March 27, 1984 DCS-HS-016

Docket No. 50-318

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Mr. A. E. Lundvall, Jr.
Vice President - Supply
Baltimore Gas & Electric Company
P. O. Box 1475
Baltimore, Maryland 21203

Dear Mr. Lundvall:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 72 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-69 for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 2. This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in partial response to your application dated December 22, 1983 as supplemented by two letters dated January 27, 1984. The remaining requested items will be handled in a separate action.

This amendment changes the Technical Specifications to reflect revised limits on shutdown margin and moderator temperature coefficient to accommodate a new steam line break analysis.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. The notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's next monthly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

David H. Jaffe, Project Manager
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 72 to DPR-69
2. Safety Evaluation

cc: See next page

L. Kopp LDK 3/23/84
LEP 3/23/84
L. Rubenstein AD/CPS
3/23/84

ORB#3:DL	ORB#3:DL	ORB#3:DL	OELD	AD:OR:DL
PMKreutzer	DJaffe/pn	JRMiller	J.GRAY	GCLainas
3/19/84	3/19/84	3/19/84	3/21/84	3/22/84

with changes to SER adding MSLB analysis at Model + final check on requests for hearing on 3/26/84

also change in Notice

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Baltimore Gas and Electric Company

cc:
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-318

CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 72
License No. DPR-69

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Baltimore Gas & Electric Company (the licensee) dated December 22, 1983 as supplemented by two letters dated January 27, 1984, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.2 of Facility Operating License No. DPR-69 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   2. Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 72 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

James R. Miller, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 27, 1984

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 72

FACILTIY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-69

DOCKET NO. 50-318

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are provided to maintain document completeness.

Pages

3/4 1-1
3/4 1-5
B 3/4 1-1

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL

SHUTDOWN MARGIN - T_{avg} > 200°F

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be ≥ 4.3%* Δk/k.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2**, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN < 4.3%* Δk/k, immediately initiate and continue boration at ≥ 40 gpm of 2300 ppm boric acid solution or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be ≥ 4.3%* Δk/k:

a. Within one hour after detection of an inoperable CEA(s) and at least once per 12 hours thereafter while the CEA(s) is inoperable. If the inoperable CEA is immovable or untrippable, the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be increased by an amount at least equal to the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable CEA(s).

b. When in MODES 1 or 2#, at least once per 12 hours by verifying that CEA group withdrawal is within the Transient Insertion Limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

c. When in MODE 2##, within 4 hours prior to achieving reactor criticality by verifying that the predicted critical CEA position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

d. Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, by consideration of the factors of e below, with the CEA groups at the Transient Insertion Limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

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* Adherence to Technical Specification 3.1.3.6 as specified in Surveillance Requirements 4.1.1.1.1 assures that there is sufficient available shutdown margin to match the shutdown margin requirements of the safety analyses.

** See Special Test Exception 3.10.1.

\# With $K_{eff} \geq 1.0$.

With $K_{eff} < 1.0$.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

e. When in MODES 3 or 4, at least once per 24 hours by consideration of the following factors:

1. Reactor coolant system boron concentration,
2. CEA position,
3. Reactor coolant system average temperature,
4. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,
5. Xenon concentration, and
6. Samarium concentration.

4.1.1.1.2 The overall core reactivity balance shall be compared to predicted values to demonstrate agreement within ± 1.0% Δk/k at least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD). This comparison shall consider at least those factors stated in Specification 4.1.1.1.1.e, above. The predicted reactivity values shall be adjusted (normalized) to correspond to the actual core conditions prior to exceeding a fuel burnup of 60 Effective Full Power Days after each fuel loading.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

e. When in MODES 3 or 4, at least once per 24 hours by consideration of the following factors:

1. Reactor coolant system boron concentration,
2. CEA position,
3. Reactor coolant system average temperature,
4. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,
5. Xenon concentration, and
6. Samarium concentration.

4.1.1.1.2 The overall core reactivity balance shall be compared to predicted values to demonstrate agreement within $\pm$ 1.0% $\Delta k/k$ at least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD). This comparison shall consider at least those factors stated in Specification 4.1.1.1.1.e, above. The predicted reactivity values shall be adjusted (normalized) to correspond to the actual core conditions prior to exceeding a fuel burnup of 60 Effective Full Power Days after each fuel loading.

MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.1.4 The moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) shall be:

a. Less positive than 0.5×10^{-4} $\Delta k/k/°F$ whenever THERMAL POWER is $\leq$ 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER,

b. Less positive than 0.2×10^{-4} $\Delta k/k/°F$ whenever THERMAL POWER is > 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and

c. Less negative than -2.5×10^{-4} $\Delta k/k/°F$ at RATED THERMAL POWER.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2*#

ACTION:

With the moderator temperature coefficient outside any one of the above limits, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.1.4.1 The MTC shall be determined to be within its limits by confirmatory measurements. MTC measured values shall be extrapolated and/or compensated to permit direct comparison with the above limits.

*With $K_{eff} \geq 1.0$.

#See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.1.1.4.2 The MTC shall be determined at the following frequencies and THERMAL POWER conditions during each fuel cycle:

a. Prior to initial operation above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, after each fuel loading.

b. At any THERMAL POWER above 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER, within 7 EFPD after initially reaching an equilibrium condition at or above 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading.

c. At any THERMAL Power, within 7 EFPD after reaching a RATED THERMAL POWER equilibrium boron concentration of 300 ppm.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.1.1.4.2 The MTC shall be determined at the following frequencies and THERMAL POWER conditions during each fuel cycle:

a. Prior to initial operation above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, after each fuel loading.

b. At any THERMAL POWER above 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER, within 7 EFPD after initially reaching an equilibrium condition at or above 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading.

c. At any THERMAL Power, within 7 EFPD after reaching a RATED THERMAL POWER equilibrium boron concentration of 300 ppm.

3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL

3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.2 SHUTDOWN MARGIN

A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that 1) the reactor can be made subcritical from all operating conditions, 2) the reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and 3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently subcritical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout core life as a function of fuel depletion, RCS boron concentration and RCS T_{avg}. The minimum available SHUTDOWN MARGIN for no load operating conditions at beginning of life is 4.3% $\Delta k/k$ and at end of life is 4.3% $\Delta k/k$. The SHUTDOWN MARGIN is based on the safety analyses performed for a steam line rupture event initiated at no load conditions. The most restrictive steam line rupture event occurs at EOC conditions. For the steam line rupture event at beginning of cycle conditions, a minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN of less than 4.3% $\Delta k/k$ is required to control the reactivity transient, and end of cycle conditions require 4.3% $\Delta k/k$. Accordingly, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement is based upon this limiting condition and is consistent with FSAR safety analysis assumptions. With $T_{avg} \leq 200^{\circ}F$, the reactivity transients resulting from any postulated accident are minimal and a 3% $\Delta k/k$ shutdown margin provides adequate protection. With the pressurizer level less than 90 inches, the sources of non-borated water are restricted to increase the time to criticality during a boron dilution event.

3/4.1.1.3 BORON DILUTION

A minimum flow rate of at least 3000 GPM provides adequate mixing, prevents stratification and ensures that reactivity changes will be gradual during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. A flow rate of at least 3000 GPM will circulate an equivalent Reactor Coolant System volume of 9,601 cubic feet in approximately 24 minutes. The reactivity change rate associated with boron concentration reductions will therefore be within the capability of operator recognition and control.

3/4.1.1.4 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (MTC)

The limitations on MTC are provided to ensure that the assumptions used in the accident and transient analyses remain valid through each fuel cycle. The surveillance requirements for measurement of the MTC during each fuel cycle are adequate to confirm the MTC value since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup. The confirmation that the measured MTC value is within its limit provides assurances that the coefficient will be maintained within acceptable values throughout each fuel cycle.

3/4.1.1.5 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY

This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 515°F. This limitation is required to ensure 1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range, 2) the protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range, 3) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and 4) the reactor pressure vessel is above its minimum RT_{NDT} temperature.

3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS

The boron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The components required to perform this function include 1) borated water sources, 2) charging pumps, 3) separate flow paths, 4) boric acid pumps, 5) associated heat tracing systems, and 6) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators.

With the RCS average temperature above 200°F, a minimum of two separate and redundant boron injection systems are provided to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the systems inoperable. Allowable out-of-service periods ensure that minor component repair or corrective action may be completed without undue risk to overall facility safety from injection system failures during the repair period.

The boration capability of either system is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN from all operating conditions of 3.0% $\Delta k/k$ after xenon decay and cooldown to 200°F. The maximum boration capability requirement occurs at EOL from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires 6500 gallons of 7.25% boric acid solution from the boric acid tanks or 55,627 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water tank. However, to be consistent with the ECCS requirements, the RWT is required to have a minimum contained volume of 400,000 gallons during MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. The maximum boron concentration of the refueling water tank shall be limited to 2700 ppm and the maximum boron concentration of the boric acid storage tanks shall be limited to 8% to preclude the possibility of boron precipitation in the core during long term ECCS cooling.

With the RCS temperature below 200°F, one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity change in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.

3/4.1.1.5 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY

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3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS

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The boration capability of either system is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN from all operating conditions of 3.0% $\Delta k/k$ after xenon decay and cooldown to 200°F. The maximum boration capability requirement occurs at EOL from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires 6500 gallons of 7.25% boric acid solution from the boric acid tanks or 55,627 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water tank. However, to be consistent with the ECCS requirements, the RWT is required to have a minimum contained volume of 400,000 gallons during MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. The maximum boron concentration of the refueling water tank shall be limited to 2700 ppm and the maximum boron concentration of the boric acid storage tanks shall be limited to 8% to preclude the possibility of boron precipitation in the core during long term ECCS cooling.

With the RCS temperature below 200°F, one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity change in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 72

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-69

BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO. 50-318

Introduction

By application for license amendment dated December 22, 1983 Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BG&E) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Calvert Cliffs Unit 2. The application was supplemented by two letters dated January 27, 1984. The proposed amendment would change the TS to reflect revised limits on shutdown margin and moderator temperature coefficient to accommodate a new steam line break analysis.

Discussion and Evaluation

The proposed changes to the TS provide for: (1) revised shutdown margin limits, decreased from greater than or equal to 5.2% delta k/k to greater than or equal to 4.3% delta k/k per TS 3/4.1.1, "Shutdown Margin - T_{avg} greater than 200°F", and (2) a change to the moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) from -2.2×10^{-4} delta k/k/°F to -2.5×10^{-4} delta k/k/°F per TS 3/4.1.1.4, "Moderator Temperature Coefficient." The proposed TS changes for shutdown margin and MTC result from the introduction of a revised main steam line break (MSLB) analysis for Unit 2. The analysis was previously referenced for Unit 1 for Cycle 7 operation and was intended to be eventually submitted for Unit 2. In 48 FR 46665, the Commission proposed that Unit 1, Cycle 7 TS changes, including those resulting from the revised MSLB, involve no significant hazards consideration. The TS changes for Unit 1 Cycle 7 operation, including changes to the MTC and shutdown margin which are the same as presently proposed for Unit 2, were issued as Unit 1 Amendment 88 on November 17, 1983.

The steamline break (SLB) analysis is performed using conservatively enveloping initial conditions and assumptions such that the results will be applicable to a large number of future plant operating cycles. The effect of the safety grade Auxiliary Feed Actuation System (AFAS) is incorporated in the analysis. The analysis includes a spectrum of steamline break sizes both inside and outside the containment initiated from hot full power and hot zero power. The licensee has determined that the steamline break events initiated from the hot full power conditions are the most limiting and the analysis results in HFP steamline breaks are provided.

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For the inside containment steamline break event, the licensee's parametric study has determined that the largest-size steamline break from the hot full power condition with loss of AC power on turbine trip results in the maximum post trip return-to-power and minimum post trip transient DNBR. The inside containment SLB event is analyzed using the assumptions having the greatest positive reactivity insertion, i.e., (1) the moderator temperature coefficient and the fuel Doppler coefficient are the values corresponding to the end of life values; (2) the moderator density reactivity change is a function of moderator density calculated with the highest worth CEA stuck in the fully withdrawn position; (3) the Doppler multiplier and the delayed neutron fraction are the maximum absolute values for the end of life conditions; (4) the boron reactivity is a conservatively low value for safety injection flow from the safety injection pumps; and (5) the CEA worth available for shutdown is the minimum value. The analysis results for the 6.305 ft^2 SLB with loss of AC power on turbine trip initiated from HFP, shown in Table 7.3.2-4 of the submittal, indicates a peak return-to-power of 8.1%. Using the approved MacBeth critical heat flux correlation, the result shows that the DNBR limit of 1.30 is not violated during this limiting SLB event.

For the outside containment SLB, the analysis is performed with the initial conditions and assumptions which maximize the power excursion prior to reactor trip. The licensee has determined that a 0.65 ft^2 SLB outside containment with loss of AC power on turbine trip initiated from HFP results in the maximum power excursion and site boundary dose release. In general, the analysis is performed with assumptions of minimum negative reactivity insertion, i.e., (1) the Doppler coefficient is based on the beginning of life fuel temperature coefficient; (2) the Doppler multiplier is a conservatively low value to minimize Doppler feedback; (3) the delayed neutron fraction is the minimum value from the end of life; and (4) a range of moderator temperature coefficients is used to determine its effect on power range detector response during the SLB event. The results show that less than 1% of the fuel pins experience DNB. The licensee assumes a 2% fuel failure for the site boundary dose calculation and the result shows thyroid dose of 81 rem and the whole body dose of 0.3 rem, within the guidelines of 10 CFR 100.

The proposed changes to TS 3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.4 are consistent with the assumptions made in the MSLB analysis and assure that the MSLB analysis remains valid for operation of Calvert Cliffs Unit 2. Accordingly, we find the proposed changes to TS 3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.4 to be acceptable.

Environmental Consideration

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to

10 CFR §51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: March 27, 1984

Principal Contributor:
D. Jaffe