



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

November 17, 2000

Mr. Mark Reddemann  
Site Vice President  
Point Beach Nuclear Plant  
Nuclear Management Company, LLC  
6610 Nuclear Road  
Two Rivers, WI 54241

SUBJECT: POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF  
AMENDMENTS RE: SERVICE WATER SYSTEM OPERABILITY  
(TAC NOS. MA7821 AND MA7822)

Dear Mr. Reddemann:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 199 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-24 and Amendment No. 204 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-27 for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated December 21, 1999, as supplemented May 2, 2000.

The application dated December 21, 1999, as supplemented May 2, 2000, superseded an application dated July 30, 1998, in its entirety. The December 21, 1999, application was submitted because the licensee performed additional analyses of the service water (SW) system subsequent to the submittal of the July 30, 1998, application, which necessitated additional changes to the TSs.

These amendments incorporate changes to the TSs to more clearly define the requirements for SW system operability in accordance with the system configuration assumed in the SW system analysis.

A copy of our related safety evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

Beth A. Wetzel, Senior Project Manager, Section 1  
Project Directorate III  
Division of Licensing Project Management  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 199 to DPR-24  
2. Amendment No. 204 to DPR-27  
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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These amendments incorporate changes to the TSs to more clearly define the requirements for SW system operability in accordance with the system configuration assumed in the SW system analysis.

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/RA/

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Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301

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cc w/encls: See next page

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|--------|-------------------|--------------------|----------|---|---------------------|
| NAME   | BWetzel <i>BW</i> | RBouling <i>RB</i> | RCaruso  | <i>12MW</i><br>RWetzel                        | <i>CC</i><br>CCraig |
| DATE   | 10/25/00          | 10/20/00           | 9/21/00  | Nov 10, 2000                                  | 11/17/00            |

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Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

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October 2000



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC

DOCKET NO. 50-266

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 199  
License No. DPR-24

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by the licensee dated December 21, 1999, as supplemented May 2, 2000, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-24 is hereby amended to read as follows:

B. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 199 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 45 days of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Claudia M. Craig, Chief, Section 1  
Project Directorate III  
Division of Licensing Project Management  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of issuance: November 17, 2000



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC

DOCKET NO. 50-301

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 204  
License No. DPR-27

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by the licensee dated December 21, 1999, as supplemented May 2, 2000, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-27 is hereby amended to read as follows:

B. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 204 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 45 days of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Claudia M. Craig, Chief, Section 1  
Project Directorate III  
Division of Licensing Project Management  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of issuance: November 17, 2000

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 199

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-24

AND LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 204

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-27

DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

REMOVE

15.3.3-5  
15.3.3-6  
15.3.3-10  
15.3.3-11

INSERT

15.3.3-5  
15.3.3-6  
15.3.3-10  
15.3.3-11



D. Service Water System

1. A reactor shall not be made critical unless the following conditions are met:
  - a. Six service water pumps are operable.
  - b. All necessary valves, interlocks and piping required for the functioning of the Service Water System during accident conditions for the unit which is to be made critical are also operable.
2. During power operation, the requirements of 15.3.3.D-1 may be modified to allow the following conditions. If the system is not restored to meet the conditions of 15.3.3.D-1 within the time period specified, the affected reactor(s) will be placed in the hot shutdown condition within six hours and in cold shutdown within 36 hours.

Note: If any equipment supported by service water will not receive sufficient flow, the applicable LCOs for the affected equipment shall be entered.

- a. One of the six required service water pumps may be out of service provided a pump is restored to operable status within 7 days. A second service water pump may be out of service provided a pump is restored to operable status within 72 hours. A third service water pump may be out of service provided two pumps are restored to operable status within 72 hours.
- b. The service water ring header continuous flowpath may be out of service for up to 7 days, subject to the limitations of 15.3.3.D-2.a, provided that:
  - i. At least five service water pumps are operable and aligned to all required portions of the service water header  
  
Or
  - ii. Four service water pumps are operable and the flowpath is interrupted only between the service water pump bays or at one or more of the west header isolation valve locations.  
  
Or
  - iii. Service water pump and continuous flowpath alignment may be different from that defined in b.i or b.ii above, provided an evaluation is performed demonstrating required systems are operable prior to establishing the configuration.

If the alignment is different from that specified above and no evaluation has been completed, then the conditions of Section 15.3.0 apply.

- c. One or more required automatic non-essential load isolation valves may be inoperable for up to 72 hours. If an affected line has a required redundant automatic isolation valve, then the redundant valve must be operable. This LCO can be exited provided the affected lines are isolated with a seismically qualified isolation valve or the inoperable valves are restored to operable status.
- d. The containment fan cooler outlet motor operated valves may be open for up to 72 hours provided that:
  - i. At least five service water pumps are operable.
  - Or
  - ii. At least three service water pumps are operable provided an evaluation is performed demonstrating required systems are operable prior to establishing the configuration.

This LCO can be exited provided the valves are returned to the closed position or the flowpath is isolated.

#### Basis

The normal procedure for starting the reactor is, first, to heat the reactor coolant to near operating temperature, by running the reactor coolant pumps. The reactor is then made critical by withdrawing control rods and/or diluting boron in the coolant.<sup>(1)</sup> With this mode of start-up, the energy stored in the reactor coolant during the approach to criticality is substantially equal to that during power operation and therefore to be conservative most engineered safety system components and auxiliary cooling systems, shall be fully operable. During low temperature physics tests there is a negligible amount of stored energy in the reactor coolant, therefore an accident comparable in severity to the Design Basis Accident is not possible, and the engineered safety systems are not required.

A total of six service water pumps are installed, only three of which are required to operate during the injection and recirculation phases of a postulated loss-of-coolant accident,<sup>TM</sup> in one unit together with a hot shutdown or normal operation condition in the other unit. For either reactor to be critical, six service water pumps must be operable.

The allowed outage time for a single service water pump is 7 days. The allowed outage time for two or three service water pumps is 72 hours. If more than one service water pump is inoperable, the 7 day allowed outage time starts when the first pump is declared inoperable and the 72 hour allowed outage time for the second and third pumps is cumulative starting from the time the second pump is declared inoperable. Therefore, the total time that two or three pumps are inoperable during the period that LCO 15.3.3.D-2.a is in effect must not exceed 72 hours. All pumps must be restored to operable status within 7 days of the first pump being declared inoperable.

The service water ring header continuous flowpath LCO requirement (TS 15.3.3.D-2.b) applies anytime continuity of the flowpath in the service water ring header is interrupted. This includes isolation of any part of the ring header. This LCO recognizes that one aspect of redundancy in the service water system is the ability to isolate a break in the system and still maintain ability to provide required flow to supported equipment. This capability is impaired anytime the continuous flowpath of the ring header is blocked. The allowed outage time, up to 7 days, is based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the remaining operable equipment, and the low probability of a DBA or service water system line break occurring during this time period. Piping failures are not considered as the single failure for system functionality during an accident.

TS 15.3.3.D-2.b requires that service water system flow is evaluated prior to establishing other than the specified alignments. This is necessary to ensure that all required equipment will receive sufficient flow in this condition. If it is determined that any equipment will not receive sufficient flow, the applicable LCOs for the affected equipment shall be entered. These LCOs can be exited if system realignment is completed to achieve the required flow rates for the affected equipment.

Entry into the applicable LCOs for the affected equipment is also required when any part of the service water ring header is removed from service. For example, if the north header is removed from service, all Technical Specification required equipment required for operation should be or have already been switched to the south header. The containment accident fan cooler inoperability requires entry into the applicable LCO for Unit 2 (TS 15.3.3.B.2.a which is 72 hours) when the header is removed from service. If Unit 2 is already in a shutdown condition where containment accident fan cooler operability is not required, no LCO would apply. Unit 1 would be subject to the 7 day allowed outage time for the loss of the service water ring header continuous flowpath. The 7 day allowed outage time is based on approximate repair time for system piping and the possibility that a mechanical failure in another part of the system could result in a loss of service water system function.

TS 15.3.3.D-2.c ensures that isolation capability of non-essential service water loads during an accident is maintained per the service water analysis. In flowpaths where the service water analysis takes credit for redundant automatic non-essential load isolation valves, one of the required redundant valves must remain operable. If an evaluation demonstrates, based on existent unit status and system configuration, that isolation of the affected lines is not required during accident conditions, then this LCO would not apply to that line.

The containment fan cooler service water outlet motor operated valves consist of two fully redundant valves that are automatically opened in response to a safety injection signal. Either valve is capable of passing the full flow required for all four fan cooler units in accident mode. At various times, these valves are opened to allow testing of the containment fan coolers or adjustment of the system flow rates. If one or both of these motor operated valves are open in a unit, there may be insufficient service water flow if an accident occurs in the other unit and single failure occurs. Therefore, in this case, the other unit is in a limiting condition for operation because relaxation of single failure is necessary. That unit would be considered the "affected unit" and hence the valves must be closed within 72 hours or the affected unit must be shut down. If the valves are open in both units, they would both be considered "affected" until such time that the motor operated valves were closed for a unit, at which time the affected unit would be the unit with the closed valves. The 72-hour allowed time is consistent with the relaxation of single failure and allowed outage time associated with a loss of redundancy for the service water system. For the case of single unit operation, the valves for the operating unit may be open without limitation if the valves for the shutdown unit are in the shut position or the flowpath is isolated. The flowpath is considered isolated if total flow would not exceed the expected flowrate in the non-accident unit during accident conditions.

Specification 15.3.3.D-2.d requires five service water pumps to be operable to provide sufficient flow for accident mitigation when this specification is in effect. Unit status and system configuration lineups may result in sufficient flow being provided with only three or four service water pumps operable. Operation for 72 hours is allowed in this condition provided that an evaluation is performed to demonstrate system operability.

#### References

- (1) FSAR Section 3.2.1
- (2) FSAR Section 6.2
- (3) FSAR Section 6.3.2
- (4) FSAR Section 6.3
- (5) FSAR Section 9.3.2
- (6) FSAR Section 9.6.2



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 199 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-24  
AND AMENDMENT NO. 204 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-27  
NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC  
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2  
DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301

## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated December 21, 1999, as supplemented May 2, 2000, the licensee requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP), Units 1 and 2. The proposed changes would incorporate changes to the TSs to more clearly define the requirements for service water (SW) system operability in accordance with the system configuration assumed in the SW system analysis. The application dated December 21, 1999, as supplemented May 2, 2000, superceded an application dated July 30, 1998, in its entirety. The December 21, 1999, application was submitted because the licensee performed additional analyses of the SW system subsequent to the submittal of the July 30, 1998, application, which necessitated additional changes to the TSs.

The May 2, 2000, supplemental letter provided additional clarifying information that was within the scope of the original application and did not change the staff's initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

## 2.0 BACKGROUND

The SW system is designed to provide cooling water supplies to essential and nonessential plant equipment. The PBNP SW system consists of two trains of SW pumps (three loops per train) discharging to a common loop header which provides SW to both units. The loop header actually is made up of four headers designated "north," "south," "east," and "west." The SW pumps discharge to the east header. The loop header contains isolation valves that may be used to isolate the north, south, east, and west headers. In addition, redundant motor-operated valves (MOVs) in the east header may be used to divide the east header into two sets of three SW pumps.

With the exception of two containment fan coolers (CFCs), all essential SW loads may be manually aligned to either the north or south header as required. Two CFCs on each unit are supplied from the west header. Two Unit 1 CFCs are supplied from the south header and two Unit 2 CFCs are supplied from the north header. SW pumps are sequenced "on" in response to a safety injection signal, and nonessential loads are automatically isolated as required.

The purpose of the proposed changes to the TSs is to more clearly define the requirements for SW system operability. The proposed changes ensure that the inputs and assumptions of the SW system analyses, which demonstrate SW system operability, are appropriately reflected as limiting conditions on system operation.

Analyses for determining SW system flowrates are based on the use of a computer model of the SW system. The PBNP SW system model has been validated by comparison of the computer program results with actual plant data and specifications. The model was developed by the licensee from the as-built system and is intended to provide verification of SW system performance. In support of the proposed TS changes, the licensee performed analyses using the SW system model to demonstrate the ability of the SW system to perform its design-basis functions. The results of the analyses demonstrate that adequate flow exists to all required safety-related components to ensure the safety function is accomplished. The licensee has implemented procedure changes to ensure that the limiting assumptions in the analyses remain valid. These assumptions have also been translated into the proposed TS changes to ensure that the TSs provide appropriate system alignment and limits on equipment operability, and that the SW system will perform its functions as analyzed and designed.

### 3.0 EVALUATION

#### 3.1 Service Water System Continuous Flowpath

Current TS 15.3.3.D-2.b provides for up to seven days inoperability of the SW header continuous flowpath. The existing TS also specifies that with less than four SW pumps operable, the SW flow path must be evaluated within 24 hours to determine if any equipment will not receive sufficient flow, in which case, the applicable limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) for the affected equipment shall be entered.

The proposed change to the TS would allow for interruption of the flowpath anywhere in the loop header provided that five SW pumps are operable, with each pump aligned to all required portions of the SW header. With four SW pumps operable, the flowpath can only be interrupted between the SW pump bays or at one or more of the west header isolation valve locations. The licensee has performed evaluations of these system lineups that demonstrate that all accident mitigation functions will be supported. These conditions are more restrictive than the existing TS. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed TS change acceptable.

Proposed TS 15.3.3.D-2.b also allows for the SW pump and continuous flowpath alignment to differ from the above two conditions provided that an evaluation has been completed prior to establishing the configuration which demonstrates that required systems and components supported by SW are operable. The duration of operation in these other alignments is effectively limited by existing TS 15.3.3.D-2.a, which provides operability requirements and LCOs for the SW pumps. The analysis requirement is consistent with, but more restrictive than the existing TS in that it requires that the evaluation must be performed prior to placing the system in the desired lineup, providing assurance that the SW system will remain operable. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed TS change acceptable.

Current TS 15.3.3.D-2.b states that if any equipment supported by SW will not receive sufficient flow, the applicable LCOs for the affected equipment shall be entered. This statement is changed to a note in proposed TS 15.3.3.D-2.

### 3.2 Service Water Automatic Isolation Valves

The SW system supports several nonessential loads that were designed to automatically isolate upon receipt of an accident signal to ensure that sufficient SW is available to all safety-related accident loads. As originally designed, the nonessential loads were isolated only if less than four SW pumps were operating. Automatic isolation of nonessential loads was not credited in any analysis involving operation with more than four SW pumps. This is reflected in existing TS 15.3.3.D-2.c, which allows any or all automatic isolation valves to be out of service for up to 72 hours provided at least four SW pumps are operable. The licensee has modified the plant design to eliminate the "less than four of six" pump logic, which will make the automatic isolation of all nonessential SW loads following a safety injection signal on either unit independent of the number of SW pumps operating. This simplifies the plant design and provides consistency in the plant accident response.

In the existing plant design, certain nonessential loads are isolated by a single isolation valve, which is actuated by one of the two safety injection trains. To ensure that a nonessential flowpath will be isolated when required and the automatic isolation can be credited in the SW accident analysis, two redundant valves must be provided and each valve must be actuated by an independent safety injection train. The licensee is modifying the plant design to include redundant isolation capability for nonessential SW loads. For the loads where the plant modification has already been completed, credit for redundant isolation capability has been taken in the plant analysis. The licensee has implemented interim administrative controls that limit allowed SW system lineups to be more restrictive than the current TS and that will ensure the isolation of these nonessential SW loads during an accident. Proposed TS 15.3.3.D-2c incorporates these administrative controls for the SW system into the TS.

The licensee plans to revise the SW analysis to take credit for the new redundant isolation capability as plant modifications are completed to provide redundant isolation capability for the remaining nonessential loads. The licensee stated that all modifications have been completed for Unit 1 and the remaining Unit 2 modifications are scheduled to be completed during the Unit 2 refueling outage in the Fall of 2000. When plant modifications are completed, redundant isolation capability will be provided for all nonessential SW loads required to be isolated for accident mitigation. When the redundant isolation valves are installed and credited in the analysis, each of the isolation valves will then be normally required to be operable. Proposed TS 15.3.3.D-2.c allows one or more of the SW automatic isolation valves required during accident conditions to be inoperable for up to 72 hours provided that the required redundant valves, if any, are operable. By requiring the necessary redundant valve to be operable, the proposed change to the TS is more restrictive than the existing TS, and assurance is provided that the nonessential flowpath will be isolated as assumed in the accident analysis. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed TS change acceptable.

### 3.3 Containment Fan Cooler Outlet Motor-Operated Valves

In response to a safety injection signal, MOVs at the SW outlet from the containment fan coolers open to increase cooling water flow to the fan coolers. At various times, these valves are opened to allow testing of the containment fan coolers or adjustment of system flowrates. When an MOV is open, the opposite unit is in an LCO for SW since a portion of the SW flow will be diverted to the opposite unit in the event of a design-basis accident.

Existing TS 15.3.3.D-2.d specifies that the containment fan cooler MOVs may be open for up to 72 hours provided that at least five SW pumps are operable. Depending upon unit status and system configurations, sufficient flow may be provided with only three or four SW pumps operable. The licensee has proposed to modify the TS to allow the containment fan cooler MOVs to be open for up to 72 hours with three or four SW pumps operable provided that an evaluation has been performed to demonstrate system operability prior to placing the system in that configuration. The duration of operation in these other alignments is effectively limited by existing TS 15.3.3.D-2.a, which provides operability requirements and LCOs for the SW pumps. The proposed TS provides the licensee the ability to test the SW pumps with three or four pumps operable and the containment fan cooler MOVs open. The proposed TS provides assurance that the SW system will be capable of performing its safety function in this configuration by requiring analyses prior to entering this condition. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed TS change acceptable.

### 3.4 Bases Change

In Attachment 5, "Technical Specifications Page Markups," of the December 21, 1999, application, the licensee submitted a markup of TS page 15.3.3-10, in which a sentence was inadvertently deleted. The following sentence should have been the last sentence in the second paragraph on TS page 15.3.3-10 of Attachment 5:

Specifications 15.3.3.D.2.c requires four and 15.3.3.D.2.d requires five service water pumps to be operable to provide sufficient flow for accident mitigation when these specifications are in effect.

This sentence should have been reflected in Attachment 5 as strike-out text to reflect the changes proposed to related TSs in this amendment and also because this sentence is in the current version of the TSs. The above sentence did not appear on TS page 15.3.3-10 submitted with Attachment 6, "Incorporation of Proposed Changes," of the December 21, 1999, application. This amendment will be issued with the above sentence deleted, as the licensee intended.

### 3.5 Conclusions

The staff has reviewed the licensee's proposed changes to TS 15.3.3.D-2 and the associated TS Bases related to the operability requirements of the SW system. The licensee has performed analyses of the SW system using a validated SW system model, which demonstrated that adequate flow will be provided to all safety-related components required to mitigate a design-basis accident. The limiting assumptions in the analyses have been translated into the proposed TS, and the proposed TS provides appropriate system alignments and limits on operability to ensure that the SW system will perform its functions as designed and analyzed. Based on the review, the staff concludes that the proposed TS changes are acceptable.

## 4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Wisconsin State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.



## 5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments change a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or change a surveillance requirement. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluent that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously published a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (65 FR 9014). Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

## 6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: A. Cubbage

Date: November 17, 2000