

April 15, 1993

Docket Nos. 50-387
and 50-388

Mr. Robert G. Byram
Senior Vice President-Nuclear
Pennsylvania Power and Light Company
2 North Ninth Street
Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101

Dear Mr. Byram:

SUBJECT: CHANGES TO LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERIC LETTER 88-01, SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 (PLA-3961) (TAC NOS. M86277 AND M86278)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 134 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-14 and Amendment No. 104 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-22 for the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2. These amendments are in response to your letter dated April 16, 1993.

These amendments revise the Technical Specifications to conform to the NRC staff positions on Inservice Inspection and on monitoring of unidentified leakage as requested in Generic Letter 88-01, "NRC Position On IGSCC In BWR Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping".

A copy of our Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's Biweekly Federal Register Notice.

Sincerely, Original signed by
Richard J. Clark

Richard J. Clark, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 134 to License No. NPF-14
2. Amendment No. 104 to License No. NPF-22
3. Safety Evaluation

NRC FILE CONTROL COPY

cc w/enclosures:

See next page

DISTRIBUTION:

Docket File	MO'Brien(2)	CGrimes, 11E21
NRC & Local PDRs	RClark(3)	WKoo, EMCB
PDI-2 Reading	OGC	ACRS(10)
SVarga	DHagan, 3206	OPA
JCalvo	GHill(4), P1-22	OC/LFDCB
CMiller	EWenzinger, RGN-I	JWhite, RGN-I
RCapra	JStrosnider	

OFC	: PDI-2/LA	: PDI-2/PM	: EMCB	: C/EMCB	: OGC	: PDI-2/D
NAME	: MO'Brien	: RClark:rb	: WKoo	: JStrosnider	: HOLLER	: CMiller:tm

DATE	: 5/16/94	: 03/04/94	: 03/23/94	: 3/30/94	: 4/15/94
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

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Senior Vice President-Nuclear
Pennsylvania Power and Light Company
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Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101

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A copy of our Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's Biweekly Federal Register Notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Richard J. Clark".

Richard J. Clark, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 134 to License No. NPF-14
2. Amendment No. 104 to License No. NPF-22
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

Mr. Robert G. Byram
Pennsylvania Power & Light Company

Susquehanna Steam Electric Station,
Units 1 & 2

cc:

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

ALLEGHENY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-387

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 134
License No. NPF-14

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) having found that:
 - A. The application for the amendment filed by the Pennsylvania Power & Light Company, dated April 16, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of the Facility Operating License No. NPF-14 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 134 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. PP&L shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and is to be implemented within 90 days after its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Charles L. Miller

Charles L. Miller, Director
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: April 15, 1994

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 134

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-14

DOCKET NO. 50-387

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The overleaf page is provided to maintain document completeness.*

<u>REMOVE</u>	<u>INSERT</u>
3/4 0-3 -	3/4 0-3 -
3/4 4-5 3/4 4-6	3/4 4-5* 3/4 4-6
3/4 4-7 3/4 4-8	3/4 4-7 3/4 4-8
B 3/4 4-2 -	B 3/4 4-2 -

APPLICABILITY

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda terminology for inservice inspection and testing activities	Required frequencies for performing inservice inspection and testing activities
Weekly Monthly Quarterly or every 3 months Semiannually or every 6 months Every 9 months Yearly or annually	At least once per 7 days At least once per 31 days At least once per 92 days At least once per 184 days At least once per 276 days At least once per 366 days

- c. The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are applicable to the above required frequencies for performing inservice inspection and testing activities.
- d. Performance of the above inservice inspection and testing activities shall be in addition to other specified Surveillance Requirements.
- e. Nothing in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code shall be construed to supersede the requirements of any Technical Specification.
- f. The Inservice Inspection Program for piping identified in NRC Generic Letter 88-01 shall be performed in accordance with the NRC Staff position on Schedule, Methods and Personnel, and sample expansions included in the Generic Letter.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.2 SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.2 The safety valve function of at least 10 of the following reactor coolant system safety/relief valves shall be OPERABLE with the specified code safety valve function lift settings: * **

- 2 safety-relief valves @ 1146 psig $\pm 1\%$
- 4 safety-relief valves @ 1175 psig $\pm 1\%$
- 4 safety-relief valves @ 1185 psig $\pm 1\%$
- 3 safety-relief valves @ 1195 psig $\pm 1\%$
- 3 safety-relief valves @ 1205 psig $\pm 1\%$

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With the safety valve function of one or more of the above required safety/relief valves inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours.
- b. With one or more safety/relief valves stuck open, provided that suppression pool average water temperature is less than 105°F, close the stuck open relief valve(s); if unable to close the open valve(s) within 2 minutes or if suppression pool water temperature is 105°F or greater, place the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position.
- c. With one or more safety/relief valve acoustic monitors inoperable, restore the inoperable monitor(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.2 The acoustic monitor for each safety/relief valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE with the setpoint verified to be 0.25 of the full open noise level by performance of a:

- a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days, and a
- b. Calibration in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations at least once per 18 months. ##

*The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valves at nominal operating temperatures and pressures.

**Up to 2 inoperable valves may be replaced with spare OPERABLE valves with lower setpoints until the next refueling.

##The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable provided the surveillance is performed within 12 hours after reactor steam pressure is adequate to perform the test.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- 3.4.3.1 At least the following reactor coolant system leakage detection systems shall be OPERABLE:
- a. Two drywell floor drain sump level channels, and
 - b. One primary containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitoring system channel and one containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitoring system channel aligned to the drywell.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With one or both channels of the drywell floor drain sump level monitoring system inoperable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided the drywell floor drain sump flow rate is monitored and determined by alternate means at least once per 12 hours. Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- b. With both channels of the gaseous radioactivity monitoring system inoperable or with both channels of the particulate radioactivity monitoring system inoperable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed at least once per 24 hours. If at least one channel of the affected monitoring system cannot be returned to OPERABLE status and aligned to the drywell within 30 days, or the grab samples are not obtained and analyzed as required, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.4.3.1 The reactor coolant system leakage detection systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:
- a. Primary containment atmosphere particulate and gaseous monitoring systems-performance of a CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours, a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days and a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.
 - b. Drywell floor drain sump level monitoring system-performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days and a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.3.2 Reactor coolant system leakage shall be limited to:

- a. No PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE.
- b. 5 gpm UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE.
- c. 25 gpm total leakage average over any 24-hour period.
- d. 1 gpm leakage at a reactor coolant system pressure of 1000 ± 10 psig from any reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve specified in Table 3.4.3.2-1.
- e. 2 gpm increase in UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE within any 24-hour period in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.

- ACTION:**
- a. With any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours.
 - b. With any reactor coolant system leakage greater than the limits in b and/or c, above, reduce the leakage rate to within the limits within 4 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
 - c. With any reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve leakage greater than the above limit, isolate the high pressure portion of the affected system from the low pressure portion within 4 hours by use of at least one closed manual or deactivated automatic valves, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
 - d. With one or more of the high/low pressure interface valve leakage pressure monitors shown in Table 3.4.3.2-1 inoperable, restore the inoperable monitor(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or verify the pressure to be less than the alarm pressure at least once per 12 hours; restore the inoperable monitor(s) to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
 - e. With any reactor coolant system UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE increase greater than 2 gpm within any 24-hour period, in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 only, identify the source of leakage increase as not service sensitive Type 304 or 316 austenitic stainless steel within 12 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.3.2.1 The reactor coolant system leakage shall be demonstrated to be within each of the above limits by:

- a. Monitoring the primary containment atmospheric particulate and gaseous radioactivity at least once per 4 hours, and
- b. Monitoring the drywell floor drain sump level at least once per 12 hours.
- c. Determining the total IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE at least once per 24 hours.

4.4.3.2.2 Each reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve specified in Table 3.4.3.2-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by leak testing pursuant to Specification 4.0.5 and verifying the leakage of each valve to be within the specified limit:

- a. At least once per 18 months, and
- b. Prior to returning the valve to service following maintenance, repair or replacement work on the valve which could affect its leakage rate.

The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3.

4.4.3.2.3 The high/low pressure interface valve leakage pressure monitors shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within the alarm setpoints per Table 3.4.3.2-1 by performance of a:

- a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days, and
- b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES (Continued)

3/4.4.2 SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES

The safety valve function of the safety/relief valves operate to prevent the reactor coolant system from being pressurized above the Safety Limit of 1325 psig in accordance with the ASME Code. A total of 10 OPERABLE safety-relief valves is required to limit reactor pressure to within ASME III allowable values for the worst case upset transient.

Demonstration of the safety/relief valve lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Specification 4.0.5.

3/4.4.3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

3/4.4.3.1 LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS

The RCS leakage detection systems required by this specification are provided to monitor and detect leakage from the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

3/4.4.3.2 OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE

The allowable leakage rates for the reactor coolant system have been based on the predicted and experimentally observed behavior of cracks in pipes. The normally expected background leakage due to equipment design and the detection capability of the instrumentation for determining system leakage was also considered. The evidence obtained from experiments suggests that for leakage somewhat greater than that specified for UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE the probability is small that the imperfection or crack associated with such leakage would grow rapidly. The limit of unidentified leakage has been changed to reflect the requirements of Generic Letter 88-01. However, in all cases, if the leakage rates exceed the values specified or the leakage is located and known to be PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, the reactor will be shutdown to allow further investigation and corrective action.

The Surveillance Requirements for RCS pressure isolation valves provide added assurance of valve integrity thereby reducing the probability of gross valve failure and consequence intersystem LOCA.

3/4.4.4 CHEMISTRY

The water chemistry limits of the reactor coolant system are established to prevent damage to the reactor materials in contact with the coolant. Chloride limits are specified to prevent stress corrosion cracking of the stainless steel. The effect of chloride is not as great when the oxygen concentration in the coolant is low, thus the 0.2 ppm limit on chlorides is permitted during POWER OPERATION. During shutdown and refueling operations, the temperature necessary for stress corrosion to occur is not present so a 0.5 ppm concentration of chlorides is not considered harmful during these periods.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

ALLEGHENY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-388

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 104
License No. NPF-22

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) having found that:
 - A. The application for the amendment filed by the Pennsylvania Power & Light Company, dated April 16, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of the Facility Operating License No. NPF-22 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 104 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. PP&L shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and is to be implemented within 90 days after its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Charles L. Miller

Charles L. Miller, Director
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: April 15, 1994

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 104

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-22

DOCKET NO. 50-388

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The overleaf pages are provided to maintain document completeness.*

<u>REMOVE</u>	<u>INSERT</u>
3/4 0-1	3/4 0-1*
3/4 0-2	3/4 0-2
3/4 0-3	3/4 0-3
-	-
3/4 4-5	3/4 4-5*
3/4 4-6	3/4 4-6
3/4 4-7	3/4 4-7
3/4 4-8	3/4 4-8
B 3/4 4-1	B 3/4 4-1*
B 3/4 4-2	B 3/4 4-2

3/4.0 APPLICABILITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- 3.0.1 Compliance with the Limiting Conditions for Operation contained in the succeeding Specifications is required during the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS or other conditions specified therein; except that upon failure to meet the Limiting Conditions for Operation, the associated ACTION requirements shall be met.
- 3.0.2 Noncompliance with a Specification shall exist when the requirements of the Limiting Condition for Operation and associated ACTION requirements are not met within the specified time intervals. If the Limiting Condition for Operation is restored prior to expiration of the specified time intervals, completion of the ACTION requirements is not required.
- 3.0.3 When a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met, except as provided in the associated ACTION requirements, within one hour action shall be initiated to place the unit in an OPERATIONAL CONDITION in which the Specification does not apply by placing it, as applicable, in:
1. At least STARTUP within the next 6 hours,
 2. At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, and
 3. At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours.

Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation under the ACTION requirements, the ACTION may be taken in accordance with the specified time limits as measured from the time of failure to meet the Limiting Condition for Operation. Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the individual Specifications. This specification is not applicable in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5.

- 3.0.4* Entry into an OPERATIONAL CONDITION or other specified condition shall not be made when the conditions for the Limiting Conditions for Operation are not met and the associated ACTION requires a shutdown if they are not met within a specified time interval. Entry into an OPERATIONAL CONDITION or other specified condition may be made in accordance with the ACTION requirements when conformance to them permits continued operation of the facility for an unlimited period of time. This provision shall not prevent passage through or to OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS as required to comply with ACTION requirements. Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the individual Specifications.

* Compliance with this Specification for the inoperable "S" SRV acoustic monitor is not required for the period beginning January 21, 1994, until the next unit shutdown of sufficient duration to allow for containment entry, not to exceed the sixth refueling and inspection outage.

APPLICABILITY

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.0.1 Surveillance Requirements shall be met during the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS or other conditions specified for individual Limiting Conditions for Operation unless otherwise stated in an individual Surveillance Requirement.
- 4.0.2 Each Surveillance Requirement shall be performed within the specified surveillance interval with a maximum allowable extension not to exceed 25 percent of the specified surveillance interval.
- 4.0.3 Failure to perform a Surveillance Requirement within the allowed surveillance interval, defined by Specification 4.0.2, shall constitute noncompliance with the OPERABILITY requirements for a Limiting Condition for Operation. The time limits of the ACTION requirements are applicable at the time it is identified that a Surveillance Requirement has not been performed. The ACTION requirements may be delayed for up to 24 hours to permit the completion of the surveillance when the allowable outage time limits of the ACTION requirements are less than 24 hours. Surveillance Requirements do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment.
- 4.0.4 ** Entry into an OPERATIONAL CONDITION or other specified applicable condition shall not be made unless the Surveillance Requirement(s) associated with the Limiting Condition for Operation have been performed within the applicable surveillance interval or as otherwise specified. This provision shall not prevent passage through or to OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS as required to comply with ACTION requirements.
- 4.0.5 Surveillance Requirements for inservice inspection and testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2, & 3 components shall be applicable as follows:
- a. Inservice inspection of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components and inservice testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 pumps and valves shall be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50, Section 50.55a(g), except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50, Section 50.55a(g)(6)(i).
 - b. Surveillance intervals specified in Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda for the inservice inspection and testing activities required by the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda shall be applicable as follows in these Technical Specifications:

** Compliance with this Specification for the inoperable "S" SRV acoustic monitor is not required for the period beginning January 21, 1994, until the next unit shutdown of sufficient duration to allow for containment entry, not to exceed the sixth refueling and inspection outage.

APPLICABILITY

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda terminology for inservice inspection and testing activities	Required frequencies for performing inservice inspection and testing activities
Weekly Monthly Quarterly or every 3 months Semiannually or every 6 months Every 9 months Yearly or annually	At least once per 7 days At least once per 31 days At least once per 92 days At least once per 184 days At least once per 276 days At least once per 366 days

- c. The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are applicable to the above required frequencies for performing inservice inspection and testing activities.
- d. Performance of the above inservice inspection and testing activities shall be in addition to other specified Surveillance Requirements.
- e. Nothing in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code shall be construed to supersede the requirements of any Technical Specification.
- f. The Inservice Inspection Program for piping identified in NRC Generic Letter 88-01 shall be performed in accordance with the NRC Staff position on Schedule, Methods and Personnel, and sample expansions included in the Generic Letter.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.2 SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.2 The safety valve function of at least 10 of the following reactor coolant system safety/relief valves shall be OPERABLE with the specified code safety valve function lift settings:

- 2 safety-relief valves @ 1146 psig $\pm 1\%$
- 4 safety-relief valves @ 1175 psig $\pm 1\%$
- 4 safety-relief valves @ 1185 psig $\pm 1\%$
- 3 safety-relief valves @ 1195 psig $\pm 1\%$
- 3 safety-relief valves @ 1205 psig $\pm 1\%$

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, AND 3.

ACTION:

- a. With the safety valve function of one or more of the above required safety/relief valves inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours.
- b. With one or more safety/relief valves stuck open, provided that suppression pool average water temperature is less than 105°F, close the stuck open relief valve(s); if unable to close the open valve(s) within 2 minutes or if suppression pool water temperature is 105°F or greater, place the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position.
- c.### With one or more safety/relief valve acoustic monitors inoperable, restore the inoperable monitor(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.2### The acoustic monitor for each safety/relief valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE with the setpoint verified to be 0.25 of the full open noise level# by performance of a:

- a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days, and a
- b. Calibration in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations at least once per 18 months.##

* The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valves at nominal operating temperatures and pressures.

** Up to 2 inoperable valves may be replaced with spare OPERABLE valves with lower setpoints until the next refueling.

Initial setting shall be in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendation. Adjustment to the valve full open noise level shall be accomplished during the startup test program.

The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable provided the surveillance is performed within 12 hours after reactor steam pressure is adequate to perform the test.

Compliance with these requirements for the "S" SRV acoustic monitor is not required for the period beginning January 21, 1994, until the next unit shutdown of sufficient duration to allow for containment entry, not to exceed the sixth refueling and inspection outage.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.3.1 At least the following reactor coolant system leakage detection systems shall be OPERABLE:

- a. Two drywell floor drain sump level channels, and
- b. One primary containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitoring system channel and one containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitoring system channel aligned to the drywell.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With one or both channels of the drywell floor drain sump level monitoring system inoperable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided the drywell floor drain sump flow rate is monitored and determined by alternate means at least once per 12 hours. Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- b. With both channels of the gaseous radioactivity monitoring system inoperable or with both channels of the particulate radioactivity monitoring system inoperable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed at least once per 24 hours. If at least one channel of the affected monitoring system cannot be returned to OPERABLE status and aligned to the drywell within 30 days, or the grab samples are not obtained and analyzed as required, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.3.1 The reactor coolant system leakage detection systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

- a. Primary containment atmosphere particulate and gaseous monitoring systems-performance of a CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours, a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days and a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.
- b. Drywell floor drain sump level monitoring system-performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days and a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.3.2 Reactor coolant system leakage shall be limited to:

- a. No PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE.
- b. 5 gpm UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE.
- c. 25 gpm total leakage average over any 24-hour period.
- d. 1 gpm leakage at a reactor coolant system pressure of 1000 ± 10 psig from any reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve specified in Table 3.4.3.2-1.
- e. 2 gpm increase in UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE within any 24-hour period in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.

- ACTION:**
- a. With any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours.
 - b. With any reactor coolant system leakage greater than the limits in b and/or c, above, reduce the leakage rate to within the limits within 4 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
 - c. With any reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve leakage greater than the above limit, isolate the high pressure portion of the affected system from the low pressure portion within 4 hours by use of at least one closed manual or deactivated automatic valve, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
 - d. With one or more of the high/low pressure interface valve leakage pressure monitors shown in Table 3.4.3.2-1 inoperable, restore the inoperable monitor(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or verify the pressure to be less than the alarm pressure at least once per 12 hours; restore the inoperable monitor(s) to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
 - e. With any reactor coolant system UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE increase greater than 2 gpm within any 24-hour period, in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 only, identify the source of leakage increase as not service sensitive Type 304 or 316 austenitic stainless steel within 12 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.3.2.1 The reactor coolant system leakage shall be demonstrated to be within each of the above limits by:

- a. Monitoring the primary containment atmospheric particulate and gaseous radioactivity at least once per 4 hours, and
- b. Monitoring the drywell floor drain sump level at least once per 12 hours.
- c. Determining the total IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE at least once per 24 hours.

4.4.3.2.2 Each reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve specified in Table 3.4.3.2-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by leak testing pursuant to Specification 4.0.5 and verifying the leakage of each valve to be within the specified limit:

- a. At least once per 18 months, and
- b. Prior to returning the valve to service following maintenance, repair or replacement work on the valve which could affect its leakage rate.

The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3.

4.4.3.2.3 The high/low pressure interface valve leakage pressure monitors shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within the alarm setpoints per Table 3.4.3.2-1 by performance of a:

- a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days, and
- b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

3/4.4.1 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM

Operation with one reactor recirculation loop inoperable has been evaluated and found acceptable, provided that the unit is operated in accordance with Specification 3.4.1.1.2.

LOCA analyses for two loop operating conditions, which result in Peak Cladding Temperatures (PCTs) below 2200°F, bound single loop operating conditions. Single loop operation LOCA analyses using two-loop MAPLHGR limits result in lower PCTs. Therefore, the use of two-loop MAPLHGR limits during single loop operation assures that the PCT during a LOCA event remains below 2200°F.

The MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) limits for single loop operation assure that the Safety Limit MCPR is not exceeded for any Anticipated Operational Occurrence (AOO). In addition, the MCPR limits for single-loop operation protect against the effects of the Recirculation Pump Seizure Accident. That is, for operation in single-loop with an operating MCPR limit ≥ 1.30 , the radiological consequences of a pump seizure accident from single-loop operating conditions are but a small fraction of 10CFR100 guidelines.

For single loop operation, the RBM and APRM setpoints are adjusted by a 8.5% decrease in recirculation drive flow to account for the active loop drive flow that bypasses the core and goes up through the inactive loop jet pumps.

Surveillance on the pump speed of the operating recirculation loop is imposed to exclude the possibility of excessive reactor vessel internals vibration. Surveillance on differential temperatures below the threshold limits of THERMAL POWER or recirculation loop flow mitigates undue thermal stress on vessel nozzles, recirculation pumps and the vessel bottom head during extended operation in the single loop mode. The threshold limits are those values which will sweep up the cold water from the vessel bottom head.

Specifications have been provided to prevent, detect, and mitigate core thermal hydraulic instability events. These specifications are prescribed in accordance with NRC Bulletin 88-07, Supplement 1, "Power Oscillations in Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs)," dated December 30, 1988.

LPRM upscale alarms are required to detect reactor core thermal hydraulic instability events. The criteria for determining which LPRM upscale alarms are required is based on assignment of these alarm to designated core zones. These core zones consist of the level A, B and C alarms in 4 or 5 adjacent LPRM strings. The number and location of LPRM strings in each zone assure that with 50% or more of the associated LPRM upscale alarms OPERABLE sufficient monitoring capability is available to detect core wide and regional oscillations. Operating plant instability data is used to determine the specific LPRM strings assigned to each zone. The core zones and required LPRM upscale alarms in each zone are specified in appropriate procedures.

An inoperable jet pump is not, in itself, a sufficient reason to declare a recirculation loop inoperable, but it does in case of a design basis accident, increase the blowdown area and reduce the capability of reflooding the core; thus, the requirement for shutdown of the facility with a jet pump inoperable. Jet pump failure can be detected by monitoring jet pump performance on a prescribed schedule for significant degradation.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

Recirculation pump speed mismatch limits are in compliance with the ECCS LOCA analysis design criteria for two loop operation. The limits will ensure an adequate core flow coastdown from either recirculation loop following a LOCA. In the case where the mismatch limits cannot be maintained during the loop operation, continued operation is permitted in the single loop mode.

In order to prevent undue stress on the vessel nozzles and bottom head region, the recirculation loop temperatures shall be within 50°F of each other prior to startup of an idle loop. The loop temperature must also be within 50°F of the reactor pressure vessel coolant temperature to prevent thermal shock to the recirculation pump and recirculation nozzles. Since the coolant in the bottom of the vessel is at a lower temperature than the coolant in the upper regions of the core, undue stress on the vessel would result if the temperature difference was greater than 145°F.

3/4.4.2 SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES

The safety valve function of the safety/relief valves operate to prevent the reactor coolant system from being pressurized above the Safety Limit of 1325 psig in accordance with the ASME Code. A total of 10 OPERABLE safety-relief valves is required to limit reactor pressure to within ASME III allowable values for the worst case upset transient.

Demonstration of the safety/relief valve lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Specification 4.0.5.

3/4.4.3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

3/4.4.3.1 LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS

The RCS leakage detection systems required by this specification are provided to monitor and detect leakage from the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

3/4.4.3.2 OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE

The allowable leakage rates for the reactor coolant system have been based on the predicted and experimentally observed behavior of cracks in pipes. The normally expected background leakage due to equipment design and the detection capability of the instrumentation for determining system leakage was also considered. The evidence obtained from experiments suggests that for leakage somewhat greater than that specified for UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE the probability is small that the imperfection or crack associated with such leakage would grow rapidly. The limit of unidentified leakage has been changed to reflect the requirements of Generic Letter 88-01. However, in all cases, if the leakage rates exceed the values specified or the leakage is located and known to be PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, the reactor will be shutdown to allow further investigation and corrective action.

The Surveillance Requirements for RCS pressure isolation valves provide added assurance of valve integrity thereby reducing the probability of gross valve failure and consequence intersystem LOCA.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 134 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-14

AMENDMENT NO. 104 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-22

PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

ALLEGHENY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-387 AND 50-388

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated April 16, 1993, the Pennsylvania Power and Light Company (PP&L or the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would revise the TSs to conform to the NRC staff positions on Inservice Inspection (ISI) and on monitoring of unidentified leakage as set forth in Generic Letter (GL), 88-01, NRC Position On Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) In Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping.

2.0 DISCUSSION

NRC GL 88-01, issued January 25, 1988, provided guidance in the form of NRC positions regarding Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) problems in Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) piping made of austenitic stainless steel that is 4 inches or larger in nominal diameter and contains reactor coolant at a temperature above 200 degrees F during reactor power operation regardless of ASME Code classification. NRC GL 88-01 requested licensees of operating BWRs and holders of construction permits for BWRs to provide information regarding conformance with the NRC positions. Two of the items which the GL requested licensees to address were: (1) a TS change to include a statement in the TS section on Inservice Inspection (ISI) that the ISI program for piping covered by the scope of NRC GL 88-01 will be in conformance with the NRC positions on schedule, methods and personnel, and sample expansion included in the GL, and (2) confirmation of the licensee's plans to ensure that the TSs related to leak detection will be in conformance with the NRC positions on leak detection included in the GL. The NRC position on leakage detection specifically stated that unidentified leakage be limited to an increase of 2 gpm over a 24-hour period.

3.0 EVALUATION

The NRC previously completed an evaluation of PP&L's programs to meet the 13 staff positions and other guidance in GL 88-01.

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By letter dated February 16, 1990, the staff informed PP&L that their programs were fully acceptable and satisfied all of the requirements in GL 88-01 except for the TSs on ISI and unidentified leakage and their position concerning crack evaluation. The latter issue was subsequently resolved.

The licensee has proposed the following changes to the TSs in conformance with the guidance in GL 88-01:

1. Add new Surveillance Requirement 4.0.5.f to read "The Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program for piping identified in NRC Generic Letter 88-01 shall be performed in accordance with the staff position on schedule, methods and personnel, and sample expansion included in the Generic Letter".
2. Revise the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) in Section 3.4.3.2e to require that reactor coolant system leakage shall be limited to a 2 gpm increase in unidentified leakage within any 24-hour period in Operational Condition 1. The current requirement is a 2 gpm increase in unidentified leakage within any 4-hour period.
3. Modify ACTION requirement e for the above LCO to specify that:
 - e. With any reactor coolant system UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE increase greater than 2 gpm within any 24-hour period, in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 only, identify the source of leakage increase as not service sensitive Type 304 or 316 austenitic stainless steel within 12 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

The revisions limit the increase to 2 gpm within any 24-hour period vs the present 4 hours, specify that this requirement only applies while the units are at power (Operational Condition 1) and allow 12 hours to try to identify the source of the unidentified leakage.

4. Modify ACTION requirement a. in Section 3.4.3.1 on Leakage Detection Systems to read:
 - a. With one or both channels of the drywell floor drain sump level monitoring system inoperable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided the drywell floor drain sump flow rate is monitored and determined by alternate means at least once per 12 hours. Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

The above conforms to staff position (3) in Supplement 1 to GL 88-01.

5. Modify SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.4.3.2.1b to require that the drywell floor drain sump level be monitored every 12 hours vs the 4 hours in the current TS. This is in conformance with staff position (1) in Supplement 1 to GL 88-01.

6. Modify the BASES in 3/4.4.3.2 on OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE by adding the sentence: "The limit of unidentified leakage has been changed to reflect the requirements of Generic Letter 88-01".

The above changes to the TSs are in accordance with the staff positions and model TSs in GL 88-01 and Supplement 1 to GL 88-01 and are acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Pennsylvania State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (58 FR 28058). Accordingly, the amendments meet eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: R. Clark

Date: April 15, 1994