

Mr. James Knubel
 Chief Nuclear Officer
 Power Authority of the State
 of New York
 123 Main Street
 White Plains, NY 10601

September 16, 1999

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT FOR INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING
 UNIT NO. 3 RE: REMOVAL OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE TABLES
 (TAC NO. MA4676)

Dear Mr. Knubel:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 195 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-64 for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSS) in response to your application transmitted by letter dated January 28, 1999, as supplemented July 16, 1999.

The amendment removes two lists of Containment Isolation Valves in Tables 3.6-1 and 4.4-1 and makes related changes to TS 1.10, 3.6.A.1, 4.4 and associated bases pages.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

George F. Wunder, Project Manager, Section 1
 Project Directorate 1
 Division of Licensing Project Management
 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-286

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 195 to DPR-64
 2. Safety Evaluation

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DATED: September 16, 1999

AMENDMENT NO. 195 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-64-INDIAN POINT
UNIT 3

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S. Little

G. Wunder

L. Berry

OGC

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W. Beckner

J. Pulsipher

G. Hubbard

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

September 16, 1999

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "George F. Wunder".

George F. Wunder, Project Manager, Section 1
Project Directorate 1
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-286

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 195 to DPR-64
2. Safety Evaluation

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

DOCKET NO. 50-286

INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 195
License No. DPR-64

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by the Power Authority of the State of New York (the licensee) dated January 28, 1999, as supplemented July 16, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-64 is hereby amended to read as follows:


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(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 195 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance to be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



S. Singh Bajwa, Chief, Section 1
Project Directorate 1
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 16, 1999

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 195

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-64

DOCKET NO. 50-286

Replace the following page of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Pages

vii
1-4
3.6-1
3.6-2
3.6-3
3.6-3a
Table 3.6-1
4.4-4
Table 4.4-1

Insert Pages

vii
1-4
3.6-1
3.6-2
3.6-3
3.6-3a
Table 3.6-1
4.4-4
Table 4.4-1

LIST OF TABLES

Title

Table No.

3.4-1	Maximum Allowable Power Range Neutron Flux High Setpoint with Inoperable Steam Line Safety Valves
3.5-1	Engineered Safety Features Initiation Instrument Setting Limits
3.5-2	Reactor Trip Instrumentation Limiting Operating Conditions
3.5-3	Instrumentation Operating Condition for Engineered Safety Features
3.5-4	Instrument Operating Conditions for Isolation Functions
3.5-5	Table of Indicators and/or Recorders Available to the Operator
3.10-1	Accident Analyses Requiring Reevaluation in the Event of an Inoperable Full Length Rod
3.14-1	Fire Detection Instruments
3.14-2	Fire Hose Stations
3.14-3	Yard Fire Hydrant and Associated Hydrant Hose Houses
4.1-1	Minimum Frequencies for Checks, Calibrations and Tests of Instrument Channels
4.1-2	Frequencies for Sampling Tests
4.1-3	Frequencies for Equipment Tests
4.9-1	Steam Generator Tube Inspection
4.10-1	Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation
4.10-2	Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements
6.2-1	Minimum Shift Crew Composition

1.9.2 Instrument Channel Functional Test

Injection of a simulated signal into the channel to verify that it is operable, including alarm and/or trip initiating action.

1.9.3 Instrument Channel Calibration

Adjustment of channel output such that it responds, with acceptable range and accuracy, to known values of the parameter which the channel measures. Calibration shall encompass the entire channel, including alarm or trip, and shall be deemed to include the channel functional test.

1.9.4 Logic Channel Functional Test

The operation of relays or switch contacts, in all the combinations required, to produce the required output.

1.10 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

Containment integrity is defined to exist when:

1.10.1 All non-automatic containment isolation valves which are not required to be open during accident conditions, except those opened under administrative control for normal plant operation or testing, are closed and blind flanges are installed where required.

1.10.2 The equipment door is properly closed.

1.10.3 Both doors in each personnel air lock are properly closed unless being used for entry, egress or maintenance, at which time at least one air lock door shall be closed.

1.10.4 All automatic containment isolation valves are either operable or in the closed position, or isolated by a closed manual valve or flange that meets the same design criteria as the isolation valve.

3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEM

Applicability

Applies to the integrity of reactor containment.

Objective

To define the operating status of the reactor containment for plant operation.

Specification

A. Containment Integrity

1. The containment integrity (as defined in 1.10) shall not be violated unless the reactor is in the cold shutdown condition. However, those non-automatic valves referred to in Specification 1.10.1, may be opened if necessary for plant operation and only as long as necessary to perform the intended function. Those non-automatic valves which are opened intermittently are under administrative controls.
2. The containment integrity shall not be violated when the reactor vessel head is removed unless the boron concentration is sufficient to maintain the shutdown margin equal to or greater than the requirements of specification 3.8.D.
3. If the containment integrity requirements are not met when the reactor is above cold shutdown, containment integrity shall be restored within one hour or the reactor shall be in the hot shutdown condition within six hours and in cold shutdown condition within the next 30 hours.

B. Internal Pressure

If the internal pressure exceeds 2.5 psig or the internal vacuum exceeds 2.0 psig, the condition shall be corrected or the reactor shutdown.

C. Containment Temperature

1. The reactor shall not be taken above the cold shutdown condition unless the containment ambient temperature is greater than 50° F.
2. Containment ambient temperature shall not exceed 130°F when the reactor is above the cold shutdown condition. If the temperature is greater than 130°F, reduce the temperature to within the limit within 8 hours, or be in hot shutdown within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

3. Containment ambient temperature as specified in 3.6.C.1 and 3.6.C.2 shall be the arithmetic average of temperatures measured at no fewer than 4 locations, at least once per 24 hours.

D. Containment Vent and Purge System

The reactor shall not be taken above the cold shutdown condition unless the containment vent isolation valves (PCV - 1190, - 1191, - 1192) are closed or limited to a maximum valve opening angle of 60° (90° - full open) by mechanical means.

The reactor shall not be taken above the cold shutdown condition unless the containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves (FCV - 1170, - 1171, - 1172, - 1173) are closed.

If the above conditions cannot be met within one hour, the reactor shall be in the hot shutdown condition within six hours and in the cold shutdown condition within the next 30 hours.

Basis

The Reactor Coolant System must be in the cold shutdown condition in order to relax containment integrity. When the Reactor Coolant System is in the cold shutdown condition, the pressurizer may have an internal temperature above 200°F for purposes of drawing and maintaining a steam bubble, provided that the reactor has been subcritical for at least 24 hours. Operation in this manner ensures that, in case of an accidental RCS coolant release under cold shutdown conditions, the ensuing offsite radiation doses will be within the limits of 10 CFR 100.

The shutdown margins are selected on the type of activities that are being carried out. The shutdown margin requirement of specification 3.8.D when the vessel head bolts are less than fully tensioned precludes criticality during refueling. When the reactor head is not to be removed, the specified cold shutdown margin of 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ Δ k/k precludes criticality in any occurrence.

Regarding internal pressure limitations, the containment design pressure of 47 psig would not be exceeded for a major loss-of-coolant accident or for a main steam line break accident.⁽¹⁾ The loss-of-coolant accident event bounds the main steam line break accident from the containment peak pressures standpoint. The initial pressure condition used in the containment analysis was 2.5 psig.⁽¹⁾ The containment can withstand an internal vacuum of 3 psig.⁽²⁾ The 2.0 psig vacuum specified as an operating limit avoids any difficulties with motor cooling.

The requirement of a 50°F minimum containment ambient temperature is to assure that the minimum service metal temperature of the containment liner is well above the NDT + 30°F criterion for the liner material.⁽³⁾

3.6-2

Amendment No. 26, 28, 3/16/95, Revised by letter dated 9/22/98, 195

Limiting maximum containment ambient temperature will ensure that the peak accident containment pressure does not exceed the design limit of 47 psig during steamline break or loss of coolant accidents. Environmentally and seismically qualified RTDs mounted on the crane wall above the containment fan cooler units inlet are normally used for measuring containment ambient temperature. Portable temperature sensing equipment may also be used, provided the criteria of 3.6.C.3 are met.

During periods of normal plant operations requiring containment integrity⁽⁴⁾, some containment isolation valves, which include some locked or sealed closed valves, may be opened either continuously or intermittently depending on requirements of the particular protection, safeguards or essential service systems. Those valves which are opened intermittently are under administrative controls and are open only as long as necessary to perform their intended function. These administrative controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the valve controls, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for containment isolation is indicated. An exception to this is containment isolation valve AC-732. Valve AC-732 is on the RHR Suction Line and is continuously open during RHR shutdown cooling from about 350 degrees F to below 200 degrees F in the RCS. If containment isolation is required valve AC-732 would be shut as part of the administrative controls to realign the RHR system for safety injection. A clarification is for non-automatic, remote manual containment isolation valves operated intermittently from the control room. The administrative controls for these valves consist of the normally stationed control room operator, since this operator is continually available to isolate the valve from the control room. In all cases, however, those containment isolation valves not required to be opened post accident are closed during the post accident period in accordance with plant procedures and consistent with requirements of the related protection, safeguards, or essential service systems. The exception to the application of these administrative controls are the 36 inch containment purge flow paths. Due to the size of these containment purge line penetrations and the fact that these penetrations exhaust directly from the containment atmosphere to the environment, the penetration flow path containing these purge valves may not be opened under administrative controls.

The opening angle of the containment vent isolation valves is being limited as an analysis demonstrates valve operability against accident containment pressures provided the valves are limited to a maximum opening angle of 60°. The containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are required to be closed during plant operation above cold shutdown.

REFERENCES

- (1) FSAR - Section 14.3.6
- (2) FSAR - Appendix 5A, Section 3.1.8
- (3) FSAR - Section 5.1.1.1
- (4) FSAR - Section 5.2

3.6-3a

Amendment No. 195

E.

Containment Isolation Valves

1. Verify the combined leakage rate for all containment bypass leakage paths (except those verified by Specifications 4.4.E.2 or 4.4.E.3) is $\leq 0.6\text{La}$ when pressurized $\geq 1\text{Pa}$, in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
2. Verify the leakage rate of water from the Isolation Valve Seal Water System is $\leq 14,700$ cc/hr when pressurized ≥ 1.1 Pa, in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
3. Verify the leakage rate of water into the containment from isolation valves sealed with the service water system is ≤ 0.36 gpm per fan cooler unit when pressurized ≥ 1.1 Pa, in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

TABLE 4.4-1

DELETED

Amendment No. 88, 102, 184, 195



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.195 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-64

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 3

DOCKET NO. 50-286

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated January 28, 1999, as supplemented by letter dated July 16, 1999, the Power Authority of the State of New York (the licensee) proposed a change to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3). The amendment would remove two lists of Containment Isolation Valves (CIVs) in Tables 3.6-1 and 4.4-1 and make related changes to TS 1.10, 3.6.A.1, 4.4, and associated basis pages. This proposal is consistent with the staff's Generic Letter (GL) 91-08, "Removal of Component Lists from Technical Specifications," dated May 6, 1991. The licensee also proposed supporting changes related to removal of the table, related Bases changes, and some unrelated editorial changes. The changes are evaluated below. The licensee's July 16, 1999, submittal included additional information regarding administrative controls for nonautomatic CIVs and did not change the staff's proposed finding of no significant hazards considerations.

2.0 EVALUATION

GL 91-08 provided guidance for relocating CIV tables from the TSs. The GL gives the following four requirements that are directly applicable to the IP3 submittal.

- 1) The specification for containment isolation valves applies to those valves that are listed in the table referenced in the TS. The alternative to listing these valves in a TS table is the revision of the limiting condition for operation (LCO) to state "Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE."
- 2) Although some components may be listed in the updated final safety analysis report (FSAR), the FSAR should not be the sole means to identify these components. The Bases Section of the TS may reference the plant procedures where these lists are located; however, component lists should not be included in the Bases Section because the Bases Section lacks an appropriate regulatory process for change control.

- 3) The list of CIVs typically includes footnotes that modify the TS requirements for these valves. Such notes must be incorporated into the associated LCO so that they will remain in effect when the table containing these footnotes is removed from the TS.
- 4) The TS Bases should include a description of what constitutes acceptable administrative control for opening locked or sealed closed CIVs.

The licensee meets the first of these requirements through TS 1.10 and the LCO for TS 3.6.A.

With regard to the second requirement, IP3 lists both the nonautomatic CIVs that are open continuously or intermittently for plant operation (Table 3.6-1) and the required CIVs in verifying the combined leakage rate for all containment bypass leakage paths (Table 4.4-1) in various locations which are subject to 10 CFR 50.59 change control provisions, including the FSAR, several plant valve check off lists, selected surveillance test procedures, and other system operating procedures.

With regard to the third requirement, there are no footnotes associated with Table 3.6-1 and, of the 9 footnotes associated with Table 4.4-1, only two (Notes 8 and 9) meet the requirements for retention intended by GL 91-08.

Note 8 states "The minimum test pressure may be reduced by 2 psig until the current requirements associated with the Boron Injection Tank are removed (see Tech Spec 3.3.A.3.b)." Specification 3.3.A.3.b was deleted with the issuance of Amendment No. 139, which was intended to remove references to the Boron Injection Tank. This note should have been removed along with other references to the Boron Injection Tank.

Note 9, incorporated into the TS with Amendment No. 184 permits a relaxation of Type C testing, until startup from refuel outage 10, for seven CIVs that are located on lines that are expected to be filled with water for 30 days after a postulated design basis accident. This relaxation is a one-time allowance for valves that are normally required to be pneumatically tested per the Table. To preclude a shutdown, Amendment No. 184 was obtained in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5) which granted relief from further leakage rate testing of these seven CIVs until refueling outage 10 (currently scheduled to start September 1999). Since this footnote is a one-time allowance, it will not require retention. Following the removal of the Table, the CIVs will require testing, including testing during the upcoming refueling outage, in accordance with Appendix J and IP3's Appendix J testing program as per TS 6.14, "Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program" and the NRC Safety Evaluation (Amendment No. 184 to IP3 Operating License) that approved this note.

In regard to the fourth requirement, IP3 is revising the description of the administrative controls used during normal operation for CIVs that may be opened intermittently depending on requirements of the various systems. These revised administrative controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the valve controls. This operator is to be in continuous communication with the control room. The proposed TS changes to 1.10.1, 3.6.A.1, and the 3.6 TS bases are aligned to indicate that administrative controls are to be employed for those nonautomatic CIVs, including locked or sealed closed CIVs, that are closed for plant operation but may be opened intermittently when containment integrity is required.

An exception to the specified administrative controls is the 14-inch manual double disc valve AC-732 on the RHR Suction Line from RCS Loop 32 Hot Leg. The administrative controls for AC-732 do not include stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of this valve in constant communications with the control room. The current procedures (i.e., administrative controls) allow opening AC-732 for initiation of RHR shutdown cooling during a normal plant shutdown or provide for operation during post-LOCA cooldown and depressurization to Cold Shutdown, when RCS is less than 350 degrees F and 400 psig. These administrative controls consist of specific procedure operating guidance via appropriate Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Plant Operating Procedures (POPs) and System Operating Procedures (SOPs). AC-732 is locked closed, except for short duration testing purposes, when RHR shutdown cooling system is not in service or being transitioned to emergency use. Because AC-732 is designed to be open continuously, and not intermittently, for shutdown cooling purposes, these designated procedural administrative controls, which manually realign the system, are sufficient to operate this CIV when RCS temperature is between 350 and 200 degrees F. Operation of this nonautomatic CIV valve under the administrative constraints of these operating procedures ensures adequate means of control and is consistent with plant and system design.

A clarification of the administrative controls applies to those nonautomatic, remote manual CIVs operated from the control room. The dedicated operator required by the administrative controls consists of the normally stationed control room operator. This operator will be continuously available in the control room to control valve position and thus meet the intent of the administrative controls.

The staff has reviewed the licensee's submittal and finds that, with the exceptions noted above, it conforms with the intent of GL 91-08. The staff has reviewed the noted exceptions and finds that they are consistent with safety and plant design and are acceptable.

Based on the above evaluation, the staff finds the proposed revisions to the TS and Bases to be acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New York State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (64 FR 29713). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: G. Wunder

Date: September 16, 1999

DATED: September 16, 1999

AMENDMENT NO. 195 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-64-INDIAN POINT
UNIT 3

Docket File

PUBLIC

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