Docket No. 50-387

Mr. Norman W. Curtis Vice President Engineering and Construction - Nuclear Pennsylvania Power & Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101

Dear Mr. Curtis:

SUBJECT: AMENDMENT NO. 46 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-14 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 1

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 46 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-14 for the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 1. The amendment is in response to your letter dated January 31, 1985 as supplemented on February 20, 1985. This amendment revises the Technical Specifications to reflect the replacement of certain magnetic-only breakers with thermal-magnetic breakers. Additionally the amendment reflects changes made in support of drywell cooling improvements.

A copy of the related safety evaluation supporting Amendment No. 46 to Facility Operating License NPF-14 is enclosed.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

A Bournialo Walter R. Butler, Chief

Licensing Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 46 to NPF-14

2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosure: See next page

Distribution: See next page

*PReviously concurred:

*LB#2/DL/LA *LB#2/DL/PM EHylton MCampagnone:dh 05/14/85 05/14/85

8506060785 850528 PDR АДОСК 05000387

PDR



LB#2/DL/BC WRButler 05/14/85

TMNovak 05/1/85

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
A copy of the related safety evaluation supporting Amendment No. to Facility Operating License NPF-14 is enclosed.

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. to NPF-14 2. Safety Evaluation cc w/enclosure: See next page <u>Distribution:</u> See next page

Sincerely,

Walter R. Butler, Chief Licensing Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing





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		WRBu	tler	TMNo
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FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Original signed by:

Walter R. Butler, Chief Licensing Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

a.,•

Date of Issuance: MAY 2 8 1985





UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

MAY 2 8 1985

Docket No. 50-387

Mr. Norman W. Curtis Vice President Engineering and Construction - Nuclear Pennsylvania Power & Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101

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A copy of the related safety evaluation supporting Amendment No. 46 to Facility Operating License NPF-14 is enclosed.

Sincerely.

1.fn L'andre in

Walter R. Butler, Chief Licensing Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 46 to NPF-14 2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosure: See next page

Mr. Norman W. Curtis Pennsylvania Power & Light Company

cc: Jay Silberg, Esq. Shaw, Pittman, Potts, & Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N. W. Washington, D.C. 20036

> Edward M. Nagel, Esq. General Counsel and Secretary Pennsylvania Power & Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101

Mr. William E. Barberich Manager-Nuclear Licensing Pennsylvania Power & Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101

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Mr. R. Jacobs Resident Inspector P.O. Box 52 Shickshinny, Pennsylvania 18655

Mr. E. B. Poser Project Engineer Bechtel Power Corporation P. O. Box 3965 San Francisco, California 94119

Mr. Thomas M. Gerusky, Director Bureau of Radiation Protection Resources Commonwealth of Pennsylvania P. O. BOX 2063 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 & 2

Mr. N. D. Weiss, Project Manager Maile Code 391 General Electric Company 175 Curtner Avenue San Jose, California 95125

Robert W. Alder, Esquire Office of Attorney General P.O. Box 2357 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120

Mr. William Matson Allegheny Elec. Coorperative, Inc. 212 Locust Street P. U. Box 1266 Harrisburg, PA 17108-1266

Nr. Anthony J. Pietrofitta, General Manager Power Production Engineering and Construction Atlantic Electric 1199 Black Horse Pike Pleasantville, NJ 08232

Mr. Thomas E. Hurley U.S. NRC, Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Susquehanna

cc: Governor's Office of State Planning & Development Attn: Coordinator, State Clearinghouse P D. Box 1323 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120

Mr. Bruce Thomas, President Board of Supervisors R. D. #1 Berwick, Pennsylvania 18603



STATES

PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ALLEGHENY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. DOCKET NO. 50-387 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 46 License No. NPF-14

- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) having found that:
 - A. The application for an amendment filed by the Pennsylvania Power & Light Company, dated January 31, 1985 as supplemented on February 20, 1985 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- 2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-14 is hereby amended to read as follows:
 - (2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

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The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.46, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. PP&L shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan. 3. This amendment is effective upon start-up following the first refueling outage.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Walter R. Butler, Chief Licensing Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing

 Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: MAY 2 8 1985

- 2 -

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 46 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-14 DOCKET NO. 50-387

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with enclosed pages. the revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE		INSERT
3/4 6-37 3/4 6-38		3/4 6-37 3/4 6-38
3/4 8-21 3/4 8-22		3/4 8-21 3/4 8-22
3/4 8-23 3/4 8-24	: •	3/4 8-23 3/4 8-24
3/4 8-25 3/4 8-26		3/4 8-25 3/4 8-26
3/4 8 - 27 3/4 8-28		3/4 8-27 3/4 8-28

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.6 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL

DRYWELL AND SUPPRESSION CHAMBER HYDROGEN RECOMBINER SYSTEMS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.6.1 Two drywell and two suppression chamber hydrogen recombiner systems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2.

ACTION:

With one drywell and/or one suppression chamber hydrogen recombiner system inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.6.1 Each drywell and suppression chamber hydrogen recombiner system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 6 months by energizing the recombiner system to at least 10 kw for \geq 5 minutes.
- b. At least once per 18 months by:
 - 1. Performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of all recombiner operating instrumentation and control circuits.
 - 2. Verifying the integrity of all heater electrical circuits by performing a resistance to ground test following the above required energization. The resistance to ground for any heater phase shall be greater than or equal to 10,000 ohms.
 - 3. Verifying through a visual examination that there is no evidence of abnormal conditions within the recombiner enclosure; i.e, loose wiring or structural connections, deposits of foreign materials, etc.

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

DRYWELL AIR FLOW SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.6.3 Drywell unit cooler fans 1V414 A&B, 1V416 A&B and recirculation fans 1V418 A&B shall be OPERABLE at low speed.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2.

ACTION:

With one or more of the above fans inoperable at low speed, restore the inoperable fan(s) to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.6.3 Each of the fans required above shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days by:

- a. Starting each fan at low speed from the control room, and
- b. Verifying that each fan operates for at least 15 minutes.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION:

- a. With less than Division I or Division II of the above required A.C. distribution system energized, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, handling of irradiated fuel in the secondary containment and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
- b. With less than Division I or Division II of the above required Unit 1 D.C. distribution system energized, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, handling or irradiated fuel in the secondary containment and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
- c. With less than Division I or Division II of the above required Unit 2 D.C. distribution system energized, either:
 - Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, handling of irradiated fuel in the secondary containment, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel, or
 - 2. Transfer the Unit 1 and common loads aligned to the deenergized Unit 2 load group(s) to the corresponding Unit 1 load group(s).

Otherwise, declare the Unit 1 and common loads aligned to the deenergized Unit 2 load group(s) inoperable and take the ACTION required by the applicable Specification(s).

- d. With the Unit 1 loads aligned to one or more of the above required Unit 1 125-volt D.C. load group(s) aligned to the corresponding Unit 2 load group(s), realign the Unit 1 loads to the Unit 1 load group(s) within 72 hours after restoring the Unit 1 load group(s) to OPERABLE status; otherwise, declare the Unit 1 loads aligned to the Unit 2 load group(s) inoperable and take the ACTION required by the applicable Specification(s).
- e. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.3.2.1 At least the above required power distribution system divisions shall be determined energized at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment and voltage on the busses/MCCs/panels.

4.8.3.2.2 The A.C. power distribution system swing bus automatic transfer switch shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days by actuating the load test switch or by disconnecting the normal power source to the transfer switch and verifying that swing bus automatic transfer is accomplished. ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.4.1 All primary containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices shown in Table 3.8.4.1-1 and all fuses tested pursuant to Specification 4.8.4.1.a.2 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With one or more of the above required containment penetration conductor overcurrent devices shown in Table 3.8.4.1-1 and/or fuses tested pursuant Specification 4.8.4.1.a.2 inoperable:
 - Restore the protective device(s) to OPERABLE status or deenergize the circuit(s) by tripping, racking out, or removing the alternate device or racking out or removing the inoperable device within 72 hours, and
 - 2. Declare the affected system or component inoperable, and
 - 3. Verify at least once per 7 days thereafter the alternate device is tripped, racked out, or removed, or the device is racked out or removed.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable to overcurrent devices which have the inoperable device racked out or removed or, which have the alternate device tripped, racked out, or removed.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.4.1 Each of the primary containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices required above shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 18 months:
 - 1. By selecting and functionally testing a representative sample of at least 10% of each type of lower voltage circuit breakers. Circuit breakers selected for functional testing shall be selected on a rotating basis. Testing of these circuit breakers shall consist of injecting a current with a value equal to 300% of the pickup of the thermal (long term time delay) element of Types HFB-TM and KB-TM (thermal magnetic) circuit breakers, and verifying that the circuit breaker operates within the time delay band-width

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

2.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

specified by the manufacturer for the test current. The magnetic (instantaneous) element shall be tested by injecting a current in excess of 120% of the pickup value of the magnetic (instantaneous) element and verifying that the circuit breaker trips instantaneously with no intentional time delay. Type HFB-M (magnetic only) circuit breaker testing shall also follow this procedure except that no thermal trip elements will be involved. Circuit breakers found inoperable during functional testing shall be restored to OPERABLE status prior to resuming operation. For each circuit breaker found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all the circuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested.

a. By selecting and functionally testing a representative sample of each type of fuse on a rotating basis. Each representative sample of fuses shall include at least 10% of all fuses of that type. The functional test shall consist of a non-destructive resistance measurement test which demonstrates that the fuse meets its manufacturer's design criteria. Fuses found inoperable during these functional testing shall be replaced with OPERABLE fuses prior to resuming operation. For each fuse found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all fuses of that type shall be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all fuses of that type have been functionally tested, or

b. By replacing 100% of all required fuses.

- 3. By functionally testing each overcurrent relay listed in Table 3.8.4.1-1. Testing of these relays shall consist of injecting a current in excess of 120% of the nominal relay initiation current and measuring the response time. The measured response time shall be within ± 10% of the specified value.
- b. At least once per 60 months by subjecting each circuit breaker to an inspection and preventive maintenance in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations.

TABLE 3.8.4.1-1

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

		cuit Breaker esignation		System/Equipment Powered
Α.	Тур	<u>e HFB-TM</u> *		
	1.	1B237043		Rx Recirc/HV-B31-1F023A
	2.	1B219022		Rx Recirc/HV-B31-1F031A
	3.	1B219023		Rx Recirc/HV-B31-1F032A
	4.	1B246011		Rx Recirc/HV-B31-1F023B
	5.	1B229022		Rx Recirc/HV-B31-1F031B
	6.	1B229023		Rx Recirc/HV-B31-1F032B
	7.	1B236042	. *	Drywell Air Flow/1V411A
	8.	1B236032		Drywell Air Flow/1V412A
	9.	1B236011		Drywell Air Flow/1V413A
	10.	1B236033		Drywell Air Flow/1V414A
	11.	1B236082		Drywell Air Flow/1V415A
	12.	1B236043		Drywell Air Flow/1V416A
	13.	1B236021		Drywell Air Flow/1V417A
	14.	1B246091		Drywell Air Flow/1V411B
	15.	1B246103		Drywell Air Flow/1V412B
	16.	1B246102		Drywell Air Flow/1V413B
	17.	1B246061		Drywell Air Flow/1V414B
	18.	1B246072		Drywell Air Flow/1V415B
	19.	1B246081		Drywell Air Flow/1V416B
	20.	1B246051		Drywell Air Flow/1V417B
	21.	1B236123		Drywell Air Flow/1V418A
	22.	1B246121		Drywell Air Flow/1V418B

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1

TABLE 3.8.4.1-1 (Continued)

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

	cuit Breaker	System/Equipment Boyonad
		System/Equipment Powered
23.	1B236052	RHR/HV-E11-1F009
24.	1B237073	RHR/HV-E11-1F022
25.	1B237082	HPCI/HV-E41-1F002
26.	1B253021	NSSS/HV-B21-1F011A
27.	1B253023	NSSS/HV-B21-1F011B
28.	18253041	MSIV Hoist/TBB15
28.	1B263021	MSIV Hoist/TBB16
Туре	HFB-M*	
1.	1B236023	Cont. Inst. Gas/HV-12603
2.	1B246022	RCIC/HV-E51-1F007
3.	1B237072	NSSS/HV-B21-1F016
4.	1B236102	NSSS/HV-B21-1F001
5.	1B246112	NSSS/HV-B21-1F002
6.	1B246113	NSSS/HV-B21-1F005
7.	1B236053	RWCU/HV-G33-1F001
8.	1B253053	RWCU/HV-G33-1F102
9.	1B263043	RWCU/HV-G33-1F100
10.	1B263053	RWCU/HV-G33-1F106
11.	1B263081	RWCU/HV-G33-1F101
12.	1B246062	RBCCW/HV-11346
13.	1B246012	RBCCW/HV-11345
14.	1B253063	Drywell Sump/1P402A
15.	1B263071	Drywell Sump/1P402B

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TABLE 3.8.4.1-1 (Continued)

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

Circuit Breaker Designation	System/Equipment Powered
16. 1B253043	Drywell Sump/1P403A
17. 1B263072	Drywell Sump/1P403B
Туре КВ-ТМ	-
1. 1B216092	Cont. H2 Recombiner/1E440A
2. 1B226103	Cont. H2 Recombiner/1E440B
3. 1B236103	Cont. H2 Recombiner/1E440C
4. 1B246033	Cont. H2 Recombiner/1E440D
Circuit Breakers Tripped By Overcurrent Relays	
1. 1A20501 1A20502	Rx Recirc/1P401A
2. 1A20601 1A20602	Rx Recirc/1P401B

*Each circuit breaker designation represents two redundant circuit breakers.

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1

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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

MOTOR OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.4.2 The thermal overload protection of each valve shown in Table 3.8.4.2-1 shall be bypassed continuously by an OPERABLE bypass device integral with the motor starter.

<u>APPLICABILITY</u>: Whenever the motor operated valve is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

- a. With thermal overload protection for one or more of the above required valves not bypassed continuously by an OPERABLE integral bypass device, take administrative action to continuously bypass the thermal overload within 8 hours or declare the affected valve(s) inoperable and apply the appropriate ACTION statement(s) for the affected system(s).
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.4.2.1 The thermal overload protection for the above required values shall be verified to be bypassed continuously by an OPERABLE integral bypass device by verifying that the thermal overload protection is bypassed: 29

- a. At least once per 18 months, and
- b. Following maintenance on the motor starter.

4.8.4.2.2 The thermal overload protection shall be verified to be bypassed following activities during which the thermal overload protection was temporarily placed in force. $\exists 9$



UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION

AMENDMENT NO. 46 TO NPF-14

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-387

Introduction

By letter dated Januray 31, 1985, as supplemented on February 20, 1985, the Pennsylvania Power and Light Company requested changes to the Unit 1 Technical Specifications to: 1) support drywell cooling improvements; and 2) support replacement of certain magnetic - only breakers with thermalmagetic breakers.

Evaluation

<u>Technical Specification 3/4.6.6.3</u>: The proposed changes reflect a design improvement to the drywell atmosphere recirculation & cooling system. This system serves two functions. During normal operation, it maintains the drywell temperature. For post-LOCA conditions, the system is used for air mixing. The post-LOCA operation is the only safety-related function. The design modifications consisted of adding two recirculation fans, 1V418A and B, in the orginial location of one of the existing three fan cooler units. This fan cooler unit was moved to another drywell location to allow for more effective drywell cooling during normal operation.

The requested Technical Specification changes replace the relocated fan cooler with the added fans. Since the safety-related operation of the fans is the same as the replaced fan cooler, there is no impact on the post-LOCA performance.

Based on our review of the proposed Technical Specification changes, the staff concludes that the equipment change will not affect the safety-related function of the system and, therefore, is acceptable.

<u>Technical Specification 4.8.4.1.a.1</u>: The proposed changes achieve a greater level of clarity in that this proposed revision specifies how the acceptance criteria shall be met for each type of breaker, i.e., magnetic-only (HFB-M) and thermal-magnetic (HFB-TM, KB-TM). The staff in a conference call with the licensee, agreed to further clarify this specification by further stating that a thermal element is a long-term time delay element and a magnetic element is an instantaneous element. This change is not substantive but is only a clarification of nomenclature. It does not effect that information previously noticed or in any way change the technical merit or review of the licensee's original proposal. In reviewing this proposal the staff finds that these changes are preferable to the existing Technical Specification. Additionally, the staff finds that, since the degree of testing for any given breaker remains unchanged and no safety implications exist, the licensee's proposal is fully acceptable.

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Table 3.8.4.1-1:

I. Replacement of magnetic-only with thermal-magnetic circuit breakers.

The as-built system of containment penetration overcurrent protection was designed to provide protection for "bolted" short circuits occurring at the terminals of 480-volt motors or other loads. However, since the as-built distribution system is a 480-volt, solidly grounded system it is assumed that "arcing" short circuits could occur. The problem is that the phase to neutral voltage in a 480-volt system is high encugh to allow re-striking after the arc extinguishes at a current zero.

This re-striking may result in very low short circuit currents (that is, very high arc resistances) which approach full load currents. Usually, these small magnitude short circuit currents are detected by motor overloads and isolated. However, in this specific case, some overloads are bypassed to ensure completion of a safety function, and even if the overloads were not bypassed, redundant protection would not exist since only one overload has been installed.

Changing the containment penetration overcurrent protection from magneticonly to thermal-magnetic circuit breakers allows detection of substantially lower short circuit currents. The NRC staff originally recommended that the licensee replace these magnetic-only circuit breakers with thermalmagnetic circuit breakers and, therefore, the NRC staff finds the licensee's proposal acceptable.

II. Editorial Changes

a. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's proposal to reduce the amount of information in this table and reorganize the table listing. The modified format of the table deletes the Frame Rating/UL, Trip Setpoint, and Response Time columns from the table. The listing of breaker information has been grouped by system, rather than randomly.

Electrical equipment overcurrent protective relaying (devices) protect the electrical equipment including cable and the containment penetrations from fault current. The fault current for each penetration is derived based on the system voltage level, e.g. 480 volts, 4160 volts. The licensee has included this information by noting the type of break e.g. (HFB, KB). Therefore, protective devices are classified in the technical specifications at a voltage level. Thus, it is unnecessary and serves no useful purpose to specify Frame Rating/UL information in the technical specifications for the overcurrent protective devices' surveillance requirement.

For overcurrent protective devices, the trip setpoint and response time are required to protect the equipment from the fault current. This information has been moved from the Table and, as a practical matter, placed in the surveillance test procedure in the proposed Technical Specification 4.8.4.1. The overcurrent protective relaying for Susquehanna has two elements, magnetic (instantaneous), and thermal (long term time delay). Testing of these breakers consists of injecting a current with a value equal to 300% of the setpoint of the thermal element, and verifying that the circuit breaker operates within the time delay bandwidth for the current specified by the manufacturer. The magnetic element shall be tested by injecting a current equal to 120% of the setpoint of the magnetic element and verifying that the circuit breakers trips instantaneously with no intentional time delay.

Conformance with these practical surveillance specifications will adequately demonstrate that protection of containment penetrations will be provided by the protective devices, at appropriate values.

- b. "Circuit Breaker Location" has been changed to "Circuit Breaker Designation."
- c. "Molded Case Circuit Breaker" headings were deleted. The need for this heading is tied to a need to differentiate test methods from those used for metal case circuit breakers. The surveillance is now tied to the types listed since no metal case breakers are now in use, therefore, the deleted information would no longer serve any purpose.
- d. Editorial descriptions of specific equipment have been deleted. System and equipment number is sufficient information to be included in the Technical Specifications.
- e. Footnotes referring to vendors have been deleted since they are unnecessary. The type definitions provided are covered by the revised surveillance.
- f. Footnote "+" was revised (new footnote *) to grop a reference to A and B, because this is not always the correct designation. Furthermore, such specific information is unnecessary; the key information is that two redundant breakers are to be OPERABLE.

III. Drywell Cooling

Two pairs of Type HFB-TM circuit breakers have been added to the table to support recirculation fans 1V418A and B which are being added as discussed in Technical Specification 3/4.6.6.3.

The staff has reviewed all the changes proposed for Table 3.8.4.1-1 and finds that these changes are appropriate to support the replacement of the magnetic breakers with thermal-magnetic breakers. Additionally, the staff finds that the information which has been deleted in Table 3.8.4.1-1 was an unnecessary restriction which did not significantly increase safe operation, and therefore this change is acceptable.

Environmental Consideration

This amendment involves a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

Conclusions

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: #AY 2 8 1985

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