UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

April 15, 1992

Docket No. 50-286

Mr. Ralph E. Beedle
Executive Vice President - Nuclear Generation
Power Authority of the State of New York
123 Main Street
White Plains, New York 10601

Dear Mr. Beedle:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT FOR INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 3 (TAC NO. M82181)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 115 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-64 for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application transmitted by letter dated November 13, 1991, as supplemented December 16, 1991, and February 26, 1992.

The amendment revises Technical Specifications Sections 3.3 and 4.5 to provide limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for a containment electric hydrogen recombiner system (EHRS). The EHRS is scheduled to replace the existing mechanical flame-type recombiner system during the cycle 8/9 refueling outage. The amendment also revises Table 4.4-1 to delete the containment isolation valves which will be removed during the modification. Additionally, the amendment revises the Bases associated with Sections 3.3 and 4.5.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

N. F. Conicella

Nicola F. Conicella, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 115 to DPR-64
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

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Mr. Ralph E. Beedle
Power Authority of the State
of New York

Indian Point Nuclear Generating
Station Unit No. 3

cc:

Regional Administrator, Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Mr. Gerald C. Goldstein
Assistant General Counsel
Power Authority of the State
of New York
1633 Broadway
New York, New York 10019

Mr. John C. Brons, President
Power Authority of the State
of New York
1633 Broadway
New York, New York 10019

Mr. Joseph E. Russell
Resident Manager
Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant
Post Office Box 215
Buchanan, New York 10511

Mr. Peter Kokolakis
Director Nuclear Licensing - PWR
Power Authority of the State
of New York
123 Main Street
White Plains, New York 10601

Ms. Donna Ross
New York State Energy Office
2 Empire State Plaza
16th Floor
Albany, New York 12223

Charles Donaldson, Esquire
Assistant Attorney General
New York Department of Law
120 Broadway
New York, New York 10271

Resident Inspector
Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Post Office Box 337
Buchanan, New York 10511

Mr. Charles W. Jackson
Manager, Nuclear Safety and
Licensing
Consolidated Edison Company
of New York, Inc.
Broadway and Bleakley Avenues
Buchanan, New York 10511

Mayor, Village of Buchanan
236 Tate Avenue
Buchanan, New York 10511

DATED: April 15, 1992

AMENDMENT NO. 115 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-64-INDIAN POINT UNIT 3

Docket File
NRC & Local PDRs
PDI-1 Reading
S. Varga, 14/E/4
J. Calvo, 14/A/4
R. Capra
C. Vogan
N. Conicella
D. Oudinot
C. Cowgill
OGC-WF
D. Hagan, 3302 MNBB
G. Hill (4), P-137
Wanda Jones, P-130A
C. Grimes, 11/F/23
ACRS (10)
OPA
OC/LFMB
CMcCracken
Plant File

cc: Plant Service list

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

DOCKET NO. 50-286

INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 115
License No. DPR-64

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Power Authority of the State of New York (the licensee) dated November 13, 1991, as supplemented December 16, 1991 and February 26, 1992, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-64 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 115, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance to be implemented prior to startup from the cycle 8/9 refueling outage.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Robert A. Capra

Robert A. Capra, Director
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: April 15, 1992

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 115

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-64

DOCKET NO. 50-286

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages	Insert Pages
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ii	ii
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3.3-12	3.3-12
3.3-13	3.3-13
3.3-19	3.3-19
Table 4.4-1 (Page 6 of 7)	Table 4.4-1 (Page 6 of 7)
4.5-2	4.5-2
4.5-3	4.5-3
4.5-4	4.5-4
4.5-5	4.5-5
4.5-6	4.5-6
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INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 3

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G. Containment Hydrogen Monitoring Systems

1. One hydrogen monitor including a flow path and associated containment fan cooler unit shall be OPERABLE whenever the reactor T_{avg} exceeds 350°F.

   a. The requirements of 3.3.G.1 can be modified to allow both containment hydrogen monitoring systems to be inoperable for a period not to exceed 7 days.

H. Control Room Ventilation System

1. The control room ventilation system shall be operable at all times when containment integrity is required as per specification 3.6.

2. The requirements of 3.3.H.1 may be modified as follows:

   a. The control room ventilation system may be inoperable for a period not to exceed seventy-two hours. At the end of this period if the mal-condition in the control room ventilation system has not been corrected, the reactor shall be placed in the hot shutdown condition utilizing normal operating procedures. If after an additional 48 hours the mal-condition still exists, the reactor shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition utilizing normal operating procedures.

3. Two independent toxic gas monitoring systems, with separate channels for detecting chlorine, ammonia, and oxygen shall be operable in accordance with 3.3.H.1 except as specified below. The alarm setpoints for ammonia and chlorine shall be adjusted to actuate at 35 ppm and 3 ppm, respectively.

   a. With any channel for a monitored toxic gas inoperable, restore the inoperable channel to operable status within 7 days.

   b. If 3.a above cannot be satisfied within the specified time, then within the next 8 hours initiate and maintain operation in the control room of alternate monitoring capability for the inoperable channel.

   c. With both channels for a monitored gas inoperable, within 8 hours initiate and maintain operation in the control room of an alternate monitoring system capable of detecting the gas monitored by the inoperable channel.

AND

1. Within 72 hours after identification of the inoperability of both installed monitoring channels, restore one monitoring channel to operable status.

OR

2. Submit a Special Report to the NRC pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2 within 14 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the monitoring systems.

I. Electric Hydrogen Recombiner System

1. Two independent Hydrogen Recombiner Systems shall be OPERABLE whenever the reactor T_{avg} exceeds 350°F.

   a. With one Hydrogen Recombiner System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to operable status within 30 days, or be in the HOT SHUTDOWN CONDITION within the next 6 hours and subsequently reduce T_{avg} to less than or equal to 350°F within the following 30 hours.

   b. The reactor operating condition may be escalated while one Hydrogen Recombiner System is inoperable provided the requirements of section 3.3.I.1.a. above, are satisfied.

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temperature supplied to cool plant heat loads. Alternate locations may be acceptable on this basis. The limit on the service water maximum inlet temperature insures that the service water and component cooling water systems will be able to dissipate the heat loads generated in the limiting design basis accident [15]. This restriction allows up to seven hours for river water temperature transients which may temporarily increase the service water inlet temperature due to tidal effects to dissipate.

The operability of the equipment and systems required for the control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment is available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below the flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Hydrogen concentration exceeding the flammable limit could potentially result in a containment wide hydrogen burn. This could lead to overpressurization of containment, a breach of CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, containment leakage, unacceptably high offsite doses, and damage to safety-related equipment located in containment. Two full rated recombiner units are provided in order to control the hydrogen evolved in containment following a loss-of-coolant accident. Each unit is capable of preventing the hydrogen concentration from exceeding the flammable limit. Each recombiner is installed such that independence is maintained and redundancy is assured. Each hydrogen recombiner system consists of a recombiner located inside containment, and a separate power supply, and control panel located outside containment such that they are accessible following a design basis accident.

The containment hydrogen monitoring system consists of two safety related hydrogen concentration measurement cabinets with sample lines which pass through the containment penetrations to each containment fan cooler unit plenum. Two of the five sampling lines (from containment fan cooler units nos. 32 and 35) are routed to a common source line and then to a hydrogen monitor. The other three sample lines (from containment fan cooler units nos. 31, 33 and 34) are likewise headered and routed to the other hydrogen monitor. Each monitor has a separate return line. The design hydrogen concentration for operating the recombiner is established at 3% by volume. Conservative calculations indicate that the hydrogen content within the containment will not reach 3% by volume until 10 days after a loss-of-coolant accident. [10] There is, therefore, no need for immediate operation of the recombiner following an accident.

TABLE 4.4-1 (Page 6 of 7)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES			
Valve No.	Penetration Number[1]	Test Fluid[2]	Minimum Test Pressure (PSIG)[8]
SP-SOV-508	57	Gas[7]	43
SP-SOV-509	57	Gas[7]	43
SP-SOV-510	57	Gas[7]	43
SP-SOV-511	57	Gas[7]	43
SP-SOV-512	57	Gas[7]	43
SP-SOV-513	57	Gas[7]	43
SP-SOV-514	57	Gas[7]	43
SP-SOV-515	57	Gas[7]	43
SP-SOV-516	57	Gas[7]	43
IA-39	64	Gas	43
IA-PCV-1228	64	Gas	43
PS-7	65	Gas[7]	43
PS-10	65	Gas[7]	43
PS-8	65	Gas[7]	43
PS-9	65	Gas[7]	43
CB-1	69	Gas	43
CB-2	69	Gas	43
CB-3	69	Gas[7]	43
CB-4	69	Gas[7]	43
DW-AOV-1	70	Water[4]	47
DW-AOV-2	70	Water[4]	47

2. Containment Spray System

a. System tests shall be performed at each reactor refueling interval. The tests shall be performed with the isolation valves in the spray supply lines at the containment and the spray additive tank isolation valves blocked closed. Operation of the system is initiated by tripping the normal actuation instrumentation.

b. The spray nozzles shall be checked for proper functioning at least every five years.

c. The tests will be considered satisfactory if visual observations indicate all components have operated satisfactorily.

3. Containment Hydrogen Monitoring Systems

a. Containment hydrogen monitoring system tests shall be performed at intervals no greater than six months. The tests shall include drawing a sample from the fan cooler units.

b. The above tests will be considered satisfactory if visual observations and control panel indication indicate that all components have operated satisfactorily.

4. Containment Air Filtration System

a. Visual inspection of the filter installations shall be performed in accordance with ANSI N 510 (1975) every six months for the first two years and every refueling thereafter, or at any time fire, chemical releases or work done on the filters could alter their integrity.

b. At each refueling outage, the following conditions shall be demonstrated before the system can be considered operable:

(1) The pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 6 inches of water at ambient conditions and accident design flow rates.

(2) Using either direct or indirect measurements, the flow rate of the system fans shall be shown to be at least 90% of the accident design flow rate.

(3) The charcoal filter isolation valves shall be tested to verify operability.

c. At each refueling outage or at any time fire, chemical releases or work done on the filters could alter their integrity or after every 720 hours of charcoal adsorber use since the last test, the following conditions shall be demonstrated before the system can be considered operable:

(1) Impregnated activated charcoal from each of the five units shall have a methyl iodine removal efficiency $\geq$ 85% $\pm$ 20% of the accident design flow rate, 5 to 15 mg/m^3 inlet methyl iodine concentration, $\geq$ 95% relative humidity and $\geq$ 250°F. In addition, ignition shall not occur below 300°F.

(2) A halogenated hydrocarbon (freon) test on charcoal adsorbers at $\pm$ 20% of the accident design flow rate and ambient conditions shall show $\geq$ 99% halogenated hydrocarbon removal.

(3) A locally generated DOP* test of the HEPA filters at $\pm$ 20% of the accident design flow rate and ambient conditions shall show $\geq$ 99% DOP removal.

*Dioctylphthalate Particles

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5. Control Room Air Filtration System

a. Visual inspection of the filter installations shall be performed in accordance with ANSI N 510 (1975) every six months for the first two years and every refueling thereafter, or at any time fire, chemical releases or work done on the filters could alter their integrity.

b. The charcoal filtration system shall be operated for a minimum of 15 minutes every month.

c. At each refueling outage, the following conditions shall be demonstrated before the system can be considered operable:

(1) The pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 6 inches of water at ambient conditions and accident design flow rates.

(2) Using either direct or indirect measurements, the flow rate of the system fans shall be shown to be at least 90% of accident design flow rate.

d. At each refueling outage or at any time fire, chemical releases or work done on the filters could alter their integrity or after every 720 hours of charcoal adsorber use since the last test, the following conditions shall be demonstrated before the system can be considered operable:

(1) The charcoal shall have a methyl iodine removal efficiency $\geq$ 90% at $\pm$ 20% of the accident design flow rate, 0.05 to 0.15 mg/m^3 inlet methyl iodine concentration, $\geq$ 95% relative humidity and $\geq$ 125°F.

(2) A halogenated hydrocarbon (freon) test on charcoal adsorbers at $\pm$ 20% of the accident design flow rate and ambient conditions shall show $\geq$ 99% halogenated hydrocarbon removal.

(3) A locally generated DOP test of the HEPA filters at $\pm$ 20% of the accident design flow rate and ambient conditions shall show $\geq$ 99% DOP removal.

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e. Each toxic gas monitoring system shall be demonstrated operable by performance of a channel check at least once per day, a channel test at least once per 31 days and a channel calibration each refueling cycle.

6. Fuel Storage Building Emergency Ventilation System

a. The fuel storage building emergency ventilation system fan shall be operated for a minimum of 15 minutes every month when there is irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pit.

b. Prior to handling of irradiated fuel, the following conditions shall be demonstrated before the system can be considered operable:

(1) The pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 6 inches of water at ambient conditions and accident design flow rates.

(2) Using either direct or indirect measurements, the flow rate of the system fans shall be shown to be at least 90% of the accident design flow rate.

(3) The filtration system bypass assembly shall be isolated and leak tested to assure that it is properly sealed.

c. Prior to handling of irradiated fuel, or at any time fire, chemical releases or work done on the filters could alter their integrity or after every 720 hours of charcoal adsorber use since the last test, the following conditions shall be demonstrated before the system can be considered operable:

(1) Charcoal shall have a methyl iodine removal efficiency $\geq$ 90% at $\pm$ 20% of the accident design flow rate, 0.05 to 0.15 mg/m^3 inlet methyl iodine concentration, $\geq$ 95% relative humidity and $\geq$ 125°F.

(2) A halogenated hydrocarbon (freon) test on charcoal adsorbers at $\pm$ 20% of the accident design flow rate and ambient conditions shall show $\geq$ 99% halogenated hydrocarbon removal.

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(3) A locally generated DOP test of the HEPA filters at ± 20% of the accident design flow rate and ambient conditions shall show ≥ 99% DOP removal.

(4) Visual inspection in accordance with the applicable sections of ANSI N 510 (1975) of filter installations.

7. Electric Hydrogen Recombiner Systems

a. Each hydrogen recombiner system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

1) At least once every 6 months by verifying, during a Hydrogen Recombiner System Functional test, that the minimum heater sheath temperature increases to greater than or equal to 700°F within 90 minutes. Upon reaching 700°F, increase the power setting to maximum power for 2 minutes and verify that the power meter reads greater than or equal to 60 kW, and

2) At least once per 18 months by:

a) Performing CHANNEL CALIBRATION of all recombiner instrumentation and control circuits,

b) Verifying through a visual examination that there is no evidence of abnormal conditions within the recombiner enclosure (i.e., loose wiring or structural connections, deposits of foreign materials, etc.), and

c) Verifying the integrity of all heater electrical circuits by performing a resistance to ground test following the above required functional test. The resistance to ground for any heater phase shall be greater than or equal to 10,000 ohms.

The hydrogen recombiner system is an engineered safety feature which would be used only following a loss-of-coolant accident to control the hydrogen evolved in the containment. The system is not expected to be needed until approximately 10 days have elapsed following the accident. At this time, the hydrogen concentration in the containment will have reached 3.0% by volume, which is the design concentration for starting the recombiner system. [3] Actual starting of the system will be based upon containment atmosphere sample analysis. The required surveillance testing of each unit will demonstrate the operability of the system. The bi-annual testing of the containment hydrogen monitoring system will demonstrate the availability of this system.

For the eight flow distribution valves (856 A, C, D, E, F, H, J and K), verification of the valve mechanical stop adjustments is performed periodically to provide assurance that the high head safety injection flow distribution is in accordance with flow values assumed in the core cooling analysis.

<u>References</u>

(1) FSAR Section 6.2

(2) FSAR Section 6.4

(3) FSAR Section 6.8

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 115 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-64

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 3

DOCKET NO. 50-286

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated November 19, 1991, as supplemented December 16, 1991, and February 26, 1992, the Power Authority of the State of New York (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3, Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would revise TS Table 4.4-1, Sections 3.3 and 4.5, and associated Bases to support a plant modification which consists of replacing the existing mechanical flame-type hydrogen recombiner system with an electric hydrogen recombiner system (EHRS).

The February 26, 1992, letter provided the following additional changes which were not considered in the initially proposed no significant hazards consideration: In Section 3.3.I.1.b) the reference "3.3.H.1.a)" was replaced by "3.3.I.1.a." to correct a typographical error; in Sections 3.3.G. and 3.3.I. the subsections "a)" and "b)," were replaced by "a." and "b." for consistency with the format of Section 3.3.H. These changes are administrative in nature and, therefore, did not change the initially proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

2.0 EVALUATION

The general design criteria (GDC) for nuclear power plants are contained in Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 50. GDC 41, Containment Atmosphere Cleanup, requires that systems to control fission products be provided to reduce the concentration and quality of fission products released to the environment following postulated accidents, and to control the concentration of hydrogen in the containment atmosphere following postulated accidents to assure that containment integrity is maintained. GDC 41 also requires that each system have redundancy in components and features. GDC 42 and 43 provide the requirements for the inspection and testing of the containment atmosphere cleanup systems. Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.7, Revision 2, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a Loss-of-Coolant Accident," provides guidance for implementing GDC 41.

At the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP-3), a mechanical flame-type hydrogen recombiner system ensures that the hydrogen gas concentration in containment following a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) is maintained at a safe

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level in accordance with RG 1.7, Revision 2. The licensee intends to replace the existing mechanical flame-type hydrogen recombiner system with an EHRS during the cycle 8/9 refueling outage. The EHRS is an engineered safety feature system of Westinghouse design composed of two redundant electric hydrogen recombiners provided to meet the single failure criterion. The licensee states that Westinghouse Electric Corporation had previously performed, as documented in WCAP-7709-L Supplement 4, an analysis which concluded that the EHRS meets the requirements of RG 1.7, Revision 2, for the control of combustible gas concentrations in containment following a LOCA.

Table 1 of RG 1.7, Revision 2, defines conservative values and assumptions to be used to evaluate the production of combustible gases following a LOCA. When these assumptions are used to calculate the concentration of hydrogen in containment following a LOCA, the hydrogen concentration is calculated to reach the flammable limit within periods varying from a day to a month after the accident depending on the size of the containment. RG 1.7, Revision 2, also states that a lower flammability limit of 4% hydrogen in air or steam-air atmosphere is conservative. The licensee states that Westinghouse performed an analysis, specifically for the licensee, and the analysis indicated that the EHRS need not be activated until 10 days following a LOCA when the hydrogen concentration in containment reaches 3% by volume. The hydrogen generation rate at 10 days is approximately 1.6 standard cubic feet per minute (SCFM) and 1.6 SCFM is well within the capacity of the EHRS. Therefore, starting the EHRS at 3% hydrogen by volume ensures the RG 1.7, Revision 2, hydrogen lower flammability limit of 4% by volume is not exceeded.

As required by GDC 42 and 43, inspection and testing of the hydrogen recombiner system are made periodically. Current TS provide limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements of the existing hydrogen recombiner system. However, differences in the design characteristics of the new system require changes to the TS. The proposed amendment would delete from Sections 3.3.6 and 4.5.A.3, respectively, the limiting conditions for operation and the surveillance requirements applicable to the existing containment hydrogen recombiner system. The limiting conditions for operations and surveillance requirements for the new system would be addressed in two new Sections, 3.3.I and 4.5.A.7, and these limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements are consistent with the standard TS most recently approved for EHRS at Westinghouse pressurized water reactors. The amendment would also delete 11 containment isolation valves from Table 4.4-1, which lists containment isolation valves to be tested for operability and leakage in accordance with TS Section 4.4.E. These 11 valves proposed for deletion from Table 4.4-1 are associated with the existing hydrogen recombiner system and are not needed for operation of the EHRS. These valves will be removed during installation of the EHRS. Finally, the Bases would be updated to be consistent with the TS changes and the Table of Contents would be corrected to reflect the TS changes. The staff has reviewed the data, methodology, and conclusion of the licensee and finds they are acceptable. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed changes to the TS acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New York State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes to the surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (51 FR 716). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor:
D. Oudinot

Date: April 15, 1992

Docket No. 50-286

April 15, 1992

Mr. Ralph E. Beedle
Executive Vice President - Nuclear Generation
Power Authority of the State of New York
123 Main Street
White Plains, New York 10601

Dear Mr. Beedle:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT FOR INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 3 (TAC NO. M82181)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 115 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-64 for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application transmitted by letter dated November 13, 1991, as supplemented December 16, 1991, and February 26, 1992.

The amendment revises Technical Specifications Sections 3.3 and 4.5 to provide limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for a containment electric hydrogen recombiner system (EHRS). The EHRS is scheduled to replace the existing mechanical flame-type recombiner system during the cycle 8/9 refueling outage. The amendment also revises Table 4.4-1 to delete the containment isolation valves which will be removed during the modification. Additionally, the amendment revises the Bases associated with Sections 3.3 and 4.5.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,
Original Signed By:
Nicola F. Conicella, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 115 to DPR-64
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

OFFICE	LA:PDI-1	PE:PDI-1	PM:PDI-1	SPLB	OGC
NAME	CVogan	DOudinot:	NConicella	CMcCracken	BMB
DATE	3/12/92	3/16/92	3/16/92	4/6/92	4/8/92

Subject to clarification re 2-26-92 supp. info did not change the usfc determination in 1-8-92 FR notice of that is the case

OFFICE	D:PDI-1	
NAME	RCapra RGC	
DATE	4/15/92	/ /92

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
FILENAME: A:\IP382181.AMD