



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION II  
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER  
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931

January 24, 2001

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.  
ATTN: Mr. D. N. Morey  
Vice President  
P. O. Box 1295  
Birmingham, AL 35201-1295

SUBJECT: JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION  
REPORT NOS. 50-348/00-05 and 50-364/00-05

Dear Mr. Morey:

On December 30, 2000, the NRC completed an inspection at your Farley Nuclear Plant. The enclosed integrated report presents the results of that inspection. The results of this inspection were discussed on December 28, with Mr. Mike Stinson and other members of your staff.

This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel. Based on the results this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

**/RA/**

Stephen J. Cahill, Chief  
Reactor Projects, Branch 2  
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364  
License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8

Enclosure: NRC Integrated Inspection  
Report Nos. 50-348/00-05 and 50-364/00-05

cc w/encl: (See page 2)

SNC

2

cc w/encl:

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SIGNATURE	C. Rapp	TJ by telecom	RC by telecom	DR via e-mail	DF via e-mail	MS via e-mail	KV via e-mail
NAME	CRapp	TJohnson	RCaldwell	DRich	DForbes	MScott	KVanDoom
DATE	1/24/2001	1/24/2001	1/24/2001	1/24/2001	1/24/2001	1/24/2001	1/24/2001
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E-MAIL COPY?	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)

REGION II

Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364

License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8

Report Nos.: 50-348/00-05 and 50-364/00-05

Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)

Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location: 7388 N. State Highway 95  
Columbia, AL 36319

Dates: October 1 to December 30, 2000

Inspectors: T. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector  
R. Caldwell, Resident Inspector  
D. Rich, Resident Inspector, Watts Bar  
D. Forbes, Radiation Specialist (Sections 2 and 4OA1)  
M. Scott, Reactor Inspector (Sections 1R02 and 1R17)  
K. VanDoorn, Reactor Inspector (Sections 1R02 and 1R17)  
S. Vias, Reactor Inspector (Sections 1R02 and 17)  
C. Rapp, Senior Project Engineer (Section 4OA1)  
D. Thompson, Physical Security Inspector (Section 3 and 4OA5)

Approved by: Stephen J. Cahill, Chief  
Reactor Projects, Branch 2  
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

## **SUMMARY OF FINDINGS**

IR 05000348/00-05, IR 05000364/00-05, 10/01-12/30/2000, Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2; Resident Routine Operations Report

This report covers a 12-week period of inspection conducted by resident inspectors, a regional project engineer, a regional radiation specialist, a visiting resident inspector, a physical security inspector, and three regional engineering specialists. The significance of inspector findings would be indicated by their color (green, white, yellow, or red) as determined by the Significance Determination Process in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609. There were no findings of significance.

## Report Details

### Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 operated at 100% rated thermal power (RTP) for the inspection period except for short periods to perform cooling tower maintenance.

Unit 2 operated at 100% RTP until November 16 when the reactor tripped due to a feedwater transient. The unit was restarted and reached 100% RTP on November 19. The unit remained at or near 100% RTP except for short periods to perform cooling tower maintenance.

#### 1. **REACTOR SAFETY**

##### **Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity**

#### 1R01 Adverse Weather

##### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of licensee procedure FNP-0-AP-21.0, Severe Weather, and compensatory measures for equipment affected by cold weather. The inspectors verified the requirements of FNP-0-SOP-0.12, Cold Weather Contingencies, were satisfactorily completed. The inspectors verified the implementation of licensee procedure FNP-1(2)-EMP-1383.01, Freeze Protection Inspections, used by plant operators to check operation of freeze protection circuits. The inspectors walked down safety-related and fire protection equipment including the following to verify required cold weather protection measures were implemented:

- Unit 1 & 2 Condensate Storage Tanks and associated instrumentation
- Unit 1 & 2 Reactor Water Storage Tanks
- Unit 1 & 2 Fire Protection Tanks and associated pump house
- Unit 1 & 2 Plant Vent Stack Radiation Monitors
- Unit 1 Circulating Water Structure
- Unit 1 & 2 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) flow transmitters
- Unit 1 & 2 Steam Generator pressure transmitters

##### b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

#### 1R02 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments

##### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the 20 safety evaluations listed in Attachment 2 to confirm that the license had appropriately reviewed and documented changes in accordance with 10CFR50.59 and licensee procedure FNP-0-AP-88, Nuclear Safety Evaluations. The inspectors also reviewed the 16 design changes listed in the attachment for which the licensee had determined that safety evaluations were not required to confirm that the licensee's conclusions to "screen out" these changes were correct and consistent with

10CFR50.59 and licensee procedure FNP-0-AP-88. Several similar samples such as snubber removals and battery charger changes were counted as individual samples. Therefore, the sample size was larger than that specified in NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.02, Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments.

In addition, the inspectors reviewed the two corrective action program reports listed in Attachment 2 and the minutes of three Nuclear Operations Review Board listed in Attachment 2 to confirm that the licensee was identifying issues, entering issues into the corrective action program, and was resolving the concerns.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a partial system walk down and reviewed documentation to verify that the systems listed below were properly aligned when redundant systems or trains were out of service as required by licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-16, Conduct of Operations - Operations Group and FNP-0-SOP-0, General Instructions to Operations Personnel. The walk down included both control room and infield checks of valves, switches, components, electrical power, support equipment, and instrumentation for the following systems:

- Unit 1 and 2 AFW systems
- Unit 1 and 2 Service Water (SW) systems
- Unit 1 and 2 Component Cooling Water (CCW) systems

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a walk down of the Unit 1 and 2 Auxiliary, Diesel, and Service Water buildings to verify the licensee's implementation of fire protection requirements. The inspectors verified the licensee's control of transient combustibles, the operational readiness of the fire suppression system, and the material condition and status of fire dampers, doors and barriers. The inspectors also verified that adequate compensatory measures, including fire watches, were in place for degraded fire barriers. The inspectors compared the requirements in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Appendix 9B, Fire Protection Program, to the licensee's implementation of the program. The inspectors observed a routine fire drill on December 13 to evaluate the readiness of the licensee's fire brigade as required by licensee procedure FNP-0-AP-37, Fire Brigade Organization, and UFSAR Appendix 9.B.2.3, Fire Fighting.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed licensed operator training scenarios for a reactor startup and a loss of feedwater at 25% RTP. The inspectors used licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-27, Conduct of Operations - Training Group, and FNP-0-AP-45, Farley Nuclear Plant Training Plan, to assess high risk operator actions, overall performance, self-critiques, training feedback, and management oversight.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation of functional failures, maintenance preventable functional failures, repetitive failures, availability and reliability monitoring, and system specialist involvement. The following equipment was evaluated for compliance with 10 CFR 50.65 and licensee procedures FNP-0-M-87, Maintenance Rule Scoping Manual, and FNP-0-M-89, FNP Maintenance Rule Site Implementation Manual:

- Unit 1 and 2 Cooling Towers
- Unit 1 and 2 AFW pumps
- Unit 1 and 2 Radiation Monitors
- Unit 1 and 2 CCW pumps
- Unit 1 and 2 solid state protection system (SSPS) card failures
- 4160 Volt Breakers

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors used licensee procedures FNP-0-ACP-52.1, Guidelines for Scheduling of On-Line Maintenance, AP-FNP-0-AP-52, Equipment Status Control and Maintenance Authorization, and FNP-0-AP-16 to review the licensee's actions to plan and control the work activities and to verify that the licensee had adequately identified and resolved risk challenges for emergent work for following the systems:



- Unit 1 Turbine Driven AFW pump
- Unit 1 and 2 Cooling Towers
- Unit 2 'B' AFW pump
- Unit 2 'B' CCW heat exchanger
- Unit 2 'B' EDG
- Unit 1 'A' AFW pump

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the licensee's actions in response to a Unit 2 reactor trip on November 16 and subsequent startup on November 17. These actions included main control room command and control, emergency operating procedure use, event notification, reactor trip data/information protection and gathering, root cause team formation and investigation, root cause team interviews, simulator start-up training, and portions of the start-up. The inspectors verified that the event root cause analysis was completed in accordance with licensee procedure FNP-0-ACP-9.1, Root Cause Investigation.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operability evaluations to verify the technical adequacy, consideration of degraded conditions, and identification of compensatory measures. Inspectors reviewed the evaluations against the design bases as stated in the UFSAR and Functional System Descriptions. The licensee's performance and evaluations were compared to the requirements of licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-16 and FNP-0-ACP-9.2, Operability Determination, for the following systems:

- Removing 1A Charging Pump Door 162
- 2B EDG
- Unit 2 digital rod position system
- Unit 1 CCW valve 003C

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

## 1R16 Operator Work Arounds

### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operator work arounds to determine if system functional capability or human performance during an initiating event were affected. Inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of the operator work arounds on the operators' ability to implement abnormal or emergency operating procedures, potential to increase an initiating event frequency, and potential to affect multiple mitigating systems. Additionally, the prioritization and actions required to address the operator work arounds were evaluated as required by licensee procedure FNP-0-ACP-17, Operator Workarounds, for the following systems:

- Unit 2 Circulating Water canal makeup valve
- 2A-9 Cooling Tower northwest Isolation valve failure
- Unit 1 main lube oil temperature control valve
- Unit 1 electro hydraulic control system
- Unit 1 CCW valve 003C

### b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

## 1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the 10 modifications listed in Attachment 2 to verify the implementation of licensee procedure FNP-0-AP-8, Design Modification Control. The inspectors verified that system energy requirements could be supplied by supporting systems; materials/replacement components were compatible with physical interfaces; replacement components were seismically qualified; code and safety classification of replacement system, structures, and components were consistent with system design bases; the modification design assumptions; that post-modification testing verified system operability; failure modes were bounded by existing analyses; and that new procedures or procedure changes have been initiated. The inspectors also reviewed the two audit reports listed in Attachment 2 to confirm that the licensee was identifying issues and initiating actions to resolve concerns.

### b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

## 1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors used licensee procedures FNP-0-ACP-52.1, Guidelines for Scheduling of On-Line Maintenance, and AP-FNP-0-AP-52, Equipment Status Control and

Maintenance Authorization, to verify that post maintenance test procedures and test activities were adequate to verify system operability and functional capability for the following systems:

- Unit 1 Turbine Driven AFW pump
- Unit 2 'B' AFW pump
- Unit 2 'B' CCW heat exchanger
- 1-2A emergency diesel generator (EDG)
- Unit 2 'C' EDG
- Unit 2 'B' EDG
- Unit 1 'A' AFW pump

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors used licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-24, Test Control, and FNP-0-AP-16 to verify system and component operability. The inspectors also verified that the STP acceptance criteria met Technical Specification (TS) and design requirements the following surveillance test procedures (STP's):

- FNP-1-STP-80.8, DG 1B 1000KW Load Rejection Test
- FNP-1-STP-23.2, Component Cooling Water Pump 1B Inservice Test
- FNP-2-STP-15.2, 1B Main Feed Pump 2B Overspeed Trip Mechanism est
- FNP-0-STP-80.7, DG 1C 24 Hour Load Test
- FNP-1/2-STP-22.19, AFW Flow Path Verification
- FNP-2-STP-24.21, 2A Service Water Booster Pump Inservice Test
- FNP-1-STP-33.A, SSPS Train A Operability Test

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

**Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness**

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed two practice emergency drills on October 11 and November 9. The inspectors verified that the licensee was properly classifying the event, making required notifications, making protective action recommendations, and conducting self-assessments as required by licensee procedure FNP-0-EIP-15.0, Emergency Drills.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

**2. RADIATION SAFETY**

**Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety [OS]**

**2OS2 As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls**

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed radiation work permits, collective plant exposure, and current exposure dose trends to verify the licensee was implementing ALARA practices as required by 10 CFR 20.1101(b), and licensee procedure FNP-0-AP-90, ALARA Policy and Implementation. During plant tours, the inspectors observed ALARA practices during a movement of radioactive waste containers with dose rates in excess of 10 Rem per hour. The inspectors observed ALARA training for contractor personnel performing work during the 2001 Unit 2 refueling outage and reviewed other radiological controls planned for the outage to verify outage planning was consistent with 10 CFR Part 20 requirements.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

**2PS2 Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation**

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's radioactive materials transportation programs for implementing NRC regulations, Department of Transportation regulations, and licensee procedures FNP-0-RCP-81, Radiation Control and Protection Procedure and FNP-0-RCP-810, Shipment of Radioactive Waste. The inspectors also attended a pre-job briefing and observed the movement of several High Integrity Containers being prepared for shipment to verify implementation of licensee procedures and controls for handling solid radioactive waste. The inspectors observed a shipment of radioactive material and reviewed both the licensee's 10 CFR Part 61 licensee waste stream analysis, C-1463315 and A-R500-26, and verified the shipping papers contained the required information for the following radioactive material shipment records:

- 00-04
- 00-05
- 00-06
- 00-07
- 00-20
- 00-24

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

**3. SAFEGUARDS**  
**Cornerstone: Physical Protection [PP]**

3PP1 Access Authorization

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors interviewed five licensee managers and five escort personnel to verify the effectiveness of training and their abilities to recognize aberrant behavior as required by licensee procedure FNP-0-AP-42, Access Control. The also inspectors reviewed licensee procedure FNP-0-FHP-5, Farley Nuclear Plant Fitness for Duty Program, the Southern Nuclear/Farley Annual Security audit date January 13, 2000, and the following Licensee Event Reports (LER's) reporting Fitness For Duty (FFD) issues:

- LER 2000-002-00
- LER 2000-004-00
- LER 2000-005-00
- LER 2000-001-02
- LER 2000-006-00

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3PP2 Access Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed access control activities on November 15, and 16, 2000, to assess if officers could detect contraband before entering the protected area as required by the Farley Nuclear Plant Physical Security Plan. The inspectors also observed equipment testing conducted on November 16, 2000 and reviewed log entries to verify the officers were conducting access control equipment testing in accordance with regulatory requirements.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

#### 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

##### 4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

###### .1 PI Verification

###### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors used licensee procedure FNP-0-AP-54, Preparation and Review of NRC Performance Indicator Data, to verify the third quarter of 2000 PI data for Reactor Coolant System leakage and specific activity in the Barrier Integrity cornerstone, the first and third quarters PI data for Safety System Unavailability and Maintenance Preventable Functional Failures in the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, and the PI data from January thru November 2000 for the Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness and the RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence in the Occupational And Public Radiation Safety cornerstone. The inspectors reviewed available licensee documentation including reactor operator logs, maintenance and tagout records, monthly operating reports, surveillance procedures, entries into Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operations, and the following condition reports, audits, and self assessments:

- Condition Report 20001003
- Condition Report 20001099
- Condition Report 20003066
- Condition Report 20005781
- Condition Report 20004001
- Audit of Radiological Protection and Waste Management
- Spent Filter Management Assessment

###### b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

##### 4OA3 Event Follow-up

###### .1 (Closed) LER 50-348/00-04, Reactor Trip Due to Degarded Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Transient Response

This LER was reviewed by the inspectors and verified to be captured in the licensee corrective action program. No findings of significance were identified.

4OA5 Other.1 Steam Generator Replacementa. Inspection Scope

Inspectors conducted a review of the licensee's Temporary Order #003-2000, regarding security procedures for the Steam Generator Staging Area.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 MeetingsExit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mike Stinson, Plant General Manager, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on December 28. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

**PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED**Licensee

R. V. Badham, Safety Audit Engineering Review Supervisor  
 C. L. Buck, Technical Manager  
 R. M. Coleman, Outage and Modification Manager  
 C. D. Collins, Operations Manager  
 K. C. Dyar, Security Manager  
 S. Fulmer, Plant Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager  
 J. S. Gates, Administration Manager  
 D. E. Grissette, Assistant General Manager - Operations  
 J. G. Horn, Outage Planning Supervisor  
 J. R. Johnson, Maintenance Manager  
 R. R. Martin, Engineering Support Manager  
 C. D. Nesbitt, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support  
 L. M. Stinson, Plant General Manager - FNP  
 R. J. Vanderbye, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator

**ITEM CLOSED**Closed

(Closed) Unit 1 LER 50-348/00-04, Automatic Reactor Trip (4OA3)

Attachments: 1. NRC's Revised Reactor Oversight Process Summary  
 2. Procedures and Documents Reviewed

## ATTACHMENT 1

# NRC's REVISED REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS

The federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recently revamped its inspection, assessment, and enforcement programs for commercial nuclear power plants. The new process takes into account improvements in the performance of the nuclear industry over the past 25 years and improved approaches of inspecting and assessing safety performance at NRC licensed plants.

The new process monitors licensee performance in three broad areas (called strategic performance areas): reactor safety (avoiding accidents and reducing the consequences of accidents if they occur), radiation safety (protecting plant employees and the public during routine operations), and safeguards (protecting the plant against sabotage or other security threats). The process focuses on licensee performance within each of seven cornerstones of safety in the three areas:

### Reactor Safety

- Initiating Events
- Mitigating Systems
- Barrier Integrity
- Emergency Preparedness

### Radiation Safety

- Occupational
- Public

### Safeguards

- Physical Protection

To monitor these seven cornerstones of safety, the NRC uses two processes that generate information about the safety significance of plant operations: inspections and performance indicators. Inspection findings will be evaluated according to their potential significance for safety, using the Significance Determination Process, and assigned colors of GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW or RED. GREEN findings are indicative of issues that, while they may not be desirable, represent very low safety significance. WHITE findings indicate issues that are of low to moderate safety significance. YELLOW findings are issues that are of substantial safety significance. RED findings represent issues that are of high safety significance with a significant reduction in safety margin.

Performance indicator data will be compared to established criteria for measuring licensee performance in terms of potential safety. Based on prescribed thresholds, the indicators will be classified by color representing varying levels of performance and incremental degradation in safety: GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW, and RED. GREEN indicators represent performance at a level requiring no additional NRC oversight beyond the baseline inspections. WHITE corresponds to performance that may result in increased NRC oversight. YELLOW represents performance that minimally reduces safety margin and requires even more NRC oversight. RED indicates performance that represents a significant reduction in safety margin but still provides adequate protection to public health and safety.

The assessment process integrates performance indicators and inspection so the agency can reach objective conclusions regarding overall plant performance. The agency will use an Action Matrix to determine in a systematic, predictable manner which regulatory actions should be taken based on a licensee's performance. The NRC's actions in response to the significance (as represented by the color) of issues will be the same for performance indicators as for inspection findings. As a licensee's safety performance degrades, the NRC will take more and



increasingly significant action, which can include shutting down a plant, as described in the Action Matrix.

More information can be found at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html>.

## ATTACHMENT 2

### Procedures and Documents Reviewed

#### Section 1R02

##### Safety Evaluation Screenings Reviewed

- SECL-98-148S, Safety Evaluation of Loose Objects in RCS
- DCP 99-1-9514-0-001, Pressurizer Surge Line Pipe Whip Restraint Removal
- LER 2000-001-00, TS 3.0.5 Entered Due to SW Lube and Cooling Pumps Inoperable
- NEL 00-0118, Design Basis for Tornado-Generated Missiles FSAR Revision
- FNP-1-ETP-4439, Rev 0, Valve Functions added to FSAR for CCW System
- MD 98-2552, Rev. 1, Change Automatic Start of Charging Pump 1C to 1B
- DCP 98-2-9363-0-001, Installation of Main Steam Vibration Monitoring Equipment
- MD 99-2606, Rev. 0, Change to Reactor Coolant Pump #1 Seal Leakoff Alarm Setpoint
- DCP 99-1-9555-1-001, Change Service Water System Valve
- MD 00-2622, Rev. 0, Change Portion of Protection Rack Ground Wiring from Teflon Insulated to Polyethylene Insulated
- MD 00-2638, Rev. 0, Diesel Generator Operation Without Desiccant
- DCP 99-1-9501-0-002, RCS Attached Piping Analysis and Modification
- DCP 98-0-9400, Removal of Turbocharger Doors for 1-2A, 1B, and 2B D/G's
- DCP 97-0-9202-0-001, 4160 V Test Breaker at the SWIS
- DCP 00-2-9571-0-001, Atlas Copco Air Compressor Modifications
- DCP 98-2-9371-0-001, Unit 2 Service Water Lube and Cooling Strainer Replacement

##### Safety Evaluations Reviewed

- DCP 98-1-9446-0-002, Revised Settings on 1C Battery Charger AC Load Center Breaker
- DCP 98-2-9447-0-002, Revised Settings on 1C Battery Charger AC Load Center Breaker
- DCP 97-2-9216-0-001, RHR Snubber Removal
- DCP 97-2-9217-0-001, CVCS Snubber Removal
- DCP 97-2-9208-0-001, HHSI Snubber Removal
- DCP 97-1-9198-0-002, Emergency Air to Atmospheric Solenoid Valves
- DCP 96-1-9071-0-001, Design Change to Pressure Switch on Solenoid Valve in Instrument Air System
- ABN 99-0-1527, Emergency Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Loads
- DCP 95-0-8955-1-005, Emergency Diesel Generators Air Start System
- FNP-2-ETP-4439, Valve Functions added to FSAR for CCW System
- DCP 00-1-9570-0-001, Atlas Copco Air Compressor Modifications
- DCP 97-2-9199-0-003, Replacement of Emergency Air to Atmospheric Solenoids Valve
- SECL-99-007, Integrated ECCS and Accumulator Discharge Testing
- FNP-0-SOP-38.0, Rev 59A, Diesel Generators
- SECL-00-066, Evaluation of CCP/RHR ECCS Flow Balancing Test Data - U2RF13
- ABN 99-0-1576, Changes to Appendix R Compliance Report A-350971
- DCP 90-0-7046-00-001, Replace Allis-Chalmers 4160V Air Magnetic Breakers with Siemens Vacuum Breakers
- DCP 97-1-9281-0-004, Installation of Test Connections on Service Water Piping
- ABN 99-0-1418, Documentation of Silicone Foam Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Configurations
- ABN 99-0-1575, Revision of Alternate Shutdown Capability Report

Section 1R17Modification Packages Reviewed

- DCP 99-1-9514-0-001, Pressurizer Surge Line Pipe Whip Restraint Removal
- DCP 98-1-9446-0-002, Revised Settings on 1C Battery Charger AC Load Center Breaker
- DCP 98-2-9447-0-002, Revised Settings on 1C Battery Charger AC Load Center Breaker
- ABN 99-0-1527, Emergency Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Loads
- DCP 95-0-8955-1-005, Emergency Diesel Generators Air Start System
- DCP 90-0-7046-00-001, Replace Allis-Chalmers 4160V Air Magnetic Breakers with Siemens Vacuum Breakers
- SECL-99-007, Integrated ECCS and Accumulator Discharge Testing
- DCP 98-2-9371-0-001, Unit 2 Service Water Lube and Cooling Strainer Replacement
- DCP 99-1-9501-0-002, RCS Attached Piping Analysis and Modification
- DCP 99-1-9555-1-001, Change Service Water System Valve N1P16V735 from Carbon Steel to Stainless Steel

Corrective Action Documents Reviewed

- Condition Report 2000005031, Operations Report on 50.59 Self-Assessment
- Corrective Action Report 2365, 10CFR 50.59 Screening not Performed for Changes Made in Switchyard
- Safety Audit and Engineering, Audit of Plant Changes and Modifications
- Review 98-PMD/9-1
- Safety Audit and Engineering, Audit of Design Change Request Process
- Review 98-DCR-1
- Nuclear Operations Review Board Minutes 1999-02, 1999-04, and 2000-04