



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

May 10, 1993

Docket No. 50-286

Mr. Ralph E. Beedle  
Executive Vice President - Nuclear Generation  
Power Authority of the State of New York  
123 Main Street  
White Plains, New York 10601

Dear Mr. Beedle:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT FOR INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING  
UNIT NO. 3 (TAC NO. M84836)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 133 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-64 for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application transmitted by letter dated October 26, 1992.

The amendment revises the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Technical Specifications (ETS) to incorporate the changes listed below:

- (1) The main steam safety valve lift setpoint testing frequency (specified in TS Table 4.1-3) has been changed to accommodate operation on a 24-month cycle.
- (2) The main steam stop valve closure stroke testing frequency (specified in TS Section 4.7) has been changed to accommodate operation on a 24-month cycle. In addition, this testing requirement has been changed to allow testing in operating conditions other than cold shutdown.
- (3) The steam generator blowdown flow instrumentation calibration frequency (specified in ETS Table 3.1-1) has been changed to accommodate operation on a 24-month cycle.
- (4) The radioactive liquid effluent and gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation surveillance requirements (specified in ETS Tables 3.1-1 and 3.2-1, respectively) have been changed to clearly indicate that each instrument's refueling calibration interval is 18 months unless it has been specifically approved to accommodate operation on a 24-month cycle. In addition, ETS Tables 3.1-1 and 3.2-1 have been reformatted for consistency.

These changes followed the guidance provided in Generic Letter 91-04, "Changes in Technical Specification Surveillance Intervals to Accommodate a 24-Month Fuel Cycle," as applicable.

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Mr. Ralph E. Beedle

- 2 -

May 10, 1993

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,



Nicola F. Conicella, Project Manager  
Project Directorate I-1  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No.133 to DPR-64
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:

See next page

Mr. Ralph E. Beedle  
Power Authority of the State  
of New York

Indian Point Nuclear Generating  
Station Unit No. 3

cc:

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Assistant Attorney General  
New York Department of Law  
120 Broadway  
New York, New York 10271

DATED: May 10, 1993

AMENDMENT NO. 133 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-64-INDIAN POINT UNIT 3

Docket File

NRC & Local PDRs

PDI-1 Reading

S. Varga, 14/E/4

J. Calvo, 14/A/4

R. Capra

C. Vogan

N. Conicella

OGC-WF

D. Hagan, 3302 MNBB

G. Hill (2), P1-22

Wanda Jones, P-370

C. Grimes, 11/F/23

J. Norberg, 7/E/21

ACRS (10)

OPA

OC/LFDCB

PD plant-specific file

C. Cowgill, Region I

cc: Plant Service list

DATED: May 10, 1993

AMENDMENT NO. 133 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-64-INDIAN POINT UNIT 3

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

DOCKET NO. 50-286

INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 133  
License No. DPR-64

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Power Authority of the State of New York (the licensee) dated October 26, 1992, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-64 is hereby amended to read as follows:


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(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 133, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance to be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Robert A. Capra, Director  
Project Directorate I-1  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 10, 1993

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.133

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-64

DOCKET NO. 50-286

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages

Table 4.1-3 (sheet 1 of 2)  
4.7-1

Insert Pages

Table 4.1-3 (sheet 1 of 2)  
4.7-1

Revise Appendix B as follows:

Remove Pages

3.1-2  
3.1-3  
3.2-2  
3.2-3

Insert Pages

3.1-2  
3.1-3  
3.2-2  
3.2-3



**TABLE 4.1-3 (Sheet 1 of 2)**

<b>FREQUENCIES FOR EQUIPMENT TESTS</b>		
	<u>Check</u>	<u>Frequency</u>
1. Control Rods	Rod drop times of all control rods	24M
2. Control Rods	Movement of at least 10 steps in any one direction of all control rods	Every 31 days during reactor critical operations
3. Pressurizer Safety Valves	Set Point	24M
4. Main Steam Safety Valves	Set Point	24M
5. Containment Isolation System	Automatic actuation	24M
6. Refueling System Interlocks	Functioning	Each refueling, prior to movement of core components
7. Primary System Leakage	Evaluate	5 days/week
8. Diesel Generators Nos. 31, 32 & 33 Fuel Supply	Fuel Inventory	Weekly
9. Turbine Steam Stop Control Valves	Closure	Yearly
10. L.P. Steam Dump System (6 lines)	Closure	Monthly
11. Service Water System	Each pump starts and operates for 15 minutes (unless already operating)	Monthly
12. City Water Connections to Charging Pumps and Boric Acid Piping	Temporary connections available and valves operable	18M

#### 4.7 MAIN STEAM STOP VALVES

##### Applicability

Applies to periodic testing of the main steam stop valves.

##### Objective

To verify the ability of the main steam stop valves to close upon signal.

##### Specification

The main steam stop valves shall be tested at least once per 24 months. Closure time of five seconds or less shall be verified.

##### Basis

The main steam stop valves serve to limit an excessive Reactor Coolant System cooldown rate and resultant reactivity insertion following a main steam break incident.<sup>(1)</sup> Their ability to close upon signal should be verified at least once per 24 months. A closure time of five seconds was selected as being consistent with expected response time for instrumentation as detailed in the steam line break incident analysis.<sup>(2)</sup>

##### References

- (1) FSAR - Section 10.5
- (2) FSAR - Section 14.2.5

**TABLE 3.1-1**

<b>RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS</b>				
INSTRUMENT	CHANNEL CHECK	SOURCE CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRA- TION	CHANNEL FUNC- TIONAL TEST
<b>1. GROSS RADIOACTIVITY MONITORS PROVIDING ALARM AND AUTOMATIC TERMINATION OF RELEASE</b>  a. Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line b. Steam Generator Blowdown Effluent Line	D* D*	D* M*	18M(3) 18M(3)	Q(1)* Q(1)*
<b>2. GROSS BETA OR GAMMA RADIOACTIVITY MONITORS PROVIDING ALARM BUT NOT PROVIDING AUTOMATIC TERMINATION OF RELEASE</b>  a. Service Water System Effluent Line	D*	M*	18M(3)	Q(2)*
<b>3. FLOW RATE MEASUREMENT <u>DEVICES</u></b>  a. Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line b. Steam Generator Blowdown Effluent Line	D(4) D(4)	N.A. N.A.	18M 24M	Q N.A.
<b>4. RADIOACTIVITY RECORDERS</b>  a. Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line b. Steam Generator Blowdown Effluent Line	D* D*	N.A. N.A.	18M 18M	Q**** Q****
<b>5. TANK LEVEL INDICATING DEVICES***</b>  a. Refueling Water Storage Tank b. Primary Water Storage Tank c. Monitor Tank #31 d. Monitor Tank #32	D** D** D** D**	N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.	18M 18M 18M 18M	18M 18M 18M 18M

**TABLE NOTATIONS**

\* When this pathway is utilized for releases, with frequency no more than indicated.

\*\* During liquid additions to the tank.

TABLE 3.1-1(Continued)

\*\*\* Tanks included in this specification are those outdoor tanks that are not surrounded by liners, dikes, or walls capable of holding the tank contents and do not have tank overflows and surrounding area drains connected to the liquid radwaste treatment system.

\*\*\*\* Required only if alarm/trip setpoint is based on recorder-controller.

(1) The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that automatic isolation of this pathway and control room alarm annunciation occur if the following condition exists:

1. Instrument indicates measured levels above the alarm/trip setpoint.

(2) The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that control room alarm annunciation occurs if any of the following conditions exists:

1. Instrument indicates measured levels above the alarm setpoint.

2. Instrument controls not set in operate mode.

(3) Radioactive calibration standards used for channel calibrations shall be traceable to the National Bureau of Standards or an aliquot of calibration solution shall be analyzed with instrumentation which is calibrated with NBS traceable standards. (Standards from suppliers who participate in measurement assurance activities with NBS are acceptable).

(4) CHANNEL CHECK shall consist of verifying indication of flow during periods of release. CHANNEL CHECK shall be made at least once per 24 hours on days on which continuous, periodic, or batch releases are made.

D Daily  
M Monthly  
N.A. Not Applicable  
Q Quarterly  
18M At least once per 18 months.  
24M At least once per 24 months.

TABLE 3.2-1

RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS					
INSTRUMENT	CHANNEL CHECK	SOURCE CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	FUNCTIONAL TEST	MODES IN WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED
1. WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYSTEM					
a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor-Providing Alarm	D	M	18M(2)	Q(1)***	*
2. WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYSTEM EXPLOSIVE GAS MONITORING SYSTEM					
a. Hydrogen Monitor	D	N.A.	M(3)	N.A.	**
b. Oxygen Monitor	D	N.A.	M(4)	N.A.	**
3. CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR					
a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor	D	M	18M(2)	Q(1)***	*
4. ENVIRONMENTAL RELEASE POINTS (PLANT VENT, ADMIN. BUILDING CONTROLLED AREA. VENT, RAD. MACHINE SHOP VENT)					
a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor	D	M	18M(2)	Q(1)***	*
b. Iodine Sampler	W	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	*
c. Particulate Sampler	W	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	*
d. Flow Rate Monitor	D	N.A.	18M	Q	*
e. Sampler Flow Rate Monitor	D	N.A.	18M	N.A.	*
5. CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM					
a. Containment Noble Gas Activity Monitor - Providing Alarm and Automatic Termination of Release	D	M	18M(2)	Q(1)***	*

TABLE NOTATIONS

\* Surveillance is required at all times except when monitor has been removed from service in accordance with Table 2.2-1.

TABLE 3.2-1(Continued)

- \*\* During waste gas holdup system operation (treatment for primary system off gases).
- \*\*\* Will not include operation of automatic control functions.
- (1) The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that control room alarm annunciation occurs if any of the following conditions exists:
1. Instrument indicates measured levels above the alarm setpoint.
  2. Instrument controls not set in operate mode.
- (2) Radioactive Calibration Standards used for channel calibrations shall be traceable to the National Bureau of Standards or an aliquot of calibration gas shall be analyzed with instrumentation which is calibrated with NBS traceable standards (standards from suppliers which participate in measurement assurance activities with NBS are acceptable).
- (3) The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall include the use of standard gas samples containing:
1. Less than or equal to two volume percent hydrogen,  
and
  2. Greater than or equal to four volume percent hydrogen,
- (4) The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall include the use of standard gas samples containing:
1. Less than or equal to one volume percent oxygen,  
and
  2. Greater than or equal to four volume percent oxygen.

D Daily  
M Monthly  
N.A. Not Applicable  
Q Quarterly  
18M At least once per 18 months



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 133 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-64  
POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK  
INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 3  
DOCKET NO. 50-286

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated October 26, 1992, the Power Authority of the State of New York (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3), Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would revise the TS and the Environmental Technical Specifications (ETS) to incorporate the following main steam system changes:

- (1) The main steam safety valve lift setpoint testing frequency (specified in TS Table 4.1-3) would be changed to accommodate operation on a 24-month cycle.
- (2) The main steam stop valve closure stroke testing frequency (specified in TS Section 4.7) would be changed to accommodate operation on a 24-month cycle. In addition, this testing requirement would be changed to allow testing in operating conditions other than cold shutdown.
- (3) The steam generator blowdown flow instrumentation calibration frequency (specified in ETS Table 3.1-1) would be changed to accommodate operation on a 24-month cycle.
- (4) The radioactive liquid effluent and gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation surveillance requirements (specified in ETS Tables 3.1-1 and 3.2-1, respectively) would be changed to clearly indicate that each instrument's refueling calibration interval is 18 months unless it has been specifically approved to accommodate operation on a 24-month cycle. In addition, ETS Tables 3.1-1 and 3.2-1 would be reformatted for consistency.

The requested changes are needed to accommodate operation on a 24-month fuel cycle. The licensee commenced operating on a 24-month fuel cycle, instead of the previous 18-month fuel cycle, with fuel cycle 9. Fuel cycle 9 started in August 1992. The proposed changes follow the guidance provided in Generic Letter (GL) 91-04, "Changes in Technical Specification Surveillance Intervals to Accommodate a 24-Month Fuel Cycle," as applicable.

## 2.0 EVALUATION

The licensee considered the following factors in evaluating the main steam system surveillance interval extensions from 18 to 24 months:

- Does on-line testing adequately demonstrate operability or are failures only being detected during these refueling tests?
- Did past equipment performance have an effect on system safety functions?
- Does performing the surveillance test at power present an unacceptable burden?

### 2.1 Main Steam Safety Valve Lift Setpoint Testing

The primary purpose of the main steam safety valves (MSSV) is to provide overpressure protection for the secondary system. Each of the four steam generators is equipped with five MSSVs. The total relieving capability of the 20 MSSVs is 116% of secondary steam flow. Operability of the 20 MSSVs ensures that secondary system pressure will be limited to 110% of the design pressure during the most severe anticipated operational transient which is a full power turbine trip without steam bypass capability.

The purpose of the refueling test is, in part, to verify the operability of the MSSVs by verifying the lift setpoint of each valve. This testing must be performed with the plant shutdown due to the potential for a plant transient. The licensee's inservice testing program (IST), as required by Section XI of the ASME Code, has committed to safety and relief valve testing in accordance with the requirements of ANSI/ASME OM-1-1981, "Requirements for Inservice Performance Testing of Nuclear Plant Pressure Relief Devices." The licensee states that according to ANSI/ASME OM-1-1981, safety valves must be set pressure tested prior to initial installation and then once every 5 years. The MSSV testing requirement of NUREG-1431, "Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Plants (W-STs)," was based on ANSI/ASME OM-1-1987. This standard requires that all MSSVs must be tested each 5 years and that 20% of the valves must be tested each refueling outage. However, the IP3 TS requires all MSSVs to be tested each refueling outage. Therefore, the licensee's proposed MSSV testing requirement would remain more stringent than the testing requirements of both versions of the ANSI/ASME standard and the W-STs.

The licensee reviewed data from 1985 to 1992 related to MSSV performance. The data indicated that the MSSVs have proven to be reliable. Out of a total of 60 valve drift data points, only one exceeded the  $\pm 3\%$  acceptance criteria; however, further analysis of this one drift point indicated MSSV setpoint drift was not a function of time. Therefore, the licensee concluded that this surveillance test interval could be extended since the results of the refueling tests were generally satisfactory and there was no evidence that MSSV performance was a function of the surveillance interval.

The NRC staff has reviewed the information presented by the licensee regarding MSSV lift setpoint testing and concludes the requested change is acceptable.



## 2.2 Main Steam Stop Valve Closure Stroke Testing

The primary purpose of the main steam stop valves, commonly referred to as the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), is to mitigate the consequences of a steam line break accident. The MSIVs, which are air-operated, reverse flow check valves, are normally held open with instrument air pressure and automatically close upon receipt of a steam line isolation signal. The MSIVs limit the excessive reactor coolant system cooldown rate and resultant reactivity insertion following a steam line break accident.

The purpose of the refueling test is to verify that the MSIVs close within 5 seconds. This ensures that MSIV closure time is consistent with the closure time assumed in the accident analysis. The licensee indicated that the MSIVs cannot be tested with the plant at power since valve closure above 10% power would result in a turbine and subsequent reactor trip. In addition, the IP3 MSIVs do not have bypass valves, therefore, if closed at power, the valves could not be opened due to the high differential pressure across each valve.

The licensee's proposed change would be consistent with the MSIV testing requirements of the W-STS. Specifically, the W-STS requires that all the MSIVs be tested each refueling outage. Along with the inability to test these valves at power, the basis for the W-STS testing frequency is that operating experience has shown that the MSIVs usually pass the surveillance test when performed at the refueling frequency, therefore, the refueling frequency is acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

In addition, the MSIV stroke testing requirement would be changed to allow testing in operating conditions other than cold shutdown. This is consistent with the testing requirements of the W-STS. Specifically, the W-STS allows entry into the hot shutdown condition so that this testing can be performed with the plant at normal temperature and pressure. This is done to allow establishing plant conditions for testing which are consistent with those under which the acceptance criteria was developed.

The licensee reviewed data from 1985 to 1992 related to MSIV performance. The data indicated that there was only one significant valve failure during this time period. During a plant shutdown in February 1989, one MSIV failed to close remotely (from the control room) due to mechanical binding. A root cause investigation of this failure indicated that, due to deficiencies in the MSIV preventive maintenance repack procedure, incorrect packing material was installed in the valve's actuator. As a result of this finding, which was reported via licensee event reports (LERs) 50-286/89-002-00 and 50-286/89-002-01, the licensee implemented corrective actions which included repacking all MSIV actuators per the manufacturer's instructions and revising the preventive maintenance procedure to prevent this type of event from recurring. Subsequent testing of the MSIVs has demonstrated acceptable closure times. In addition, since establishing plant shutdown conditions includes manual closure of the MSIVs, a mechanically bound open MSIV would be

detected during each plant shutdown whether or not the refueling surveillance test is performed (as this one failure was detected).

Based on the results of the review, the licensee concluded that this surveillance test interval could be extended since, with one exception, the results of the refueling tests were satisfactory, corrective actions for the one MSIV failure have been implemented, and there was no evidence that MSIV performance was a function of the surveillance interval.

The NRC staff has reviewed the information presented by the licensee regarding MSIV surveillance testing and concludes the requested changes are acceptable.

### 2.3 Steam Generator Blowdown Flow Instrumentation Calibration

The steam generator blowdown (SGBD) system provides continuous blowdown of the steam generators to maintain steam generator chemistry within limits. The system also limits the accumulation of solid contaminants and corrosion products. Flow instrumentation is installed in the SGBD line of each steam generator and is used, in part, to calculate radiological releases from the secondary plant.

The licensee replaced the SGBD flow instruments with new instrumentation during IP3's most recent refueling outage. Since the instrumentation is new, the licensee did not have historical calibration and performance data specifically for the application at IP3 which could be used to justify the calibration interval extension. Therefore, the licensee used vendor drift allowances and instrument accuracies to calculate an instrument drift for a maximum calibration interval of 30 months (24 months plus 25%). The licensee indicated that the resulting calculations predicted calibration drifts for the new SGBD flow instrumentation to be within the required calibration tolerance.

The NRC staff has reviewed the information presented by the licensee regarding the SGBD flow instrumentation calibration extension and concludes the requested change is acceptable.

### 2.4 ETS Instrument Surveillance Requirements Tables

By letter dated September 21, 1992, the NRC issued Amendment No. 125 to the IP3 TS. Amendment No. 125, in part, changed all the applicable TS pages to replace the wording "every refueling outage," or similar words, with "once per 18 months" or "18M," as applicable. These clarifications were intended to prepare the TS for future 24-month submittals by avoiding confusion between the existing surveillance intervals and those surveillance intervals which, in the future, would receive approval to be extended to once per 24 months.

Similarly, the licensee has now proposed this administrative change to the ETS. Specifically, the licensee has proposed changing ETS Table 3.1-1 (Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements) and ETS Table 3.2-1 (Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring

Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements) to clearly distinguish those surveillances that are currently being performed once per 18 months and those that have been approved to accommodate operation on a 24-month cycle. The notation "R" would be changed to "18M" to identify surveillances required to be performed once per 18 months and surveillance intervals which have been approved for a 24-month cycle would be annotated "24M." In addition, the licensee has proposed reformatting ETS Tables 3.1-1 and 3.1-2 for consistency.

The NRC staff has reviewed the proposed changes and concludes the changes are administrative in nature and meet the intent of GL 91-04. Therefore, the proposed changes are acceptable.

## 2.5 Summary

The licensee has evaluated the effect of the increase in the surveillance interval on safety for each of the proposed changes and has concluded that the effect is small. The licensee has confirmed that historical plant maintenance and surveillance data, as applicable, does not invalidate this conclusion. The increase in each of the surveillance intervals to accommodate a 24-month fuel cycle does not invalidate any assumption in the IP3 licensing basis.

The staff has reviewed the information presented by the licensee and concludes that the proposed changes do not have a significant effect on safety. Therefore, all the proposed changes are acceptable. In addition, the proposed changes are consistent with the W-STs and follow the guidance of GL 91-04, as applicable.

## 3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New York State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

## 4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (57 FR 55587). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor:  
Nicola F. Conicella

Date: May 10, 1993

Mr. Ralph E. Beedle

- 2 -

May 10, 1993

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By:

Nicola F. Conicella, Project Manager  
Project Directorate I-1  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

- 1. Amendment No.133 to DPR-64
- 2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:  
See next page

*N/A*

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Mr. Ralph E. Beedle

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May 10, 1993

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

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Nicola F. Conicella, Project Manager  
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*N/A*

OFFICE	PDI-1:LA	PDI-1:PM ✓	HIOB	EMEB <i>[Signature]</i>	OGG <i>[Signature]</i>	PDI-1:D
NAME	CVogan <i>[Signature]</i>	NConicella:avl	JWerniel	JNorberg	<i>[Signature]</i>	RACapra <i>[Signature]</i>
DATE	3/24/93	3/24/93	1/93	4/23/93	4/24/93	5/10/93

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY  
FILENAME: G:\IP3\IP384836.AMD

*OK 4/11*