March 22, 1991

Docket No. 50-286

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Mr. John C. Brons
Executive Vice President - Nuclear Generation
Power Authority of the State of New York
123 Main Street
White Plains, New York 10601

Dear Mr. Brons:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT FOR INDIAN POINT 3 (TAC NO. 75574)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 107 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-64 for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application transmitted by letter dated December 20, 1989.

The amendment revises Technical Specifications Section 4.1 and associated Bases to increase the surveillance intervals for the Reactor Protection System and Engineered Safety Features analog channel operational tests from monthly to quarterly. The amendment also changes the Bases applicable to Section 3.5 to allow routine analog channel testing in a bypassed condition instead of a tripped condition.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,
ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:
F. J. Williams, Jr., for
Joseph D. Neighbors, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 107 to DPR-64
2. Safety Evaluation

cc: w/enclosures
See next page

PDI-1:LA	PDI-~~1:PE~~	PDI-1:PM	PDI-1:D
CVogan	DOudinot:rsc	DNeighbors	RACapra
2/20/91	2/25/91	2/25/91	3/22/91

DOCUMENT NAME: IP3 AMEND 75574

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

March 22, 1991

Docket No. 50-286

Mr. John C. Brons
Executive Vice President - Nuclear Generation
Power Authority of the State of New York
123 Main Street
White Plains, New York 10601

Dear Mr. Brons:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT FOR INDIAN POINT 3 (TAC NO. 75574)

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A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Joseph D. Neighbors, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No.107 to DPR-64
2. Safety Evaluation

cc: w/enclosures
See next page

cc:

Regional Administrator, Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Mr. Gerald C. Goldstein
Assistant General Counsel
Power Authority of the State
of New York
1633 Broadway
New York, New York 10019

Mr. Phillip Bayne, President
Power Authority of the State
of New York
123 Main Street
White Plains, New York 10601

Mr. Joseph E. Russell
Resident Manager
Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant
Post Office Box 215
Buchanan, New York 10511

Mr. George M. Wilverding, Manager
Nuclear Safety Evaluation
Power Authority of the State
of New York
123 Main Street
White Plains, New York 10601

Mr. Peter Kokolakis, Director
Nuclear Licensing
Power Authority of the State
of New York
123 Main Street
White Plains, New York, 10601

Ms. Donna Ross
New York State Energy Office
2 Empire State Plaza
16th Floor
Albany, New York 12223

Mr. William Josiger, Vice President
Operations and Maintenance
Power Authority of the State
of New York
124 Main Street
White Plains, New York 10601

Resident Inspector
Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Post Office Box 337
Buchanan, New York 10511

Mr. Charles W. Jackson
Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing
Consolidated Edison Company
of New York, Inc.
Broadway and Bleakley Avenues
New York, New York 10511

Mr. A. Klausmann, Vice President
Quality Assurance
Power Authority of the State
of New York
1633 Broadway
New York, New York 10019

Mayor, Village of Buchanan
236 Tate Avenue
Buchanan, New York 10511

Mr. F. X. Pindar
Quality Assurance Superintendent
Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant
Post Office Box 215
Buchanan, New York 10511

Mr. R. Beedle, Vice President
Nuclear Support
Power Authority of the State
of New York
123 Main Street
White Plains, New York 10601

Mr. S. S. Zulla, Vice President
Nuclear Engineering
Power Authority of the State
of New York
123 Main Street
White Plains, New York 10601

Charlie Donaldson, Esquire
Assistant Attorney General
New York Department of Law
120 Broadway
New York, New York 10271

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

DOCKET NO. 50-286

INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 107
License No. DPR-64

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Power Authority of the State of New York (the licensee) dated December 20, 1989, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-64 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.107 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance to be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Robert A. Capra

Robert A. Capra, Director
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 22, 1991

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 107

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-64

DOCKET NO. 50-286

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages	Insert Pages
3.5-8	3.5-8
4.1-4	4.1-4
--	4.1-5
Table 4.1-1 (sheet 1 of 5)	Table 4.1-1 (sheet 1 of 5)
Table 4.1-1 (sheet 2 of 5)	Table 4.1-1 (sheet 2 of 5)
Table 4.1-1 (sheet 3 of 5)	Table 4.1-1 (sheet 3 of 5)
Table 4.1-1 (sheet 5 of 5)	Table 4.1-1 (sheet 5 of 5)

Almost all reactor protection channels are supplied with sufficient redundancy to provide the capability for channel calibration and test at power. Exceptions are backup channels such as reactor coolant pump breakers. The removal of one trip channel on process control equipment is accomplished by placing that channel bistable in a tripped mode; e.g., a two-out-of-three circuit becomes a one-out-of-two circuit. A channel bistable may also be placed in a bypassed mode; e.g., a two-out-of-three circuit becomes a two-out-of-two circuit. The nuclear instrumentation system channels are not intentionally placed in a tripped mode since the test signal is superimposed on the normal detector signal to test at power. Testing of the NIS power range channel requires: (a) bypassing the Dropped Rod protection from NIS, for the channel being tested; and (b) defeating the ΔT protection CHANNEL SET that is being fed from the NIS channel and (c) defeating the power mismatch section of T_{avg} control channels when the appropriate NIS channel is being tested. However, the Rod Position System and remaining NIS channels still provide the dropped-rod protection. Testing does not trip the system unless a trip condition exists in a concurrent channel.

In the event that either the specified Minimum Number of Operable Channels or the Minimum Degree of Redundancy cannot be met, the reactor and the remainder of the plant is placed, utilizing normal operating procedures, in that condition consistent with the loss of protection.

The source range and the intermediate range nuclear instrumentation and the turbine and steam-feedwater flow mismatch trip functions are not required to be operable since they were not used in the transient and safety analysis (FSAR Section 14).

The shunt trip features of the reactor trip and bypass breakers were modified as a result of the Salem ATWS events [4]. Operability requirements for the reactor trip breakers and the reactor protection logic relays were added to the reactor protection instrument operating conditions as a result of NRC review of shunt trip modifications at Westinghouse plants [5]. Operability is demonstrated when the logic coincidence relays are tested to show they are capable of initiating a reactor trip. Reactor trip breakers are considered operable when tested to show they are capable of being opened: (a) by the undervoltage device and the shunt trip device independent of each other from an automatic trip signal and (b) from the Control Room Flight Panel manual trip during refueling outages. An exception of 72 hours is allowed before a reactor trip breaker is declared inoperable if only one of the diverse trip features (undervoltage or shunt trip) fails to open the breaker when tested.

<u>References:</u>

1) FSAR - Section 7.5
2) FSAR - Section 14.3
3) FSAR - Section 14.2.5
4) GL 83-28 - Item 4.3
5) GL 85-09

Testing

The minimum testing frequency for those instrument channels connected to the safety system is based on an average unsafe failure rate of 2.5×10^{-6} failure/hrs. per channel. This is based on operating experience at conventional and nuclear plants. An unsafe failure is defined as one which negates channel operability and which, due to its nature, is revealed only when the channel is tested or attempts to respond to a bona fide signal.

For a specified test interval W and an M out of N redundant system with identical and independent channels having a constant failure rate λ, the average availability A is given by:

$$A = \frac{W - Q\left(\frac{W}{N-M+2}\right)}{W} = 1 - \frac{N!}{(N-M+2)!\,(M-1)!}(\lambda W)^{N-M+1}$$

where A is defined as the fraction of time during which the system is functional, and Q is the probability of failure of such a system during a time interval W.

For a 2-out-of-3 system A = 0.9999708, assuming a channel failure rate, λ, equal to 2.5×10^{-6} hr^{-1} and a test interval, W, equal to 2160 hrs.

This average availability of the 2-out-of-3 system is high, hence the test interval of one quarter is acceptable.

Because of their greater degree of redundancy, the 1/3 and 2/4 logic arrays provide an even greater measure of protection and are thereby acceptable for the same testing interval. Those items specified for quarterly testing are associated with process components where other means of verification provide additional assurance that the channel is operable, thereby requiring less frequent testing.

Specified surveillance intervals for the Reactor Protection System and Engineered Safety Features have been determined in accordance with WCAP - 10271, Supplement 1, "Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection Instrumentation System," and WCAP - 10271, Supplement 2, Revision 1, "Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System," as approved by the NRC and documented in the SERs (letters to J. J. Sheppard from C. O. Thomas, dated February 21, 1985, and to R. A. Newton from C. E. Rossi, dated February 22, 1989). Surveillance intervals were determined based on maintaining an appropriate level of reliability of the Reactor Protection System and Engineered Safety Features instrumentation.

The Turbine Steam Stop and Control Valves shall be tested at a frequency determined by the methodology presented in WCAP-11525, "Probabilistic Evaluation of Reduction in Turbine Valve Test Frequency", and in accordance with established NRC acceptance criteria for the probability of a missile ejection incident at IP-3. In no case shall the test interval for these valves exceed one year.

TABLE 4.1-1 (Sheet 1 of 5)

MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTS OF INSTRUMENT CHANNELS

Channel Description	Check	Calibrate	Test	Remarks
1. Nuclear Power Range	S	D (1) M (3)*	Q (2)** Q (4)	1) Heat balance calibration 2) Bistable action (permissive, rod stop, trips) 3) Upper and lower chambers for axial offset 4) Signal to ΔT
2. Nuclear Intermediate Range	S (1)	N.A.	P (2)	1) Once/shift when in service 2) Verification of channel response to simulated inputs
3. Nuclear Source Range	S (1)	N.A.	P (2)	1) Once/shift when in service 2) Verification of channel response to simulated inputs
4. Reactor Coolant Temperature	S	R	Q (1) Q (2)	1) Overtemperature - ΔT 2) Overpower - ΔT
5. Reactor Coolant Flow	S	R	Q	
6. Pressurizer Water Level	S	R	Q	
7. Pressurizer Pressure	S	R	Q	High and Low
8. 6.9 KV Voltage & Frequency	N.A.	R	Q	Reactor protection circuits only
9. Analog Rod Position	S	R	M	

TABLE 4.1-1 (Sheet 2 of 5)

Channel Description	Check	Calibrate	Test	Remarks
10. Steam Generator Level	S	R	Q	
11. Residual Heat Removal Pump Flow	N.A.	R	N.A.	
12. Boric Acid Tank Level	S	R	N.A.	Bubbler tube rodded during calibration
13. Refueling Water Storage Tank Level	W	R	N.A.	Low level alarms
14. Containment Pressure	S	R	Q	High and High-High
15. Process and Area Radiation Monitoring Systems	D	R	Q	
16. Containment Water Level Monitoring System:				
a. Containment Sump	N.A.	R	N.A.	Narrow Range, Analog
b. Recirculation Sump	N.A.	R	N.A.	Narrow Range, Analog
c. Containment Water Level	N.A.	R	N.A.	Wide Range
17. Accumulator Level and Pressure	S***	R	N.A.	
18. Steam Line Pressure	S	R	Q	
19. Turbine First Stage Pressure	S	R	Q	
20. Reactor Protection Relay Logic	N.A.	N.A.	TM	
21. Turbine Trip Low Auto Stop Oil Pressure	N.A.	R	N.A.	
22. Boron Injection Tank Return Flow	S	R	N.A.	

TABLE 4.1-1 (Sheet 3 of 5)

Channel Description	Check	Calibrate	Test	Remarks
23. Temperature Sensor in Auxiliary Boiler Feedwater Pump Building	N.A.	N.A.	R	
24. Temperature Sensors in Primary Auxiliary Building				
a. Piping Penetration Area	N.A.	N.A.	R	
b. Mini-Containment Area	N.A.	N.A.	R	
c. Steam Generator Blowdown Heat Exchanger Room	N.A.	N.A.	R	
25. Level Sensors in Turbine Building	N.A.	N.A.	R	
26. Volume Control Tank Level	N.A.	R	N.A.	
27. Boric Acid Makeup Flow Channel	N.A.	R	N.A.	
28. Auxiliary Feedwater:				
a. Steam Generator Level	S	R	Q	Low-Low
b. Undervoltage	N.A.	R	R	
c. Main Feedwater Pump Trip	N.A.	N.A.	R	
29. Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin Monitor	D	R	N.A.	
30. PORV Position Indicator	N.A.	R	R	Limit Switch
31. PORV Position Indicator	D	R	R	Acoustic Monitor
32. Safety Valve Position Indicator	D	R	R	Acoustic Monitor
33. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate	N.A.	R	N.A.	

TABLE 4.1-1 (Sheet 5 of 5)

Channel Description	Check	Calibrate	Test	Remarks
43. Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers	N.A.	N.A.	(1)	1) Manual shunt trip prior to each use
			R(2)	2) Independent operation of undervoltage and shunt trip from Control Room manual push-button
			R(3)	3) Automatic undervoltage trip
44. Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS)	D	R	N.A.	
45. Ambient Temperature Sensors Within the Containment Building	D	R	N.A.	
46. River Water Temperature # (installed)	S	R	N.A.	1) Check against installed instrumentation or another portable device
47. River Water Temperature # (portable)	S (1)	Q (2)	N.A.	2) Calibrate within 30 days prior to use and quarterly thereafter

* By means of the movable incore detector system

** Quarterly when reactor power is below the setpoint and prior to each startup if not done previous month.

*** If either an accumulator level or pressure instrument channel is declared inoperable, the remaining level or pressure channel must be verified operable by interconnecting and equalizing (pressure and/or level wise) a minimum of two accumulators and crosschecking the instrumentation.

\# These requirements are applicable when specification 3.3.F.5 is in effect only.

S - Each shift
P - Prior to each startup if not done previous week
NA- Not applicable
D - Daily
TM- At least every two months on a staggered test basis (i.e., one train per month)
W - Weekly
M - Monthly
Q - Quarterly
R - Each refueling outage

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 107 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-64

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 3

DOCKET NO. 50-286

1.0 INTRODUCTION

On December 20, 1989, the Power Authority of the State of New York (the licensee), submitted an application for amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3. The proposed changes to Table 4.1-1 and to the Bases applicable to Section 4.1 would allow extension of surveillance intervals for channel operational tests of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) instrumentation and Engineered Safety Features System (ESFS) instrumentation from a 1-month interval to a 3-month interval. The proposed changes to the Bases associated with Section 3.5 would allow routine analog channel testing in a bypassed condition instead of a tripped condition.

2.0 EVALUATION

2.1 Extension of the surveillance intervals for channel operational tests of the RPS and ESFS instrumentation from 1 month to quarterly.

In justifying the request for extending the RPS and ESFS instrumentation surveillance intervals, the licensee states that the specified surveillance intervals have been determined in accordance with WCAP-10271 (Reference 1), WCAP-10271, Supplement 1 (Reference 2), and WCAP-10271, Supplement 2, Revision 1 (Reference 3), which were approved by the NRC (References 4 and 5). As stated in the licensee's submittal, several conditions were imposed by the NRC to allow use of WCAP-10271 for amending technical specifications. The licensee's responses to these conditions are discussed in this section.

a. The licensee must implement procedures to identify common cause failures and to test other channels that may be affected by the common cause.

   The licensee has committed to modify their procedures prior to the institution of quarterly testing, to require an evaluation for common cause failure should any RPS or ESFS channel fail during its quarterly test. Additional testing of other channels in the function will be performed if a determination is made that a plausible common cause exists. The staff finds this commitment to be acceptable.

b. The instrument setpoint methodology must include sufficient adjustments to offset the drift anticipated as a result of less frequent surveillances.

The licensee based their justification for the extended surveillance intervals on the results of an evaluation of Indian Point 3 plant instrument drift data. The staff requested that the licensee perform a statistical analysis of the drift data to ensure that the data is representative of longer term instrument performance.

The licensee examined a sample of "as found" and "as left" RPS and ESFS test data that were gathered over a period of 12 months. The 12-month period was recommended by the vendor, Westinghouse, and has been accepted by the staff. The licensee analyzed the data sample to ensure the instrumentation drift data is within the required tolerances specified in the licensee's TS. Based on the results of the evaluations, the licensee concludes that the instrumentation drift will remain within the TS allowances for the entire extended surveillance interval (the licensee will retain their analyses for possible future NRC staff audit). The licensee's conclusions are acceptable to the staff.

c. The licensee shall confirm the applicability of the generic WCAP-10271 analyses to the Indian Point 3 plant.

Indian Point 3 does not have a completely installed bypass capability and has not adopted the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications. Nevertheless, the licensee concurs with the Westinghouse studies (References 1, 2 and 3) and the proposed TS changes. The licensee does not concur with the suggested increase (to 6 hours) in the time an inoperable channel may remain untripped. Current plant "Off Normal Operating Procedures" require that the bistables for an instrument channel be tripped following an instrument failure. The licensee states that this is a more conservative action with regard to safety system availability than allowing an inoperable channel to remain untripped for up to 6 hours. The staff finds the licensee's conclusion acceptable.

Additionally, the licensee states that the Westinghouse analog channel fault tree analysis assumes that more than one channel will be tested at a time. The licensee states that the plant TS allows testing only one channel at a time, which is also more conservative than the Westinghouse assumption. The staff concurs.

2.2 Analog Channel Testing in Bypass Mode.

The licensee requested staff concurrence allowing routine analog channel testing in a bypassed condition instead of a tripped condition. The licensee states the plant does not have full bypass testing capability, although there is a commitment to implement hardware changes in the future that would allow this testing capability. The licensee further commits that only those instruments whose hardware capability does not require the lifting of leads or installing of jumpers will be routinely tested in bypass. The staff concurs with these commitments, and agrees that the lifting of leads and the use of jumpers should be avoided.

The licensee had also proposed to correct a typographical error in Section 4.1 under "Testing." A letter "N" was mistakenly typed instead of the letter "M" as the last letter in the denominator of the equation. This proposed correction was included in the proposed TS change noticed in the Federal Register (55FR6115) on February 21, 1990. However, this error has previously been corrected per Amendment No. 97, issued on April 26, 1990.

3.0 SUMMARY

The staff accepts the licensee's justification for extending the monthly surveillance intervals to a quarterly frequency. The staff finds that routine analog channel testing with the channel in a bypassed condition instead of a tripped condition is acceptable. The staff also concurs with the licensee's statement that the testing of only one channel at a time per TS is more conservative than the Westinghouse assumption.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves a change to surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

6.0 REFERENCES

1) WCAP-10271, "Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection Instrumentation System," January 1983.

2) WCAP-10271, Supplement 1, "Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection Instrumentation System," July 1983.

3) WCAP-10271, Supplement 2, Revision 1, "Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System," March 1987.

4) Letter from Mr. C. O. Thomas (NRC) to Mr. J. J. Sheppard (WOG), dated February 21, 1985, enclosing NRC Safety Evaluation for WCAP-10271 including Supplement 1.

5) Letter from Mr. C. E. Rossi (NRC) to Mr. R. A. Newton (WOG-WEPC), dated February 22, 1989, enclosing NRC Safety Evaluation for WCAP-10271 Supplement 2, and WCAP-10271 Supplement 2, Revision 1.

Principal Contributor:
M. Waterman

Dated: March 22, 1991

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
March 22, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR: Sholly Coordinator

FROM: Joseph D. Neighbors, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR PUBLICATION IN BIWEEKLY FR NOTICE - NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE (TAC NO. 75574)

Power Authority of The State of New York, Docket No. 50-286, Indian Point Unit No. 3, Westchester County, New York

Date of application for amendment: December 20, 1989

Brief description of amendment: The amendment revises Technical Specifications Section 4.1 and associated Bases to increase the surveillance intervals for the Reactor Protection System and Engineered Safety Features analog channel operational tests from monthly to quarterly. The amendmant also changes the Bases applicable to Section 3.5 to allow routine analog channel testing in a bypassed condition instead of a tripped condition.

Date of issuance: March 22, 1991

Effective date: March 22, 1991

Amendment No.: 107

Facility Operating License No. DPR-64: Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in FEDERAL REGISTER: February 21, 1990 (55 FR 6115)

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated March 22, 1991.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

Local Public Document Room location: White Plains Public Library, 100 Martine Avenue, White Plains, New York, 10610.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

F. J. Williams, Jr., for
Joseph D. Neighbors, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II

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2/19/91 2/21/91	2/25/91	2/25/91	2/26/91	3/22/91

DOCUMENT NAME: SHOLLY TAC NO. 75574

Date of initial notice in FEDERAL REGISTER: February 21, 1990 (55 FR 6115)

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No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

Local Public Document Room location: White Plains Public Library, 100 Martine Avenue, White Plains, New York, 10610.

Francis J. Williams, Jr. for

Joseph D. Neighbors, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II