

DCS MS-016

JAN 18 1983

Pocket No. 50-318

Mr. A. E. Lundvall, Jr.
Vice President - Supply
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P.O. Box 1475
Baltimore, Maryland 21203

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Dear Mr. Lundvall:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 62 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-69 for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 2. This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated November 5, 1982, as supplemented by your letter dated November 17, 1982.

The amendment revises the Technical Specifications to provide Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements which reflect the operability of a recently installed third train of the auxiliary feedwater system.

Copies of our Safety Evaluation and the Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

David H. Jaffe, Project Manager
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 62 to DPR-69
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice of Issuance

cc w/enclosures:

See nest page

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OFFICE	ORB#3 DL	ORB#3 DL	ORB#3 DL	AD OR BL	OELD		
SURNAME	PMKreutzer	DJaffe	RAClark	GCLainas			
DATE	1/6/83	1/10/83	1/7/83	1/18/83	1/7/83		



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

DISTRIBUTION
Docket File
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Docket No. 50-318

Docketing and Service Section
Office of the Secretary of the Commission

SUBJECT: BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear
Power Plant, Unit No. 2

Two signed originals of the Federal Register Notice identified below are enclosed for your transmittal to the Office of the Federal Register for publication. Additional conformed copies (12) of the Notice are enclosed for your use.

- Notice of Receipt of Application for Construction Permit(s) and Operating License(s).
- Notice of Receipt of Partial Application for Construction Permit(s) and Facility License(s): Time for Submission of Views on Antitrust Matters.
- Notice of Availability of Applicant's Environmental Report.
- Notice of Proposed Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License.
- Notice of Receipt of Application for Facility License(s); Notice of Availability of Applicant's Environmental Report; and Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Facility License(s) and Notice of Opportunity for Hearing.
- Notice of Availability of NRC Draft/Final Environmental Statement.
- Notice of Limited Work Authorization.
- Notice of Availability of Safety Evaluation Report.
- Notice of Issuance of Construction Permit(s).
- Notice of Issuance of Facility Operating License(s) or Amendment(s).

Other: Amendment No. 62.
Referenced documents have been provided PDR.

Division of Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:
As Stated

OFFICE →	ORB#3:DL					
SURNAME →	PMKreutzer/pn					
DATE →	1/18/83					

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company

cc:

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Prince Frederick, MD 20768

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Region III Office
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-318

CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 62
License No. DPR-69

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Baltimore Gas & Electric Company (the licensee) dated November 5, 1982, as supplemented November 17, 1982, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.2 of Facility Operating License No. DPR-69 is hereby amended to read as follows:

- 2 Technical Specifications

- The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 62, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Gus C. Lainas, Assistant Director
for Operating Reactors
Division of Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the
Technical Specifications.

Date of Issuance: January 18, 1982

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 62

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-69

DOCKET NO. 50-318

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contains vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

Pages

3/4 7-5
3/4 7-5a
3/4 7-5b (deleted)
3/4 7-6 (overleaf to 3/4 7-5b)
B 3/4 7-2

PLANT SYSTEMS

CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.3 The No. 12 condensate storage tank (CST) shall be OPERABLE with a minimum contained water volume of 150,000 gallons per unit.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With the No. 12 condensate storage tank inoperable, within 4 hours either:

- a. Restore the CST to OPERABLE status or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours, or
- b. Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the No. 21 condensate storage tank as a backup supply to the auxiliary feedwater pumps and restore the No. 12 condensate storage tank to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.3.1 The No. 12 condensate storage tank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 12 hours by verifying the contained water volume is within its limits when the tank is the supply source for the auxiliary feedwater pumps.

4.7.1.3.2 The No. 21 condensate storage tank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 12 hours by verifying that the tank contains a minimum of 150,000 gallons of water and by verifying that the flow path for taking suction from this tank is OPERABLE with the manual valves in this flow path open whenever the No. 21 condensate storage tank is the supply source for the auxiliary feedwater pumps.

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 62

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-69

DOCKET NO. 50-318

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contains vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

Pages

3/4 7-5

3/4 7-5a

3/4 7-5b (deleted)

3/4 7-6 (overleaf to 3/4 7-5b)

B 3/4 7-2

PLANT SYSTEMS

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.2 Two auxiliary feedwater trains consisting of one steam driven and one motor driven pump and associated flow paths capable of automatically initiating flow shall be OPERABLE.* (An OPERABLE steam driven train shall consist of one pump aligned for automatic flow initiation and one pump aligned in standby.)**

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With one motor driven pump inoperable:
 1. Restore the inoperable motor driven pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- b. With one steam driven pump inoperable:
 1. Align the OPERABLE steam driven pump to automatic initiating status within 72 hours or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours, and
 2. Restore the inoperable steam driven pump to standby status (or automatic initiating status if the other steam driven pump is to be placed in standby) within the next 30 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- c. Whenever a subsystem (consisting of one pump, piping, valves and controls in the direct flow path) required for operability is inoperable for the performance of periodic testing (e.g. manual discharge valve closed for pump Total Dynamic Head test) a dedicated operator will be stationed at the local station with direct communication to the Control Room. Upon completion of any testing, the subsystem required for operability will be returned to its proper status and verified in its proper status by an independent operator check.
- d. The requirements of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable whenever any combination of two (motor or steam driven) pumps are aligned for automatic flow initiation.

* For a period of up to 30 days following the entering into Mode 2 from Cycle 5 startup, at power levels not to exceed 55% of rated thermal power, the auxiliary feedwater system may be inoperable except with regard to the capability for manually initiating and manually controlling flow to either steam generator with the two steam driven auxiliary feedwater trains.

** A standby pump shall be available for operation but aligned so that automatic flow initiation is defeated upon AFAS actuation.

PLANT SYSTEMS

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.2 Each auxiliary feedwater flowpath shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by:
 1. Verifying that each steam driven pump develops a Total Dynamic Head of ≥ 2800 ft. on recirculation flow. (If verification must be demonstrated during startup, surveillance testing shall be performed upon achieving an RCS temperature $\geq 300^{\circ}\text{F}$ and prior to entering MODE 1).
 2. Verifying that the motor driven pump develops a Total Dynamic Head of ≥ 3100 ft. on recirculation flow.
 3. Cycling each testable, remote operated valve that is not in its operating position through at least one complete cycle.
 4. Verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the direct flow path is in its correct position. The AFW flow control valves may be verified by observing a 160 gpm setpoint on the flow indicator controller in Control Room.
- b. Before entering MODE 3 after a COLD SHUTDOWN of at least 14 days by completing a flow test that verifies the flow path from the condensate storage tank to the steam generators.
- c. At least once per 18 months by verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position and each auxiliary feedwater pump automatically starts and delivers a modulated flow of $160 \text{ gpm} \pm 10 \text{ GPM}$ to each flow leg upon receipt of each auxiliary feedwater actuation system (AFAS) test signal.

3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE

3/4.7.1.1 SAFETY VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the main steam line code safety valves ensures that the secondary system pressure will be limited to within its design pressure of 1000 psig during the most severe anticipated system operational transient. The maximum relieving capacity is associated with a turbine trip from 100% RATED THERMAL POWER coincident with an assumed loss of condenser heat sink (i.e., no steam bypass to the condenser).

The specified valve lift settings and relieving capacities are in accordance with the requirements of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code, 1971 Edition. The total relieving capacity for all valves on all of the steam lines is 12.18×10^6 lbs/hr which is 108 percent of the total secondary steam flow of 11.23×10^6 lbs/hr at 100% RATED THERMAL POWER. A minimum of 2 OPERABLE safety valves per steam generator ensures that sufficient relieving capacity is available for removing decay heat.

STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION is allowable with safety valves inoperable within the limitations of the ACTION requirements on the basis of the reduction in secondary system steam flow and THERMAL POWER required by the reduced reactor trip settings of the Power Level-High channels. The reactor trip setpoint reductions are derived on the following bases:

For two loop operation

$$SP = \frac{(X) - (Y)(V)}{X} \times 106.5$$

For single loop operation (two reactor coolant pumps operating in the same loop)

$$SP = \frac{(X) - (Y)(U)}{X} \times 46.8$$

where:

SP = reduced reactor trip setpoint in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER

V = maximum number of inoperable safety valves per steam line

PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

- U = maximum number of inoperable safety valves per operating steam line
- 106.5 = Power Level-High Trip Setpoint for two loop operation
- 46.8 = Power Level-High Trip Setpoint for single loop operation with two reactor coolant pumps operating in the same loop
- X = Total relieving capacity of all safety valves per steam line in lbs/hour
- Y = Maximum relieving capacity of any one safety valve in lbs/hour

3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the auxiliary feedwater system ensures that the Reactor Coolant System can be cooled down to less than 300°F from normal operating conditions in the event of a total loss of offsite power. A capacity of 400 gpm is sufficient to ensure that adequate feedwater flow is available to remove decay heat and reduce the Reactor Coolant System temperature to less than 300°F when the shutdown cooling system may be placed into operation.

Flow control valves, installed in each leg supplying the steam generators, maintain a nominal flow setpoint of 160 gpm plus or minus 10 gpm for operator setting band. The nominal flow setpoint of 160 gpm incorporates a total instrument loop error band of plus 47 gpm (217 gpm total flow per leg) and minus 60 gpm (90 gpm total flow per leg).

In the spectrum of events analyzed in which automatic initiation of auxiliary feedwater occurs the nominal setting of 160 gpm allows a minimum of 10 minutes before operator action is required. At 10 minutes after automatic initiation of flow the operator is assumed to be available to increase or decrease auxiliary feedwater flow to that required for existing plant conditions.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 62 TO

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-69

BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO. 50-318

Introduction

By application dated November 5, 1982, as supplemented by letter dated November 17, 1982, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BG&E) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Calvert Cliffs Unit 2. The proposed changes to the TS would provide Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) and Surveillance Requirements (SR) which reflect the operability of a recently installed third train of the auxiliary feedwater system.

Discussion

BG&E has implemented a number of changes to the Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 and Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater systems in response to the NRC's TMI Action Items (NUREG-0737). Among the most significant of such changes involves the addition of a third train, to the auxiliary feedwater systems, which is provided with a motor driven pump rated at 450 gpm. The original two trains of auxiliary feedwater are provided with steam-driven turbine pumps each rated at 700 gpm. Upon reaching a low steam generator level setpoint, the auxiliary feedwater actuation system (AFAS) will automatically initiate auxiliary feedwater using one steam turbine powered and one motor powered, auxiliary feedwater pump.* The instrumentation and control features of this system were reviewed and approved by our letter dated June 21, 1982.

As a result of recent progress on the auxiliary feedwater modifications during the Fall 1982, Unit 2 refueling outage, these modifications to the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system are now complete. Accordingly, BG&E has evaluated the safety significance of operating Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 with the modified auxiliary feedwater system. In addition, BG&E has proposed a revised LCO and SR which requires demonstrated operability of the motor driven auxiliary feedwater train.

*The second steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump would be prevented from automatically supplying auxiliary feedwater.

Evaluation

The November 17, 1982 letter from BG&E addressed the three Design Basis Events (DBEs) which are affected by the automatic actuation of the modified auxiliary feedwater system.

The three DBEs - loss of feedwater, feed line break, and steam line break - were analyzed with and without loss of AC power (LOAC) on turbine trip to ensure that relevant acceptance criteria continue to be met in light of the new AFAS logic.

A spectrum of feedwater and steam line break sizes were analyzed. The worst break size was 0.275 ft² for the feedline break, 6.305 ft² for steam line break inside containment and 0.33 ft² for steam line break outside containment with LOAC on turbine trip. The 0.275 ft² feed line break downstream of the check valve with LOAC on turbine trip resulted in the highest reactor coolant system peak pressure but did not exceed the pressure limit of 2750 psia. The 6.305 ft² steam line break inside containment resulted in the maximum post trip return to power and minimum DNBR. However, the DNBR still was above the design limit of 1.23. The 0.33 ft² steam line break outside containment resulted in the maximum number of predicted fuel pin failures where 2% of fuel pins experienced DNB. However, the resulting site boundary dose was well within the 10 CFR 100 guidelines. The result of the loss of feedwater flow event with and without loss of AC following reactor trip showed that the peak pressure did not exceed the upper limit of 2750 psia and that an adequate heat sink was maintained during the event.

Based upon the above, we conclude that the consequences of the DBEs, in terms of an acceptable level of fuel failure and primary system integrity, are acceptable for automatic initiation of the modified auxiliary feedwater system.

Technical Specification

The Bases for TS 3/4 7.1.2, "Auxiliary Feedwater System", has been changed as a result of the modifications to the auxiliary feedwater system. The existing TS 3/4 7.1.2 is based upon two steam driven auxiliary feedwater pumps which are automatically started with flow controlling valves (1/2-CV-4512) preset to supply between 100 and 130 gpm. This configuration allows up to 20 minutes for the reactor operator to terminate auxiliary feedwater flow in the event of an overcooling transient*, or

*Continued auxiliary feedwater flow, if unnecessary, could result in an overcooling transient which might cause an emergency core cooling actuation.

to increase auxiliary feedwater flow to maintain an adequate heat sink. The revised TS 3/4 7.1.2 is based upon automatic actuation of one steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump and the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump with the AFAS providing a modulated flow of 160 gpm (+ 10 gpm). This increased flow, and other factors associated with the AFAS design, allows the operator up to 10 minutes to take action to increase, or isolate, auxiliary feedwater flow. These changes are reflected in the revised Bases for TS 3/4 7.1.2.

The proposed TS 3.7.1.2 is consistent with the Bases in that the LCO requires that one steam driven and one motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump be operable and available to start and provide flow upon initiation of the AFAS (automatic initiation mode). In addition, the LCO requires that the second steam driven pump be operable in its standby mode. A footnote explains that "standby" requires that the pump be operable; however, automatic starting of the pump is defeated upon AFAS actuation. The above LCO provides a reliable auxiliary feedwater source of 160 gpm (+ 10 gpm). As indicated in Bases 3/4 7.1.2, "A [auxiliary feedwater] capacity of 400 gpm is sufficient to ensure that adequate feedwater flow is available to remove decay heat and reduce the Reactor Coolant System temperature to less than 300°F when the shutdown cooling system may be placed in operation." The required flow rate of 400 gpm can be accommodated by the motor driven feedwater pump, alone. The LCO is within the bounds of the safety analysis and is therefore acceptable.

The remedial actions to be taken, should the requirements of TS 3.7.1.2 not be met, have been modified to reflect the addition of the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump. At the present time, TS 3.7.1.2 requires that an inoperable steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump be returned to service within 72 hours or the plant shall be placed in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours. The proposed remedial action for the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump is the same as was previously required for the inoperability of a steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The proposed remedial action for a single inoperable steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump is to:

- (1) align the operable steam driven pump to automatic initiating status within 72 hours or be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours, and
- (2) restore the inoperable steam driven pump to operable status within 30 days or be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours.

The above remedial requirements assure that, except for periods of up to 72 hours, at least two auxiliary feedwater trains are available to

provide automatic initiation of auxiliary feedwater. Thus, as indicated above, the auxiliary feedwater system can reliably perform its design function to deliver at least 400 gpm to maintain an adequate heat removal capability. In addition, since no additional safety concerns are associated with changing operational modes with an inoperable steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump, no prohibition on such mode changes is appropriate. Based upon the above, proposed TS 3.7.1.2 is acceptable.

The Surveillance Requirements of TS 4.7.1.2 have been proposed for modification to reflect changes to the auxiliary feedwater flow control. Prior to modification, auxiliary feedwater flow was controlled via preset flow control valves. These valves were the subject of surveillance to assure that their position would permit a flow of between 100 and 130 gpm. Specifically, TS 4.7.1.2.d required reverification of an auxiliary feedwater flow of between 100 and 130 gpm should the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves (1/2-CV-4511 and/or 1/2-CV-4512) be repositioned. Since these preset flow control valves have been replaced by air-operated modulating valves, this surveillance is no longer applicable. In place of TS 4.7.1.2.d, BG&E has proposed a requirement to perform a flow verification test (proposed TS 4.7.1.2.c) each 18 months which would assure that each auxiliary feedwater pump delivers a modulated flow of 160 gpm (+ 10 gpm) upon automatic initiation. In addition, BG&E has proposed a test of the dynamic head for the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump (proposed TS 4.7.1.2.a.2). This proposed test would be conducted every 31 days to assure a dynamic head of at least 3100 ft on recirculation flow. This test frequency is consistent with dynamic head test currently required for the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pumps.

Our review of the proposed TS 4.7.1.2 indicates that the modified surveillance requirements provide assurance that the auxiliary feedwater system will be maintained with sufficient capacity to meet the operability requirements of the LCO (TS 3.7.1.2). Accordingly, we find this TS to be acceptable.

Environmental Consideration

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: January 18, 1983

Principal Contributors:

D. H. Jaffe

A. Gill

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONDOCKET NO. 50-318BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANYNOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY
OPERATING LICENSE

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 62 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-69, issued to Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 2 located in Calvert County, Maryland. The amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

The amendment revises the Technical Specifications to provide Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements which reflect the operability of a recently installed, third train of the auxiliary feedwater system.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License in connection with this action was published in the FEDERAL REGISTER on December 14, 1982 (47 FR 56086). No request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene was filed following notice of proposed action.

- 2 -

The Commission has determined that the issuance of the amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of the amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated November 15, 1982, as supplemented November 17, 1982, (2) Amendment No. 62 to License No. DPR-69, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D.C. and at the Calvert County Library, Prince Frederick, Maryland. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Licensing.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 18th day of January, 1983.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Robert A. Clark, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Licensing