June 27, 1997

Mr. James Knubel
Chief Nuclear Officer
Power Authority of the State
of New York
123 Main Street
White Plains, NY 10601

SUBJECT: CORRECTION TO AMENDMENT NO. 174 - INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 3 (TAC NO. M97785)

Dear Mr. Knubel:

On June 17, 1997, the Commission issued the enclosed Amendment No. 174 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-64 for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3. The amendment consisted of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application transmitted by letter dated January 13, 1997, as supplemented March 24, 1997, May 13, 1997, and May 23, 1997.

The amendment as issued did not contain the revised TS pages and there was an error in the heading of the associated Safety Evaluation. This letter forwards the corrected amendment package.

Sincerely,

/S/

George F. Wunder, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-286

Enclosure: Corrected Amendment No. 174 to DPR-64

cc w/encl: See next page

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DATE: June 17, 1997

ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 174 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-64

Docket File
PUBLIC
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

June 27, 1997

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Chief Nuclear Officer
Power Authority of the State
of New York
123 Main Street
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Docket No. 50-286

Enclosure: Corrected Amendment No. 174 to DPR-64

cc w/encl: See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

DOCKET NO. 50-286

INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 174
License No. DPR-64

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Power Authority of the State of New York (the licensee) dated January 13, 1997, as supplemented March 24, 1997, May 13, 1997, and May 23, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (I) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-64 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 174 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance to be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Alexander W. Dromerick, Acting Director
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: June 17, 1997

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 174

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-64

DOCKET NO. 50-286

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages	Insert Pages
iv	iv
vi	vi
4.4-1	4.4-1
4.4-2	4.4-2
4.4-3	4.4-3
4.4-4	4.4-4
4.4-5	4.4-5
4.4-7	4.4-7
4.4-8	4.4-8
4.4-9	4.4-9
4.4-10	4.4-10
Table 4.4-1 (page 6 of 7)	Table 4.4-1 (page 6 of 7)
6-22	6-22
6-23	6-23

4.4 CONTAINMENT TESTS

Applicability

Applies to containment leakage.

Objective

To verify that potential leakage from the containment is maintained within acceptable values.

Specification

A. Integrated Leakage Rate

Perform required visual examinations and leakage rate testing, except for containment air lock testing, in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

B. DELETED

C. Sensitive Leakage Rate

Verify the leakage rate for the Containment Penetration and Weld Channel Pressurization System is $\leq$ 0.2 percent of the containment free volume per day when pressurized to $\geq$ 43 psig and the containment pressure is atmospheric. The testing shall be performed at intervals no greater than 3 years.

D. Air Lock Tests

Perform required Containment Air Lock leak rate testing in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

E. Containment Isolation Valves

1. Verify the combined leakage rate for all containment bypass leakage paths, Table 4.4-1 lists required isolation valves, is $\leq$ 0.6La when pressurized $\geq$ Pa, in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

2. Verify the leakage rate of water from the Isolation Valve Seal Water System is $\leq$ 14,700 cc/hr when pressurized $\geq$ 1.1 Pa, in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

3. Verify the leakage rate of water into the containment from isolation valves sealed with the service water system is $\leq$ 0.36 gpm per fan cooler unit when pressurized $\geq$ 1.1 Pa, in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

F. DELETED

G. DELETED

H. DELETED

Basis

The containment is designed for a pressure of 47 psig. [1] While the reactor is operating, the internal environment of the containment will be air at essentially atmospheric pressure and an average maximum temperature of approximately 130°F. The limiting peak containment temperature, based on LOCA containment response, is 261.5°F. [7] The peak containment pressure, also based on LOCA containment response, is approximately 42.39 psig. [7][8] The acceptance criteria was changed by amendment 98 to reflect analysis [4] done for the ultimate heat sink temperature increase. The acceptance criteria of 42.42 psig (based on the peak calculated pressure for a Main Steam Line Break analysis) is conservative with respect to the current LOCA peak pressure of 42.39.

Prior to initial operation, the containment was strength-tested at 54 psig and was leak-tested. The acceptance criterion for this pre-operational leakage rate test was established as 0.075 W/o (.75 L_a) per 24 hours at 40.6 psig and 263°F, which were the peak accident pressure and temperature conditions at that time. This leakage rate is consistent with the construction of the containment, [2] which is equipped with a Weld Channel and Penetration Pressurization System for continuously pressurizing the containment penetrations and the channels over certain containment liner welds. These channels were independently leak-tested during construction.

The safety analysis has been performed on the basis of a leakage rate of 0.10 W/o per day for 24 hours. With this leakage rate and with minimum containment engineered safeguards operating, the public exposure would be well below 10CFR100 values in the event of the design basis accident. [3]

Maintaining the containment operable requires compliance with the visual examinations and leakage rate test requirements of the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Failure to meet air lock leakage limits specified in surveillance requirement 4.4.D does not invalidate the acceptability of these overall leakage determinations unless their contribution to overall Type A, B, and C leakage causes that to exceed limits. As left leakage prior to the first startup after performing a required 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, leakage test is required to be $<0.6\ L_a$ for combined Type B and C leakage, and $< 0.75\ L_a$ for overall Type A leakage. At all other times between required leakage rate tests, the acceptance criteria is based on an overall Type A leakage limit of $\leq 1.0\ L_a$. At $\leq 1.0\ L_a$ the offsite dose consequences are bounded by the assumptions of the safety analysis. Surveillance requirement frequencies are as required by the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Thus, Specification 1.12 (which allows Frequency extensions) does not apply. These periodic testing requirements verify that the containment leakage rate does not exceed the leakage rate assumed in the safety analysis.

The Weld Channel and Containment Penetration Pressurization System (WCCPPS)[5] is in service continuously to monitor leakage from potential leak paths such as the containment personnel lock seals and weld channels, containment penetrations, containment liner weld channels, double-gasketed seals and spaces between certain containment isolation valves and personnel door locks. A leak would be expected to build up slowly and would, therefore, be noted before design limits are exceeded. Remedial action can be taken before the limit is reached. The sensitive leakage rate test of the WCCPPS demonstrates that pressurized containment penetrations and liner inner weld seams are within a leakage acceptance criteria that will allow the air receivers and the standby source of gas pressure, nitrogen cylinders, to provide a 24 hour supply of gas to the system. The WCCPPS is not credited for limiting containment isolation valve leakage and the sensitivity test is not used for demonstrating compliance with containment isolation valve leakage criteria. The frequency of the sensitive leakage test reflects an extension of 25 percent from the 24 month refueling cycle and, therefore, Specification 1.12 (which allows Frequency extensions) does not apply[10].

Maintaining containment air locks operable requires compliance with the leakage rate test requirements of the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. The surveillance requirement reflects the leakage rate testing requirements with regard to air lock leakage (Type B leakage tests). The acceptance criteria were established during air lock and containment OPERABILITY testing. The periodic testing requirements verify that the air lock leakage does not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall containment leakage rate. The Frequency is required by the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Thus, Specification 1.12 (which allows Frequency extensions) does not apply. During normal plant operation, containment personnel lock door seals are continuously pressurized after each closure by the WCCPPS. Whenever containment integrity is required, verification is made that seals repressurize properly upon closure of an air lock door. The verification meets the intent of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix J requirements.[8]

The containment isolation valve surveillance requirement ensures that the combined leakage rate of all containment bypass leakage paths is less than or equal to the specified leakage rate. This provides assurance that the assumptions in the safety analysis are met. The leakage rate of each bypass leakage path is assumed to be the maximum pathway leakage (leakage through the worse of the two isolation valves, and, when pressurizing between valves, the total leakage of all the valves being tested) unless the penetration is isolated by use of one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. In this case, the leakage rate of the isolated bypass leakage path is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If both isolation valves in the penetration are closed, the actual leakage rate is the lesser leakage rate of the two valves. The Frequency is required by the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. This surveillance requirement simply imposes additional acceptance criteria. The service water lines to the containment fan cooler units and the lines supplied water by the Isolation Valve Seal Water System (IVSWS)[6] have containment isolation valves that are hydrostatically tested. Surveillance of hydrostatically tested lines provides assurance that the calculation assumptions of offsite doses are met. The Frequency is required by the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Sufficient water is available in the Isolation Valve Seal Water System, Primary Water System, Service Water System, Residual Heat Removal System, and the City Water System to assure a sealing function for at least 30 days. The leakage limit for the Isolation Valve Seal Water System is consistent with the design capacity of the Isolation Valve Seal Water supply tank. The seal water provided by these systems is credited with limiting containment leakage (the measured leakage is not considered part of the allowable containment leakage).

The 350 psig test pressure, achieved either by normal Residual Heat Removal System operation or hydrostatic testing, gives an adequate margin over the highest pressure within the system after a design basis accident. Similarly, the hydrostatic test pressure for the containment sump return line of 100 psig gives an adequate margin over the highest pressure within the line after a design basis accident. A recirculation system leakage of 2 gal./hr. will limit off-site exposures due to leakage to insignificant levels relative to those calculated for leakage directly from the containment in the design basis accident.

The maximum permissible inleakage rate from the containment isolation valves sealed with service water for the full 12-month period of post accident recirculation without flooding the internal recirculation pumps is 0.36 gpm per fan cooler.

REFERENCES

(1) FSAR - Section 5
(2) FSAR - Section 5.1.7
(3) FSAR - 14.3.5
(4) WCAP - 12269 Rev. 1, "Containment Margin Improvement Analysis for IP-3 Unit 3"
(5) FSAR - Section 6.6
(6) FSAR - Section 6.5
(7) SECL-92-131, Indian Point Unit 3 High Head Safety Injection Flow Changes Safety Evaluation, June 1992
(8) SECL-96-103, Indian Point Unit 3 Safety Evaluation of 24-Month Fuel Cycle Phase I Instrument Channel Uncertainties, June 1996
(9) Indian Point 3 Safety Evaluation Report, Supplement 2, December 1975.
(10) NRC Safety Evaluation Related to Amendment 129 to Operating License DPR-64.

TABLE 4.4-1 (Page 6 of 7)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES			
Valve No.	Penetration Number[1]	Test Fluid[2]	Minimum Test Pressure (PSIG)[8]
SP-SOV-508	57	Gas[7]	43
SP-SOV-509	57	Gas[7]	43
SP-SOV-510	57	Gas[7]	43
SP-SOV-511	57	Gas[7]	43
SP-SOV-512	57	Gas[7]	43
SP-SOV-513	57	Gas[7]	43
SP-SOV-514	57	Gas[7]	43
SP-SOV-515	57	Gas[7]	43
SP-SOV-516	57	Gas[7]	43
IA-39	64	Gas	43
IA-PCV-1228	64	Gas	43
PS-7	65	Gas[7]	43
PS-10	65	Gas[7]	43
PS-8	65	Gas[7]	43
PS-9	65	Gas[7]	43
CB-1	69	Gas	43
CB-2	69	Gas	43
CB-3	69	Gas[7]	43
CB-4	69	Gas[7]	43
CB-5	68	Gas	43
CB-6	68	Gas	43
CB-7	68	Gas[7]	43
CB-8	68	Gas[7]	43
DW-AOV-1	70	Water[4]	47
DW-AOV-2	70	Water[4]	47

6.12.2 The requirements of 6.12.1 above, shall also apply to each high radiation area in which the intensity of radiation is greater than 1000 mrem/hr. In addition, locked doors shall be provided to prevent unauthorized entry into such areas and the keys shall be maintained under the administrative control of the Shift Manager on duty and/or the plant Radiological and Environmental Services Manager or his designee.

6.13 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION

6.13.1 Environmental qualification of electric equipment important to safety shall be in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.49. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.49, Section 50.49 (d), the EQ Master List identifies electrical equipment requiring environmental qualification.

6.13.2 Complete and auditable records which describe the environmental qualification method used, for all electrical equipment identified in the EQ Master List, in sufficient detail to document the degree of compliance with the appropriate requirements of 10 CFR 50.49 shall be available and maintained at a central location. Such records shall be updated and maintained current as equipment is replaced, further tested, or otherwise further qualified.

6.14 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE RATE TESTING PROGRAM

A program shall be established to implement the leakage rate testing of the containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions. This program shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak Test Program, dated September 1995" as modified by the following exception:

a. ANS 56.8 - 1994, Section 3.3.1: WCCPPS isolation valves are not Type C tested.

The peak calculated containment internal pressure for the design basis loss of coolant accident, P_a, is 42.39 psig. The minimum test pressure is 42.42 psig.

The maximum allowable primary containment leakage rate, L_a, at P_a, shall be 0.1% of primary containment air weight per day.

Leakage acceptance criteria are:

a. Containment leakage rate acceptance criterion is $\leq 1.0\ L_a$. During the first unit startup following testing in accordance with this program, the leakage rate acceptance criteria are $\leq 0.60\ L_a$ for the Type B and C tests and $\leq 0.75 L_a$ for Type A tests;

b. Air lock testing acceptance criteria are :

   1) Overall air lock leakage rate is $\leq 0.05\ L_a$ when tested at $\geq P_a$,

   2) For each door, leakage rate is $\leq 0.01\ L_a$ when pressurized to $\geq P_a$.

c. Isolation valves sealed with the service water system leakage rate into containment acceptance criterion is $\leq$0.36 gpm per fan cooler unit

d. Isolation Valve Seal Water System leakage rate acceptance criterion is 14,700 cc/hr at $1.1P_a$.

The provisions of Specification 1.12 do not apply to the test frequencies specified in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. The provisions of Specification 4.1, "Applicability," as they relate to delay of 24 hours in applying an LCO following the discovery of a surveillance test not performed, are applicable to the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 174 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-64

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 3

DOCKET NO. 50-286

1.0 INTRODUCTION

On September 12, 1995, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved issuance of revisions to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, "Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors" which was subsequently published in the Federal Register on September 26, 1995, and became effective on October 26, 1995. The NRC added Option B, "Performance-Based Requirements," to allow licensees to voluntarily replace the prescriptive testing requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, with testing requirements based on both overall performance and the performance of individual components.

By letter dated January 13, 1997, as supplemented March 24, 1997, May 13, 1997, and May 23, 1997, the New York Power Authority (the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3. The changes would permit implementation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, and reference Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak Test Program," dated September 1995, which specifies a method acceptable to the NRC for complying with Option B. The March 24, May 13, and May 23, 1997, supplemental letters provided clarifying information and a correction that were bounded by the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration.

2.0 BACKGROUND

Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, provides assurance that the primary containment, including those systems and components which penetrate the primary containment, do not exceed the allowable leakage rate specified in the TS and Bases. The allowable leakage rate is determined so that the leakage rate assumed in the safety analyses is not exceeded.

On February 4, 1992, the NRC published a notice in the Federal Register (57 FR 4166) discussing a planned initiative to begin eliminating requirements marginal to safety which impose a significant regulatory burden. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, "Primary Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors," was considered for this initiative and the staff undertook a study of possible changes to this regulation. The study examined the previous performance history of domestic containments and examined the effect on risk

of a revision to the requirements of Appendix J. The results of this study are reported in NUREG-1493, "Performance-Based Leak-Test Program." Based on the results of this study, the staff developed a performance-based approach to containment leakage rate testing. On September 12, 1995, the NRC approved issuance of this revision to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, which was subsequently published in the Federal Register on September 26, 1995, and became effective on October 26, 1995. The revision added Option B, "Performance-Based Requirements," to Appendix J to allow licensees to voluntarily replace the prescriptive testing requirements of Appendix J with testing requirements based on both overall and individual component leakage rate performance.

Regulatory Guide 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak Test Program," dated September 1995, was developed as a method acceptable to the NRC staff for implementing Option B. This RG states that the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) guidance document NEI 94-01, Rev. 0, "Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J," provides methods acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with Option B with four exceptions which are described therein.

Option B requires that a regulatory guide or other implementation document used by a licensee to develop a performance-based leakage testing program must be included, by general reference, in the plant TS. The licensee has referenced RG 1.163 in the proposed Indian Point, Unit 3 TS.

Regulatory Guide 1.163 specifies an extension in Type A test frequency to at least one test in 10 years based upon two consecutive successful tests. Type B tests may be extended up to a maximum interval of 10 years based upon completion of two consecutive successful tests and Type C tests may be extended up to 5 years based on two consecutive successful tests.

By letter dated October 20, 1995, NEI proposed TS to implement Option B. After some discussion, the staff and NEI agreed on final TS which were transmitted to NEI in a letter dated November 2, 1995. These TS are to serve as a model for licensees to develop plant-specific TS in preparing amendment requests to implement Option B.

In order for a licensee to determine the performance of each component, factors that are indicative of or affect performance, such as an administrative leakage limit, must be established. The administrative limit is selected to be indicative of the potential onset of component degradation. Although these limits are subject to NRC inspection to assure that they are selected in a reasonable manner, they are not TS requirements. Failure to meet an administrative limit requires the licensee to return to the minimum value of the test interval.

Option B requires that the licensee maintain records to show that the criteria for Type A, B, and C tests have been met. In addition, the licensee must maintain comparisons of the performance of the overall containment system and the individual components to show that the test intervals are adequate. These records are subject to NRC inspection.

3.0 EVALUATION

The licensee's January 13, 1997, March 24, 1997, May 13, 1997 and May 23, 1997, letters to the NRC proposes to establish a "Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program" that will implement 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B requirements for performance-based surveillance frequencies for Type A, B, and C containment leakage testing and to add this program, as well as several containment isolation valves, to the TS. The TS changes reference RG 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak Test Program," dated September 1995, which specifies a method acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix J, Option B. This requires changes to existing TS Section 4.4, and the addition of Section 6.14, "Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program" to the TS. The corresponding basis for TS Section 4.4 was also modified. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B permits a licensee to choose Type A; or Type B and C; or Type A, B, and C; testing to be done on a performance basis. The licensee has elected to perform Type A, B, and C testing on a performance basis.

Section 4.4.A.1.a, b, c, and d, which specify the test requirements, such as test pressure, duration, pre-test general containment inspection, and method of closure of containment isolation valves, for the integrated leakage rate test are removed based on those requirements being translated to the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program as proposed in TS Section 6.14. Similarly, Section 4.4.A.2, and 3, "Acceptance Criteria," and "Frequency" are also being removed and their performance-based criteria incorporated into the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Section 4.4.B is unchanged. The test, acceptance criteria, and frequency of test found in Sections 4.4.C.1, 2, and 3, "Sensitive Leakage Rate" are combined into one section, Section 4.4.C, under the change. This editorial change refers to the Weld Channel and Containment Penetration Pressurization System (WCCPPS) instead of identifying containment penetrations, weld channels, and certain double gasketed seals and isolation valve interspaces, as written in the current TS. Sub-sections 1 and 2 of Section 4.4.D.1 and 2, which provide test pressure, frequency, acceptance criteria, and containment integrity verification requirements for air lock tests are removed and replaced by a reference to Containment Air Lock leak rate testing in the Containment Leak Rate Testing Program added as TS Section 6.14. Current TS Section 4.4.E, "Containment Isolation Valves" contains individual requirements (sub-sections 1.a-e, and 2.a-c) for test frequencies and acceptance criteria for standard, non-pressurized, service water pressurized, and seal water pressurized containment isolation valves. TS Section 4.4.E consolidates the test pressures and acceptance criteria for each of the previously mentioned isolation valve categories and references the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. TS Sections 4.4.F, "Containment Modifications," 4.4.G, "Report of Test Results," and 4.4.H, "Annual Inspection," are deleted in the TS amendment. These changes are in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions and RG 1.163 dated September 1995. Section V.B of Option B of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J requires licensees who wish to adopt Option B, submit to the NRC the implementation plan and request for revision to the TS, including a general reference in the plant TS to the regulatory guide or other implementation documents used by the licensee to develop a performance-based, leakage testing program. Accordingly, the licensee proposed TS Section 6.14,

"Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program," to implement the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B as modified by approved exemptions. Further, proposed TS Section 6.14 states that the program shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in RG 1.163 dated September 1995, as modified by an exception, which is discussed below.

RG 1.163 specifies conformance to NEI 94-01, "Industry Guideline For Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J," Rev. 0. NEI 94-01 states that the methods and techniques of ANSI/ANS 56.8-1994, "Containment System Leakage Testing Requirements," should be used. The licensee proposes to take exception to section 3.3.1 of the standard, in that certain WCCPPS isolation valves will not be Type C tested.

The licensee's letter dated May 13, 1997, states that these valves have not been Type C tested throughout the plant's life, and that NRC inspection reports from 1975 and the staff SER and supplements for IP3, issued in 1973 and 1975, indicate that the staff found it acceptable that these valves were not Type C tested. Consideration was given to the following design features, (1) the WCCPPS system is constantly monitored for changes to the system leakage rate while at power, (2) the WCCPPS system leakage rate is quantified during every refueling outage, and (3) pressure, higher than the peak containment accident pressure, is constantly maintained by the system. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed exception from RG 1.163 and its subordinate documents to be acceptable.

Based on the above, the staff finds the proposed changes to the TS to be acceptable.

The technical bases contained in TS Section 4 provide background information and are generally related to the individual Section 4 subsections. These technical bases were updated to be consistent with the overall amendment request and those changes are viewed by the staff as administrative, and are found to be acceptable.

To the list of containment isolation valves in Table 4.4-1, "Containment Isolation Valves," the licensee added four containment isolation valves that are currently identified in the FSAR and tested as containment isolation valves. The TS amendment request also adds two references to TS Section 4. The first reference is to Supplement 2 of the Indian Point 3 safety evaluation report. The second reference added is to the NRC safety evaluation related to Amendment No. 129 to Operating License No. DPR-64. The staff finds these administrative changes acceptable.

3.1 Summary

In summary, the staff has reviewed the changes to the TS and associated Bases proposed by the licensee and finds that they are in compliance with the requirements of Appendix J, Option B, and are consistent with the guidance of RG 1.163, and finds them to be consistent with the intent of the model TS, and are, therefore, acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New York State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes a surveillance requirement. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluent that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (62 FR 13173). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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