May 4, 1989

Docket Nos. 50-387/388

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Mr. Harold W. Keiser
Senior Vice President-Nuclear
Pennsylvania Power and Light Company
2 North Ninth Street
Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101

Dear Mr. Keiser:

SUBJECT: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES RELATED TO DRYWELL FLOOR DRAIN SUMP MONITOR (TAC NOS. 71189/71190)

RE: SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 87 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-14 and Amendment No. 53 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-22 for the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2. These amendments are in response to your letter dated November 9, 1988.

These amendments revise the Technical Specifications relative to Drywell Floor Drain Sump Flowrate Monitoring System's Action Statement.

A copy of our Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's Biweekly Federal Register Notice.

Sincerely,

/s/
Walter R. Butler, Director
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 87 to License No. NPF-14
2. Amendment No. 53 to License No. NPF-22
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

[KEISER LETT]

PDI-2/LA	PDI-2/PM	PDI-2/D	OGC
MO'Brien	MThadani:tr	WButler	
4/19/89	4/18/89	5/3/89	5/2/89

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

May 4, 1989

Docket Nos. 50-387/388

Mr. Harold W. Keiser
Senior Vice President-Nuclear
Pennsylvania Power and Light Company
2 North Ninth Street
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Dear Mr. Keiser:

SUBJECT: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES RELATED TO DRYWELL FLOOR DRAIN SUMP MONITOR (TAC NOS. 71189/71190)

RE: SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 87 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-14 and Amendment No. 53 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-22 for the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2. These amendments are in response to your letter dated November 9, 1988.

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Sincerely,

Walter R. Butler

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Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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1. Amendment No. 87 to License No. NPF-14
2. Amendment No. 53 to License No. NPF-22
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

cc:

Jay Silberg, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
2300 N Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Bryan A. Snapp, Esq.
Assistant Corporate Counsel
Pennsylvania Power & Light Company
2 North Ninth Street
Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101

Mr. E. A. Heckman
Licensing Group Supervisor
Pennsylvania Power & Light Company
2 North Ninth Street
Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101

Mr. F. I. Young
Resident Inspector
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P.O. Box 35
Berwick, Pennsylvania 18603-0035

Mr. Thomas M. Gerusky, Director
Bureau of Radiation Protection
Resources
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
P. O. Box 2063
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120

Mr. Jesse C. Tilton, III
Allegheny Elec. Coorperative, Inc.
212 Locust Street
P.O. Box 1266
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108-1266

Mr. W. H. Hirst, Manager
Joint Generation
Projects Department
Atlantic Electric
P.O. Box 1500
1199 Black Horse Pike
Pleasantville, New Jersey 08232

Regional Administrator, Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

ALLEGHENY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-387

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 87
License No. NPF-14

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) having found that:

   A. The application for the amendment filed by the Pennsylvania Power & Light Company, dated November 9, 1988 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of the Facility Operating License No. NPF-14 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 87 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. PP&L shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

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3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/s/
Walter R. Butler, Director
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects I/II

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 4, 1989

PDI-2/LA	PDI-2/PM	OGC	PDI-2/D
MO'Brien	MThadani:tr		WButler
4/19/89	4/18/89	5/2/89	5/3/89

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Walter R. Butler

Walter R. Butler, Director
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects I/II

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 4, 1989

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 87

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-14

DOCKET NO. 50-387

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The overleaf pages are provided to maintain document completeness.*

REMOVE	INSERT
3/4 4-5*	3/4 4-5*
3/4 4-6	3/4 4-6
3/4 4-7*	3/4 4-7*
3/4 4-8	3/4 4-8

3/4.4.2 SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.2 The safety valve function of at least 10 of the following reactor coolant system safety/relief valves shall be OPERABLE with the specified code safety valve function lift settings:* ** |29

2	safety-relief valves @ 1146 psig ±1%
4	safety-relief valves @ 1175 psig ±1%
4	safety-relief valves @ 1185 psig ±1%
3	safety-relief valves @ 1195 psig ±1%
3	safety-relief valves @ 1205 psig ±1%

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a. With the safety valve function of one or more of the above required safety/relief valves inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours.

b. With one or more safety/relief valves stuck open, provided that suppression pool average water temperature is less than 105°F, close the stuck open relief valve(s); if unable to close the open valve(s) within 2 minutes or if suppression pool water temperature is 105°F or greater, place the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position.

c. With one or more safety/relief valve acoustic monitors inoperable, restore the inoperable monitor(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.2 The acoustic monitor for each safety/relief valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE with the setpoint verified to be 0.25 of the full open noise level by performance of a: |

a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days, and a

b. Calibration in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations at least once per 18 months.## |29

*The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valves at nominal operating temperatures and pressures.

**Up to 2 inoperable valves may be replaced with spare OPERABLE valves with lower setpoints until the next refueling.

##The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable provided the surveillance is performed within 12 hours after reactor steam pressure is adequate to perform the test. |29

3/4.4.3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.3.1 At least the following reactor coolant system leakage detection systems shall be OPERABLE:

a. Two drywell floor drain sump level channels, and

b. One primary containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitoring system channel and one containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitoring system channel aligned to the drywell.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a. With one or both channels of the drywell floor drain sump level monitoring system inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

b. With both channels of the gaseous radioactivity monitoring system inoperable or with both channels of the particulate radioactivity monitoring system inoperable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed at least once per 24 hours. If at least one channel of the affected monitoring system cannot be returned to OPERABLE status and aligned to the drywell within 30 days, or the grab samples are not obtained and analyzed as required, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.3.1 The reactor coolant system leakage detection systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. Primary containment atmosphere particulate and gaseous monitoring systems-performance of a CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours, a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days and a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

b. Drywell floor drain sump level monitoring system-performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days and a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.3.2 Reactor coolant system leakage shall be limited to:

a. No PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE.

b. 5 gpm UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE.

c. 25 gpm total leakage averaged over any 24-hour period.

d. 1 gpm leakage at a reactor coolant system pressure of 1000 ± 10 psig from any reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve specified in Table 3.4.3.2-1.

e. 2 gpm increase in UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE within any 4-hour period. |7

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a. With any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours.

b. With any reactor coolant system leakage greater than the limits in b and/or c, above, reduce the leakage rate to within the limits within 4 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

c. With any reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve leakage greater than the above limit, isolate the high pressure portion of the affected system from the low pressure portion within 4 hours by use of at least one closed manual or deactivated automatic valves, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

d. With one or more of the high/low pressure interface valve leakage pressure monitors shown in Table 3.4.3.2-1 inoperable, restore the inoperable monitor(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or verify the pressure to be less than the alarm pressure at least once per 12 hours; restore the inoperable monitor(s) to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

e. With any reactor coolant system UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE increase greater than 2 gpm within any 4-hour period, identify the source of leakage increase as not service sensitive Type 304 or 316 austenitic stainless steel within 4 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours. |7

4.4.3.2.1 The reactor coolant system leakage shall be demonstrated to be within each of the above limits by:

a. Monitoring the primary containment atmospheric particulate and gaseous radioactivity at least once per 4 hours, and

b. Monitoring the drywell floor drain sump level at least once per 4 hours.

c. Determining the total IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE at least once per 24 hours.

4.4.3.2.2 Each reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve specified in Table 3.4.3.2-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by leak testing pursuant to Specification 4.0.5 and verifying the leakage of each valve to be within the specified limit:

a. At least once per 18 months, and

b. Prior to returning the valve to service following maintenance, repair or replacement work on the valve which could affect its leakage rate.

The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3.

4.4.3.2.3 The high/low pressure interface valve leakage pressure monitors shall be demonstrated OPERABLE with the alarm setpoints per Table 3.4.3.2-1 by performance of a:

a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days, and

b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

ALLEGHENY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-388

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 53
License No. NPF-22

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) having found that:

   A. The application for the amendment filed by the Pennsylvania Power & Light Company, dated November 9, 1988 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of the Facility Operating License No. NPF-22 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 53 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. PP&L shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/s/

Walter R. Butler, Director
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects I/II

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 4, 1989

PDI-2/LA	PDI-2/PM	OGC	PDI-2/D
MO'Brien	MThadani:tr		WButler
4/17/89	4/18/89	5/2/89	5/3/89

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Walter R. Butler, Director
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects I/II

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 4, 1989

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 53

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-22

DOCKET NO. 50-388

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The overleaf pages are provided to maintain document completeness.*

REMOVE	INSERT
3/4 4-5*	3/4 4-5*
3/4 4-6	3/4 4-6
3/4 4-7*	3/4 4-7*
3/4 4-8	3/4 4-8

3/4.4.2 SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.2 The safety valve function of at least 10 of the following reactor coolant system safety/relief valves shall be OPERABLE with the specified code safety valve function lift settings:* **

2 safety-relief valves @ 1146 psig ±1%
4 safety-relief valves @ 1175 psig ±1%
4 safety-relief valves @ 1185 psig ±1%
3 safety-relief valves @ 1195 psig ±1%
3 safety-relief valves @ 1205 psig ±1%

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With the safety valve function of one or more of the above required safety/relief valves inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours.

b. With one or more safety/relief valves stuck open, provided that suppression pool average water temperature is less than 105°F, close the stuck open relief valve(s); if unable to close the open valve(s) within 2 minutes or if suppression pool water temperature is 105°F or greater, place the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position.

c. With one or more safety/relief valve acoustic monitors inoperable, restore the inoperable monitor(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.2 The acoustic monitor for each safety/relief valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE with the setpoint verified to be 0.25 of the full open noise level# by performance of a:

a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days, and a

b. Calibration in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations at least once per 18 months.##

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*The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valves at nominal operating temperatures and pressures.

**Up to 2 inoperable valves may be replaced with spare OPERABLE valves with lower setpoints until the next refueling.

#Initial setting shall be in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendation. Adjustment to the valve full open noise level shall be accomplished during the startup test program.

##The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable provided the surveillance is performed within 12 hours after reactor steam pressure is adequate to perform the test.

3/4.4.3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.3.1 At least the following reactor coolant system leakage detection systems shall be OPERABLE:

a. Two drywell floor drain sump level channels, and

b. One primary containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitoring system channel and one containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitoring system channel aligned to the drywell.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With one or both channels of the drywell floor drain sump level monitoring system inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

b. With both channels of the gaseous radioactivity monitoring system inoperable or with both channels of the particulate radioactivity monitoring system inoperable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed at least once per 24 hours. If at least one channel of the affected monitoring system cannot be returned to OPERABLE status and aligned to the drywell within 30 days, or the grab samples are not obtained and analyzed as required, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.3.1 The reactor coolant system leakage detection systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. Primary containment atmosphere particulate and gaseous monitoring systems-performance of a CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours, a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days and a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

b. Drywell floor drain sump level monitoring system-performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days and a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.3.2 Reactor coolant system leakage shall be limited to:

a. No PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE.

b. 5 gpm UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE.

c. 25 gpm total leakage averaged over any 24-hour period.

d. 1 gpm leakage at a reactor coolant system pressure of 1000 ± 10 psig from any reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve specified in Table 3.4.3.2-1.

e. 2 gpm increase in UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE within any 4-hour period.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours.

b. With any reactor coolant system leakage greater than the limits in b. and/or c., above, reduce the leakage rate to within the limits within 4 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

c. With any reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve leakage greater than the above limit, isolate the high pressure portion of the affected system from the low pressure portion within 4 hours by use of at least one closed manual or deactivated automatic valve, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

d. With one or more of the high/low pressure interface valve leakage pressure monitors shown in Table 3.4.3.2-1 inoperable, restore the inoperable monitor(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or verify the pressure to be less than the alarm pressure at least once per 12 hours; restore the inoperable monitor(s) to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

e. With any reactor coolant system UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE increase greater than 2 gpm within any 4-hour period, identify the source of leakage increase as not service sensitive Type 304 or 316 austenitic stainless steel within 4 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.3.2.1 The reactor coolant system leakage shall be demonstrated to be within each of the above limits by:

a. Monitoring the primary containment atmospheric particulate and gaseous radioactivity at least once per 4 hours, and

b. Monitoring the drywell floor drain sump level at least once per 4 hours.

c. Determining the total IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE at least once per 24 hours.

4.4.3.2.2 Each reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve specified in Table 3.4.3.2-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by leak testing pursuant to Specification 4.0.5 and verifying the leakage of each valve to be within the specified limit:

a. At least once per 18 months, and

b. Prior to returning the valve to service following maintenance, repair or replacement work on the valve which could affect its leakage rate.

The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3.

4.4.3.2.3 The high/low pressure interface valve leakage pressure monitors shall be demonstrated OPERABLE with the alarm setpoints per Table 3.4.3.2-1 by performance of a:

a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days, and

b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 87 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-14 AND

AMENDMENT NO. 53 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-22

PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

ALLEGHENY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.

DOCKET NOS. 50-387 AND 50-388

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated November 9, 1988, Pennsylvania Power & Light Company requested an amendment to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-14 and NPF-22 for the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES), Units 1 and 2. The proposed amendments would delete the Technical Specifications relative to the drywell floor drain sump flowrate monitor of the Reactor Coolant Leakage Detection System. The sump level monitors will continue to remain in the Technical Specifications.

2.0 EVALUATION

The licensee, in its November 9, 1988 application, indicates that the flowrate monitoring system is not a part of the original design basis of the SSES Reactor Coolant Leakage Detection System but was voluntarily installed by the licensee as a redundant system to the floor drain sump level monitors. The flowrate monitoring system was included in the Technical Specifications by Amendment No. 36, dated April 12, 1985. The licensee states that the flowrate monitors have never provided accurate leakage measurements. The current Technical Specifications permit continued operation of the plant when both the level monitoring channels are inoperable, but the inaccurate flowrate monitors are operable. The licensee has concluded that such an action is non-conservative and the removal of the flowrate monitors from the Technical Specifications would make the action statement of the level monitors more conservative such that the continued operation of the plant will be prevented when both drywell floor drain sump level channels are inoperable. By removing the flowrate monitors from the Technical Specifications and applying the Action Statement to the level monitors, the licensee is re-establishing the conservatism intended in the design basis of the SSES.

The staff agrees with the licensee's assessment and finds the proposed changes acceptable.

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3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments involve changes to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes to the surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that these amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement nor environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission made a proposed determination that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (53 FR 50334) on December 14, 1988 and consulted with the State of Pennsylvania. No public comments were received, and the State of Pennsylvania did not have any comments.

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security nor to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Mohan Thadani

Dated: May 4, 1989