

December 8, 1995

Mr. Stephen E. Quinn
Vice President, Nuclear Power
Consolidated Edison Company
of New York, Inc.
Broadway and Bleakley Avenue
Buchanan, NY 10511

50-247

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF EMERGENCY AMENDMENT FOR INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR
GENERATING UNIT NO. 2

Dear Mr. Quinn:

The Commission has issued the enclosed emergency Amendment No. 185 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-26 for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application transmitted by letter dated December 8, 1995.

The amendment revises TS 3.1.A-4 to revise the wording to allow a single train of Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)/Block Valves to be closed and deenergized indefinitely. The proposed change is administrative and is intended to correct inconsistencies between the intended operation of the PORVs/Block Valves and the language of the TSs.

As a result of slowly increasing leakage through both PORVs, you have planned maintenance activities for the PORVs and Block Valves. However, planning for the maintenance revealed a wording problem in TS 3.1.A.5.d. Absent relief from the NRC, a plant shutdown may be required due to excessive pressure boundary leakage.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. Notice of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License and Final Determination of No Significant Hazards Consideration and Opportunity for Hearing will be included in the Commission's Biweekly Federal Register Notice.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

Ledyard B. Marsh, Project Director
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-247

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 185 to DPR-26
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

Distribution: See attached sheet

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DATED: December 8, 1995

AMENDMENT NO. 185 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-26-INDIAN POINT UNIT 2

Docket File

PUBLIC

PDI-1 Reading

S. Varga, 14/E/4

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G. Hill (2), T-5 C3

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

December 8, 1995

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Broadway and Bleakley Avenue
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Ledyard B. Marsh, Project Director
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-247

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2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

Stephen E. Quinn
Consolidated Edison Company
of New York, Inc.

Indian Point Nuclear Generating
Station Units 1/2

cc:

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-247

INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 185
License No. DPR-26

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (the licensee) dated December 8, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-26 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 185, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance to be implemented immediately.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Ledyard B. Marsh, Director
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 8, 1995

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 185

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-26

DOCKET NO. 50-247

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages

3.1.A-4

Insert Pages

3.1.A-4

5. Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)/Block Valves (for operation above 350°F)

- a. Whenever the reactor coolant system is above 350°F, the PORVs and their associated block valves shall be operable with the block valves either open or closed.
- b. If a PORV becomes inoperable when above 350°F, its associated block valve shall be maintained in the closed position.
- c. If a PORV block valve becomes inoperable when above 350°F, the block valve shall be closed and deenergized.
- d. If the requirements of Specification 3.1.A.5.b or 3.1.A.5.c above cannot be satisfied, compliance shall be established within four (4) hours, or the reactor shall be placed in the hot shutdown condition within the next six (6) hours and subsequently cooled below 350°F.
- e. With regard to the use of the PORVs/Block Valves as a reactor coolant system vent, the requirements of Specification 3.16 shall be adhered to.

6. Pressurizer Heaters

- a. Whenever the reactor coolant system is above 350°F, the pressurizer shall be operable with at least 150kW of pressurizer heaters.
- b. If the requirements of Specification 3.1.A.6.a cannot be met, restore the required pressurizer heater capacity to operable status within 72 hours or the reactor shall be placed in the hot shutdown condition within the next six (6) hours and subsequently cooled to below 350°F.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 185 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-26
CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC.
INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET NO. 50-247

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated December 8, 1995, the Consolidated Edison Company of New York (Con Edison or the licensee) submitted an emergency request for changes to the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications (TSs). The requested changes would revise the TSs to make editorial changes to TS 3.1.A.5 to revise the wording to allow Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)/block valves to be closed and deenergized indefinitely to provide shutoff capability should a relief valve become inoperable.

By Letter to All Pressurized Water Reactors, dated July 2, 1980, the NRC staff prepared model TSs which reflected the lessons learned from the accident at Three Mile Island. These Model TSs included requirements to assure the shutoff capability of PORVs and PORV block valves. The licensee responded by letter dated April 27, 1981, submitting a request for amendment to the TSs based on the model TSs. An Amendment (No. 72, dated August 24, 1981) was issued by the NRC staff granting the licensee's requested changes to bring its TSs in line with the model TSs.

2.0 EVALUATION

The proposed amendment is administrative in nature. There are no changes to the physical design or operation of the facility. Neither the TSs Bases, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report design basis nor the adducent assumptions are affected. The changes and their explanations are as follows:

3.1.A.5. Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)/block valves (for operation above 350 F)

- d. If the requirements of Specification 3.1.A.5.b or 3.1.A.5.c above cannot be satisfied, compliance shall be established within four (4) hours, or the reactor shall be placed in the hot shutdown condition within the next six (6) hours and subsequently cooled below 350 F.

Indian Point Unit No. 2 TS 3.1.A.5.a requires that whenever the reactor coolant system is above 350 F, the PORVs and their associated block valves shall be operable with the block valves either open or closed. TS 3.1.A.5.b requires that if a PORV becomes inoperable when above 350 F, its associated

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block valve shall be maintained in the closed position. TS 3.1.A.5.c requires that if a PORV block valve becomes inoperable when above 350 F, the block valve shall be closed and deenergized. TS 3.1.A.5.d requires that if the requirements of Specification 3.1.A.5.a, 3.1.A.5.b or 3.1.A.5.c cannot be satisfied, compliance shall be established within four (4) hours, or the reactor shall be placed in the hot shutdown condition within the next six (6) hours and subsequently cooled below 350 F.

However, the wording chosen for the TS 3.1.A.5.d did not literally reflect the intended meaning of the model TSs and is in direct conflict with the original intention of the TS. TS 3.1.A.5.d can be interpreted to restrict the time allowed to operate with the block valves closed and deenergized instead of requiring the block valves to be closed and deenergized under certain conditions. This proposed change is intended to restore the wording of the TS to reflect more clearly the intended meaning. The proposed change would allow a single train of PORVs/block valves to be closed and deenergized subject to other applicable TSs.

The licensee had indication that one or both of the PORVs may have been leaking past its seat. The PORV block valves were then closed and there is continuing indication that one or both of the PORV block valves in addition to the PORVs may be leaking. It may be desirable to manually close a block valve and deenergize it, thus making the block valve inoperable. The way that TS 3.1.A.5.d is currently written, an interpretation could be made that this would necessitate a return to operable status within 4 hours or the reactor would have to be placed in hot shutdown.

The licensee requested to change TS 3.1.A.5.d such that the present reference to TS 3.1.A.5.a is deleted, thus bringing the intent of the TSs in line with the intent of the original safety evaluation. The NRC staff has evaluated this requested change and concludes that it is administrative in nature and is acceptable.

3.0 EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES

In its December 8, 1995, application, the licensee requested that this amendment be treated as an emergency amendment. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5), the licensee provided the following information regarding why this emergency situation occurred and how it could not avoid the situation.

As a result of slowly increasing leakage through both PORVs, a decision was reached by the licensee on December 5, 1995, to close both block valves. Leakage is still present through one or both block valves. On December 7, 1995, the licensee formulated plans for potential maintenance activities for the PORVs and block valves. These included actions which would result in one or both block valves being declared inoperable. Discussion of planned maintenance action with NRC Region based personnel revealed the wording conflict problem in TS 3.1.A.5.d.

The licensee desires to take action to eliminate the reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage through the PORV/block valve path, as well as the radioactive waste being generated by this leakage. If possible, this would be

accomplished with the unit on-line. A review of the NUREG 1431 Standard Technical Specifications (STS) and the Generic Letter (GL) 90-06 compliance position issued by the NRC indicates that use of STS would not have been effective in avoiding this TS wording conflict for Indian Point 2.

The combined PORV and block valve leakage has just occurred, and therefore could not have been anticipated. Absent relief from the NRC, a plant shutdown may be required due to excessive RCS pressure boundary leakage, or other requirements. Thus, the conditions needed to satisfy 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5) exist.

4.0 FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION

The Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92(c) state that the Commission may make a final determination that a license amendment involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the amendment would not:

- (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or,
- (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated; or,
- (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration, because operation of the Indian Point 2 facility in accordance with the proposed changes would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

This proposed change is administrative in nature and merely restores consistency between the intent of the TS and the language of the TS. The basis for the TS involves assuring the shutoff capability of the PORVs/block valves. This proposed change would allow PORVs/block valves to be closed and deenergized indefinitely subject to the provisions of the other applicable TSs. As discussed in Con Edison letter dated September 29, 1992, and NRC letter dated June 2, 1994, regarding NRC Generic Letter No. 90-06, the PORVs are not credited for being able to relieve primary system pressure in any Indian Point Unit No. 2 design basis accident analysis. Additionally, the PORVs are not relied upon as the primary means of mitigating a steam generator tube rupture accident. Therefore closing and deenergizing the PORV/block valves indefinitely subject to the provisions of other applicable TSs can have no effect on the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident.

2. Involve the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

As discussed above the proposed change restores consistency between the literal wording of the TS and its intended meaning to assure the availability of the shutoff capability of the PORV/block valves. Since the PORVs are not credited in any design basis accident analysis, closing and deenergizing the PORV/block valves, subject to the provisions of other applicable TSs, cannot create the possibility of any new accident.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

This proposed change does not have any effect on the plant's margin of safety as utilized in design basis accident analysis to show compliance with the requirements of all applicable regulations.

5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New York State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). The Commission has made a final no significant hazards finding with respect to this amendment. Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

7.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) the amendment does not (a) significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, (b) increase the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated or (c) significantly reduce a safety margin and, therefore, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration; (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: K. R. Cotton
C. E. Carpenter

Date: December 8, 1995