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March 6, 1978

Docket No. 50-247

Consolidated Edison Company
of New York, Inc.
ATTN: Mr. William J. Cahill, Jr.
Vice President
4 Irving Place
New York, New York 10003

Gentlemen:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 38 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-26 for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2. This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application transmitted by letter dated November 2, 1977.

The amendment changes the Technical Specifications to delete requirements for part length control rods. Minor changes, as discussed with your staff, have been made to your application to conform the Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications with your proposed Technical Specifications for Unit No. 3. Other matters mentioned in your letter of November 2, 1977, have been or will be handled in separate actions.

Copies of the Safety Evaluation and the Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 38 to DPR-26
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

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*SEE PREVIOUS YELLOW FOR CONCURRENCES

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Docket No. 50-247

Consolidated Edison Company
of New York, Inc.
ATTN: Mr. William J. Cahill, Jr.
Vice President
4 Irving Place
New York, New York 10003

Gentlemen:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. to Facility Operating License No. DPR-26 for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2. This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application transmitted by letter dated November 2, 1977.

The amendment changes the Technical Specifications to delete requirements for part length control rods. Changes, as discussed with your staff, have been made to your proposal to meet Regulatory requirements.

Copies of the Safety Evaluation and the Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. to DPR-26
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice

cc w/enclosures:
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subject to changes in letter & FR notice as discussed with Pete Erickson

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Consolidated Edison Company
of New York, Inc.

cc: White Plains Public Library
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White Plains, New York 10601

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Natural Resources Defense Council
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New York, New York 10017

Director, Technical Development
Programs
State of New York Energy Office
Agency Building 2
Empire State Plaza
Albany, New York 12223

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-247

INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 38
License No. DPR-26

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (the licensee) sworn to November 2, 1977, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR- 26 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 38, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 6, 1978

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 38

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-26

DOCKET NO. 50-247

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages	Insert Pages
2.1-3	2.1-3
3.10-4 - 3.10-7	3.10-4 - 3.10-7
3.10-10 - 3.10-12	3.10-10 - 3.10-12
5.3-1 & 5.3-2	5.3-1 & 5.3-2
Remove Table	**Insert Table**
4.1-3	4.1-3

Changes on the revised pages are shown by marginal lines. Page 5.3-1 is unchanged and is included for convenience only.

Rod withdrawal block and load runback occurs if reactor trip setpoints are approached within a fixed limit.

The Reactor Control and Protection System is designed to prevent any anticipated combination of transient conditions that would result in a DNBR of less than 1.30.[4]

The ranges on reactor coolant system temperature, pressure and loop coolant flow during steady-state, four-loop, power operation are specified to assure that the values assumed in the accident analyses are not exceeded during normal plant operation.

Compliance with the specified ranges on reactor coolant system temperature and pressurizer pressure is demonstrated by verifying that the parameters are within their applicable ranges at least once each 12 hours.

Compliance with the specified range on Reactor Coolant System total flow rate is demonstrated by verifying the parameter is within it's range after each refueling cycle.

References

[1]FSAR Section 3.2.2

[2]FSAR Section 3.2.1

[3]FSAR Technical Specification 3.10

[4]FSAR Section 14.1.1

3.10.2.8 Alarms are provided to indicate non-conformance with the flux difference requirements of 3.10.2.5.1 and the flux difference-time requirements of 3.10.2.6.1. If the alarms are temporarily out of service, conformance with the applicable limit shall be demonstrated by logging the flux difference at hourly intervals for the first 24 hours and half-hourly thereafter.

3.10.2.9 If the core is operating above 75% power with one excore nuclear channel out of service, then core quadrant power balance shall be determined once a day using movable incore detectors (at least two thimbles per quadrant).

3.10.3 Quadrant Power Tilt Limits

3.10.3.1 Whenever the indicated quadrant power tilt ratio exceeds 1.02, except for physics tests, within two hours the tilt condition shall be eliminated or the following actions shall be taken:

a) Restrict core power level and reset the power range high flux setpoint two percent of rated values for every percent of indicated power tilt ratio exceeding 1.0, and

b) If the tilt condition is not eliminated after 24 hours, the power range nuclear instrumentation setpoint shall be reset to 55% of allowed power. Subsequent reactor operation is permitted up to 50% for the purpose of measurement, testing and corrective action.

3.10.3.2 Except for physics tests, if the indicated quadrant power tilt ratio exceeds 1.09 and there is simultaneous indication of a misaligned control rod, restrict core power level two percent of rated value for every percent of indicated power tilt ratio exceeding 1.0 and realign the rod within two hours. If the rod is not realigned within two hours

or if there is no simultaneous indication of a misaligned control rod, the reactor shall be brought to the hot shutdown condition within 4 hours. If the reactor is shut down, subsequent testing up to 50% of rated power shall be permitted to determine the cause of the tilt.

3.10.3.3 The rod position indicators shall be monitored and logged once each shift to verify rod position within each bank assignment.

3.10.3.4 The tilt deviation alarm shall be set to annunciate whenever the excore tilt ratio exceeds 1.02 except as modified in specification 3.10.10.

3.10.4 Rod Insertion Limits

3.10.4.1 The shutdown rods shall be fully withdrawn when the reactor is critical or approaching criticality (i.e., the reactor is no longer subcritical by an amount equal to or greater than the shutdown margin in Figure 3.10-1).

3.10.4.2 When the reactor is critical, the control banks shall be limited in physical insertion to the insertion limits shown in Figure 3.10-3 or Figure 3.10-4.

3.10.4.3 Control bank insertion shall be further restricted if:

a. The measured control rod worth of all rods, less the worth of the most reactive rod (worst case stuck rod), is less than the reactivity required to provide the design value of available shutdown,
b. A rod is inoperable (Specification 3.10.7).

3.10.4.4 Insertion limits do not apply during physics tests or during periodic exercise of individual rods. However, the shutdown margin indicated in Figure 3.10-1 must be maintained except for the low power physics test to measure control rod worth and shutdown margin. For this test the reactor may be critical with all but one control rod inserted.

3.10.5 Rod Misalignment Limitations

3.10.5.1 If a control rod is misaligned from its bank demand position by more than 13 steps, then realign the rod or determine the core peaking factors within 2 hours and apply Specification 3.10.2.

3.10.5.2 If the restrictions of Specification 3.10.3 are determined not to apply and the core peaking factors have not been determined within two hours and the rod remains misaligned, the high reactor flux setpoint shall be reduced to 85% of its rated value.

3.10.5.3 If the misaligned control rod is not realigned within 8 hours, the rod shall be declared inoperable.

3.10.6 Inoperable Rod Position Indicator Channels

3.10.6.1 If a rod position indicator channel is out of service then:

a. For operation between 50 percent and 100 percent of rating, the position of the control rod shall be checked indirectly by core instrumentation (excore detectors and/or movable incore detectors) every shift, or subsequent to rod motion exceeding 24 steps, whichever occurs first.
b. During operation below 50 percent of rating, no special monitoring is required.

3.10.6.2 Not more than one rod position indicator channel per group nor two rod position indicator channels per bank shall be permitted to be inoperable at any time.

3.10.6.3 If a control rod having a rod position indicator channel out of service, is found to be misaligned from 3.10.6.1a, above, then Specification 3.10.5 will be applied.

3.10.7 Inoperable Rod Limitations

3.10.7.1 An inoperable rod is a rod which does not trip or which is declared inoperable under Specification 3.10.5 or fails to meet the requirements of 3.10.8.

3.10.7.2 Not more than one inoperable control rod shall be allowed any time the reactor is critical except during physics tests requiring intentional rod misalignment. Otherwise, the plant shall be brought to the hot shutdown condition.

3.10.7.3 If any rod has been declared inoperable, then the potential ejected rod worth and associated transient power distribution peaking factors shall be determined by analysis within 30 days. The analysis shall include due allowance for non-uniform fuel depletion in the neighborhood of the inoperable rod. If the analysis results in a more limiting hypothetical transient than the cases reported in the safety analysis, the plant power level shall be reduced to an analytically determined part power level which is consistent with the safety analysis.

3.10.8 Rod Drop Time

At operating temperature and full flow, the drop time of each control rod shall be no greater than 1.8 seconds from loss of stationary gripper coil voltage to dashpot entry.

3.10.9 Rod Position Monitor

If the rod position deviation monitor is inoperable, individual rod positions shall be logged once per shift and after a load change greater than 10 percent of rated power.

3.10.10 Quadrant Power Tilt Monitor

If one or both of the quadrant power tilt monitors is inoperable, individual upper and lower excore detector calibrated outputs shall

Measurements of the hot channel factors are required as part of startup physics tests, at least each effective full power month of operation, and whenever abnormal power distribution conditions require a reduction of core power to a level based on measured hot channel factors. The incore map taken following initial loading provides confirmation of the basic nuclear design basis including proper fuel loading patterns. The periodic monthly incore mapping provides additional assurance that the nuclear design basis remain inviolate and identify operational anomolies which would, otherwise, affect these bases.

For normal operation, it is not necessary to measure these quantities. Instead it has been determined that, provided certain conditions are observed, the hot channel factor limits will be met; these conditions are as follows:

1. Control rods in a single bank move together with no individual rod insertion differing by more than 15 inches from the bank demand position. An indicated misalignment limit of 13 steps precludes a rod misalignment no greater than 15 inches with consideration maximum instrumentation error.
2. Control Rod banks are sequenced with overlapping banks as described in Technical Specification 3.10.4.
3. The control rod bank insertion limits are not violated.
4. Axial power distribution control procedures, which are given in terms of flux difference control and control bank insertion limits are observed. Flux difference refers to the difference in signals between the top and bottom halves of two-section excore neutron detectors. The flux difference is a measure of the axial offset which is defined as the difference in normalized power between the top and bottom halves of the core.

The permitted relaxation in $F^N_{\Delta H}$ allows radial power shape changes with rod insertion to the insertion limits. It has been determined that provided the above conditions 1 through 4 are observed, these hot channel factors limits are met. In Specification 3.10.2, F_Q is arbitrarily limited for $P \leq 0.5$ (except for low power physics tests).

The procedures for axial power distribution control referred to above are designed to minimize the effects of xenon redistribution on the axial power distribution during load-follow maneuvers. Basically, control of flux difference is required

to limit the difference between the current value of Flux Difference (ΔI) and a reference value which corresponds to the full power equilibrium value of Axial Offset (Axial Offset = ΔI/fractional power). The reference value of flux difference varies with power level and burnup but expressed as axial offset it varies only with burnup.

The technical specifications on power distribution control assure that F_Q upper bound envelope of 2.32 times Figure 3.10-2 is not exceeded and xenon distributions are not developed which at a later time, would cause greater local power peaking even though the flux difference is then within the limits specified by the procedure.

The target (or reference) value of flux difference is determined as follows. At any time that equilibrium xenon conditions have been established, the indicated flux difference is noted with the control rod bank more than 190 steps withdrawn (i.e. normal full power operating position appropriate for the time in life, usually withdrawn farther as burnup proceeds). This value, divided by the fraction of full power at which the core was operating is the full power value of the target flux difference. Values for all other core power levels are obtained by multiplying the full power value by the fractional power. Since the indicated equilibrium value was noted, no allowances for excore detector error are necessary and indicated deviation of ±5 percent ΔI are permitted from the indicated reference value. During periods where extensive load following is required, it may be impractical to establish the required core conditions for measuring the target flux difference every month. For this reason, the specification provides two methods for updating the target flux difference. Figure 3.10-5 shows a typical construction of the target flux difference band at BOL and Figure 3.10-6 shows the typical variation of the full power value with burnup.

Strict control of the flux difference (and rod position) is not as necessary during part power operation. This is because xenon distribution control at part power is not as significant as the control at full power and allowance has been made in predicting the heat flux peaking factors for less strict control at part power. Strict control of the flux difference is not possible during certain physics tests or during required, periodic, excore calibrations which require larger flux

differences than permitted. Therefore, the specifications on power distribution control are not applied during physics tests or excore calibrations; this is acceptable due to the low probability of a significant accident occurring during these operations.

In some instances of rapid plant power reduction, automatic rod motion will cause the flux difference to deviate from the target bank when the reduced power level is reached. This does not necessarily affect the xenon distribution sufficiently to change the envelope of peaking factors which can be reached on a subsequent return to full power within the target bank, however to simplify the specification, a limitation of one hour in any period of 24 hours is placed on operation outside the band. This ensures that the resulting xenon distributions are not significantly different from those resulting from operation within the target band. The instantaneous consequences of being outside the band, provided rod insertion limits are observed, is not worse than a 10 percent increment in peaking factor for flux difference in the range +14 to -14 percent (+11 percent to -11 percent indicated) increasing by ± 1 percent for each 2 percent decrease in rated power. Therefore, while the deviation exists the power level is limited to 90 percent or lower depending on the indicated flux difference.

If, for any reason, flux difference is not controlled within the ±5 percent band for as long a period as one hour, then xenon distributions may be significantly changed and operation at 50 percent is required to protect against potentially more severe consequences of some accidents.

As discussed above, the essence of the procedure is to maintain the xenon distribution in the core as close to the equilibrium full power condition as possible. This is accomplished by using the boron system to position the control rods to produce the required indicated flux difference.

For Condition II events the core is protected from overpower and a minimum DNBR of 1.30 by an automatic protection system. Compliance with operating procedures is assumed as a precondition for condition II transients, however, operator error and equipment malfunctions are separately assumed to lead to the cause of the transients considered.

5.3 REACTOR

Applicability

Applies to the reactor core, reactor coolant system, and emergency core cooling systems.

Objective

To define those design features which are essential in providing for safe system operations.

A. Reactor Core

1. The reactor core contains approximately 87 metric tons of uranium in the form of slightly enriched uranium dioxide pellets. The pellets are encapsulated in Zircaloy-4 tubing to form fuel rods. The reactor core is made up of 193 fuel assemblies. Each fuel assembly contains 204 fuel rods.[1]

2. The average enrichment of the initial core is a nominal 2.8 weight per cent of U-235. Three fuel enrichments are used in the initial core. The highest enrichment is a nominal 3.3 weight per cent of U-235.[2]

3. Reload fuel will be similar in design to the initial core. The enrichment of reload fuel will be no more than 3.4 weight per cent of U-235.

4. Burnable poison rods are incorporated in the initial core. There are 1412 poison rods in the form of 7,8,9,12,16 and 20-rod clusters, which are located in vacant rod cluster control guide tubes.[3] The burnable poison rods consist of borated pyrex glass clad with stainless steel.[4]

5. There are 53 control rods in the reactor core. The control rods contain 142 inch lengths of silver-indium-cadmium alloy clad with the stainless steel.[5]

B. Reactor Coolant System

1. The design of the reactor coolant system complies with the code requirements.[6]

2. All piping, components and supporting structures of the reactor coolant system are designed to Class I requirements, and have been designed to withstand the maximum potential seismic ground acceleration, 0.15g, acting in the horizontal and 0.10g acting in the vertical planes simultaneously with no loss of function.

3. The total liquid volume of the reactor coolant system, at rated operating conditions, is 11,350 cubic feet.

References

(1) FSAR Section 3.2.2 & Sec. 3 of Fuel Densification Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station Unit No. 2, Dated January, 1973

(2) FSAR Section 3.2.1 & Sec. 3 of Fuel Densification Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station Unit No. 2, Dated January, 1973

(3) FSAR Section 3.2.1 & Figure 3.3 of Fuel Densification Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station Unit No. 2, Dated January, 1973

(4) FSAR Section 3.2.3

(5) FSAR Sections 3.2.1 & 3.2.3

(6) FSAR Table 4.1-9

TABLE 4.1-3

FREQUENCIES FOR EQUIPMENT TESTS

	Check	Frequency	Maximum Time Between Tests
1. Control Rods	Rod drop times of all control rods	Each refueling shutdown	18 months**
2. Control Rods	Partial movement of all control rods	Every 2 weeks during reactor critical operations	20 days
3. Pressurizer Safety Valves	Set point	Each refueling shutdown	18 months**
4. Main Steam Safety Valves	Set point	Each refueling shutdown	18 months**
5. Containment Isolation System	Automatic Actuation	Each refueling shutdown	18 months**
6. Refueling System Interlocks	Functioning	Prior to each refueling shutdown	NA*
7. Primary System Leakage	Evaluate	5 days/week	NA*
8. Diesel Fuel Supply	Fuel Inventory	Weekly	10 days
9. Turbine Steam Stop, Control Valves	Closure	Monthly	45 days
10. Cable Tunnel Ventilation Fans	Functioning	Monthly	45 days
11. Control Room and Fuel Handling Building Filtration System	Charcoal Filter Pressure Drop Test < 5 inches of water visual inspection Freon - 112 (or equivalent) test ≥ 99.5% at ambient conditions	Prior to each refueling outage***	18 months**

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 38 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-26

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC.

INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO. 50-247

Introduction

By letter dated November 2, 1977, Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (Con Edison) proposed an amendment to delete Technical Specification requirements for part length control rods.

Discussion and Evaluation

Part length control rods were initially installed to suppress xenon induced power oscillations in the axial direction, should such oscillations occur. They were also intended for use in axial offset calibration tests or low power physics tests.

The Technical Specifications as now written require that the part length control rods be withdrawn and excluded from the core except for axial offset calibration or low power physics tests. That restriction provided assurance that the axial power shape conditions, used as a basis for Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) analysis, were met. That restriction also prevented the use of part length rods for xenon control. In addition, Con Edison has determined that the part length rods are no longer needed for axial offset calibrations or for low power physics tests and want to remove them from the reactor. The part length rods remain withdrawn at all times now during reactor operations and are not needed or used for reactor shutdown. This removal, therefore, will not cause any change in reactivity characteristics at full power, low power or shutdown. Their removal will, in addition, eliminate the potential for part length rods dropping into the core during operation which could cause abnormal flux distribution and/or reactor shutdown. Therefore, reactor safety is improved by the part length rod removal.

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Environmental Consideration

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) that an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: March 6, 1978

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. 50-247

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC.

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 38 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-26, issued to Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (the licensee), which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 (the facility) located in Buchanan, Westchester County, New York. The amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

The amendment deletes requirements in the Technical Specifications for part length control rods on the basis that they are not needed for reactor operation and their drop into the core could cause abnormal flux distribution and/or reactor shutdown.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Prior public notice of this amendment was not required since the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

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The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment transmitted by letter dated November 2, 1977, (2) Amendment No. 38 to License No. DPR-26, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. and at the White Plains Public Library, 100 Martine Avenue, White Plains, New York. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Operating Reactors.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 6th day of March 1978.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

A. Schwencer

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors