 1 hour and a Notice of Unusual Event was declared. Local area law enforcement and the Federal Bureau of Investigation were notified and responded. The device was declared to be nonexplosive and an obvious hoax. After investigation by the plant and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, it was determined to be a prank with no malicious intent. The individual who constructed the device was a contractor who had already had

his unescorted access removed. His future access as a temporary worker is suspended and his name was entered into the NEI Personnel Access Data System as a denial. The licensee security force followed all contingency plan and procedural requirements during the incident. Corrective actions completed and planned included:

- An e-mail from the plant senior vice president to all personnel described the event and emphasized expected standards of conduct and professionalism expected of the plant staff.
- A meeting was conducted with all plant supervisors to emphasize expectations that plant supervisors will address behavior that is unacceptable in a nuclear plant work environment.
- Behavioral Observation Training for supervisors will incorporate lessons learned from this event.
- Protected Area Access General Employee Training will incorporate the lessons learned from this event.

The event was entered into the corrective action program as AR A0519801.

#### 40A6 Management Meetings

##### Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. D. Oatley, Vice President, and other members of licensee management, at the conclusion of the inspections on January 5, 2001. The security section of this report was debriefed on December 22, 2000. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

## ATTACHMENT 1

### PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

#### Licensee

C. Belmont, Director, Nuclear Quality Services  
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D. Christensen, Engineer, Nuclear Quality Assurance and Licensing  
R. Gray, Engineer, Radiation Protection  
C. Hansen, Supervisor, Nuclear Quality Services  
J. Hubble, Shift Supervisor, Security  
R. Hite, Director, Radiation Protection  
S. Ketelsen, Supervisor, Regulatory Services  
D. Miklush, Manager, Engineering Services  
P. Nugent, Director, Regulatory Services  
D. Oatley, Vice President and Plant Manager  
B. Ryan, Supervisor, Access Authorization and Fitness-for-Duty  
R. Taylor, Assistant Team Leader, Nuclear Quality Services  
R. Todaro, Director, Security  
J. Tompkins, Manager, Nuclear Quality Analysis and Licensing  
R. Waltos, Manager, Maintenance Services

### ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

#### Opened and Closed During this Inspection

275; 323/0015-01      NCV      Failure to Adequately Control Personnel Access at the Plant Warehouse

#### Previous Items Closed

2000-S01              LER      Mock Explosive Device Incident

#### Previous Items Discussed

None

### LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

AR	Action Request
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
LER	Licensee Event Report
NEI	Nuclear Energy Institute
NCV	Noncited Violation
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
SDP	Significance Determination Process
STP	Surveillance Test Procedure

## DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Access Control Self Assessment 003707154, dated September 27, 2000  
Access Control Self Assessment 003706460, dated August 5, 2000  
Access Control Self Assessment 003707443, dated November 8, 2000  
Fitness-for-Duty Self Assessment 003670894, dated February 25, 2000  
Fitness-for-Duty Self Assessment 003706955, dated August 31, 2000  
Security Program Audit 003679579, dated December 13, 2000  
Fitness-for-Duty Program Audit 003679187, dated June 23, 2000  
Access Authorization Program Audit 003680824, dated September 21, 2000

### Contractor Audits:

- Psychological Screening Services Audit 991310021, dated June 7, 1999
- NEI Personnel Access Data System Audit CGSV-00-0123, dated July 6, 2000
- Interquest Northwest, Inc., Audit 10257-A00, dated June 9, 2000
- INPO Audit 1081-A 001, dated March 9, 2000

Reference Guide for Supervisors, Escorts, and Individuals on Nuclear Fitness-for-Duty Behavior Observation and Chemical Testing

Instructor Lesson Guide GFFD 100i, "FFD for Supervisors"

Safeguards Event Logs for First through Fourth Quarters, 2000

## ATTACHMENT 2

### **NRC's REVISED REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS**

The federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recently revamped its inspection, assessment, and enforcement programs for commercial nuclear power plants. The new process takes into account improvements in the performance of the nuclear industry over the past 25 years and improved approaches of inspecting and assessing safety performance at NRC licensed plants.

The new process monitors licensee performance in three broad areas (called strategic performance areas): reactor safety (avoiding accidents and reducing the consequences of accidents if they occur), radiation safety (protecting plant employees and the public during routine operations), and safeguards (protecting the plant against sabotage or other security threats). The process focuses on licensee performance within each of seven cornerstones of safety in the three areas:

#### **Reactor Safety**

- Initiating Events
- Mitigating Systems
- Barrier Integrity
- Emergency Preparedness

#### **Radiation Safety**

- Occupational
- Public

#### **Safeguards**

- Physical Protection

To monitor these seven cornerstones of safety, the NRC uses two processes that generate information about the safety significance of plant operations: inspections and performance indicators. Inspection findings will be evaluated according to their potential significance for safety, using the significance determination process, and assigned colors of GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW, or RED. GREEN findings are indicative of issues that, while they may not be desirable, represent very low safety significance. WHITE findings indicate issues that are of low to moderate safety significance. YELLOW findings are issues that are of substantial safety significance. RED findings represent issues that are of high safety significance with a significant reduction in safety margin.

Performance indicator data will be compared to established criteria for measuring licensee performance in terms of potential safety. Based on prescribed thresholds, the indicators will be classified by color representing varying levels of performance and incremental degradation in safety: GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW, or RED. GREEN indicators represent performance at a level requiring no additional NRC oversight beyond the baseline inspections. WHITE corresponds to performance that may result in increased NRC oversight. YELLOW represents performance that minimally reduces safety margin and requires even more NRC oversight. RED indicates performance that represents a significant reduction in safety margin but still provides adequate protection to public health and safety.

The assessment process integrates performance indicators and inspection so the agency can reach objective conclusions regarding overall plant performance. The agency will use an Action Matrix to determine in a systematic, predictable manner which regulatory actions should be taken based on a licensee's performance. The NRC's actions in response to the significance (as represented by the color) of issues will be the same for performance indicators as for inspection findings. As a licensee's safety performance degrades, the NRC will take more and increasingly significant action, which can include shutting down a plant, as described in the Action Matrix.

More information can be found at: <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html>.