

August 26, 1993

Docket No. 50-247

Mr. Stephen B. Bram
Vice President, Nuclear Power
Consolidated Edison Company of
New York, Inc.
Broadway and Bleakley Avenue
Buchanan, New York 10511

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Dear Mr. Bram:

SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATIVE ERROR IN ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 163, INDIAN POINT
NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 2 (TAC M84990)

Amendment No. 163, which changed the Technical Specification (TS) requirements for the testing of redundant components, was issued on June 7, 1993. Through an administrative error, pages 3.7-7 and 3.7-8 were inadvertently omitted from the issuance although they were listed in the instructions for the TS update. Pages 3.7-7 and 3.7-8 are TS Basis pages which changed only as a result of shifting text. We note that your distribution of the TS changes did include these pages and the purpose of this letter is to clarify the record. Pages 3.7-7 and 3.7-8 are enclosed.

We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

Francis J. Williams, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

TS pages 3.7-7 and 3.7-8

cc w/enclosure:

See next page

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NAME	CVogan <i>CV</i>	FWilliams FWilliams:avl	RACapra <i>RC</i>		
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

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Vice President, Nuclear Power
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We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Francis J. Williams".

Francis J. Williams, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:
TS pages 3.7-7 and 3.7-8

cc w/enclosure:
See next page

Mr. Stephen B. Bram
Consolidated Edison Company
of New York, Inc.

Indian Point Nuclear Generating
Station Units 1/2

cc:

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Conditions of a system-wide blackout could result in a unit trip. Since normal offsite power supplies as required in Specification 3.7.A are not available for startup, it is desirable to be able to blackstart this unit with onsite power supplies as a first step in restoring the system to an operable status and restoring power to customers for essential service. Specification 3.7.D.1 provides for startup using the onsite gas turbine to supply the 6.9 kV loads and the diesels to supply the 480-volt loads. Tie breakers between the 6.9 kV and 480-volt systems are open so that the diesels would not be jeopardized in the event of any incident and would be able to continue to supply 480-volt safeguards power. The scheme consists of starting two reactor coolant pumps, one condensate pump, 2 circulating water pumps and necessary auxiliaries to bring the unit up to approximately 10% power. At this point, loads can be assumed by the main generator and power supplied to the system in an orderly and routine manner.

Specification 3.7.D.2 is identical with normal start-up requirements as in Specification 3.7.A except that offsite power is supplied exclusively from gas turbines with a minimum total power of 37 MW (nameplate rating), which is sufficient to carry out normal plant startup.

As a result of an investigation of the effect components, that might become submerged following a LOCA, may have on ECCS, containment isolation, and other safety-related functions, a fuse and a locked-open circuit breaker were provided on the electrical feeder to emergency lighting panel 218 inside containment. With the circuit breaker in the open position, containment electrical penetration H-70 is de-energized during the accident condition. Personnel access to containment may be required during power operation. Since it is highly improbable that a LOCA would occur during this short period of time, the circuit breaker may be closed during that time to provide emergency lighting inside containment for personnel safety.

When the 138 kV source of offsite power is out of service, the automatic transfer of 6.9 kV Buses 1, 2, 3 and 4 to offsite power after a unit trip could result in overloading of the 20 MVA 13.8 kV/6.9 kV auto-transformer. Accordingly, the intent of Specification 3.7.B.3 is to prevent the automatic transfer when only the 13.8 kV source of offsite power is available. However, this specification is not intended to preclude subsequent manual operations or bus transfers once sufficient loads have been stripped to assure that the 20 MVA auto-transformer will not be overloaded by these manual actions.

References

- (1) UFSAR Section 8.2.1
- (2) UFSAR Section 8.2.3