

NP-06-2000-01

Docket No. 50-346

License No. NPF-3

January 2, 2001


United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Security Event Report 2000-S01
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1
Date of Occurrence - December 1, 2000

Enclosed please find Security Event Report 2000-S01, which is being submitted to provide 30 days written notification of the subject occurrence. This report is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR73.71(b).

Very truly yours,



Howard W. Bergendahl
Plant Manager
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

GMW/s

Enclosure

cc: Mr. J. E. Dyer, Regional Administrator, USNRC Region III
Mr. K. S. Zellers, DB-1 NRC Senior Resident Inspector
Utility Radiological Safety Board

JE74

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COMMITMENT LIST

The following list identifies those actions committed to by the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station in this document. Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by Davis-Besse. They are described only as information and are not regulatory commitments. Please notify the Manager - Regulatory Affairs (419-321-8450) at Davis-Besse of any questions regarding this document or associated regulatory commitments.

COMMITMENTS

DUE DATE

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. The expectations for following the administrative processes associated with the access control process will be defined, and training objectives will be established as defined for NPS Access Control Processing personnel. | 1. March 16, 2001 |
| 2. All NPS unescorted access authorizations will be fully reviewed by FirstEnergy Access Control to ensure all pertinent information is considered before unescorted access is authorized. | 2. Until additional NPS Access Control positions are staffed, the individuals are properly trained, and satisfactory performance has been demonstrated. These actions will be completed by June 30, 2001. |

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50.0 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

FACILITY NAME (1) Davis-Besse Unit Number 1		DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000346	PAGE (3) 1 OF 4
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TITLE (4)
Unescorted Access Improperly Granted to Contract Employee Due to Misfiling of Derogatory Information

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
12	01	2000	2000	-- S01 --	00	01	02	2001	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER 05000
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER 05000

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)									
	20.2201(b)			20.2203(a)(2)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)
POWER LEVEL (10) 100	20.2203(a)(1)			20.2203(a)(3)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(x)
	20.2203(a)(2)(i)			20.2203(a)(3)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			X 73.71
	20.2203(a)(2)(ii)			20.2203(a)(4)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)			OTHER
	20.2203(a)(2)(iii)			50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)			Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
	20.2203(a)(2)(iv)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Gerald M. Wolf, Engineer - Licensing	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (419) 321-8114
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X	NO					

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On December 1, 2000, it was discovered that derogatory information had been received by contract access control personnel for a contract employee on November 7, 2000. This derogatory information was not adjudicated by the contract access control personnel prior to granting interim unescorted access to the employee on November 10, 2000. The unescorted access of the contract employee was immediately revoked.

The apparent cause of this event was an excessive workload for the single individual coordinating the access authorization program for the contract company. The contract company's managerial oversight failed to recognize that insufficient manpower was available to properly review access information and failed to ensure that the established administrative process for reviewing information was followed. Additional experienced staffing will be added to the contract company's access authorization program to prevent recurrence. Until this staffing is added, all unescorted access authorizations will be fully reviewed by FirstEnergy Access Control.

This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR73.71(b) as a failure, or discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, controlled access area, or vital area for which compensatory measures have not been employed.

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TEXT CONTINUATION**

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Davis-Besse Unit Number 1	05000346	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2 OF 4
		2000	-- S01 --	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On November 29, 2000, it was discovered that derogatory information had been received for two Nuclear Power Services (NPS) contract employees granted interim unescorted access for work at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) during the Twelfth Refueling Outage, which was from April 1 to May 18, 2000. These two outage contract employees were properly approved for interim unescorted access in accordance with site procedures, and were terminated under favorable conditions at the completion of the outage. While completing the full background investigation, derogatory information was received on August 15 and 17, 2000, revealing both employees had tested positive during a drug test at a past employer (non-nuclear facilities). This derogatory information was not adjudicated by NPS Access Control personnel prior to granting full unescorted access authorization for these two employees. Since the two outage contract employees had been off-site since May 5, 2000 and did not possess unescorted access to the DBNPS at the time of discovery of the derogatory information, this event was entered into the Safeguards Event Log as required by 10CFR73.71(c) and Condition Report 2000-2946 was initiated to document the occurrence.

During the extent of condition review for Condition Report 2000-2946, a complete review of all NPS contract employees that possessed unescorted access to the DBNPS was performed. During the course of this review on December 1, 2000, it was discovered that derogatory information had been received by NPS on another contract employee on November 7, 2000, revealing that this employee had also tested positive during a drug test at a past employer (non-nuclear facility). This derogatory information was not adjudicated by NPS prior to granting interim unescorted access to the employee on November 10, 2000. Interim access was granted by FirstEnergy based upon the access authorization review completed by NPS under the NPS access authorization program. Furthermore, the contract employee did not disclose this prior derogatory information on the self-disclosure form that he completed on November 2, 2000.

Upon discovery of this derogatory information on December 1, 2000, the unescorted access of the contract employee was immediately revoked and the individual was denied access to Protected and Vital Areas. This event was determined to be reportable in accordance with 10CFR73.71(b) as a failure, or discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, controlled access area, or vital area for which compensatory measures have not been employed (reference 10CFR73 Appendix G, Item (I)(c)). The NRC was notified within one hour of discovery as required by 10CFR73.71(b). This event was entered into the DBNPS Corrective Action Process as Condition Report 2000-2974.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

On April 21, 2000, an experienced NPS Access Control Processing Coordinator resigned their position, leaving only a single person responsible for processing the NPS employees at the DBNPS as well as the Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP, Docket Number 50-440) The DBNPS and the PNPP are the only two nuclear facilities that NPS conducts self-screening for access authorization. In June 2000, an audit was performed on NPS Access Control Processing. This audit determined there was a continuing weakness in the adjudication of derogatory information. A review of 20 percent of previous NPS employee screening files for the PNPP had already been conducted as a result of a 1999 audit, so a review of the remaining 80 percent of the previous NPS employee screening files was requested (approximately 550).

In Fall 2000, employees were being processed at the PNPP in preparation for an upcoming outage, and the review of PNPP screening files was scheduled to be completed. In October and November, approximately 40 additional employees were processed at the DBNPS. On November 7, 2000, when the derogatory information was received from the background investigator, it was misfiled by the NPS Access Control Processing Coordinator and not used to determine eligibility for unescorted access. This was due in part to an excessive workload for the Coordinator. Information necessary for requesting unescorted access was not properly reviewed due to shortcuts employed by the NPS Coordinator in order to complete the assigned tasks. These shortcuts were taken because the NPS Coordinator did not fully understand the significance of the tasks being performed. Managerial oversight failed to recognize that insufficient manpower was available to properly review access information and failed to ensure that the established administrative process for reviewing information was followed.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The contract employee granted unescorted access on November 10, 2000 complied with all site access requirements including drug/alcohol screening prior to being granted interim unescorted access. While onsite the contract employee did not perform safety-related work, but did perform work as a painter in various parts of the plant, including vital areas (Emergency Core Cooling System Rooms). This contract employee did not work alone in these areas, so the likelihood of malevolent actions is minimal. Upon discovery of this event, a review of this contract employee's work history was performed and determined to have no adverse effect on Nuclear Safety or plant reliability. A review of the two outage contract employees' work history was also performed and determined to have no adverse effect on Nuclear Safety or plant reliability.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Upon discovery of this derogatory information on December 1, 2000, the unescorted access of the NPS contract employee was immediately revoked and the individual was denied access to Protected and Vital Areas.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: (Continued)

The data in the Personnel Access Data System (PADS) was changed to indicate interim rather than full access for the two outage contract employees identified on November 29, 2000. A comment was added to PADS for the two individuals that information subsequent to termination was received.

On December 1, 2000, an administrative hold was placed on all current NPS employees badged for unescorted access to both the DBNPS and the PNPP. This administrative hold was not released to allow unescorted access until each employee's file was reviewed by FirstEnergy Access Control. This review was initiated on December 2 and completed on December 8, 2000. Some of the employee's files required additional adjudication for clarification, but no other instances were discovered where unescorted access was inappropriately authorized.

A review of all NPS employees at the DBNPS that were hired and granted unescorted access after April 21 and subsequently left prior to December 1, 2000 was performed. This review, completed on December 12, 2000, revealed no instances where unescorted access was inappropriately authorized. Additionally, a ten percent sample of all non-current NPS employees at the DBNPS was completed by December 22, 2000 to ensure unescorted access was appropriately authorized.

The expectations for following the administrative processes associated with the access control process will be defined, and training objectives will be established for NPS Access Control Processing personnel by March 16, 2001.

Additional staffing will be added to NPS Access Control to ensure background information is properly reviewed and adjudicated prior to authorizing unescorted access. Minimum staffing will consist of an experienced supervisor and two full-time experienced reviewers. Until these NPS Access Control positions are staffed, the individuals are properly trained, and satisfactory performance has been demonstrated, all NPS unescorted access authorizations will be fully reviewed by FirstEnergy Access Control to ensure all pertinent information is considered before unescorted access is authorized. These actions will be completed by June 30, 2001.

FAILURE DATA:

There have been no similar events at the DBNPS since 1994, when two contract employees provided false information on their self-disclosure questionnaires, resulting in the two contract employees being inappropriately authorized unescorted access. The corrective actions taken as a result of this 1994 event would not have prevented the event that occurred in 2000.

NP-06-2000-001

CRs 2000-2946, 2000-2974