March 12, 2001

Mr. Charles H. Cruse
Vice President - Nuclear Energy
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc.
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway
Lusby, MD 20657-4702

SUBJECT: CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 - AMENDMENT RE: CONTAINMENT CLOSURE (TAC NOS. MA8063 AND MA8064)

Dear Mr. Cruse:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 242 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-53 and Amendment No. 216 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-69 for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. These amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application transmitted by letter dated January 27, 2000, as supplemented by letters dated June 15 and November 21, 2000.

On the date of the January 27, 2000, application, Baltimore Gas and Electric (BG&E) was the licensed operator of Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant. On June 30, 2000, BG&E's ownership interest in Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant was transferred to Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc. (CCNPPI). By letter dated February 14, 2001, CCNPPI requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission continue to review and act upon all requests before the Commission which had been submitted by BG&E. Accordingly, the staff has completed its review of the requested amendment.

The amendments modify the conditions of containment closure during core alterations, fuel handling and the loss of shutdown cooling within TSs 3.9.3 and 3.9.4. A new containment outage door assembly is proposed to be installed on the outside of the equipment hatch opening to allow more flexibility when staging material in the containment during an outage, while providing for quicker closure and improved safety with the equipment hatch removed. The licensee also proposed changes to the way the personnel air lock and the containment purge system are operated during maintenance activities on the shutdown cooling system.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Donna Skay, Project Manager, Section 1
Project Directorate 1
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-318

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 242 to DPR-53
2. Amendment No. 216 to DPR-69
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Donna Skay, Project Manager, Section 1
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Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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cc w/encls: See next page

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*SE inputs dated 5/12/00, 12/20/00, and 12/22/00 were incorporated with no significant changes.
Accession Number: ML010180575

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CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-317

CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 242
Renewed License No. DPR-53

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Baltimore Gas and Electric Company dated January 27, 2000, as supplemented June 15, 2000 and November 21, 2000, and as adopted by CCNPPI (the licensee), pursuant to a letter dated February 14, 2001, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.2. of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-53 is hereby amended to read as follows:

2. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 242, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA/

Marsha Gamberoni, Chief, Section 1
Project Directorate I
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 12, 2001

CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-318

CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 216
Renewed License No. DPR-69

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Baltimore Gas and Electric Company dated January 27, 2000, as supplemented June 15, 2000 and November 21, 2000, and as adopted by CCNPPI (the licensee), pursuant to a letter dated February 14, 2001, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.2. of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-69 is hereby amended to read as follows:

2. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 216, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA/

Marsha Gamberoni, Chief, Section 1
Project Directorate I
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 12, 2001

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENT NO. 242 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-53

AMENDMENT NO. 216 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-69

DOCKET NOS. 50-317 AND 50-318

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Pages	Insert Pages
3.9.3-1	3.9.3-1
3.9.4-1	3.9.4-1

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 242 TO RENEWED

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-53

AND AMENDMENT NO. 216 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-69

CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, INC.

CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-317 AND 50-318

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated January 27, 2000, as supplemented by letters dated June 15, 2000, and November 21, 2000, the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BGE, the licensee) submitted a request to change the Technical Specifications (TSs) for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. On the date of the January 27, 2000, application, Baltimore Gas and Electric (BG&E) was the licensed operator of Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant. On June 30, 2000, BG&E's ownership interest in Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant was transferred to Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc. (CCNPPI). By letter dated February 14, 2001, CCNPPI requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission continue to review and act upon all requests before the Commission which had been submitted by BG&E. Accordingly, the staff has completed its review of the requested amendment.

The Calvert Cliffs TSs specify that, during fuel handling and core alterations, several conditions must be met, including: (1) the containment equipment hatch must be closed and held in place by four bolts, and (2) the personnel air lock must be either closed, or capable of being closed, by an operable personnel air lock door under administrative control when there is 23 feet of water above the fuel. The requested change would allow the licensee to perform fuel handling and core alterations with the containment equipment hatch open, provided that a newly-installed containment outage door is capable of being closed under administrative control. Further, the phrase "when there is 23 feet of water above the fuel" would be deleted from the personnel air lock requirement.

CCNPPI has also requested a related change to the Shutdown Cooling (SDC) TSs, which would allow the personnel air lock, the equipment hatch, and the containment purge valves to be open under administrative control during certain SDC maintenance and testing conditions, when SDC is inoperable. This would make the allowed status (open or closed) of these containment penetrations the same during either fuel handling and core alterations or when the SDC is inoperable during maintenance and testing. The June 15, 2000, and November 21, 2000, submittals provided clarifying information that did not change the original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

2.0 BACKGROUND

2.1 Regulatory Background

Historically, development of regulatory requirements for nuclear power plant operation was based on the premise that most potential risk was due to operation at power. Consequently, protection of the public could be ensured by designs and operations that conservatively bounded all conditions by achieving defense-in-depth for power operation. Fuel movement was recognized as a situation for which there was no corresponding power operation scenario, and was judged as an area where additional regulatory protection was necessary. This is reflected in TSs in that there are many containment requirements during power operation, but few requirements apply during the Cold Shutdown and Refueling Modes outside of fuel handling and core alterations.

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the NRC and the industry realized that significant risk reductions could be achieved during shutdown operation. The NRC responded with a rulemaking effort, and the industry implemented voluntary initiatives to realize risk improvements. In recognition of these efforts, work to improve TSs was concentrated on power operation specifications, with the intention to address shutdown once a rule was in place.

The Commission, however, subsequently declined to issue a shutdown rule for comment. In SECY-97-168, dated July 30, 1997, the industry's voluntary actions were credited with helping achieve the acceptable level of risk from shutdown operations that now exists at U.S. nuclear power plants. Rather than implementing a new rule only to maintain this acceptable level of risk, in a staff requirements memorandum dated December 11, 1997, the Commission instructed the NRC staff to monitor licensee performance during shutdown operations through inspections and other means.

In summary, for the above reasons, TSs for shutdown operations are not always consistent with the amount of risk involved with certain plant configurations.

2.2 Discussion of Proposed Modification and Licensee Rationale

The licensee plans to install a new containment outage door assembly on the outside of the equipment hatch opening to provide quicker closure, improve safety when the door is open, and allow more flexibility when staging material in the containment during an outage. The licensee states that this will improve personnel safety and the progress of outages by allowing greater egress from and access to the containment during refueling outages.

The steel containment outage door assembly will be installed on the outside of the containment equipment hatch opening. The operational part of the assembly is a hinged door that can be sealed in the closed position by handwheel-operated dogs. The door is sized to allow the passage of the reactor coolant pump motor on a trailer. The door assembly is designed to withstand a containment pressure of 12 psig, and will be tested for its capability to close and seal prior to being placed in service. The containment outage door frame is designed with flange connections that will allow the passage of hoses and cables into containment. These penetrations on the containment outage door frame will be closed by either a blind flange or with a cable or hose fitting that will withstand a containment pressure of 12 psig. Currently, the temporary closure device installed in the emergency air lock (allowed by TS 3.9.3.b.) provides

this function. After the changes proposed in this request are approved, the licensee will not need to install the temporary closure device in the emergency air lock during routine outages, which will restore the emergency air lock to its original method of use. The restoration of the emergency air lock and the installation of the containment outage door will enhance personnel safety by providing two, or possibly three (equipment hatch opening, personnel air lock, and the emergency air lock during routine outages), containment exit points instead of the present single point at the personnel air lock. In the event of an emergency, the open equipment hatch opening gives personnel a quick path to evacuate containment.

With regard to SDC inoperability during SDC maintenance and testing, the licensee states that closing the containment penetrations during SDC system maintenance could create a potential health hazard for the people working in containment. In addition, closing all containment access interferes with the progress of maintenance work and slows the progress of the outage. Allowing the personnel air lock and the equipment hatch opening to be open and the purge system to be running during the SDC maintenance could alleviate the potential health hazard and could reduce the amount of time the unit is on alternate SDC. In the event of an emergency, the open equipment hatch opening gives personnel a quick path to evacuate containment.

2.3 Description of Proposed Changes to Technical Specifications

Currently, TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.9.3.a. requires, in part, the equipment hatch to be “closed and held in place by four bolts” during fuel handling and core alterations.

The licensee proposes to change LCO 3.9.3.a. to recognize the installation of the new containment outage door and allow its use as an alternative to the equipment hatch during core alterations and fuel handling. Additionally, the wording of the TS is being changed to indicate that four bolts are the minimum number required to secure the equipment hatch when it is used for containment closure.

Thus, proposed LCO 3.9.3.a. states “....closed and held in place by a minimum of four bolts OR the containment outage door is capable of being closed under administrative control.”

Currently, TS LCO 3.9.3.c. requires that:

c. The personnel air lock shall be either:

1. closed by one personnel air lock door, or

2. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE personnel air lock door under administrative control when there is 23 feet of water above the fuel.

The licensee proposes that LCO 3.9.3.c.2. be changed to delete the words "when there is 23 feet of water above the fuel."

Technical Specification LCO 3.9.4 requires one SDC loop to be operable and in operation during certain refueling operations. Note 2 states an exception:

2. The shutdown cooling pumps may be removed from operation during the time required for local leak rate testing of containment penetration number 41 pursuant to the requirements of SR [surveillance requirement] 3.6.1.1 or to permit maintenance on valves located in the common SDC suction line, provided:

   a. no operations are permitted that would cause a reduction to Reactor Coolant System boron concentration,

   b. CORE ALTERATIONS are suspended, and

   c. all containment penetrations providing direct access from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere are closed.

The licensee proposes that Note 2.c. be changed to require that all containment penetrations are placed in the status described in LCO 3.9.3, to assure that they are either closed or are capable of being closed. Thus, Note 2.c. would state:

   c. all containment penetrations are in the status described in LCO 3.9.3.

3.0 EVALUATION

3.1 Closing of the Containment Outage Door

To ensure that the current acceptable level of safety is maintained, the staff's evaluation of the licensee's proposed TS changes focused on four main issues:

(1) radiological consequences
(2) administrative controls
(3) risk significance
(4) structural integrity of the containment outage door

3.1.1 Radiological Consequences

In support of the proposed change to the TSs, the licensee has evaluated the radiological consequences of a fuel-handling accident (FHA) in containment with the containment outage door open. The licensee determined that the proposed change did not affect any of the assumptions or inputs previously used to analyze the fuel-handling accident within containment. The current analysis presented in the Calvert Cliffs updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) assumes that the personnel air lock is open for the duration of the FHA and takes no credit for filtration of the radioactivity released. Although the release would occur from a different location from that assumed in the current analysis, the licensee determined that the current control room atmospheric dispersion factor remains bounding. The calculated offsite dose results for the current analysis are well within the 10 CFR Part 100 limits. The current FHA in containment analysis shows that the dose to the control room operator can meet 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria GDC-19 limits as long as additional temporary protective measures (KI tablets and self contained breathing apparatuses (SCBAs)) are taken within approximately 3 hours. The amendment request does not ask for a change to the additional protective measures for the control room. The staff reviewed the licensee's evaluation and agrees that the licensee's current analysis of the FHA inside containment remains bounding for the proposed containment closure configuration during refueling.

The licensee determined that the proposed changes allow the equipment hatch opening, the personnel air lock, and the containment purge system to be managed for changes in the status of shutdown cooling such that there is no postulated radiological release to the environment due to a total loss of shutdown cooling. The staff agrees with the licensee that containment closure can be achieved before the release would be expected to occur.

The staff has reviewed the licensee's application, and has determined that the current FHA analysis, as documented in the UFSAR, remains bounding for the proposed changes.

3.1.2 Administrative Controls

Although the radiological consequences analysis for a fuel handling accident assumes that the containment remains open, the actual consequences would be reduced if the containment were promptly closed. In addition, if there were a loss of shutdown cooling, the containment would be closed before a radioactive release occurred. Therefore, the licensee's administrative controls regarding an open containment equipment hatch are important. The administrative controls most important to this review are the capability to close the equipment hatch penetration promptly and the ability to monitor possible radioactive releases.

The actual closing of the containment outage door can be accomplished by one person simply pushing the door closed and turning the handwheel to latch it. The procedure for closing the equipment hatch penetration includes removal of any grating or truck ramps that are in the opening, with the use of a fork lift, followed by door closure. The licensee expects that this can be accomplished in 20 minutes.

Cables, hoses, or pipes will not have to be run through the containment outage door because the frame of the containment outage door is equipped with fittings or penetrations that will allow electricity, compressed air, water, etc., to be run through the equipment hatch opening without going through the door. Flanges, cable penetrations, and isolation valves at these penetrations will be designed to withstand containment pressure resulting from postulated boiling in the reactor coolant system, as might occur during a loss of shutdown cooling.

Regarding the administrative controls already in place for the personnel air lock for prompt closure, the licensee's TS Bases currently state, in part:

> The administrative controls consist of a designated individual available immediately outside the personnel air lock to close an OPERABLE air lock door. Should a fuel handling accident occur inside containment, one personnel air lock door will be closed following an evacuation of containment.
>
> ....a designated individual is continuously available to close the air lock door. This individual must be stationed at the Auxiliary Building side of the outer air lock door. Operability of a containment personnel air lock door requires that the door is capable of being closed, that the door is unblocked, and no cables or hoses are run through the air lock.

The licensee states that administrative controls for the equipment hatch penetration will be put in place, similar to those placed on the personnel air lock, to ensure that the equipment hatch

opening will be closed when containment closure is required. Trained personnel will be available to close the door and contain any radiation released inside containment as a result of an FHA or loss of shutdown cooling.

Licensee compliance with GDC 64 will ensure adequate monitoring of effluents from the open equipment hatch penetration.

Having reviewed the licensee's administrative controls, we find them to be acceptable and we conclude that they are an adequate means for supporting the proposed TS change.

3.1.3 Risk Significance

There have been several occurrences in the history of the nuclear power industry in which fuel bundles have actually been dropped in the course of fuel handling activities. In each of these instances, the actual releases from the fuel have been minimal or nonexistent (reference NSAC/129 and other subsequent plant operating event reports). This evidence shows that the assumptions used in the radiological dose calculations for a fuel-handling accident are conservative.

Although a fuel-handling accident does contribute to overall risk, the dominant contributor to overall risk, due to its more severe consequences, is core damage. While fuel is being handled, the reactor vessel head is removed, and the water level above the reactor vessel flange is required by TSs to be 23 feet. Should a loss of SDC occur, the operator has approximately 48 hours to recover SDC before core damage, as long as failure of SDC was not caused by a significant loss of reactor cavity inventory. As long as the equipment hatch penetration can be closed in sufficient time to prevent fission product release, allowing an open equipment hatch will have relatively small risk implications.

As described in Section 3.1.2 above, the licensee has proposed a set of administrative controls for providing reasonable assurance that closure of the equipment hatch penetration can be achieved within 30 minutes. In addition, the licensee's compliance with GDC-64 ensures adequate monitoring of effluents when the equipment hatch penetration is open. We find these measures to be effective in ensuring low risk.

On the basis of the above, the staff concludes that the risk of permitting the licensee to open the equipment hatch during core alterations and fuel handling is relatively small. This conclusion is based on the licensee maintaining procedures and practices described in this safety evaluation that allow it to close the containment outage door, and thereby close the equipment hatch opening, within 30 minutes. This closure time is much less than the time that it would take the reactor coolant to boil following a loss of decay heat removal, considering that the refueling cavity is flooded. Therefore, we believe that the licensee can ensure that the containment will be closed prior to the potential release of fission products.

Accordingly, we have concluded that risk-informed considerations support the licensee's proposed TS changes.

3.1.4 Structural Integrity of Containment Door

The frame of the containment outage door is equipped with fittings or penetrations that will allow electricity, compressed air water, etc., to be run through the equipment hatch opening without going through the door. Flanges, cable penetrations, and isolation valves at these penetrations will be designed to withstand containment pressure resulting from postulated boiling in the reactor coolant system, as might occur during a loss of shutdown cooling.

The containment outage door vendor recommends performing a visual inspection of the hinges and latches prior to each refueling outage when the door is used. The hinges, latches, and bearing have been designed for a 40-year service life. The stress calculations for these components show that the stresses are low and maintain adequate design margins against accident loadings, including seismic. The loading conditions will not provide sufficient driving force for either high- or low-cycle fatigue. The structure is fabricated of carbon steel, which is not susceptible to stress corrosion cracking. The indoor environment is relatively benign to carbon steel. Although no failure mechanisms seem plausible, visual examinations will be performed at the start of each outage that the containment outage door will be used. These examinations will be sufficient to discover general corrosion well before it could lead to loss of significant section thickness. The inspections would also discover high ductility cracking, such as low-cycle fatigue, even though such cracking is not likely to occur.

The containment outage door and mounting hardware are designed in accordance with the requirements of 1995 American Society of Mechanical Engineering Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code) Section VIII, Division 1 using the stress categories given in Division 2 for the various loading combinations. The ASME Code Section VIII, Division 2 stress categories are utilized since Section VIII, Division 1 does not address all of the appropriate loading combinations applicable to this type of structure. The loads considered in the structural design of the containment outage door include the outage design pressure, restrained thermal expansion, accident temperature and seismic including the safe shutdown earthquake. The licensee's evaluation indicates that the calculated primary and secondary membrane and bending stresses will not exceed the applicable allowable stresses at temperature for the design, service levels A, B, C and D conditions.

The equipment hatch was designed to 1968 ASME Code, Section III, requirements. The containment outage door is attached to the outer edge of the carbon steel sleeve of the equipment hatch penetration with new hardware. The new hardware installed does not interfere with the functionality of the equipment hatch.

Based on the structural integrity evaluation discussed above, the staff concludes that the containment outage door design is consistent with applicable ASME Code requirements.

3.2 Other Technical Specification Changes

The licensee proposes to change LCO 3.9.3.a. to indicate that they may use four or more bolts to hold the closed equipment hatch in place. Compared to the current requirement for four bolts, the staff finds that this clearly is conservative and acceptable.

In LCO 3.9.3.c.2., the licensee proposes to delete the phrase "when there is 23 feet of water above the fuel," which is a condition on the opening of the personnel air lock doors during fuel

handling and core alterations. The explicit statement of that requirement in LCO 3.9.3.c.2. is redundant, because LCO 3.9.3 applies only during fuel handling and core alterations, and another TS (LCO 3.9.6, Refueling Pool Water Level) requires 23 feet of water above the fuel before fuel handling and core alterations may occur. Therefore, we find that the redundant phrase in LCO 3.9.3.c.2. is unnecessary and that its deletion is acceptable.

3.3 Conclusion

The NRC staff concludes, based on the considerations discussed above, that the proposed TS changes are acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Maryland State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (65 FR 12288). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: J. Pulsipher
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M. Hart

Date: March 12, 2001