



Nebraska Public Power District
Nebraska's Energy Leader

NLS2000107
November 29, 2000

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Gentlemen:

Subject: Safeguards Licensee Event Report No. 2000-S01
Cooper Nuclear Station, NRC Docket 50-298, DPR-46

The subject Safeguards Licensee Event Report is forwarded as an enclosure to this letter.

Sincerely,

J. A. McDonald
Plant Manager

/dm
Enclosure

cc: Regional Administrator w/enclosure
USNRC - Region IV

Senior Project Manager w/o enclosure
USNRC - NRR Project Directorate IV-1

Senior Resident Inspector w/o enclosure
USNRC

INPO Records Center w/o enclosure

W. Leech w/o enclosure
MidAmerican Energy

NPG Distribution w/o enclosure

Safeguards Records w/enclosure

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME (1)

Cooper Nuclear Station

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000298

PAGE (3)

1 OF 4

TITLE (4)

SAFEGUARDS EVENT

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER	
11	06	2000	2000	-- S01 --	00	11	29	2000		05000	
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER	
										05000	
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)									
1		20.2201(b)			20.2203(a)(2)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)	
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.2203(a)(1)			20.2203(a)(3)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)	
90		20.2203(a)(2)(i)			20.2203(a)(3)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)		X 73.71	
		20.2203(a)(2)(ii)			20.2203(a)(4)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)		OTHER	
		20.2203(a)(2)(iii)			50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)		Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A	
		20.2203(a)(2)(iv)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

Sharon Mahler, Assistant Manager Nuclear Licensing and Safety

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

402-825-3811

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). X NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

See text for Safeguards Event. The text which specifically addresses the information requests of Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.62, Revision 1, Section 3.2, is followed by reference to the specific RG attribute.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Cooper Nuclear Station	05000298	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2 OF 4
		2000	-- S01 --	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

The text below specifically addresses the information requests of Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.62, Revision 1, Section 3.2. Text meeting the applicable individual RG attribute is followed by reference to the specific RG attribute number. Attributes 11 and 12 were determined to be not applicable. There is no Safeguards Information in the text below.

PLANT STATUS

The plant was operating at approximately 90 percent power when the event occurred (3).

BACKGROUND

Zone 22 [EIS Code: IA] is part of the Protected Area microwave intrusion detection system. The zone consists of an area located on top of the roof of the Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) Emergency Operations Facility. It is monitored by both the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) (2, 4). The security force is proprietary (5).

EVENT DESCRIPTION

At 02:50 Central Standard Time on November 6, 2000 it was identified by the CNS CAS that microwave zone 22 (2) had exceeded the nuisance alarm rate due to inclement weather/light rain (16). This zone required posting within the following 10 minutes according to CNS Security Procedure 2.14 (8). Although the Security Shift Supervisor was notified by radio and directed CAS to post the zone at that time, this zone was not posted until 03:38 on November 6, 2000. The total time that zone 22 was unmonitored was 48 minutes, which was in excess of the required 10 minute posting (1).

Standard procedure during bad or inclement weather is to monitor the zone with an officer whose sole responsibility is to monitor the zone via a camera in either the CAS or the SAS. The CAS and the SAS had conversation concerning the posting over an intercom system and upon completion of the conversation each area (CAS and SAS) understood the other station was monitoring zone 22. The officers in CAS and SAS heard just enough of the conversation to make them think the opposite station had posted the system.

The details are as follows: At 02:52, one of the CAS officers left to perform a firewatch patrol, leaving only one person in CAS. At 03:17 one of the SAS officers left SAS for a scheduled break and to relieve Access Control. At 03:35 the SAS officer entered Access Control and seeing only one officer in CAS realized they could not be monitoring zone 22 (7). The Crew Leader who was in Access Control was made aware of the situation and the SAS officer was posted in CAS as a compensatory measure to monitor zone 22 at 03:38 on November 6, 2000 (9). Thus, the total time that zone 22 was unmonitored was 48 minutes, which was in excess of the required 10 minute posting. There were five (two people in SAS, two people in CAS, and crew leader in Access Control) security personnel involved in this event (6).

The Control Room was notified of the event and a 1-hour report was completed to the NRC per 10CFR73.71(b)(1) to be followed by a written Licensee Event Report per 10CFR73.71(d).

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

BASES FOR REPORT

This event is being reported under the requirements of 10CFR73.71(d) and per the guidance of RG 5.62, Revision 1, Section 2.2, Item No. 21. This event consisted of an uncompensated loss of ability to detect with a single intrusion detection zone, in combination with a failure to provide proper compensation within 10 minutes of discovery.

CAUSE

The root cause of this event is personnel error (NUREG 1022 Cause Code A). There was a miscommunication between CAS and SAS. While communicating with each other using the intercom, both stations were transmitting at the same time and neither station could clearly hear and understand the actions that needed to be taken and who was to take those actions. The individuals did not utilize two-part/repeat back communication practices.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

There is no safety significance associated with this event. There were no safety systems affected or threatened, directly or indirectly (4). There was no intrusion during the event.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Immediate Corrective Actions (9):

Upon discovery the zone was posted in accordance with Security Procedure 2.14 (9).

Control Room was notified by the on-duty Security Shift Supervisor and a 1-hour notification was made to the NRC (9).

The Security CAS and SAS specialist personnel involved were coached regarding the need to verify that posting requirements are implemented.

An interim control for supervisory verification of compensatory measures prior to the required time frame to ensure implementation has been put in place.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Long Term Corrective Actions (10):

Implement a requirement for the use of 2-part/repeat back communication for the Security operational crew personnel during the course of normal work by December 15, 2000.

The interim control for supervisory verification of compensatory measures will be formalized in a CNS Security Procedure by December 27, 2000.

PREVIOUS EVENTS (13)

There are no known similar previous events in the last five years.

KNOWLEDGEABLE CONTACT (14)

Michael Hamm
Security Operations Supervisor
402-825-5337

