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November 27, 2000

SVP-00-182

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Quad Cities Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30
NRC Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265

Subject: Licensee Event Report Concerning Secondary Containment Breach Due to Open 1" Conduit

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) 254/00-008, "Secondary Containment Breach Due to Open 1" Conduit," Revision 00, for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.

This report is submitted in accordance with the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), which requires reporting of any operation or condition prohibited by the Plant's Technical Specifications.

No actions are being committed to in this report. Any actions described in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by Commonwealth Edison (ComEd) Company. They are described for the NRC's information and are not regulatory commitments.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. C.C. Peterson at (309) 654-2241, extension 3609.

Respectfully,

Joel P. Dimmette, Jr.
Site Vice President
Quad Cities Generating Station

cc: Regional Administrator – NRC Region III
NRC Senior Resident Inspector – Quad Cities Generating Station

IE22

NRC FORM 366 (6-1998)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 06/30/2001

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the information and Records Management Branch (t-6 f33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office Of Management And Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1	05000254	1 of 3

TITLE (4)
Secondary Containment Breach Due to Open 1" Conduit

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
									Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2	05000265
10	28	2000	2000	008	00	11	27	2000	FACILITY NAME: N/A	DOCKET NUMBER: 05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	5
POWER LEVEL (10)	000

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more) (11)

	20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)
	20.2203(a)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)
	20.2203(a)(2)(i))		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		73.71
	20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		OTHER
	20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
	20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Charles Peterson, Regulatory Assurance Manager	(309) 654-2241 ext 3609

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
	YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X	NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i. e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On October 20, 2000, an open line was found in the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) room with air flow into the HPCI room. This was determined to be a potential breach of secondary containment and the line was immediately capped to close the breach. After initial investigation the routing of the line could not be determined and on October 28, 2000, a breach of secondary containment was assumed to have occurred. A boroscope examination later confirmed that the conduit breached secondary containment.

Because the event is believed to have occurred prior to 1993, the root cause of this event could not be determined.

Throughout the time the condition is believed to have existed, secondary containment pressure tests were performed satisfactorily. Therefore, the safety significance of this event is minimal.

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor - 2511 MWt rated core thermal power
Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) Codes are identified in the text as [XX] and are obtained from IEEE Standard 805-1984, IEEE Recommended Practice for System Identification in Nuclear Power Plants and Related Facilities.

EVENT IDENTIFICATION:

Secondary Containment Breach Due to Open 1" Conduit

A. PLANT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit: 1 Event Date: October 28, 2000 Event Time: 1100 hours
Reactor Mode: 5 Mode Name: Refueling Power Level: 000

Reactor Coolant System Pressure: 000 psig
Reactor Coolant System Temperature: 98 degrees F.

Refueling (5) - Mode switch in the Shutdown or Refueling position with average reactor coolant temperature ≤ 140 degrees F and fuel in the reactor vessel with one or more vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed.

Unit: 2 Event Date: October 28, 2000 Event Time: 1100 hours
Reactor Mode: 1 Mode Name: Power Operation Power Level: 95%

Power Operation (1) - Mode switch in the RUN position with average reactor coolant temperature at any temperature.

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On October 20, 2000, an open line was found in the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) [BJ] room with air flow into the HPCI room. This was determined to be a potential breach of secondary containment [NH]. The line was immediately capped to close the breach.

After initial investigation the routing of the line could not be determined and on October 28, 2000, a breach of secondary containment was assumed to have occurred. A boroscope examination on November 9, 2000, determined that the 1" conduit [CND] penetrated the adjoining Unit 2 cable tunnel wall and terminated near a cable tray. The dimensions taken of the routing from the boroscope examination confirmed that the secondary containment had been breached. Secondary containment at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (QCNPS) is common to both Unit 1 and Unit 2.

This event is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) – any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications. QCNPS Technical Specification 3.7.N requires that secondary containment integrity be maintained.

C. CAUSE OF EVENT:

Because the event is believed to have occurred prior to 1993, the root cause of this event could not be determined. Design changes and other activities were reviewed and no activities were found associated with this conduit. It was determined likely that this conduit had been installed prior to 1993, and quite possibly during original construction.

Current processes in place to control design changes or maintenance activities were evaluated. The plant barrier control program is the primary station barrier against this type of event. This program controls breaches of barriers for any reason. In addition, design change procedures ensure requirements are met related to plant alterations on all structures, systems or components, including secondary containment. These barriers are adequate to prevent recurrence of this event.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS

During the time the condition is believed to have existed, secondary containment pressure tests were satisfactory. These tests are conducted with an additional 4" diameter opening to ensure adequate margins. Although this conduit appears to have been open for some time, it has not adversely impacted the ability to maintain the secondary containment integrity surveillance requirements.

Had steam entered the HPCI room from a blown rupture disk [RPD], some steam might have escaped to the cable tunnel through the conduit. Because of the small size of the conduit and the volume of the HPCI room, it is not likely that large amounts of steam would have entered the cable tunnel. The Licensee Event Report (LER) that was submitted in response to a 1993 event involving failure of the HPCI rupture disk did not indicate any damage or presence of steam in the cable tunnel after the rupture.

Therefore, the safety significance of the breach of secondary containment from the 1" conduit is minimal.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The conduit was capped.

F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:

LER 265/99002 concerns the discovery of an uncapped spare pipe going from the High Radiation Sample System basement to the reactor building. The investigation found that the line was part of a modification installed in 1981. The investigation reviewed the modification and the work package. It identified lack of proper work control as the root cause.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

There were no component failures associated with this event.