August 7, 1989

Docket No. 50-247

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Mr. Stephen B. Bram
Vice President, Nuclear Power
Consolidated Edison Company
of New York, Inc.
Broadway and Bleakley Avenue
Buchanan, New York 10511

Dear Mr. Bram:

SUBJECT: EMERGENCY AMENDMENT TO INCREASE THE SERVICE WATER TEMPERATURE LIMIT TO 90°F (TAC 73764)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 143 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-26 for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2. The amendment is in response to your letter of August 3, 1989 and consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS), the TS Basis, and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).

The amendment permits operation of Indian Point Unit 2 with service water system inlet water temperatures of up to 90°F and with containment air temperatures of up to 130°F. The staff is also continuing its review of your July 13, 1989 request which would permit operation of Indian Point Unit 2 with service water system inlet water temperatures of up to 95°F.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular bi-weekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

Donald S. Brinkman, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 143 to DPR-26
2. Safety Evaluation

cc: w/enclosures
See next page

* See previous concurrence

PDI-1	PDI-1	SPLB*	Region	OGC*	PDI-1
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8/1/89	8/7/89	8/1/89	8/7/89	8/7/89	8/7/89

Acting ADR
WButler
8/7/89

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PDR ADOCK 05000247
P PNU

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Original signed by

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CVogan	DBrinkman/bah	CMcCracken	JWiggins		RCapra
8/1/89	8/7/89	8/1/89	8/4/89	8/7/89	8/1/89

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The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. to Facility Operating License No. DPR-26 for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2. The amendment is in response to your letter of August 3, 1989 and consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS), the TS Basis, and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).

The amendment permits operation of Indian Point Unit 2 with service water system inlet water temperatures of up to 90°F and with containment air temperatures of up to 130°F. The staff is also continuing its review of your July 13, 1989 request which would permit operation of Indian Point Unit 2 with service water system inlet water temperatures of up to 95°F.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular bi-weekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Donald S. Brinkman, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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PDI-1	PDI-1	SPLB *	Region	OGC JEM	PDI-1
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subject to change as noted

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Vice President, Nuclear Power
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of New York, Inc.
Broadway and Bleakley Avenue
Buchanan, New York 10511

Dear Mr. Bram:

SUBJECT: EMERGENCY AMENDMENT TO INCREASE THE SERVICE WATER TEMPERATURE LIMIT TO 90°F (TAC 73764)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. to Facility Operating License No. DPR-26 for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS), the TS Basis, and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).

The amendment is in partial response to your letters dated July 13 and 26, 1989. This amendment permits operation of Indian Point Unit 2 with service water system inlet water temperatures of up to 90°F, rather than 95°F as requested in your submittals and with containment air temperatures of up to 130°F. This change from 95°F to 90°F has been discussed with and agreed to by members of your staff. The staff is continuing its review of your request to permit operation of Indian Point Unit 2 with service water system inlet water temperatures of up to 95°F.

This amendment temporarily modifies TS 5.2.C, "Containment Systems," TS Basis page 3.3-10 and UFSAR Table 9.6-1, "Essential Service Water Requirements at 75°F River Water Temperature," by increasing the design inlet water temperature limit for the service water system from 85°F to 90°F.

On October 1, 1989 at 12:01 a.m., this temporary amendment shall expire and the design limit for maximum service water temperature shall revert to 85°F unless the staff first completes its review of your request to increase the allowable service water system inlet temperature to 95°F and issues a subsequent license amendment.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular bi-weekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Donald S. Brinkman, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects, I/II

Enclosures:
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8/ /89	8/ /89	8/ /89	/ /89	/ /89	/ /89

cc:

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Senior Resident Inspector
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New York, New York 10271

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-247

INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 143
License No. DPR-26

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (the licensee) dated August 3, 1989, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-26 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 143 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Walter A. Butler, Acting Assistant Director
for Region I Reactors
Division of Reactor Projects, I/II

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: August 7, 1989

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 143

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-26

DOCKET NO. 50-247

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages	Insert Pages
3.3-10	3.3-10
4.4-6	4.4-6
5.2-2	5.2-2

The requirement regarding the maximum number of SI pumps that can be energized when RCS temperature is less than or equal to 310°F is discussed under specification 3.1.A.

The containment cooling and iodine removal functions are provided by two independent systems: (a) fan-coolers plus charcoal filters and (b) containment spray with sodium hydroxide addition. During normal power operation, the five fan-coolers are required to remove heat lost from equipment and piping within containment at design conditions (with a cooling water temperature of 90°F).[4] In the event of a Design Basis Accident, any one of the following combinations will provide sufficient cooling to reduce containment pressure at a rate consistent with limiting off-site doses to acceptable values: (1) five fan-cooler units, (2) two containment spray pumps, (3) three fan-cooler units and one spray pump. Also in the event of a Design Basis Accident, three charcoal filters (and their associated recirculation fans) in operation, along with one containment spray pump and sodium hydroxide addition, will reduce airborne organic and molecular iodine activities sufficiently to limit off-site doses to acceptable values. These constitute the minimum safeguards for iodine removal, and are capable of being operated on emergency power with one diesel generator inoperable.

If off-site power is available or all diesel generators are operating to provide emergency power, the remaining installed iodine removal equipment (two charcoal filters and their associated fans, and one containment spray pump and sodium hydroxide addition) can be operated to provide iodine removal in excess of the minimum requirements. Adequate power for operation of the redundant containment heat removal systems (i.e., five fan-cooler units or two containment spray pumps) is assured by the availability of off-site power or operation of all emergency diesel generators.

One of the five fan cooler units is permitted to be inoperable during power operation. This is an abnormal operating situation, in that the normal plant operating procedures require that an inoperable fan-cooler be repaired as soon as practical.

However, because of the difficulty of access to make repairs, it is important on occasion to be able to operate temporarily without at least one fan-cooler. Compensation for this mode of operation, is provided by the high degree of redundancy of containment cooling systems during a Design Basis Accident.

The Component Cooling System is different from the system discussed above in that the pumps are so located in the Auxiliary Building as to be accessible

b. Visual inspection shall be made for excessive leakage during these tests from components of the system. Any significant leakage shall be measured by collection and weighing or by another equivalent method.

2. Acceptance Criterion

The maximum allowable leakage from the Residual Heat Removal System components located outside of the containment shall not exceed two gallons per hour.

3. Corrective Action

Repairs or isolation shall be made as required to maintain leakage within the acceptance criterion.

4. Test Frequency

Tests of the Residual Heat Removal System shall be conducted at every refueling.

The containment is designed for a calculated peak accident pressure of 47 psig.[1] While the reactor is operating, the internal environment of the containment will be air at essentially atmospheric pressure and an average maximum temperature of approximately 130°F. With these initial conditions, the peak accident pressure and temperature of the steam-air mixture will not exceed the containment design pressure and temperature of 47 psig and 271°F.

Prior to initial operation, the containment was strength-tested at 54 psig and was leak-tested. The acceptance criterion for this preoperational leakage rate test was established as 0.10 w/o (L_a) per 24 hours at 47 psig and 271°F, which are the peak accident pressure and temperature conditions. This leakage rate is consistent with the construction of the containment,[2] which is equipped with a Weld Channel and Penetration Pressurization System for

2. The automatic Phase A containment isolation (trip) valves are actuated to the closed position either manually or by an automatically derived safety injection signal. The automatic Phase B containment isolation valves are tripped closed by automatic or manual containment spray actuation. The actuation system is designed such that no single component failure will prevent containment isolation if required.

C. Containment Systems

1. The containment vessel has an internal spray system which is capable of providing a distributed borated water spray of at least 2200 gpm. During the initial period of spray operation, sodium hydroxide would be added to the spray water to increase the removal of iodine from the containment atmosphere.[3]

2. The containment vessel has an internal recirculation system which includes five fan cooler units (centrifugal fans and water cooled heat exchangers), with a total heat removal capability of at least 308.5 MBTU/Hr. under conditions following a loss of coolant accident and at service water temperature of 90°F.[4] All of the fan cooler units are equipped with activated charcoal filters to remove volatile iodine following an accident.

References

(1) FSAR Section 5.1
(2) FSAR Section 5.1.2.7
(3) FSAR Section 6.3
(4) FSAR Section 6.4

Amendment No. 111 135, 143

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 143 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-26

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC.

INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO. 50-247

INTRODUCTION

By letter dated July 13, 1989, Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (the licensee) requested a license amendment to increase the design basis water inlet temperature of the Indian Point 2 Service Water System (SWS) from 85°F to 95°F and to increase the allowable containment air temperature from approximately 120°F to 130°F. On July 26, 1989, the licensee submitted a letter supplementing the July 13, 1989 amendment request. The July 26, 1989 letter requested that the July 13, 1989 proposed license amendment be issued as an emergency Technical Specification (TS) change. The July 26, 1989 letter also stated that the SWS water inlet temperature had exceeded the 85°F limit for 20 minutes on July 25, 1989. (The 85°F limit was exceeded again on July 26, 1989 for 40 minutes). On July 27, 1989, the NRC staff issued a temporary waiver of compliance to permit the licensee to operate Indian Point 2 at up to 100% rated thermal power with service water temperature of less than or equal to 90°F and with containment air temperature of up to 130°F. The temporary waiver of compliance was effective immediately and was to remain in effect until the NRC staff completed processing of the licensee's request for an emergency TS change. On August 2, 1989, the staff orally notified the licensee that its review of the July 13, 1989 submittal would not be completed in sufficient time to issue the requested emergency TS change. Therefore, the licensee submitted an emergency TS change request on August 3, 1989 to increase the allowable SWS inlet water temperature from 85°F to 90°F and to increase the allowable containment air temperature to 130°F.

EVALUATION

Due to the extensive review analysis required, the NRC staff's review of the licensee's July 13, 1989 submittal has not progressed sufficiently to approve the request for operation with 95°F water inlet temperature to SWS. However, a similar situation (SWS inlet temperature exceeding 85°F and corresponding high containment air temperatures) occurred during July and August 1988. On August 25, 1988, the staff issued Corrected License Amendment No. 135 for operation of Indian Point Unit 2 at up to 100% rated thermal power with service water inlet temperatures of up to 90°F and with containment air temperatures of

up to 130°F. The licensee's July 26 and August 3, 1989 letters state that (1) the plant heat loads have not changed, (2) the extensive analyses of equipment and systems precluded earlier submission of the proposed TS changes, and (3) to complete these extensive analyses, confirmatory testing was completed during the refueling outage which ended July 2, 1989.

The staff concluded that although its review has not progressed sufficiently to approve operation with 95°F SWS inlet water temperature, operation with SWS inlet water temperatures of up to 90°F could be approved based upon the review performed for License Amendment No. 135. The staff discussed this approach with licensee representatives who agreed with the staff's approach. Therefore, since an urgent need (to preclude a shutdown if the river water temperature exceeds 85°F again) still exists for relief from the current TS, the licensee submitted a request for an emergency TS change on August 3, 1989. This TS change would increase the allowable SWS inlet water temperature limit to 90°F and the allowable containment air temperature to 130°F. These proposed changes are based on the analyses performed for License Amendment No. 135. For the reasons stated in our Safety Evaluation for License Amendment No. 135, the staff finds these requested changes acceptable.

MITIGATING FACTORS

To ensure that adequate heat removal capability is provided to the containment fan cooling units, the CCW system and the EDGs, the licensee has again committed to performing an orderly plant shutdown to hot shutdown, utilizing normal plant operating procedures, if service water inlet temperature exceeds 90°F over a two hour period. The plant shall be placed in hot shutdown within seven hours from the point in time whence the service water temperature initially exceeded 90°F.

Furthermore, the licensee has also again committed to monitoring service water temperature at least once per hour and CCW temperature at least once every two hours when the service water inlet temperature exceeds 85°F. This monitoring will ensure that, during normal plant operations, adequate cooling is provided to the reactor coolant pump thermal barriers by CCW to prevent these thermal barriers from being damaged by exceeding their continuous rating of 105°F or their two hour rating of 125°F.

STAFF CONCLUSION

The staff is not yet approving the licensee's request to increase the SWS allowable inlet water temperature to 95°F since the staff's review has not progressed sufficiently to approve that request. However, based on the staff's Safety Evaluation performed for License Amendment No. 135 (issued August 25, 1988), the staff has again approved a change to increase the allowable SWS inlet water temperature to 90°F and the containment air temperature to 130°F. These changes were temporarily approved for License Amendment No. 135 and since the safety aspects of their changes have not changed the same changes are again being approved. The staff is continuing its review of the July 13, 1989 submittal.

FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION

The Commission's regulation, 10 CFR 50.92, states that the Commission may make a final determination that a license amendment involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the amendment would not:

1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or

2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or

3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff reviewed the Final No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination that was made in support of Licensee Amendment No. 135 and has concluded that the same determination (which follows) is again valid for the current proposed change.

The only previously evaluated accidents possibly affected by this amendment are the LOCA and the loss of offsite A.C. power event. For a LOCA the 5°F increase to 90°F service water temperature could have the potential to affect 1) peak containment pressure by reducing the heat removal capability of the containment fan cooler units, 2) core reflood and fill by reducing CCW cooling to the safety injection pump seals, and 3) all safety equipment and functions powered by the EDGs due to the reduction in the heat removal capability of the EDG jacket water cooling system and lube oil cooler. The loads powered by the EDGs could be similarly affected for the loss of offsite A.C. power event. The licensee has evaluated the possibility of these effects and has determined that 1) peak containment pressure from a LOCA would not increase as the containment fan cooler units still retain the minimum heat removal capacity previously determined to be required, 2) with the previously specified revision to the EOPs, adequate CCW flow will continue to be provided to the safety injection pump seals to assure their continued operation, and 3) adequate heat and EDG lube oil to ensure that they will not malfunction or trip due to over-temperature conditions.

Additionally, the licensee's commitment to shutdown if service water temperature exceeds 90°F for more than two hours assures that these functions will not be seriously degraded or reduced during peak river temperature periods. Consequently, the NRC staff has determined that operation of the facility with a service water inlet temperature of 90°F will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

Similarly, the NRC staff has determined that this proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated as the systems affected by increasing service water temperature to 90°F still function as designed and no other changes to the plant design or operation are being made other than raising the service water temperature from 85°F to 90°F.

Finally, these proposed amendments do not involve a significant reduction in any margin of safety as peak containment pressure for a LOCA is unchanged and all safety and safety-related equipment affected still fully perform their intended functions.

STATEMENT OF EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES

The licensee's August 3, 1989 letter presents the following with regard to justification of the emergency consideration of the July 13, 1989 application:

> Based on the river water temperatures recorded in the summer of 1988, Con Edison initiated efforts to permanently revise the Technical Specifications. This effort resulted in the July 13, 1989 submittal. Extensive analyses of equipment and systems were required to be performed over many months and thus precluded earlier submission of the proposed Technical Specification changes. In addition, in order to complete the analyses, confirmatory testing was completed during the refueling outage which ended July 2, 1989.
>
> On July 25, 1989 from approximately 6:50 p.m. to approximately 7:10 p.m. and on July 26, 1989 from approximately 7:45 p.m. to approximately 8:25 p.m., the service water inlet temperature was recorded above 85°F and Specification 3.0.1 was applied. Therefore, in order to preclude recurrence we request that this emergency Technical Specification amendment be granted as expeditiously as possible and thereby allow continued operation of Indian Point Unit No. 2 with a service water inlet temperature up to 90°F and with a containment air temperature up to 130°F.

We conclude that failure to grant the emergency license amendment would require shutdown of Indian Point Unit 2.

Based upon the above, we conclude that the licensee has adequately addressed the standards of 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5) with regard to demonstrating the need for an emergency licensee amendment. We further conclude, based on the efforts required to perform the extensive analyses (including recently completed confirmatory testing) of equipment and systems for plant operations with SWS inlet water temperatures of up to 95°F, that the licensee has not abused the emergency provision by failing to make timely application for the amendment.

STAFF CONSULTATIONS

The appropriate representative of the State of New York was notified of this amendment. The State of New York contact had no comments.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment changes requirements with respect to the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. We have determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any

effluents that maybe released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. We have made a final no significant hazards consideration finding with respect to this amendment. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) this emergency situation could not be avoided; (2) the licensee acted in a timely manner with respect to responding to this emergency, (3) the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, does not create the possibility of a new or different type of accident from any evaluated previously, and does not involve a significant reduction in margin of safety, (4) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner; and (5) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTOR:

D. Brinkman

Dated: August 7, 1989