October 27, 1986

Docket No. 50-286

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Dear Mr. Brons:

The Commission issued Amendment No. 67 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-64 for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 on August 18, 1986. This Amendment contained several clerical errors which are corrected by the enclosed replacement pages.

Sincerely,

/S/
Joseph D. Neighbors, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate #3
Division of PWR Licensing-A

Enclosure:
As stated

cc: See next page

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Indian Point Nuclear Generating
Unit No. 3

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7. REACTOR VESSEL HEAD VENTS

Whenever the reactor coolant system is above 350°F, two reactor vessel head vent paths consisting of two valves in series with power available from emergency buses shall be OPERABLE.

a. If one of the above reactor vessel head vent paths is inoperable, startup and/or power operation may continue provided the inoperable vent path is maintained closed with power removed from the valve actuator of all the valves in the inoperable vent path. Restore the inoperable vent path to operable status within 90 days, or be in hot shutdown within 6 hours and be below 350°F within the following 30 hours.

b. With both reactor vessel head vent paths inoperable restore one vent path to operable status within 7 days or be in hot shutdown within 6 hours and be below 350°F within the following 30 hours.

8. OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEM (OPS)

a. When the RCS temperature is below 326°F and the RCS is not depressurized and vented with an equivalent opening of at least 2.00 square inches, the OPS shall be "armed" and "operable". Both OPS PORVs shall have lift settings not to exceed those given by Curve III (OPS PORV setpoint limit curve) on Fig. 3.1.A-3.

b. The requirements of 3.1.A.8.a. may be modified to allow one PORV and/or its series MOV to be inoperable for a maximum of seven (7) consecutive days. If the single PORV and/or its series MOV are not restored to meet the requirements of 3.1.A.8.a. within the seven (7) day period, or if both PORVs and/or their series MOVs are inoperable when required to be operable by 3.1.A.8.a., then one of the following actions shall be performed:

(1) The RCS must be depressurized and vented with an equivalent opening of at least 2.00 square inches;

Or

(2) The RCS must be heated in accordance with Specifications 3.1.A.1.h(3) and (4) and maintained above 370°F;

Or

(3) Restrict pressurizer level as per the curves referenced below:

For up to 1 charging pump in operation with no SI pumps energized and aligned to feed the Reactor Coolant System, see Fig. 3.1.A-5.

For up to 3 charging pumps in operation concurrent with up to 1 SI pump energized and aligned to feed the Reactor Coolant System, see Fig. 3.1.A-6.

c. In the event the PORV's or the RCS vent(s) are used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2.J within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or vent(s) on the transient and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.

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i. Radioactive environmental sampling results in excess of reporting levels (Appendix B Specifications 2.7, 2.8, 2.9)

j. Operation of Overpressure Protection System (Specification 3.1.A.8.c.)

6.10 RECORD RETENTION

6.10.1 The following records shall be retained for at least five years:

a. Records and logs of facility operation covering time interval at each power level.

b. Records and logs of principal maintenance activities, inspec- tions, repair and replacement of principal items of equipment related to nuclear safety.

c. All REPORTABLE EVENTS submitted to the Commission.

d. Records of surveillance activities, inspections and calibrations required by these Technical Specifications.

e. Records of changes made to Operating Procedures.

f. Records of radioactive shipments.

g. Records of sealed source and fission detector leak tests and results.

h. Records of annual physical inventory of all source material of record.

i. Records of reactor tests and experiments.

6.10.2 The following records shall be retained for the duration of the Facility Operating License:

a. Records of any drawing changes reflecting facility design modifications made to systems and equipment described in the Final Safety Analysis Report.

b. Records of new and irradiated fuel inventory, fuel transfers and assembly burnup histories.

c. Records of facility radiation and contamination surveys.

d. Records of radiation exposure for all individuals entering radiation control areas.

TABLE 3.3-3 (SHEET [illegible] 3)

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	1	2	3	4	5
3. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER					
a. Stm Gen. Water Level-Low-Low					
i. Start Motor Driven Pumps	3/stm. gen	2 in any stm gen.	2 chan. in each stm gen	1	Reduce system temperature such that $T \leq 350^{o}F$
ii. Start Turbine-Driven Pump	3/stm. gen	2/3 in each of two stm. gen.	2 chan. in each stm. gen.	1	$T \leq 350^{o}F$
b. S. I. Start Motor-Driven Pumps	(All safety injection initiating functions and requirements)				
c. Station Blackout Start Turbine-Driven Pump	2	1	1	0	$T \leq 350^{o}F$
d. Trip of Main Feedwater Pumps start Motor-Driven Pumps	2	1	1	0	Hot Shutdown
4. LOSS OF POWER					
a. 480v Bus Undervoltage Relay	2/bus	1/bus	1/bus	0	See Note 1
b. 480v Bus Degraded Voltage Relay	2/bus	2/bus	2/bus (See Note 2)	0	See Note 1
5. Overpressure Protection System (OPS)	3	2	2	1	******

Note 1. If the 138KV and 13.8KV sources of offsite power are available and the conditions of column 3 or 4 cannot be met within 72 hours, then the requirements of 3.7.C.1 or 2 shall be met.

Note 2. If one channel becomes inoperable, it is placed in the trip position and the number of minimum operable channels is reduced by one.

******Refer to Specification 3.1.A.8.

Basis

When the boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System is to be reduced the process must be uniform to prevent sudden reactivity changes in the reactor. Mixing of the reactor coolant will be sufficient to maintain a uniform boron concentration if at least one reactor coolant pump or one residual heat removal pump is running while the change is taking place. The residual heat removal pump will circulate the primary system volume in approximately one half hour. The pressurizer is of no concern because of the low pressurizer volume and because the pressurizer boron concentration will be higher than that of the rest of the reactor coolant.

Heat transfer analyses show that reactor heat equivalent to 10% of rated power (P-7) can be removed with natural circulation only (1); hence, the requirement for one operating RCP above 350°F and two operating RCP's above 2% rated power provides a substantial safety factor. In addition, a single RCP or RHR pump (connected to the RCS) provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat.

The reactor shall not be operated at power levels above 10% rated power with less than four (4) reactor coolant loops in operation until safety analyses for less than four loop operation have been submitted by the licensee and approval for less than four loop operation at power levels above 10% rated power has been granted by the Commission. (See license condition 2.C.(3))

Each of the pressurizer code safety valves is designed to relieve 420,000 lbs. per hr. of saturated steam at the valve set point.

If no residual heat were removed by the Residual Heat Removal System the amount of steam which could be generated at safety valve relief pressure would be less than half the capacity of a single valve. One valve therefore provides adequate protection for overpressurization.

The combined capacity of the three pressurizer safety valves is greater than the maximum surge rate resulting from complete loss of load (2) without a direct reactor trip or any other control.

The requirement that 150 kw of pressurizer heaters and their associated controls be capable of being supplied electrical power from an emergency bus provides assurance that these heaters can be energized during a loss of offsite power condition to maintain natural circulation at hot shutdown.

The power operated relief valves (PORVS) operate to relieve RCS pressure below the setting of the pressurizer code safety valves. These relief valves have remotely operated block valves to provide a positive shutoff capability should a relief valve become inoperable. The electrical power for both the relief valves and the block valves is capable of being supplied from an emergency power source to ensure the ability to seal off possible RCS leakage paths.