January 17, 1989

Docket No. 50-412

Mr. J. D. Sieber, Vice President
Nuclear Group
Duquesne Light Company
Post Office Box 4
Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077

Dear Mr. Sieber:

SUBJECT: BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT (TAC NO. 69300)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 12 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-73 for the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2, in response to your application dated August 30, 1988, which is supplemented by letter dated November 10, 1988.

The amendment changes the Technical Specifications to allow storage of fuel and spent fuel assemblies up to enrichment of 4.85 weight-percent U-235.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's bi-weekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Signed by

Peter S. Tam, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-4
Division of Reactor Projects I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 12 to NPF-73
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

LA:PDI-4	PM:PDI-4	PD:PDI-4	OGC
SNorris	PTam:lm	JStolz	
12/13/88	12/14/88	1/12/89	1/5/89

(5520 Document Name: AMEND TAC 69300)

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AMENDMENT NO. 12 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-73

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Mr. J. Sieber
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

OHIO EDISON COMPANY

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY

THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-412

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 12
License No. NPF-73

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Duquesne Light Company , et al. (the licensee) dated August 30, 1988, and supplemented by letter dated November 10, 1988, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-73 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 12, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto are hereby incorporated in the license. DLCo shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, to be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Peter S. Tam for

John F. Stolz, Director
Project Directorate I-4
Division of Reactor Projects I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: January 17, 1989

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 12

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-73

DOCKET NO. 50-412

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A (Technical Specifications) with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove	Insert
---	3/4 9-15
---	3/4 9-16
B 3/4 9-3	B 3/4 9-3
5-6	5-6
5-7	5-7

3/4.9.14 FUEL STORAGE - SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.14 Fuel is to be stored in the spent fuel storage pool with:

a. The boron concentration in the spent fuel pool maintained greater than or equal to 1050 ppm when moving fuel in the spent fuel pool; and

b. Fuel assembly storage in Region 1 restricted to fuel with an enrichment less than or equal to 4.85 w/o stored in a 3-out-of-4 checkerboard configuration; and

c. Fuel assembly storage in Region 2 restricted to fuel which has been qualified in accordance with Table 3.9-1.

APPLICABILITY: During storage of fuel in the spent fuel pool.

ACTION:

a. Suspend all actions involving movement of fuel in the spent fuel pool if it is determined a fuel assembly has been placed in the incorrect Region until such time as the correct storage location is determined. Move the assembly to its correct location before resumption of any other fuel movement.

b. Suspend all actions involving the movement of fuel in the spent fuel pool if it is determined the pool boron concentration is less than 1050 ppm, until such time as the boron concentration is increased to 1050 ppm or greater.

c. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.14.1 Prior to placing fuel or moving fuel in the spent fuel pool, verify through fuel receipt records for new fuel or by burnup analysis and comparison with Table 3.9-1 that fuel assemblies to be place into or moved in the spent fuel pool are within the above enrichment limits.

4.9.14.2 Verify the spent fuel pool boron concentration is $\geq$ 1050 ppm:

a. Within 8 hours prior to and at least once per 24 hours during movement of fuel in the spent fuel pool, and

b. At least once per 31 days.

Table 3.9-1

BEAVER VALLEY FUEL ASSEMBLY MINIMUM VS. INITIAL U_{235} ENRICHMENT FOR STORAGE IN REGION 2 SPENT FUEL RACKS

Initial U_{235} Enrichment	Assembly Discharge Burnup (GWD/MTU)
3.6	0
4.0	2.6
4.4	5.3
4.85	8.2

NOTE 1: Linear interpolation yields conservative results.

NOTE 2: The maximum burnup in the peak fuel rod should not exceed 60 GWD/MTU. See the safety evaluation associated with Amendment No. 12 for details.

3/4.9.10 and 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL AND STORAGE POOL

The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis.

3/4.9.12 and 3/4.9.13 FUEL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM

The limitations on the storage pool ventilation system ensure that all radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to discharge to the atmosphere. The OPERABILITY of this system and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the accident analyses. The spent fuel pool area ventilation system is non-safety related and only recirculates air through the fuel building. The fuel building portion of the SLCRS is safety related and continuously filters the fuel building exhaust air. This maintains a negative pressure in the fuel building.

3/4.9.14 FUEL STORAGE - SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL

The requirements for fuel storage in the spent fuel pool ensure that: (1) the spent fuel pool will remain subcritical during fuel storage; and (2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained in the water volume in the spent fuel pool to provide negative reactivity for postulated accident conditions under the guidelines of ANSI 16.1-1975. The value of 0.95 or less for k_{eff} which includes all uncertainties at the 95/95 probability/confidence level is the acceptance criteria for fuel storage in the spent fuel pool.

Verification that peak fuel rod burnup is less than 60 GWD/MTU is provided in the reload evaluation report associated with each fuel cycle.

The Action Statement applicable to fuel storage in the spent fuel pool ensures that: (1) the spent fuel pool is protected from distortion in the fuel storage pattern that could result in a critical array during the movement of fuel; and (2) the boron concentration is maintained at $\geq$ 1050 ppm (this includes a 50 ppm conservative allowance for uncertainties) during all action involving movement of fuel in the spent fuel pool.

The Surveillance Requirements applicable to fuel storage in the spent fuel pool ensure that: (1) the fuel assemblies satisfy the analyzed U-235 enrichment limits or an analysis has been performed and it was determined that K_{eff} is $\leq$ 0.95; and (2) the boron concentration meets the 1050 ppm limit.

DESIGN PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE

5.2.2 The reactor containment building is designed and shall be maintained for maximum internal pressure of 45 psig and a temperature of 280.0°F.

PENETRATIONS

5.2.3 Penetrations through the reactor containment building are designed and shall be maintained in accordance with the original design provisions contained in Section 6.2.4 of the FSAR with allowance for normal degradation pursuant to the applicable Surveillance Requirements.

5.3 REACTOR CORE

FUEL ASSEMBLIES

5.3.1 The reactor core shall contain 157 fuel assemblies with each fuel assembly containing 264 fuel rods clad with zircaloy-4. Each fuel rod shall have a nominal active fuel length of 144 inches. Reload fuel shall be similar in physical design to the initial core loading and shall have a maximum enrichment of 4.85 weight percent U-235.

CONTROL ROD ASSEMBLIES

5.3.2 The reactor core shall contain 48 full length and no part length control rod assemblies. The full length control rod assemblies shall contain a nominal 142 inches of absorber material. The nominal values of absorber material shall be 80 percent silver, 15 percent indium and 5 percent cadmium. All control rods shall be clad with stainless steel tubing.

5.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

DESIGN PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE

5.4.1 The Reactor Coolant System is designed and shall be maintained:

a. In accordance with the code requirements specified in Section 5.2 of the FSAR, with allowance for normal degradation pursuant to the applicable Surveillance Requirements,

b. For a pressure of 2485 psig, and

c. For a temperature of 650°F, except for the pressurizer which is 680°F.

VOLUME

5.4.2 The total water and steam volume of the Reactor Coolant System is 9370 cubic feet at a nominal T_{avg} of 576°F.

5.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

5.5.1 The emergency core cooling systems are designed and shall be maintained in accordance with the original design provisions contained in Section 6.3 of the FSAR with allowance for normal degradation pursuant to the applicable Surveillance Requirements.

5.6 FUEL STORAGE

CRITICALITY

5.6.1 The spent fuel storage racks are designed and shall be maintained with a minimum of 10.4375 inch center-to-center distance between fuel assemblies placed in the storage racks. The fuel will be stored in accordance with the provisions described in FSAR Sections 4.3 and 9.1 to ensure a k_{eff} equivalent to $\leq$0.95 with the storage pool filled with unborated water.

DRAINAGE

5.6.2 The spent fuel storage pool is designed and shall be maintained to prevent inadvertent draining of the pool below elevation 751'-3".

CAPACITY

5.6.3 The fuel storage pool is designed and shall be maintained with a storage capacity limited to no more than 1088 fuel assemblies.

5.7 SEISMIC CLASSIFICATION

5.7.1 Those structures, systems and components identified as Category I items in Section 3.7 of the FSAR shall be designed and maintained to the original design provisions with allowance for normal degradation pursuant to the applicant Surveillance Requirements.

5.8 METEOROLOGICAL TOWER LOCATION

5.8.1 The meteorological tower shall be located as shown on Figure 5.1-1.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 12 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-73

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

OHIO EDISON COMPANY

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY

THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO. 50-412

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated August 30, 1988, Duquesne Light Company (the licensee, acting as agent for the above utilities) submitted Proposed Operating License Change Request No. 15 for Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2. The proposed license change would revise design feature sections 5.3.1 and 5.6.1, and incorporate a new Section 3.9.14 and associated bases into the Technical Specifications. In particular, the proposed changes would permit the use of fuel assembles of enrichment up to 4.85 weight-percent U-235 in the spent fuel pool. Upon our request for additional information on September 20, 1988, the licensee provided supplemental information on November 10, 1988.

2.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION

The spent fuel racks at Beaver Valley 2 consist of square storage cells having an inside dimension of 8-15/16 inches. The inner wall of each storage cell is made of a 0.090-inch thick sheet of stainless steel. A Boraflex sheet 7-1/2 inches wide is sandwiched between this inner wall and an external 0.029 inch thick stainless steel wrapper. The Boraflex sheet is 0.068 inches thick with a nominal boron-10 (B-10) loading of 0.017 gm/cm^2. The cells are maintained on a 10-7/16 inch nominal center-to-center spacing. These cells have been licensed by the NRC for storage of fuel assemblies of enrichment up to 3.6 weight-percent U-235. No limit on burnup is required and assemblies may be stored in all of the cells.

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The proposed change would administratively divide the spent fuel into two regions. Fuel assembly storage in Region 1 would be restricted to fuel assemblies with an enrichment less than or equal to 4.85 weight percent U-235 stored in a three out of four checkerboard configuration. In Region 2, only fuel assemblies having a certain burnup, dependent on initial enrichment, would be stored. Region 1 will be distinguished from Region 2 by the presence of fuel cell covers installed in one of four Region 1 fuel cells, and it will be designated Region 1 on the fuel pool map in the refueling procedure. The covers will prevent inadvertent misloading of fuel assemblies in other than a three-out-of-four configuration in Region 1.

Except for the omission of Boraflex, the fresh fuel storage array contains cells similar to those in the spent fuel storage pool and are arranged in a configuration having a 21 inch center-to-center spacing. Analyses were performed by the licensee to show that fuel assemblies having enrichments up to 4.85 weight percent U-235 may be safely stored in the array.

The calculations of the k-effective value of the racks were performed with the KENO IV Monte-Carlo code. Cross-sections were calculated with the AMPX system of codes. This calculation method is widely used in the industry and is acceptable. A set of 33 critical experiments were analyzed in order to verify the method and to obtain the calculational bias and uncertainty values to be applied to the results.

2.1 Region 1 Analyses

For the Region 1 analyses, certain input assumptions were used to assure that the results would be conservative. These include:

a. Use of fresh fuel with the maximum enrichment value for each storage configuration i.e., 4.85 weight percent U-235 for the checkerboard 3-out-of-4 array.

b. Moderation with pure water at a density of 1.0 gm/cm^3 and a temperature of 68°F.

c. Replacement of the spacer grids and sleeves by pure water.

d. Use of an array which is infinite in lateral and axial extent which precludes neutron leakage from the array.

Mechanical uncertainties (gap thickness, stainless steel thickness, assembly placement in the racks, etc.), are treated by using "worst case" values. Calculational uncertainties are obtained at 95 percent probability with a 95 percent confidence value and combined statistically. The resulting total uncertainty is added to the calculational bias and the sum is added to the nominal calculated value of k-effective. The result is compared with the staff acceptance criterion value of 0.95 for k-effective.

The input assumptions and treatment of uncertainties is consistent with our acceptance criteria and is thus acceptable.

The value of k-effective, including biases and uncertainties is 0.9417 for the 3-out-of-4 storage arrangement. This value meets our criterion and is acceptable.

Accident conditions were examined for Region 1 of the pool. Most accident conditions result in a reduction in pool k-effective. Those that have a potential for increasing k-effective include not maintaining a proper arrangement (3-out-of-4), and dropping an assembly between the racks and the pool wall. For these conditions, credit may be taken for the presence of boron in the pool water. As little as 1000 parts per million of boron reduces the k-effective value by an amount sufficient to overcome any increase due to accident conditions. We conclude that accidents in Region 1 have been adequately accounted for by the licensee.

2.2 Region 2 Analyses

In Region 2 of the racks, fuel assemblies will be stored in every location. In order to meet the k-effective value acceptance criterion, fuel assemblies with enrichments greater than 3.6 weight percent U-235 will have been burned up by an amount which is dependent on the initial enrichment. The amount of burnup required is obtained by a process known as reactivity equivalencing. Specifically, a transport theory code was used to obtain the required amount of burnup for an assembly of a given enrichment greater than 3.6 weight percent U-235. This yields the same reactivity in the spent fuel rack as if fresh 3.6 weight percent fuel assemblies were stored in all cells. This is the standard industry procedure.

The transport theory code, PHOENIX, was verified by comparison to a number of critical experiments. The atom densities for the fuel assemblies were obtained with the CINDER code which is an industry standard code for such calculations. We conclude that acceptable calculation techniques were used for the Region 2 analyses.

The analysis of k-effective for the racks was performed for fresh fuel having an enrichment of 3.6 weight percent U-235. The PHOENIX code was used to obtain burnup values which yield the same k-effective for initial enrichments greater than 3.6 weight percent. The effect of post-irradiation decay on the k-effective value was studied and calculations were performed with fuel which had decayed to the point of maximum k-effective. Other assumptions made by the licensee in order to assure conservatism were similar to those for Region 1. We conclude that appropriate analysis assumptions were made.

The treatment of uncertainties was similar to that for Region 1 except that an additional uncertainty was applied to the calculation of burnup effects. We conclude that uncertainties were appropriately treated for Region 2.

The results of the k-effective calculation for Region 2 was 0.9486 including all uncertainties. This meets our acceptance criterion of 0.95 for this quantity, and is thus acceptable.

Accident considerations for Region 2 are similar to those for Region 1 and are acceptable.

2.3 Technical Specification Changes

The licensee has proposed Technical Specifications to implement the proposed increase in fuel enrichment. Specification 5.3.1 has been altered to increase the value of maximum enrichment from 3.3 to 4.85 weight percent U-235. This is consistent with the safety analysis and is acceptable. From the plant operations standpoint, the increased enrichment itself does not decrease the margin of safety since operational parameters that do determine safety limits (e.g. reactivity control, power distribution limits etc.) are not changed by this amendment. Specifi-cation 5.6.1 has been altered to reference the description of the revised storage arrangement in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The revised UFSAR pages have been included in the amendment request and are acceptable.

A the new Specification 3/4.9.14 - Spent Fuel Storage Pool - has been added. This Specification imposes the requirements for storage of fuel in Region 1 and 2 of the pool, including the table of required burnup as a function of initial enrichment for Region 2. These requirements are consistent with the analyses and are acceptable. The requirement to maintain the boron concentration in the pool water at 1050 parts per million or greater is also included. This is the amount assumed to be present in the accident configuration analyses and is acceptable.

The surveillance requirements on storage of fuel in the pool include determination of the suitability for storage based on fuel receipt records for new fuel or burnup records for spent fuel. The burnup analysis for storage in Region 2 would be performed prior to removal of the fuel from the reactor. Acceptable assemblies would then be moved directly from the reactor core to Region 2. Based on the administrative controls for movement of fuel assemblies to Region 2, we find this procedure acceptable for Beaver Valley.

We conclude that the proposed Technical Specification changes are acceptable.

2.4 Fresh Fuel Storage

The fresh fuel storage array consists of storage cells surrounded by one-eighth inch thick stainless steel walls with a 21-inch center-to-center spacing. The

cells are arranged in a 5x14 array and fuel is stored dry in the cells. Under normal conditions (i.e., without moderator) low enrichment fuel cannot be made critical. It is necessary to explore credible accident conditions, however. Two configurations are analyzed - the case in which the racks are flooded with full-density water and the case in which low-density hydrogen (from sprays, fogs, etc.) surrounds the racks.

The same analysis techniques and initial assumptions were made as those for Region 1 of the spent fuel racks. Appropriate uncertainties were treated and the results were:

k-effective = 0.9264 for full-density water
k-effective = 0.9398 for optimum low density moderation.

These values meet our acceptance criteria for these quantities and are acceptable.

2.5 DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT ANALYSIS RELATIVE TO EXTENDED FUEL BURNUP

We have evaluated the potential impact of this change on the radiological assessment of design basis accidents (DBA), which were previously analyzed in the licensing of Beaver Valley Unit 2.

An NRC publication entitled, "Assessment of the Use of Extended Burnup Fuel in Light Water Reactors," NUREG/CR 5009, February 1988, examined the changes that could result in the DBA assumptions, described in the various appropriate SRP sections and/or Regulatory Guides, that could result from the use of extended burnup fuel (up to 60,000 MWD/MT). We agree that the only DBA consequence that could be affected by the use of extended burnup fuel, even in a minor way, would be the potential thyroid doses that could result from a fuel handling accident. NUREG-CR/5009 estimates that I-131 fuel gap activity in the peak fuel rod with 60,000 MWD/MT burnup could be as high as 12%. This value is approximately 20% higher than the value normally used in evaluating fuel handling accidents (Regulatory Guide 1.25, "Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel Handling and Storage Facilities for Boiling and Pressurized Water Reactors").

We, therefore, reevaluated the fuel handling accident for the Beaver Valley Unit 2 facility with an increase in iodine gap activity in the fuel damaged in a fuel handling accident. Listed below are the fuel handling accident thyroid doses presented in the operating licensing Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-1057), and the increased thyroid doses (by 20%) resulting from extended burnup fuel.

Exclusion Area Thyroid Dose (rem)		Low Population Zone Thyroid Dose (rem)	
1985 SER	20% Increase	1985 SER	20% Increase
25	30	1.0	1.2

The increased doses are still within our acceptance criterion stated in Standard Review Plan Section 15.7.4, i.e. well within the 300-rem thyroid exposure guideline values set forth in 10 CFR Part 100.

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.21, 51.32, and 51.35, an environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact have been prepared and published in the Federal Register on January 17, 1989 (54 FR 1804). Accordingly, based upon the environmental assessment, we have determined that the issuance of the amendment will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment.

4.0 CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and (3) the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: January 17, 1989

Principal Contributor:

Laurence Kopp
Peter Tam