December 19, 1988

Docket No. 50-412

Mr. J. D. Sieber, Vice President
Nuclear Group
Duquesne Light Company
Post Office Box 4
Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077

Dear Mr. Sieber:

DISTRIBUTION
Docket File
NRC & Local PDRs
Gray File
SVarga
BBoger
SNorris
PTam
OGC
DHagan
EJordan
BGrimes
TMeek(4)
WJones
EButcher
ACRS(10)
GPA/PA
ARM/LFMB

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT (TAC NO. 69856)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 10 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-73 for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2, in response to your application dated October 24, 1988 and supplemented by letter dated November 3, 1988.

The amendment revises the schedules for a number of 18-month surveillances by permitting the performance of these surveillances to be postponed until the first refueling outage. The purpose of these extensions is to avert a reactor shutdown just for performing a surveillance. In support of this amendment you committed to perform these surveillances no later than April 1, 1989 regardless of the actual refueling shutdown schedule.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's bi-weekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Signed by

Peter S. Tam, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-4
Division of Reactor Projects I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

DFO1
1/1

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 10 to NPF-73
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

Concurrence page 1 of 3

[BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 2]

LA:PDI-4	PM:PDI-4	D:PDI-4	OGC
SNorris	PTam:cb PST	JStolz PTam for	
12/6/88	12/6/88	12/19/88	12/08/88

8812290069 881219
PDR ADOCK 05000412
P PNU

CP-1 cc

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cc w/enclosures:
See next page

Concurrence page 2 of 3

[BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 2]

LA:PDI-4	PM:PDI-4	D:PDI-4	OGC
SNorris	PTam:cb PST	JStolz	
12/6/88	12/6/88	/88	/88

BC:SICB
SNewberry
12/8/88

Docket No. 50-412

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Duquesne Light Company
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1. Amendment No. 10 to NPF-73
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

Concurrence page 3 of 3

[BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 2]

LA:PDI-4	PM:PDI-4	D:PDI-4	OGC
SNorris	PTam:cb PST	JStolz	
12/6/88	12/6/88	/88	/88

BC:SELB FR
FRosa
12/7/88

Mr. J. Sieber
Duquesne Light Company

cc:

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Beaver Valley Power Station
Units 1 & 2

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

OHIO EDISON COMPANY

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY

THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-412

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 10
License No. NPF-73

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Duquesne Light Company (the licensee) dated October 24, 1988, and supplemented by letter dated November 3, 1988 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-73 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 10, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto are hereby incorporated in the license. DLCo shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, to be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Peter S. Tam for

John F. Stolz, Director
Project Directorate I-4
Division of Reactor Projects I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 19, 1988

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 10

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-73

DOCKET NO. 50-412

Replace the following pages of Appendix A (Technical Specifications) with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove	Insert
3/4 3-1	3/4 3-1
3/4 3-13	3/4 3-13
3/4 3-15	3/4 3-15
3/4 3-37	3/4 3-37
3/4 3-38	3/4 3-38
3/4 3-48	3/4 3-48
3/4 6-13	3/4 6-13
3/4 6-16	3/4 6-16
3/4 8-3	3/4 8-3
3/4 8-10	3/4 8-10

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

3/4.3.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.1.1 As a minimum, the reactor trip system instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE with RESPONSE TIMES as shown in Table 3.3-2.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.

ACTION:

As shown in Table 3.3-1

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.1.1.1 Each reactor trip system instrumentation channel and interlock and automatic trip logic shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements* during the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1.

4.3.1.1.2 The logic for the interlocks shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the at power CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of channels affected by interlock operation. The total interlock function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by interlock operation.

4.3.1.1.3 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months**. Each test shall include at least one logic train such that both logic trains are tested at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1.

*For the automatic trip logic, the surveillance requirements shall be the application of various simulated input combinations in conjunction with each possible interlock logic state and verification of the required logic output including, as a minimum, a continuity check of output devices.

**The specified 18-month surveillance interval during the first fuel cycle may be extended to coincide with completion of the first refueling outage.

TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION

* - With the reactor trip system breakers closed and the control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal.

(1) - If not performed in previous 7 days.

(2) - Heat balance only, above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

(3) - Compare incore to excore axial imbalance above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER. Recalibrate if absolute difference $\geq$ 3 percent.

(4) - (Not used)

(5) - Each train tested every other month on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

(6) - Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

(7) - Below P-10.

(8) - Below P-6.

(9) - Required only when below Interlock Trip Setpoint.

(10) - The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip circuits for the Manual Reactor Trip Function. The test shall also verify the OPERABILITY of the Bypass Breaker trip circuit(s).

(11) - The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip attachments of the Reactor Trip Breakers.

(12) - Local manual shunt trip prior to placing breaker in service.

(13) - Automatic undervoltage trip. The specified surveillance interval during the first fuel cycle may be extended to coincide with completion of the first refueling outage.

3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.2.1.1 Each engineered safety feature actuation system instrumentation channel and interlock and the automatic actuation logic with master and slave relays shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the ESFAS Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements* during the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-2.

4.3.2.1.2 The logic for the interlocks shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the at power CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of channels affected by interlock operation. The total interlock function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by interlock operation.

4.3.2.1.3 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each ESF function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months.** Each test shall include at least one logic train such that both logic trains are tested at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once per N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ESF function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" Column of Table 3.3-3.

*For the automatic actuation logic, the surveillance requirements shall be the application of various simulated input conditions in conjunction with each possible interlock logic state and verification of the required logic output including, as a minimum, a continuity check of output devices. For the actuation relays, the surveillance requirements shall be the energization of each master and slave relay and verification of OPERABILITY of each relay. The test of master relays shall include a continuity check of each associated slave relay. The test of slave relays (to be performed at least once per 92 days in lieu of at least once per 31 days) shall include, as a minimum, a continuity check of associated actuation devices that are not testable.

**The specified 18-month surveillance interval during the first fuel cycle may be extended to coincide with completion of the first refueling outage.

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST	MODES IN WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED
7. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (continued)				
d. Safety Injection (Start Motor-Driven Pumps)	See 1 above (all SI surveillance requirements)			
e. Trip of Main Feedwater Pumps (Start Motor-Driven Pumps)	N.A.	N.A.	R	1, 2, 3
8. ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE INTERLOCKS				
a. Reactor Trip, P-4	N.A.	N.A.	R(3)	1, 2, 3
b. Pressurizer Pressure, P-11	N.A.	R	M	1, 2, 3
c. Low-Low T_{avg}, P-12	N.A.	R	M	1, 2, 3

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION

(1) Manual actuation switches shall be tested at least once per 18 months during shutdown. This 18-month surveillance interval during the first fuel cycle may be extended to coincide with completion of the first refueling outage for Containment Spray, Safety Injection and Feedwater Isolation and Phase B Isolation manual actuation switches. All other circuitry associated with manual safeguards actuation shall receive a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days.

(2) Each train or logic channel shall be tested at least every other 31 days.

(3) The specified surveillance interval during the first fuel cycle may be extended to coincide with completion of the first refueling outage.

TABLE 4.3-4

SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENTS AND SENSOR LOCATIONS	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
1. TRIAXIAL TIME-HISTORY ACCELEROGRAPHS			
a. Containment Mat. el. 692'-11"	M*	R**	SA
b. Containment Operating floor el. 767'-10"	M*	R**	SA
c. Switchyard	M*	R	SA
d. Containment Building - Steam Generator Support Cubicle No. 1 el. 718'6"	N/A	R**	N/A
e. Aux. Building - at center of Mat, el 710'6"	N/A	R	N/A
f. Aux. Building - at base of 480 volt MCC (MCC-2-E03), el. 755'6"	N/A	R	N/A
2. TRIAXIAL PEAK ACCELEROGRAPHS			
a. Containment Building - RHS heat exchanger (2RHS-E21A) el. 715'-6"	N/A	R**	N/A
b. Containment Building -Six inch SI pipe (2SIS-006-269-1(A)) el. 741'-5"	N/A	R**	N/A
c. Aux. Building - MCC-2E03 el 755'-6"	N/A	R	N/A
3. TRIAXIAL SEISMIC SWITCHES			
a. Containment mat	N/A	N/A	R**
4. RESPONSE SPECTRUM ANALYZER			
a. Control Room	N/A	R	N/A

*Except seismic trigger
**The specified surveillance interval during the first fuel cycle may be extended to coincide with completion of the first refueling outage.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

2. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a test signal.*

3. Initiating flow through each Service Water subsystem and its two associated recirculation spray heat exchangers, and verifying a flow rate of at least 12,000 gpm.

f. At least once per 5 years by performing an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.

*The specified 18-month surveillance interval during the first fuel cycle may be extended to coincide with completion of the first refueling outage.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.6.3.1.2 Each isolation valve specified in Table 3.6-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by:

a. Verifying that on a Phase A containment isolation test signal each Phase A isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

b. Verifying that on a Phase B containment isolation test signal, each Phase B isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.*

c. Verifying that on a Containment Purge and Exhaust isolation signal, each Purge and Exhaust valve actuates to its isolation position.

d. Cycling each power operated or automatic valve through at least one complete cycle of full travel and measuring the isolation time pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

e. Cycling each weight or spring loaded check valve not testable during plant operation, through one complete cycle of full travel and verifying that each check valve remains closed when the differential pressure in the direction of flow is < 1.2 psid and opens when the differential pressure in the direction of flow is ≥ 1.2 psid but less than 6.0 psid.*

f. Cycling each manual valve not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

*The specified 18-month surveillance interval during the first fuel cycle may be extended to coincide with completion of the first refueling outage.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

3. Verifying that a sample of diesel fuel from the fuel storage tank is within the acceptable limits specified in Table 1 of ASTM D975 when checked for viscosity, water and sediment,

4. Verifying the fuel transfer pump can be started and transfers fuel from the storage system to the day tank,

5. Verifying the diesel starts from ambient condition,

6. Verifying the generator is synchronized, loaded to $\geq$ 4,238 kw, and operates for at least 60 minutes, and

7. Verifying the diesel generator is aligned to provide standby power to the associated emergency busses.

8. Verifying the lubricating oil inventory in storage.

b. At least once per 18 months* during shutdown by:

1. Subjecting the diesel to an inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations for this class of standby service,

2. Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of $\geq$ 825 kw without tripping,

3. Simulating a loss of offsite power in conjunction with a safety injection signal, and:

a) Verifying de-energization of the emergency busses and load shedding from the emergency busses.

b) Verifying the diesel starts from ambient condition on the auto-start signal, energizes the emergency busses with permanently connected loads, energizes the auto-connected emergency loads through the load sequencer and operates for $>$ 5 minutes while its generator is loaded with the emergency loads.

4. Verifying that on a loss of power to the emergency busses, all diesel generator trips, except engine overspeed, generator differential current, and generator overexcitation are automatically disabled.

5. Verifying the diesel generator operates for at least 60 minutes while loaded to $\geq$ 4,238 kw.

*The specified 18-month surveillance interval during the first fuel cycle may be extended to coincide with completion of the first refueling outage.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

1. The parameters in Table 3.8-1 meet the Category B limits.

2. There is no visible corrosion at either terminals or connectors, or the connection resistance of these items is less than 150 x 10^{-6} ohms, and

3. The average electrolyte temperature of every tenth cell of connected cells is above 60°F.

c. At least once per 18 months by verifying that:

1. The cells, cell plates, and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration,

2. The cell-to-cell and terminal connections are clean, tight, and coated with anti-corrosion material,

3. The resistance of each cell-to-cell and terminal connection is less than or equal to 150 x 10^{-6} ohms; and

4. The battery charger will supply at least 100 amperes at 140-volts for at least 4 hours.

d. At least once per 18 months*, during shutdown, by verifying that the battery capacity is adequate to supply and maintain in OPERABLE status all of the actual or simulated emergency loads for the 2-hour design duty cycle when the battery is subjected to a battery service test.

e. At least once per 60 months, during shutdown, by verifying that the battery capacity is at least 80% of the manufacturer's rating when subjected to a performance discharge test. Once per 60 month interval, this performance discharge test may be performed in lieu of the battery service test.

f. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, performance discharge tests of battery capacity shall be given to any battery that shows signs of degradation or has reached 85% of the service life expected for the application. Degradation is indicated when the battery capacity drops more than 10% of rated capacity from its average on previous performance tests, or is below 90% of the manufacturer's rating.

*The specified 18-month surveillance interval during the first fuel cycle may be extended to coincide with completion of the first refueling outage.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 10 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-73

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

OHIO EDISON COMPANY

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY

THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO. 50-412

INTRODUCTION

The Beaver Valley Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) contain a number of inspections or tests that are to be performed at 18-month intervals. In general, most of these surveillances are performed during refueling outages since a duration of 18 months, with an allowable extension of 25%, would normally cover an entire fuel cycle. The first fuel cycle, however, tends to be longer than others since it includes a period of low-power operation.

Beaver Valley Unit 2 was licensed for 5% power operation on May 28, 1987, re-licensed to permit full-power operation on August 14, 1988 and achieved commercial operation on November 17, 1987. Since that date, the unit's operation has been smooth and experienced only a few shutdowns of short durations. As a result, there was not enough reactor down time for operators to perform some of the surveillances in anticipation of a longer-than-18-month fuel cycle. By letter dated October 24, 1988, Duequesne Light Company (the licensee, acting as agent for the above utilities), requested our approval to postpone surveillances that are due in the near future to the first refueling outage, expected to commence on March 17, 1989. The licensee supplemented its request by a letter dated November 3, 1988.

DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION

Our evaluation of the licensee's request follows:

(1) Reactor Trip System Response Time (Specification 4.3.1.1.3).

The Reactor Trip System response time testing includes sensor time response, instrument channel and protection system logic time response and reactor trip breaker time response. Performance of the Reactor Trip System logic time response tests involves removing one train of the Reactor Protection System from service for an extended period of time. The TS allows one train to be bypassed for a maximum of only 2 hours. Therefore, this portion of the overall time response cannot be measured during operation. Likewise, the reactor trip

breaker time cannot be measured during operation. The sensor time responses are capable of being measured during operation. However, based on past operating experience at Unit 1, when any response time degradation has been observed, it has been associated with the sensor time response. Since the portion of the Reactor Trip System time response surveillance which will not be measured in the normal surveillance interval has historically not been a problem, this surveillance extension is not expected to decrease the reliability of the Reactor Protection System.

These tests would have been due on or before January 3, 1989. On the basis discussed above, we find the extension of the 18-month interval by approximately 3 months acceptable.

(2) Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers Automatic Undervoltage Trip check (Table 4.3-1).

Performance of this surveillance would require generating a reactor trip signal and, therefore, cannot be performed during operation. Extension of this surveillance will have a minimum impact on the availability of these breakers since these breakers are only in service for the time required each month to test the Reactor Trip System. In addition, the breaker manual shunt trip capability is tested monthly.

These tests would have been due on or before January 3, 1989. On the basis discussed above, we find the extension of the 18-month interval by approximately 3 months acceptable.

(3) Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Response Time (Specification 4.3.2.1.3)

ESF response time testing includes sensor time response, instrument channel and protection system logic time response and final actuation circuitry and equipment actuation time response. Sensor time responses (with the exception of the containment pressure sensors) and equipment actuation times are capable of being measured during operation. However, performance of the ESF System logic time response portion involves removing one train of the protection system from service for an extended period of time. Therefore, this portion of the overall channel time response cannot be measured during operation. Without the instrument channel and protection system logic time response portion, the overall channel time responses listed in Table 3.3-5 of the Technical Specifications cannot be completely verified. In a phone conversation with the staff on November 22, 1988, the licensee pointed out that the logic time is in milliseconds and therefore constitutes only a very small fraction of the total ESF actuation time. Furthermore, experience gained from Unit 1 shows that measurement of logic times invariably showed conformance to limits.

This test would have been due on January 3, 1989. The requested extension would be approximately 3 months beyond the 18-month interval. Based on the above reasoning, we find this change acceptable.

(4) Safety Injection (SI) and Feedwater (FW) Isolation, Containment Spray, and Containment Isolation Phase B (CIB) Manual Switches (Table 4.3-2)

These manual actuation switches cannot be tested during plant operation. However, these switches have historically been very reliable. In addition, the automatic actuation signals, logic, and all other circuitry associated with manual safeguards actuation are periodically tested as required by the Technical Specification surveillance requirements. These tests would have been due on March 1, 1989 (for SI and FW isolation) and March 21, 1989 (for containment spray and CIB). On the above basis and the fact that the extensions would amount to only days beyond the 18-month interval, we find the changes acceptable.

(5) Reactor Trip P-4 Interlock (Table 4.3-2)

This interlock circuit is functionally tested during performance of the manual reactor trip breaker time response procedure. This procedure cannot be performed during plant operation, since the procedure manually trips the reactor trip breakers from the control room. However, a partial test of this interlock circuit is performed during the reactor trip breaker monthly tests. This test does verify proper operation of the breaker's auxiliary switch contacts which generate a P-4 signal.

This test would have been due on January 3, 1989. On the basis discussed above, we find the extension acceptable.

(6) Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation (Table 4.3-4)

The seismic monitoring instruments for which an extension of the surveillance interval is requested are all located inside the Reactor Containment Building. These instruments are within an operating exclusion area and, therefore, cannot be tested at power. The overdue date (March 25, 1989) for this surveillance is currently past the scheduled first refueling outage date. However, with some small schedule delays, this time interval could be exceeded. Since the surveillance time interval extension that may be necessary is small, there should be no impact on the reliability of these instruments. Therefore, we find the requested extension acceptable.

(7) Recirculation Spray System Valve Actuations (Specification 4.6.2.2.e.2)

This test cannot be performed at power, but as part of the quarterly ESF actuation relay testing, all automatic valves associated with the recirculation spray system are verified to operate on a test signal with the exception of 2SWS-MOV-106A and B. However, the ESF quarterly actuation relay testing does verify that these valves receive a test signal without actually stroking the valves. These valves are operated from the control room every 92 days during cold shutdown per the ASME Section XI testing program and were stroked in January 1988.

The overdue date (March 21, 1989) for this surveillance is currently past the scheduled refueling outage date. However, a short extension may be needed if the refueling outage date slips. We find the technical basis to support the short extension acceptable.

(8) Containment Isolation Check Valves (Specification 4.6.3.1.2.e)

The containment isolation check valves lift tests are performed during the containment type C leak test and, therefore, require an extended outage in Mode 5 to complete. There are 12 valves covered by this surveillance requirement. All of them are weight-loaded check valves and the licensee does not anticipate that valve opening and closing pressures will change significantly with time.

Without the amendment, the due date for this test would have been February 19, 1989. On the basis discussed above, we find the extension acceptable.

(9) Containment Isolation Phase B (CIB) Signal Valve Actuation (Specification 4.6.3.1.2.b)

This surveillance is performed by manually actuating a CIB signal from the main control room during a plant outage. Operation of all CIB isolation valves during plant operation would cause several undesirable plant disturbances including interrupting component cooling water flow to the reactor coolant pumps. This test also requires one train of the quench spray and recirculation spray systems to be taken out of service. However, as part of the ESF actuation relay testing required by Specification 4.3.2.1.1, proper CIB valve actuations are verified quarterly for all valves testable at power. For valves which cannot be stroked during operation, the output relay testing circuitry does verify that the valve control circuit receives an isolation signal, but blocks actual valve operation via a blocking relay.

The overdue date (March 21, 1989) of this test is past the scheduled refueling outage date. However, a short extension may be needed if the refueling outage date slips. We find the technical basis to support the short extension acceptable.

(10) Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Surveillances (Specification 4.8.1.1.2.b)

Surveillance Item 4.8.1.1.2.b.1 requires a maintenance inspection of the EDGs every 18 months. This is a detailed inspection of the EDGs which takes several weeks to complete and therefore cannot be performed during plant operation when both EDGs are required to be operable. Surveillance Items 4.8.1.1.2.b.2, 3 and 4 are verified during the EDG auto load test. This test de-energizes the station emergency buses and verifies the EDGs start and properly load-sequences all emergency bus loads. This surveillance cannot be performed during operation. While these 18-month surveillance tests will not be completed within the required surveillance interval, availability

of the EDGs is demonstrated by the synchronizing of the EDGs to the station buses and fully loading the diesels monthly as per Specification 4.8.1.1.2.a. In addition, there have been several plant transients at Unit 2 during the first fuel cycle in which power to the emergency buses was lost and the EDGs successfully started and supplied power to the emergency buses. The licensee stated that there have been no EDG failures to date. Therefore, the current EDG reliability factor for both diesels is 100%.

Without the amendment, the due date for EDG inspection would be January 25, 1989. On the basis discussed above and the expected short duration , we find the extension acceptable.

(11) Battery Service Test (Specification 4.8.2.3.2.d)

There are four safety-related DC buses and associated batteries. Only one of these four batteries requires an extension of the surveillance interval prior to the first refueling (i.e. battery 2-3, from December 22 to refueling). Performance of the battery service test discharges the battery sufficiently such that the battery cannot be returned to service within the allowable time period and is, therefore, not performed during plant operation. With relatively new batteries, the licensee stated that it is unlikely that the existing battery capacity would degrade significantly during the 3-month extension to fail the battery service test requirement.

On the basis of satisfactory battery discharge and service tests (see licensee's letter dated November 3, 1988) that only one out of the four batteries needs the extension, we find the change acceptable.

LICENSEE'S ADDITIONAL COMMITMENT

In addition to the technical justifications stated above, the licensee committed to perform all the surveillances affected by this amendment on or before April 1, 1989, regardless of the actual refueling outage date. This commitment ensures that the extensions would not be longer than the durations on which the staff's review is based.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment changes a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or changes to surveillance requirements. We have determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. We have previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and, (3) the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: December 19, 1988

Principal Contributor:

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