

January 2, 2001

Mr. R. G. Lizotte  
Master Process Owner - Assessment  
c/o Mr. David A. Smith  
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company  
P. O. Box 128  
Waterford, CT 06385-0128

SUBJECT: MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2 - ISSUANCE OF  
AMENDMENT RE: CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEMS  
(TAC NO. MA9349)

Dear Mr. Lizotte:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 254 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, in response to your application dated June 28, 2000.

The amendment revises Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.6.1, "Plant Systems - Control Room Emergency Ventilation System," to establish actions to be taken for an inoperable control room ventilation system due to a degraded control room boundary (CRB). This revision approves changes that would allow up to 24 hours to restore the CRB to operable status when two control room ventilation system trains are inoperable due to an inoperable CRB in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. In addition, a Limiting Condition for Operation note would be added to allow the CRB to be opened intermittently under administrative controls without affecting control room ventilation system operability. Various other editorial changes have been made to reflect the revised TS. The applicable TS Bases have been revised to document the TS changes and to provide supporting information.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

**/RA/**

Jacob I. Zimmerman, Project Manager, Section 2  
Project Directorate I  
Division of Licensing Project Management  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-336

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 254 to DPR-65  
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

Millstone Nuclear Power Station  
Unit 2

cc:

Ms. L. M. Cuoco  
Senior Nuclear Counsel  
Northeast Utilities Service Company  
P. O. Box 270  
Hartford, CT 06141-0270

Edward L. Wilds, Jr., Ph.D.  
Director, Division of Radiation  
Department of Environmental Protection  
79 Elm Street  
Hartford, CT 06106-5127

Regional Administrator, Region I  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
475 Allendale Road  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

First Selectmen  
Town of Waterford  
15 Rope Ferry Road  
Waterford, CT 06385

Charles Brinkman, Manager  
Washington Nuclear Operations  
ABB Combustion Engineering  
12300 Twinbrook Pkwy, Suite 330  
Rockville, MD 20852

Senior Resident Inspector  
Millstone Nuclear Power Station  
c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
P.O. Box 513  
Niantic, CT 06357

Mr. F. C. Rothen  
Vice President - Nuclear Work Services  
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company  
P. O. Box 128  
Waterford, CT 06385

Ernest C. Hadley, Esquire  
1040 B Main Street  
P.O. Box 549  
West Wareham, MA 02576

Mr. J. T. Carlin  
Vice President - Human Services - Nuclear  
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company  
P. O. Box 128  
Waterford, CT 06385

Mr. Allan Johanson, Assistant Director  
Office of Policy and Management  
Policy Development and Planning  
Division  
450 Capitol Avenue - MS# 52ERN  
P. O. Box 341441  
Hartford, CT 06134-1441

Mr. M. H. Brothers  
Vice President - Nuclear Operations  
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company  
P.O. Box 128  
Waterford, CT 06385

Mr. L. J. Olivier  
Senior Vice President and Chief  
Nuclear Officer - Millstone  
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company  
P.O. Box 128  
Waterford, CT 06385

Mr. C. J. Schwarz  
Station Director  
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company  
P.O. Box 128  
Waterford, CT 06385

Mr. B. D. Kenyon  
President and CEO - NNECO  
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company  
P.O. Box 270  
Waterford, CT 06141-0270

Mr. R. P. Necci  
Vice President - Nuclear Technical Services  
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company  
P. O. Box 128  
Waterford, CT 06385

Millstone Nuclear Power Station  
Unit 2  
cc:

Citizens Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Ms. Geri Winslow  
P. O. Box 199  
Waterford, CT 06385

Deborah Katz, President  
Citizens Awareness Network  
P. O. Box 83  
Shelburne Falls, MA 03170

Ms. Terry Concannon  
Co-Chair  
Nuclear Energy Advisory Council  
41 South Buckboard Lane  
Marlborough, CT 06447

Mr. Evan W. Woollacott  
Co-Chair  
Nuclear Energy Advisory Council  
128 Terry's Plain Road  
Simsbury, CT 06070

Attorney Nicholas J. Scobbo, Jr.  
Ferriter, Scobbo, Caruso, Rodophele, PC  
75 State Street, 7th Floor  
Boston, MA 02108-1807

Mr. D. A. Smith  
Manager - Regulatory Affairs  
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company  
P. O. Box 128  
Waterford, CT 06385

Ms. Nancy Burton  
147 Cross Highway  
Redding Ridge, CT 00870

Mr. G. D. Hicks  
Director - Nuclear Training Services  
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company  
P.O. Box 128  
Waterford, CT 06385

Mr. R. G. Lizotte  
Master Process Owner - Assessment  
c/o Mr. David A. Smith  
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company  
P. O. Box 128  
Waterford, CT 06385-0128

January 2, 2001

SUBJECT: MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2 - ISSUANCE OF  
AMENDMENT RE: CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEMS  
(TAC NO. MA9349)

Dear Mr. Lizotte:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 254 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, in response to your application dated June 28, 2000.

The amendment revises Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.6.1, "Plant Systems - Control Room Emergency Ventilation System," to establish actions to be taken for an inoperable control room ventilation system due to a degraded control room boundary (CRB). This revision approves changes that would allow up to 24 hours to restore the CRB to operable status when two control room ventilation system trains are inoperable due to an inoperable CRB in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. In addition, a Limiting Condition for Operation note would be added to allow the CRPB to be opened intermittently under administrative controls without affecting control room ventilation system operability. Various other editorial changes have been made to reflect the revised TS. The applicable TS Bases have been revised to document the TS changes and to provide supporting information.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

**/RAI**

Jacob I. Zimmerman, Project Manager, Section 2  
Project Directorate I  
Division of Licensing Project Management  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-336

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 254 to DPR-65

2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY, ET AL.

DOCKET NO. 50-336

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 254  
License No. DPR-65

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee) dated June 28, 2000, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 254, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance, and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

**/RA/**

James W. Clifford, Chief, Section 2  
Project Directorate I  
Division of Licensing Project Management  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: January 2, 2001

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 254

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65

DOCKET NO. 50-336

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove

3/4 7-16  
3/4 7-16a  
B3/4 7-4a  
B3/4 7-4b

Insert

3/4 7-16  
3/4 7-16a  
B3/4 7-4a  
B3/4 7-4b

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 254

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY, ET AL.

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO. 50-336

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated June 28, 2000, the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee), submitted a request for changes to the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would revise TS 3.7.6.1, "Plant Systems - Control Room Emergency Ventilation System," to establish actions to be taken for an inoperable control room ventilation system due to a degraded control room boundary (CRB). This revision approves changes that would allow up to 24 hours to restore the CRB to operable status when two control room ventilation system trains are inoperable due to an inoperable CRB in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. In addition, a Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) note would be added to allow the CRB to be opened intermittently under administrative controls without affecting control room ventilation system operability. Various other editorial changes have been made to reflect the revised TS. The applicable TS Bases have been revised to document the TS changes and to provide supporting information. These changes are based on Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF)-287 to the Standard Technical Specifications (STS).

2.0 BACKGROUND

The existing TS 3.7.6.1 provides a surveillance requirement that tests the integrity of the CRB by verifying that control room air in-leakage is less than 130 standard cubic feet per minute (SCFM) with the control room ventilation system operating in the recirculation/filtration mode. While other surveillance requirements in the same specification test the operability and function of the ventilation train, the in-leakage test ensures that the CRB leak tightness is adequate to meet design assumptions for post-accident operator doses.

Currently, there are no corresponding conditions, required actions, or completion times specified in LCO 3.7.6.1 should the CRB in-leakage exceed 130 SCFM. If the 130 SCFM limit were to be exceeded, under the existing specifications, Action b must be entered (for two-train inoperability) with a 1-hour allowed outage time. If the CRB cannot be made operable within 1 hour, the plant would be required to be in hot standby within 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.



The proposed change is similar in nature to STS LCOs for secondary containment (BWR) and shield building (PWR) which allows 24 hours to restore secondary containment or shield building envelope to operable status before requiring an orderly shutdown from operating conditions. In addition, this change is consistent with the plant specific TS 3.6.5.2, "Containment Systems - Enclosure Building," which allows normal entry and egress through associated access openings (Surveillance Requirement 4.6.5.2.1) and 24 hours to restore Enclosure Building integrity.

### 3.0 EVALUATION

The proposed changes are:

1. An asterisk (\*) will be added to the word "OPERABLE" in the LCO. This asterisk will refer to a footnote that will be added. This footnote will allow the CRB to be opened intermittently under administrative controls. For entry and exit through doors, the administrative control of the opening is performed by the person(s) entering or exiting the area. For other openings, during the period that the CRB is inoperable, appropriate compensatory measures (stationing a dedicated individual at the opening who is in constant communication with the control room) will be utilized to protect the control room operators from potential hazards. Therefore, using administrative controls to restore integrity of the CRB when required, with appropriate compensatory measures, will ensure the accident mitigation equipment will be able to function as assumed to protect control room personnel. Based on the above, the staff concludes that this TS change is acceptable and is in conformance with TSTF-287.
2. The phrase "except as specified in ACTION c.," will be added to Action b. This is necessary so that only the new action requirement will apply to address a loss of CRB integrity. This change is editorial in nature and, therefore, is acceptable.
3. A new action requirement (c.) will be added to address two inoperable Control Room Emergency Ventilation Trains in Modes 1 through 4 due only to an inoperable CRB. This new action requirement will allow 24 hours to restore the CRB before a plant shutdown to Mode 5 is required. This new action requirement will also require immediate suspension of fuel movement within the spent fuel pool and shielded cask movement over the spent fuel pool cask laydown area. If the CRB is inoperable in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4, (i.e. the control room in-leakage is greater than 130 SCFM with the control room ventilation system operating in the recirculation/filtration mode), action must be taken to restore an OPERABLE CRB. The proposed change would allow 24 hours (during Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4) to restore the capability to maintain CRB before requiring the unit to perform an orderly shutdown and also allows intermittent opening of the CRB under administrative control. Allowing 24 hours to restore the integrity of the CRB will allow time for repairs to restore integrity of the CRB without requiring an immediate plant shutdown. The 24-hour completion time is a reasonable time to diagnose, plan and possibly repair, and test most problems with the CRB. Additionally, the 24-hour completion time is considered acceptable because of the low probability of an event requiring an intact CRB during the 24-hour action Completion Time associated with the new Action c.

During the period that the CRB is inoperable, appropriate compensatory measures consistent with the intent of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A, General Design Criteria 19 will be utilized to protect control room operators from potential hazards such as radioactive contamination, toxic chemicals, smoke, temperature and relative humidity and to ensure

physical security. Based on the low probability of an event occurring during the 24-hour action period and the availability of compensatory measures consistent with GDC 19 to minimize the consequences during an event, the proposed change is acceptable and is in conformance with TSTF-287.

4. An additional asterisk (\*) will be added to the Modes 5 and 6 action requirements and to the footnote on Page 3/4 7-16a. This will avoid any confusion with the new footnote that will be added on Page 3/4 7-16. This change is editorial in nature and, therefore, is acceptable.
5. The designation for the Modes 5 and 6 action requirements will be changed from "c." and "d." to "d." and "e." as a result of the addition of the new Modes 1 through 4 action requirement (c.). This will also require the action requirement designations in the footnote on Page 3/4 7-16a to be changed. These changes are editorial in nature and, therefore, are acceptable.
6. The Bases for Technical Specification 3.7.6.1 will be modified as a result of the proposed TS changes. The staff has reviewed the Bases Section 3/4.3.7.6 and has no objections to the proposed Bases changes.

### 3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Connecticut State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

### 4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (65 FR 46010). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

### 5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: A. Wang

Date: January 2, 2001