

January 10, 1992

Docket Nos. 50-387/388

Mr. Harold W. Keiser  
Senior Vice President-Nuclear  
Pennsylvania Power and Light Company  
2 North Ninth Street  
Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101

Dear Mr. Keiser:

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SUBJECT: REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL PRESSURE-TEMPERATURE CURVES, SUSQUEHANNA  
STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 (TAC NOS 80224 AND 80225)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 116 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-14 and Amendment No. 85 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-22 for the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2. These amendments are in response to your letter dated April 18, 1991 and supplemented by letters dated September 27, 1991 and January 3, 1992.

These amendments make changes to the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES), Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications to revise the pressure-temperature curves for compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G, as requested in Generic Letter 88-11, and to delete the specimen withdrawal schedule as allowed by Generic Letter 91-01. The proposed changes affect Technical Specification Section 3.4.4.6, "Pressure/Temperature Limits" and Bases Sections 3/4.4.6, "Pressure/Temperature Limits."

A copy of our Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's Biweekly Federal Register Notice.

Sincerely,

/S/

James J. Raleigh, Project Manager  
Project Directorate I-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 116 to License No. NPF-14
2. Amendment No. 85 to License No. NPF-22
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:  
See next page

\*Previously Concurred

OFC	:PDI-2/LA	:PDI-2/MS	:PDI-2/D	:OGC*	:
NAME	:MO'Brien	:JRaleigh:rb	:CMiller	:CBarth	:
DATE	:1/10/92	:1/10/92	:1/10/92	:12/18/91	:

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

January 10, 1992

Docket Nos. 50-387/388

Mr. Harold W. Keiser  
Senior Vice President-Nuclear  
Pennsylvania Power and Light Company  
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Dear Mr. Keiser:

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STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 (TAC NOS. 80224 AND 80225)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 116 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-14 and Amendment No. 85 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-22 for the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2. These amendments are in response to your letter dated April 18, 1991 and supplemented by letters dated September 27, 1991 and January 3, 1992.

These amendments make changes to the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES), Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications to revise the pressure-temperature curves for compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G, as requested in Generic Letter 88-11, and to delete the specimen withdrawal schedule as allowed by Generic Letter 91-01. The proposed changes affect Technical Specification Section 3.4.4.6, "Pressure/Temperature Limits" and Bases Sections 3/4.4.6, "Pressure/Temperature Limits."

A copy of our Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's Biweekly Federal Register Notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "James J. Raleigh".

James J. Raleigh, Project Manager  
Project Directorate I-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 116 to  
License No. NPF-14
2. Amendment No. 85 to  
License No. NPF-22
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:  
See next page

Mr. Harold W. Keiser  
Pennsylvania Power & Light Company

Susquehanna Steam Electric Station  
Units 1 & 2

cc:

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

ALLEGHENY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-387

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 116  
License No. NPF-14

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) having found that:
  - A. The application for the amendment filed by the Pennsylvania Power & Light Company, dated April 18, 1991 and its supplements dated September 27, 1991 and January 3, 1992, comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of the Facility Operating License No. NPF-14 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 116 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. PP&L shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

*Charles L. Miller*

Charles L. Miller, Director  
Project Directorate I-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: January 10, 1992

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 116

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-14

DOCKET NO. 50-387

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The overleaf pages are provided to maintain document completeness.\*

REMOVE

3/4 4-15  
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**TABLE 4.4.5-1****PRIMARY COOLANT SPECIFIC ACTIVITY SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS PROGRAM**

<b><u>TYPE OF MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS</u></b>	<b><u>SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS FREQUENCY</u></b>	<b><u>OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS IN WHICH SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS REQUIRED</u></b>
1. Gross Beta and Gamma Activity Determination	At least once per 72 hours	1, 2, 3
2. Isotopic Analysis for DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 Concentration	At least once per 31 days	1
3. Radiochemical for E Determination	At least once per 6 months*	1
4. Isotopic Analysis for Iodine	a) At least once per 4 hours, whenever the specific activity exceeds a limit, as required by ACTION b.	1#, 2#, 3#, 4#
	b) At least one sample, between 2 and 6 hours following the change in THERMAL POWER or off-gas level, as required by ACTION c.	1, 2
5. Isotopic Analysis of an Off-gas Sample Including Quantitative Measurements for at least Xe-133, Xe-135 and Kr-88	At least once per 31 days	1

\*Sample to be taken after a minimum of 2 EFPD and 20 days of POWER OPERATION have elapsed since reactor was last subcritical for 48 hours or longer.

#Until the specific activity of the primary coolant system is restored to within its limits.

**REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM**  
**3/4.4.6 PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS**  
**REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM**

**LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION**

---

- 3.4.6.1 The reactor coolant system temperature and pressure shall be limited in accordance with the limit lines shown on Figure 3.4.6.1-1 for hydrostatic or leak testing, heatup by non-nuclear means, cooldown following a nuclear shutdown and low power PHYSICS TESTS, and operations with a critical core other than low power PHYSICS TESTS, with:
- a. A maximum heatup of 100°F in any 1-hour period,
  - b. A maximum cooldown of 100°F in any 1-hour period,
  - c. A maximum temperature change of less than or equal to 20°F in any one hour period during inservice hydrostatic and leak testing operations above the heatup and cooldown limit curves, and
  - d. The reactor vessel flange and head flange temperature greater than or equal to 70°F when reactor vessel head bolting studs are under tension.

**APPLICABILITY:** At all times.

**ACTION:**

With any of the above limits exceeded, restore the temperature and/or pressure to within the limits within 30 minutes; perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the reactor coolant system; determine that the reactor coolant system remains acceptable for continued operations or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS**

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- 4.4.6.1.1 During system heatup, cooldown and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing operations, the reactor coolant system temperature and pressure shall be determined to be within the above required heatup and cooldown limits and to the right of the limit lines of Figure 3.4.6.1-1 at least once per 30 minutes.




## **REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM**

### **SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)**

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- 4.4.6.1.2 The reactor coolant system temperature and pressure shall be determined to be to the right of the criticality limit line of Figure 3.4.6.1-1 within 15 minutes prior to the withdrawal of control rods to bring the reactor to criticality and at least once per 30 minutes during system heatup.
- 4.4.6.1.3 The reactor vessel material specimens shall be removed and examined to determine reactor pressure vessel fluence and embrittlement as a function of time and THERMAL POWER as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix H. The results of these fluence and embrittlement determinations shall be used to update the curves of Figure 3.4.6.1-1.
- 4.4.6.1.4 The reactor vessel flange and head flange temperature shall be verified to be greater than or equal to 70°F:
- a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 when reactor coolant system temperature is:
    1.  $\leq 100^{\circ}\text{F}$ , at least once per 12 hours.
    2.  $\leq 80^{\circ}\text{F}$ , at least once per 30 minutes.
  - b. Within 30 minutes prior to and at least once per 30 minutes during tensioning of the reactor vessel head bolting studs.



REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE VS. MINIMUM VESSEL TEMPERATURE FOR UNIT 1

Figure 3.4.6.1-1

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## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

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#### CHEMISTRY (Continued)

Conductivity measurements are required on a continuous basis since changes in this parameter are an indication of abnormal conditions. When the conductivity is within limits, the pH, chlorides and other impurities affecting conductivity must also be within their acceptable limits. With the conductivity meter inoperable, additional samples must be analyzed to ensure that the chlorides are not exceeding the limits.

The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that concentrations in excess of the limits will be detected in sufficient time to take corrective action.

#### 3/4.4.5 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY

The limitations on the specific activity of the primary coolant ensure that the 2 hour thyroid and whole body doses resulting from a main steam line failure outside the containment during steady state operation will not exceed small fractions of the dose guidelines of 10 CFR 100. The values for the limits on specific activity represent interim limits based upon a parametric evaluation by the NRC of typical site locations. These values are conservative in that specific site parameters such as site boundary location and meteorological conditions, were not considered in this evaluation.

The ACTION statement permitting POWER OPERATION to continue for limited time periods with the primary coolant's specific activity greater than 0.2 microcuries per gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, but less than or equal to 4.0 microcuries per gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, accommodates possible iodine spiking phenomenon which may occur following changes in THERMAL POWER.

Information obtained on iodine spiking will be used to assess the parameters associated with spiking phenomena. A reduction in frequency of isotopic analysis following power changes may be permissible if justified by the data obtained.

Closing the main steam line isolation valves prevents the release of activity to the environs should a steam line rupture occur outside containment. The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that excessive specific activity levels in the reactor coolant will be detected in sufficient time to take corrective action.

## **REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM**

### **BASES**

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#### **3/4.4.6 PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS**

All components in the reactor coolant system are designed to withstand the effects of cyclic loads due to system temperature and pressure changes. These cyclic loads are introduced by normal load transients, reactor trips, and startup and shutdown operations. The various categories of load cycles used for design purposes are provided in Section 3.9 of the FSAR. During startup and shutdown, the rates of temperature and pressure changes are limited so that the maximum specified heatup and cooldown rates are consistent with the design assumptions and satisfy the stress limits for cyclic operation.

During heatup, the thermal gradients in the reactor vessel wall produce thermal stresses which vary from compressive at the inner wall to tensile at the outer wall. These thermal induced compressive stresses tend to alleviate the tensile stresses induced by the internal pressure. Therefore, a pressure-temperature curve based on steady state conditions, i.e., no thermal stresses, represents a lower bound of all similar curves for finite heatup rates when the inner wall of the vessel is treated as the governing location.

The heatup analysis also covers the determination of pressure-temperature limitations for the case in which the outer wall of the vessel becomes the controlling location. The thermal gradients established during heatup produce tensile stresses which are already present. The thermal induced stresses at the outer wall of the vessel are tensile and are dependent on both the rate of heatup and the time along the heatup ramp; therefore, a lower bound curve similar to that described for the heatup of the inner wall cannot be defined. Subsequently, for the cases in which the outer wall of the vessel becomes the stress controlling location, each heatup rate of interest must be analyzed on an individual basis.

The reactor vessel materials have been tested to determine their initial  $RT_{NDT}$ . The results of these tests are shown in Table B 3/4.4.6-1. Reactor operation and resultant fast neutron, E greater than 1 MeV, irradiation will cause an increase in the  $RT_{NDT}$ . Therefore, an adjusted reference temperature, based upon the fluence, nickel content and copper content of the material in question, can be predicted using Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, "Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials." The pressure/temperature limit curve, Figure 3.4.6.1-1, includes predicted adjustments for this shift in  $RT_{NDT}$  for the 32 EFPY condition.

The actual shift in  $RT_{NDT}$  of the vessel material will be established periodically during operation by removing and evaluating, in accordance with ASTM E185-73 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix H, irradiated reactor vessel material specimens installed near the inside wall of the reactor vessel in the core area. The irradiated specimens can be used with confidence in predicting reactor vessel material transition temperature shift. The operating limit curves of Figure 3.4.6.1-1 shall be adjusted, as required, on the basis of the specimen data and recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2.

## **REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM**

### **BASES**

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#### **PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued)**

The pressure-temperature limit lines shown in Figure 3.4.6.1-1 curves C and A, for reactor criticality and for inservice leak and hydrostatic testing have been provided to assure compliance with the minimum temperature requirements of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 for reactor criticality and for inservice leak and hydrostatic testing.

#### **3/4.4.7 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES**

Double isolation valves are provided on each of the main steam lines to minimize the potential leakage paths from the containment in case of a line break. Only one valve in each line is required to maintain the integrity of the containment. The surveillance requirements are based on the operating history of this type valve. The maximum closure time has been selected to contain fission products and to ensure the core is not uncovered following line breaks.

#### **3/4.4.8 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY**

The inspection programs for ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components ensure that the structural integrity of these components will be maintained at an acceptable level throughout the life of the plant.

Components of the reactor coolant system were designed to provide access to permit inservice inspections in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code 1971 Edition and Addenda through 1972.

The inservice inspection program for ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components will be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable addenda as required by 10 CFR Part 50.55a(g) except where specific written relief has been granted by the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50.55a(g)(6)(i).

#### **3/4.4.9 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL**

A single shutdown cooling mode loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing core decay heat and mixing to assure accurate temperature indication, however, single failure considerations require that two loops be OPERABLE or that alternate methods capable of decay heat removal be demonstrated and that an alternate method of coolant mixing be in operation.

BASES TABLE B 3/4.4.6-1


## REACTOR VESSEL TOUGHNESS

Limiting Beltline Component	Weld Seam I.D. or Mat'l. Type	Heat/Slab or Heat/Lot	CU(%)	Ni(%)	Starting RT <sub>NDT</sub> (°F)	ΔRT <sub>NDT</sub> (°F)*	Min. Upper Shelf (Lft-Lbs)	Max. RT <sub>NDT</sub> (°F)
Plate	SA-533 GR B CL.1	C2433-1	0.10	0.63	+18	40	N/A	58
Weld	N/A	6296161 L320A27AG	0.04	0.99	-50	33	N/A	-17

**NOTE:** \* These values are given only for the benefit of calculating the 32 EFY RT<sub>NDT</sub>

NON-BELTLINE COMPONENT	MATERIAL TYPE OR WELD SEAM I.D.	HEAT/SLAB OR HEAT/LOT	HIGHEST STARTING RT <sub>NDT</sub> (°F)
Shell Ring	SA-533 GR B DL.1	C1232-2	+20
Bottom Head Dome	"	C9942-2	+34
Bottom Head Torus	"	C9942-2	+34
Top Head Dome	"	C9220-2	+10
Top Head Torus	"	C9355-1	+10
Top Head Flange	SA-508, CL.2	N/A	+10
Vessel Flange	"	N/A	+10
Feedwater Nozzle	"	Q2Q49W	-16
Recirculation Inlet Nozzle	"	Q2Q49W	+40
Weld		No CNVS Available	0
Closure Studs	SA-540 GR B24	82552	+70





Fast Neutron Fluence (E>1 MeV) at I.D. Surface as a Function of Service Life\*

Bases Figure B 3/4.4.6-1

\*At 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER and 90% availability



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY  
ALLEGHENY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-388

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 85  
License No. NPF-22

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) having found that:
  - A. The application for the amendment filed by the Pennsylvania Power & Light Company, dated April 18, 1991 and its supplements dated September 27, 1991 and January 3, 1992, comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of the Facility Operating License No. NPF-22 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 85 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. PP&L shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

*Charles L. Miller*

Charles L. Miller, Director  
Project Directorate I-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: January 10, 1992

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 85

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-22

DOCKET NO. 50-388

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The overleaf pages are provided to maintain document completeness.\*

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
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## **REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM**

### **SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)**

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- 4.4.6.1.2 The reactor coolant system temperature and pressure shall be determined to be to the right of the criticality limit line of Figure 3.4.6.1-1 within 15 minutes prior to the withdrawal of control rods to bring the reactor to criticality and at least once per 30 minutes during system heatup.
- 4.4.6.1.3 The reactor vessel material specimens shall be removed and examined to determine reactor pressure vessel fluence and embrittlement as a function of time and THERMAL POWER as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H. The results of these fluence and embrittlement determinations shall be used to update the curves of Figure 3.4.6.1-1.
- 4.4.6.1.4 The reactor vessel flange and head flange temperature shall be verified to be greater than or equal to 70°F:
- a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 when reactor coolant system temperature is:
    1.  $\leq 100^{\circ}\text{F}$ , at least once per 12 hours.
    2.  $\leq 80^{\circ}\text{F}$ , at least once per 30 minutes.
  - b. Within 30 minutes prior to and at least once per 30 minutes during tensioning of the reactor vessel head bolting studs.



REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE VS. MINIMUM VESSEL TEMPERATURE FOR UNIT 2

Figure 3.4.6.1-1

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## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### REACTOR STEAM DOME

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.4.6.2 The pressure in the reactor steam dome shall be less than 1040 psig.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1\* and 2\*.

#### ACTION:

With the reactor steam dome pressure exceeding 1040 psig, reduce the pressure to less than 1040 psig within 15 minutes or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours.

## SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.4.6.2 The reactor steam dome pressure shall be verified to be less than 1040 psig at least once per 12 hours.

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\*Not applicable during anticipated transients.



## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

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#### 3/4.4.4 CHEMISTRY

The water chemistry limits of the reactor coolant system are established to prevent damage to the reactor materials in contact with the coolant. Chloride limits are specified to prevent stress corrosion cracking of the stainless steel. The effect of chloride is not as great when the oxygen concentration in the coolant is low, thus the 0.2 ppm limit on chlorides is permitted during POWER OPERATION. During shutdown and refueling operations, the temperature necessary for stress corrosion to occur is not present so a 0.5 ppm concentration of chlorides is not considered harmful during these periods.

Conductivity measurements are required on a continuous basis since changes in this parameter are an indication of abnormal conditions. When the conductivity is within limits, the pH, chlorides and other impurities affecting conductivity must also be within their acceptable limits. With the conductivity meter inoperable, additional samples must be analyzed to ensure that the chlorides are not exceeding the limits.

The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that concentrations in excess of the limits will be detected in sufficient time to take corrective action.

#### 3/4.4.5 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY

The limitations on the specific activity of the primary coolant ensure that the 2-hour thyroid and whole body doses resulting from a main steam line failure outside the containment during steady state operation will not exceed small fractions of the dose guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100. The values for the limits on specific activity represent interim limits based upon a parametric evaluation by the NRC of typical site locations. These values are conservative in that specific site parameters such as SITE BOUNDARY location and meteorological conditions, were not considered in this evaluation.

The ACTION statement permitting POWER OPERATION to continue for limited time periods with the primary coolant's specific activity greater than 0.2 microcurie per gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, but less than or equal to 4.0 microcuries per gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, accommodates possible iodine spiking phenomenon which may occur following changes in THERMAL POWER.

Information obtained on iodine spiking will be used to assess the parameters associated with spiking phenomena. A reduction in frequency of isotopic analysis following power changes may be permissible if justified by the data obtained.

Closing the main steam line isolation valves prevents the release of activity to the environs should a steam line rupture occur outside containment. The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that excessive specific activity levels in the reactor coolant will be detected in sufficient time to take corrective action.

## **REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM**

### **BASES**

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#### **3/4.4.6 PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS**

All components in the reactor coolant system are designed to withstand the effects of cyclic loads due to system temperature and pressure changes. These cyclic loads are introduced by normal load transients, reactor trips, and startup and shutdown operations. The various categories of load cycles used for design purposes are provided in Section 3.9 of the FSAR. During startup and shutdown, the rates of temperature and pressure changes are limited so that the maximum specified heatup and cooldown rates are consistent with the design assumptions and satisfy the stress limits for cyclic operation.

During heatup, the thermal gradients in the reactor vessel wall produce thermal stresses which vary from compressive at the inner wall to tensile at the outer wall. These thermal induced compressive stresses tend to alleviate the tensile stresses induced by the internal pressure. Therefore, a pressure-temperature curve based on steady state conditions, i.e., no thermal stresses, represents a lower bound of all similar curves for finite heatup rates when the inner wall of the vessel is treated as the governing location.

The heatup analysis also covers the determination of pressure-temperature limitations for the case in which the outer wall of the vessel becomes the controlling location. The thermal gradients established during heatup produce tensile stresses which are already present. The thermal induced stresses at the outer wall of the vessel are tensile and are dependent on both the rate of heatup and the time along the heatup ramp; therefore, a lower bound curve similar to that described for the heatup of the inner wall cannot be defined. Subsequently, for the cases in which the outer wall of the vessel becomes the stress controlling location, each heatup rate of interest must be analyzed on an individual basis.

The reactor vessel materials have been tested to determine their initial  $RT_{NDT}$ . The results of these tests are shown in Table B 3/4.4.6-1. Reactor operation and resultant fast neutron, E greater than 1 MeV, irradiation will cause an increase in the  $RT_{NDT}$ . Therefore, an adjusted reference temperature, based upon the fluence, nickel content and copper content of the material in question, can be predicted using Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, "Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials". The pressure/temperature limit curve, Figure 3.4.6.1-1 includes predicted adjustments for this shift in  $RT_{NDT}$  for the 32 EFPY condition.

The actual shift in  $RT_{NDT}$  of the vessel material will be established periodically during operation by removing and evaluating, in accordance with ASTM E185-73 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, irradiated reactor vessel material specimens installed near the inside wall of the reactor vessel in the core area. The irradiated specimens can be used with confidence in predicting reactor vessel material transition temperature shift. The operating limit curves of Figure 3.4.6.1-1 shall be adjusted, as required, on the basis of the specimen data and recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

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#### PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued)

The pressure-temperature limit lines shown in Figure 3.4.6.1-1, curves C and A, for reactor criticality and for inservice leak and hydrostatic testing have been provided to assure compliance with the minimum temperature requirements of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 for reactor criticality and for inservice leak and hydrostatic testing.

#### 3/4.4.7 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES

Double isolation valves are provided on each of the main steam lines to minimize the potential leakage paths from the containment in case of a line break. Only one valve in each line is required to maintain the integrity of the containment. The surveillance requirements are based on the operating history of this type valve. The maximum closure time has been selected to contain fission products and to ensure the core is not uncovered following line breaks.

#### 3/4.4.8 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

The inspection programs for ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components ensure that the structural integrity of these components will be maintained at an acceptable level throughout the life of the plant.

Components of the reactor coolant system were designed to provide access to permit inservice inspections in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code 1971 Edition and Addenda through 1972.

The inservice inspection program for ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components will be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable addenda as required by 10 CFR 50.55a(g) except where specific written relief has been granted by the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i).

#### 3/4.4.9 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL

A single shutdown cooling mode loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing core decay heat and mixing to assure accurate temperature indication, however, single failure considerations require that two loops be OPERABLE or that alternate methods capable of decay heat removal be demonstrated and that an alternate method of coolant mixing be in operation.


BASES TABLE B 3/4.4.6-1

## REACTOR VESSEL TOUGHNESS

Limiting Beltline Component	Weld Seam I.D. or Mat'l. Type	Heat/Slab or Heat/Lot	CU(%)	Ni(%)	Starting RT <sub>NDT</sub> (°F)	ART <sub>NDT</sub> (°F)*	Min. Upper Shelf (Lb-Lbs)	Max. RT <sub>NDT</sub> (°F)
Plate	SA-533 GR B CL.1	6C1053/1	0.10	0.58	+10	40	N/A	+50
Weld	N/A	624263/ E204A27A	0.06	0.89	-20	50	N/A	+30

**NOTE:** \* These values are given only for the benefit of calculating the 32 EPFY RT<sub>NDT</sub>

NON-BELTLINE COMPONENT	MATERIAL TYPE OR WELD SEAM I.D.	HEAT/SLAB OR HEAT/LOT	HIGHEST STARTING RT <sub>NDT</sub> (°F)
Shell Ring #5	SA-533 GR B CL.1	All	+10
Bottom Head Dome	"	C0462	+20
Bottom Head Torus	"	C0472	+10
Top Head Side Plates	"	C0473-1	+10
Top Head Flange	SA-508, CL.2	125H446	+10
Vessel Flange	"	2L2393	+10
Feedwater Nozzle	"	Q2Q62W	-10
Steam Outlet Nozzle	"	Q2Q64W	+30
Weld	Bottom Head Flanges to Shell Top Head Other Non-Beltline	All All All	-20 -20 0
Closure Studs	SA-540 GR B24	All	Meet requirements of 45 ft-lbs and 25 mils lateral expansion at +10°F



Fast Neutron Fluence (E>1 Mev) at I.D. Surface as a Function of Service Life\*  
Bases Figure B 3/4.4.6-1

\*At 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER and 90% availability



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 116 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-14  
AMENDMENT NO. 85 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-22  
PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY  
ALLEGHENY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.  
SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2  
DOCKET NOS. 50-387 AND 388

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated April 18, 1991, as supplemented September 27, 1991 and January 3, 1992, the Pennsylvania Power and Light Company and Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc. (the licensees) submitted a request for changes to the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would make changes to the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES), Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications to revise the pressure-temperature (P/T) curves for compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G, as requested in Generic Letter 91-01. The proposed changes affect Technical Specification Section 3.4.4.6, "Pressure/Temperature Limits" and Bases Section 3/4.4.6, "Pressure/Temperature Limits." The September 27, 1991 and January 3, 1992 letters provided clarifying information that did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

2.0 EVALUATION

To evaluate the P/T limits, the staff uses the following NRC regulations and guidance: Appendices G and H of 10 CFR Part 50; the ASTM Standards and the ASME Code, which are referenced in Appendices G and H; 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2); RG 1.99, Rev. 2; Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 5.3.2; and Generic Letter 88-11.

Each licensee authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor is required by 10 CFR 50.36 to provide Technical Specifications for the operation of the plant. In particular, 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2) requires that limiting conditions of operation be included in the Technical Specifications. The P/T limits are among the limiting conditions of operation in the Technical Specifications for all commercial nuclear plants in the United States. Appendices G and H of 10 CFR Part 50 describe specific requirements for fracture toughness and reactor vessel material surveillance that must be considered in setting P/T limits. An acceptable method for constructing the P/T limits is described in SRP Section 5.3.2.

Appendix G of 10 CFR Part 50 specifies fracture toughness and testing requirements for reactor vessel materials in accordance with the ASME Code and, in particular, that the beltline materials in the surveillance capsules be tested in accordance with Appendix H of 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix H, in turn, refers to ASTM Standards. These tests define the extent of vessel embrittlement at the time of capsule withdrawal in terms of the increase in reference temperature. Appendix G also requires the licensee to predict the effects of neutron irradiation on vessel embrittlement by calculating the adjusted reference temperature (ART) and Charpy upper shelf energy (USE). Generic letter 88-11 requested that licensees and permittees use the methods in RG 1.99, Rev. 2, to predict the effect of neutron irradiation on reactor vessel materials. This guide defines the ART as the sum of unirradiated reference temperature, the increase in reference temperature resulting from neutron irradiation, and a margin to account for uncertainties in the prediction method.

Appendix H of 10 CFR Part 50 requires the licensee to establish a surveillance program to periodically withdraw surveillance capsules from the reactor vessel. Appendix H refers to the ASTM Standards which, in turn, require that the capsules be installed in the vessel before startup and that they contain test specimens made from plate, weld, and heat-affected-zone (HAZ) materials of the reactor beltline.

The staff evaluated the effect of neutron irradiation embrittlement on each beltline material in the Susquehanna 1 and 2 reactor vessels. The amount of irradiation embrittlement was calculated in accordance with RG 1.99, Rev. 2. The staff has determined that the material with the highest ART at 32 EFPY for Unit 1 was the lower intermediate shell plate C2433-1 with 0.10% copper (Cu), 0.63% nickel (Ni), and an initial  $RT_{ndt}$  of 18°F; and the material with the highest ART at 32 EFPY for Unit 2 was the lower shell plate 6C1053-1-1 with 0.10% Cu and 0.58% Ni, and an initial  $RT_{ndt}$  of 10°F.

The licensee has not removed any surveillance capsules from Susquehanna 1 and 2. All surveillance capsules contained Charpy impact specimens and tensile specimens made from base metal, weld metal, and HAZ metal.

For the limiting beltline material in Unit 1, lower intermediate shell plate C2433-1, the staff calculated the ART to be 53.0°F at 1/4T (T = reactor vessel beltline thickness) for 32 EFPY. For the limiting beltline material in Unit 2, lower shell plate 6C1053-1-1, the staff calculated the corresponding ART to be 44.8°F. In the above calculations, the staff used a neutron fluence of  $4.3E17$  n/cm<sup>2</sup> at 1/4T and  $2.0E17$  n/cm<sup>2</sup> at 3/4T. The ART was determined by Section 1 of RG 1.99, Rev. 2.

The licensee used the method in RG 1.99, Rev. 2, to calculate an ART of 57.6°F at 1/4T for the same limiting lower intermediate shell plate in Unit 1 for 32 EFPY and 49.5°F for the same limiting lower shell plate in Unit 2. The staff judges that the licensee's ARTs of 57.6°F for Susquehanna 1 and 49.5°F for Susquehanna 2 are more conservative than the staff's ARTs of 53°F for Unit 1 and 44.8°F for Unit 2, and they are acceptable. Substituting the ART of 57.6°F into equations in SRP 5.3.2 for Unit 1 and 49.5°F for Unit 2, the staff found

restrictive than the proposed non-beltline curves. A further investigation into these non-beltline P/T limits (Ref. 5 & 6) confirmed their soundness, and therefore verified that the proposed P/T limits for heatup, cooldown, and hydrotest meet the beltline material requirements in Appendix G of 10 CFR Part 50.

In addition to beltline materials, Appendix G of 10 CFR Part 50 also imposes P/T limits based on the reference temperature for the reactor vessel closure flange materials. Section IV.2 of Appendix G states that when the pressure exceeds 20% of the preservice system hydrostatic test pressure, the temperature of the closure flange regions highly stressed by the bolt preload must exceed the reference temperature of the material in those regions by at least 120°F for normal operation and by 90°F for hydrostatic pressure tests and leak tests. Paragraph IV.A.3 of Appendix G states "an exception may be made for boiling water reactor vessels when water level is within the normal range for power operation and the pressure is less than 20 percent of the pre-service system hydrostatic test pressure." In this case the minimum permissible temperature is 60°F (33°C) above the reference temperature of the closure flange regions that are highly stressed by the bolt preload. Based on the flange reference temperature of 10°F, the staff has determined that the proposed P/T limits satisfy Section IV.2 of Appendix G.

Section IV.B of Appendix G requires that the predicted Charpy USE at end of life be above 50 ft-lb. Using Figure 2 in RG 1.99, Rev. 2, it was estimated that the lowest end-of-life (EOL) USE for the limiting beltline material in Susquehanna 1 would be 70.8 ft-lb. The corresponding EOL USE for Susquehanna 2 would be 53.7 ft-lb when the same estimation procedure was used. Since both numbers satisfy the 50 ft-lb requirement, they are acceptable.

The staff concludes that the proposed P/T limits for reactor coolant system for heatup, cooldown, leak test, and criticality are valid through 32 EFPY because the limits conform to the requirements of Appendices G and H of 10 CFR Part 50. The licensee's submittal also satisfies Generic Letter 88-11 because the licensee used the method in RG 1.99, Rev. 2 to calculate the ART. An application of SRP 5.3.2 to limiting beltline materials for both units confirmed that they are less restrictive than the proposed non-beltline P/T limits for the feedwater nozzle. Hence, the proposed P/T limits may be incorporated into the Susquehanna, Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications.

The licensee also makes an administrative change to page B 3/4 4-6 of the Unit 1 technical specifications as per a recent telecommunication on November 20, 1991. Additionally, by letter dated January 3, 1992, the licensee informed the staff that they are committed to include changes to the specimen withdrawal schedule in the next annual update to the FSAR, as recommended in Generic Letter 91-01. This change in no way affects the no significant hazards determination as submitted by the licensee.

### 3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Pennsylvania State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.



#### 4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (56 FR 22472). Accordingly, the amendments meet eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

#### 5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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Date: January 10, 1992