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SOUTHERN COMPANY
Energy to Serve Your World℠

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP)
Revision 16 To The Updated FSAR, 10 CFR 50.59 Report,
Technical Specification Bases Change Report, and Revised NRC Commitments Report

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.71(e), Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) hereby submits Revision 16 to the FNP, Units 1 and 2, Updated FSAR (Enclosure 4). This submittal contains all the changes necessary to reflect information and analyses submitted to the Commission by SNC or prepared by SNC pursuant to Commission requirements from December 29, 1998 to May 25, 2000 (i.e., from one day after the end of the 15th Unit 1 scheduled refueling outage to the end of the 16th Unit 1 scheduled refueling outage). The Updated FSAR has been revised to include the effects of the following: all changes made in FNP or procedures as described in the FSAR, all safety evaluations performed by SNC either in support of requested license amendments or in support of conclusions that changes did not involve an unreviewed safety question, and all analyses of new safety issues performed by or on behalf of SNC at Commission request. As required, this submittal is provided on a replacement-page basis, and is accompanied by an effective page list that identifies the current pages of the FSAR following page replacement.

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59(b)(2), SNC hereby submits the 10 CFR 50.59 Report (Enclosure 1) containing a brief description of any changes, tests, or experiments, including a summary of the safety evaluation of each.

The FNP Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications, section 5.5.14, Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program, provide for changes to the Bases without prior NRC approval. In addition, TS section 5.5.14 requires that Bases changes made without prior NRC approval be provided to the NRC on a frequency consistent with 10 CFR 50.71 (e). Pursuant to TS 5.5.14, SNC hereby submits Bases changes made to the FNP TS Bases under the provisions of TS section 5.5.14 (Enclosure 2).

Attached for your information and in accordance with the NEI *Guideline For Managing NRC Commitments*, Revision 2, 12/19/95, SNC hereby submits a Revised NRC Commitments Report (Enclosure 3) that includes the same time period as the Updated FSAR, Revision 16.

A053
1/11 Paper Copies
2 CD Roms (Drawings)
sets

Attached for your information are two sets of the current project drawings (Enclosure 5) referenced in the FNP Updated FSAR, Revision 16. The drawings are provided on CD ROM in a file type of ".cal" and can be viewed by association with Myriad software. Please ensure one set of these project drawings is forwarded to the FNP local Public Document Room.

This letter contains no new NRC commitments. Revised commitments are included in Enclosure 3 as stated above.

If there are any questions, or if additional information is needed, please advise.

Respectfully submitted,

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY

DM Morey

Dave Morey

CHM: 5059 Rev 16 – NRC CMT – TS Bases.doc

Enclosures
1. 10 CFR 50.59 Report
2. TS Bases Changes
3. Revised NRC Commitments Report
4. FNP Updated FSAR, Revision 16
5. Project Drawings Referenced in FNP Updated FSAR, Revision 16

cc:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company
Mr. L. M. Stinson, General Manager – Farley (cover letter)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C.
Mr. L. M. Padovan, NRR Licensing Project Manager – Farley (cover Letter, Enclosure 1, 2, 3, 5 [w/2])

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II
Mr. L. A. Reyes, Regional Administrator (cover Letter, Enclosure 1, 2, 3, 4)
Mr. T. P. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector – Farley (cover Letter, Enclosure 1, 2, 3, 4)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C.
Document Control Desk (enclosure 4 - 10 copies)

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP)
Revision 16 To The Updated FSAR, 10 CFR 50.59 Report, Technical Specification Bases Change Report, and Revised NRC Commitments Report

Enclosure 1

10 CFR 50.59 Report

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP)
Revision 16 To The Updated FSAR, 10 CFR 50.59 Report,
Technical Specification Bases Change Report, and Revised NRC Commitments Report

Enclosure 1

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP)

10 CFR 50.59 Report

Report Format And Content

As required by 10 CFR 50.59(b)(2), this 50.59 Report contains a brief description of any changes, tests, or experiments, including a summary of the safety evaluation of each for FNP.

Each change, test, or experiment is listed with an "identifier." This identifier is typically the design change number used by SNC to implement the change. The identifier may also include the specific revision of the document, e.g., "R0" in the list would indicate "Revision 0," or may identify a transmittal number, e.g., "001." Some design change numbers may also have a "B" for Bechtel Power Corporation as the responsible design organization, "S" for Southern Company Services as the responsible design organization, or "P" for an FNP site developed change. For procedure changes, the identifier is typically the title of the procedure (e.g., FNP-0-AP-3 for an administrative procedure). Other miscellaneous identifiers are also used.

The "Description" section for each entry contains a brief description of the change, test, or experiment being reported.

The "Safety Evaluation Summary" section contains a summary of the safety evaluation developed to support the determination that no unreviewed safety question was involved. This summary was developed solely for use in this report – no activities important to safety have been based on these summaries.

This report is sorted alpha-numerically by identifier. The FNP FSAR is "shared;" therefore, this report contains any changes, tests, or experiments affecting either or both FNP units.

For additional information concerning any change, test, or experiment included in the report, contact SNC.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
ABN 93-0-0142, R1	This ABN clarifies descriptions in the FSAR to represent the current functions and components in relationship to the Service Water (SW) System. These are administrative changes which provide consistency and clarity within the FSAR by accurately describing and documenting the SW system and component conditions.	There are no physical changes to the plant nor a change to instrument setpoints or operating parameters. These changes will not degrade the ability of any system, structure, or component to perform its designed function. These changes do not introduce any new system interactions or adversely impact the reliability of any equipment important to safety. These changes do not introduce a new failure mode or single limiting failure.
ABN 96-0-0938, R1	This ABN makes the FSAR consistent with the Plant Farley Security Plan and the security practices at Farley Nuclear Plant.	There are no changes in the design or operation of the plant systems or equipment involved with the update to the security portion of the FSAR. These changes will not degrade the adequacy of any system, structure, or component to prevent accidents. There is no possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety.
ABN 96-0-1013, Part 1, R0	This ABN re-evaluated the fire severity for fire areas 1-1, 1-4, 2-1 and 2-4 due to the removal of charcoal filter units by previous production change packages. This is an administrative change of the FSAR to revise the combustibles and adjust the fire severity in these rooms due to the absence of charcoal filters.	The fire areas affected were reviewed in regards to combustible loading where the combustible material (charcoal filter) was removed and combustible loading decreased. The areas fire loading were determined adequate. No new combustible material was introduced.
ABN 97-0-1131, R2	This ABN addresses changes to design analyses as a result of revised NPSH calculations for the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pumps and containment spray system (CSS) pumps, revised refueling water storage tank (RWST) level instrumentation uncertainty and changes to the ECCS switchover sequence from injection to recirculation mode. The FSAR is revised to reflect these changes.	The changes to the RWST drain down table verifies that adequate tank capacity exists for manual switchover of the RHR, charging/high head safety injection, and containment spray pumps during an accident. Each pump will be able to perform under post accident conditions. No fission product barrier is affected by these changes. No dose assumptions are being altered as a result of these changes. There are no new system interactions and no physical changes to the ECCS, the containment spray pumps, or the RWST.
ABN 98-0-1249, R0	This ABN resolves several inconsistencies between the configuration of the spent fuel pool (SFP) system and the descriptions in the FSAR. These are administrative changes to bring the FSAR in agreement with the plant configuration.	This ABN changes the code references and flowrates for spent fuel pool equipment, but does not change the safety classifications for the equipment. The SFP demineralizer, strainer, and skimmer pump are not accident initiators. The cooling capacity and operating conditions of the SFP system are still bounded by the design flowrates of the SFP equipment. There are no physical changes required by this activity, thus, no new system interactions are created.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
ABN 98-0-1328, R0	This ABN requires revision to FSAR Project Drawings to resolve various discrepancies found during the development of the Containment Ventilation System Functional System Description.	Changing the annunciator configuration is acceptable because no credit is taken in the safety analysis for operator actions. Logic devices are changed to be represented only once, per industry convention. There are no physical changes to any system, structure, or component. The function of the affected components are not changed.
ABN 98-0-1329, R0 (FSARC 92-046)	This ABN revises the FSAR to clarify the methods used to form the pressurizer bubble during water-solid operations. The ABN also clarifies the methods used to collapse the pressurizer bubble during shutdown operations.	These changes make the FSAR wording more precise, less subject to confusion, and consistent with plant operating procedures. No plant system, structure, or component will be exposed to conditions beyond design limits. There are no adverse effects on any of the accidents that may have radiological consequences, nor will it change the radiation limits for the plant as currently licensed.
ABN 98-0-1335, R0	This ABN updates the Appendix R compliance report for fire area 2-004 to correct minor discrepancies. This ABN also updates the safe shutdown logic tree for area 2-004 to reflect changes in the Instrument Air system.	These changes do not add any new loads to the diesel generator nor does it affect the current evaluated sequencing of loads on the diesel generator. There is no impact on Appendix R compliance and safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire. These changes do not affect any fission product barrier. These changes will not impair the ability of any safety-related structure, system, or component to perform safety-related functions.
ABN 98-0-1404, R1	This ABN revises Attachment B to Appendix 9B of the FSAR to provide clear descriptions of the NRC approved exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.	These changes do not alter the plant, or combustible materials loading. These changes will have no adverse affect on any systems or structures required for safe shutdown nor the Appendix R requirements for safe shutdown of the plant.
ABN 98-0-1417, R0	This ABN makes a number of FSAR changes regarding the alignment of the mixed-bed demineralizers, and the periodic sampling of the resin beds to determine replacement.	The processing portion of the steam generator blowdown system is not safety-related downstream of the blowdown isolation valves. Failure of this portion of the steam generator blowdown system will not degrade the performance of any safety-related system or affect the safe shutdown capability of the plant. The operational intent and function are not changed. These changes will not introduce a new failure mode effect or limiting single failure.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
ABN 99-0-1418, R0	This ABN adds document A-508661 as a reference in the FSAR for the fire barrier penetration seal program for silicone foam and silicone foam/silicone elastomer fire barrier penetration seals at Plant Farley.	The functional capabilities of the silicone foam fire barrier penetration seals are not modified and the seals still meet the requirements of ASTM E-119 and E-84. The physical characteristics or functional capability of the silicone foam barrier penetration seals are not changed. These are passive fire mitigation components. These changes do not involve any increase in the radiological dose to the public resulting from an accident. There are no new system interactions.
ABN 99-0-1423, R0	This ABN clarifies the FSAR description of the high and low level alarm setpoint description for the spent fuel pool.	The spent fuel pool and cleanup system has no emergency function during an accident. The low level alarm remains well above the minimum required pool level. The assumptions used to analyze the consequences of a fuel handling accident in the spent fuel pool or refueling canal are not changed. There is no decrease in the water level above the technical specification requirements. The spent fuel pool will continue to perform its intended function.
ABN 99-0-1426, R0 (REA 98-1728/1803)	The RHR heat exchanger vendor drawing illegibly stated 184 holes for tubes. The drawing was corrected to state 1184 holes for tubes. This increased the total integrated dose to the auxiliary building rooms, requiring revision to the FSAR, but did not effect any equipment qualification limitations.	The change in the number of heat exchanger tubes does not significantly increase the dose rate to the room because the major contribution comes from the piping. The increase in total integrated dose to the RHR heat exchanger rooms is still within the qualified dose of the rooms. This revision does not change actual operating or design conditions of plant equipment. The RHR heat exchanger performance is not altered.
ABN 99-0-1443, R0	This ABN revises the FSAR to remove the statement "Air temperature detectors will be located in the suction ducts of the reactor cavity cooling fans with indication and alarm in the control room". This instrumentation does not exist and is not part of the reactor cavity cooling system.	There are no physical or functional changes to either the reactor cavity cooling system, the containment ventilation systems, or the plant. The containment ambient temperature detectors are located throughout the containment. The ambient temperature detectors only provide input to the operators and do not initiate any automatic equipment response. The temperature detectors are not identified as an initiator of any accidents previously evaluated in the FSAR.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
ABN 99-0-1446, R0	This ABN revises the FSAR to reflect the downgrade of the river water system (RWS) from safety related to non-safety related.	The change in the administrative treatment of the RWS will permit lesser grade component replacements and installations. The river water system does not provide any function that affects or supports any accident analysis described in the FSAR or any system that otherwise processes radioactive gases, liquids, or solids. The failure of the RWS will not adversely impact any safety related structure, system, or component. The RWS will continue to perform its intended function.
ABN 99-0-1455, R0	This ABN replaces the structural welding code in the FSAR with a more current welding code.	Welding code AWS D1.1 evolved from and is more current than AWS D2.0-69 and is the acceptable code of record for the original plant design. AWS D1.1 contains all the requirements of AWS D2.0-69 with the addition of structural welding. Compliance with AWS D1.1 does not degrade the ability of any system, structure, or component to perform its designed function. These changes do not affect any fission product barriers, and there are no onsite radiological dose consequences.
ABN 99-0-1465, R0	This ABN removes circuits, equipment, and raceways from the Appendix R Program which have been previously deactivated. This removal revises the Appendix R Compliance Report which is referenced in Appendix 9B of the FSAR.	These changes do not alter the plant, combustible materials, or any other condition in the plant that would increase the consequences of an accident, including a fire. These changes will have no adverse affect on any systems or structures required for safe shutdown nor the Appendix R requirements for safe shutdown of the plant.
ABN 99-0-1487, R0	This ABN corrects the service water intake structure (SWIS) pump room cooling fans and heater capacity in the FSAR to accurately depict the capacity proportion of each component in the pump room.	These changes are made to clarify the heating and cooling load removal capabilities of the installed HVAC equipment in the SWIS pump room. These changes do not alter the design basis, function, or interface of any system, structure, or component important to safety. The HVAC equipment located inside the SWIS pump room is not a precursor to any accident evaluated in the FSAR. These changes do not introduce any new failure modes, operating environment, or demands on any equipment important to safety.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
ABN 99-0-1488, R0	This ABN removes the Kaowool fire barrier requirement on safe shutdown raceways in fire areas 1-001 and 2-014 in the FSAR. This ABN also corrects analysis notes for certain safe shutdown cables in the FSAR.	These changes will have no adverse affect on any systems or structures required for safe shutdown nor the Appendix R requirements for safe shutdown of the plant. These changes do not add any new loads to the diesel generator nor does it affect the current evaluated sequencing of loads on the diesel generator. These changes do not affect any fission product barrier. No new equipment is added to the plant, nor does it create any new system interactions.
ABN 99-0-1604, R0	This ABN correctly locates the control room ventilation inlet noble gas monitors and computer room air conditioner (A/C) inlet smoke detectors downstream of the computer room A/C inlet isolation damper on the affected FSAR project drawing.	There are no physical changes to the Plant Farley facility. The detectors are classified as seismic category I equipment. These changes do not place any more stringent operating requirement, or change the operating environment for any equipment important to safety. These changes do not impact any conditions or assumptions previously made in evaluating the consequences of a radiological accident due to a malfunction of equipment important to safety.
ABN 99-0-1657, R0	Rooms 405, 459, 404, 2405, 2459, and 2404 were allocated for steam generator replacement personnel to store their clothing and combustible trash. This ABN updates the combustible loading calculation and the applicable fire areas of the FSAR to reflect the additional combustible material and any increases in maximum fire severity.	The additional combustible material has no adverse impact on the fire protection program at Plant Farley. These changes do not add any new equipment, impact the way existing equipment operates, or cause existing equipment to operate in a way not previously analyzed. The fire protection system is capable of withstanding and/or extinguishing the more severe fire load. These changes will have no adverse affect on any systems or structures required for safe shutdown nor the Appendix R requirements for safe shutdown of the plant.
ABN 99-1-1490, R0	This ABN revises the FSAR to show a foam cart, five self contained breathing apparatus (SCBAs), and five storage lockers with fire brigade turnout gear. Fire Area 1-85 is also being revised to reflect the storage lockers combustible material.	Addition of combustible materials to Fire Area 1-85 does not increase the probability of previously analyzed accidents because the materials do not contribute to the initiation of a fire. There are no onsite radiological dose consequences as a result of this activity which would restrict access to vital areas. These changes do not increase radiological doses above those limits set by 10 CFR 100 and 10 CFR 20. These changes will have no adverse affect on any systems or structures required for safe shutdown nor the Appendix R requirements for safe shutdown of the plant.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
DCP B-00-1-9574-1-001	This DCP modified the oil collection system by replacing flexible hoses at various collection points associated with the RCP 1B motor with larger diameter hoses to facilitate drainage of leaked lube oil. The FSAR project drawing which shows the flexible hoses will be revised to denote implementation.	The flexible hoses and piping changes do not change the function or method of performing the function of the oil collection system. The available flow capacity will increase and maintenance work efficiency will improve during RCP motor change outs. There is no change to barriers or to the operation of plant systems or equipment relied upon to prevent or limit radiological doses. No new equipment or system interfaces are created. These changes will have no adverse affect on any systems or structures required for safe shutdown nor the Appendix R requirements for safe shutdown of the plant.
DCP B-87-2-4730, R5 - 8 & 10	This DCP installed resistance temperature detector (RTD) instrumentation on the reactor coolant system cold leg safety injection piping. This DCP adds RTDs on project drawings referenced in the FSAR.	This instrumentation provides thermal and vibration data for investigation of weld failures. This instrumentation will not affect the integrity of the piping or the reactor coolant system. These changes will not affect the safe shutdown of the plant. These changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the fire protection program.
DCP B-95-1-8864-0-005, DCP B-95-1-8864-1-006	This DCP replaced the Eberline radiation monitors which used channel R-60 of the radiation monitoring system with Victoreen radiation monitors which are capable of reading the low end activity while maintaining the high end capability required by NUREG 0737. The FSAR is revised to reflect the new monitors.	The new detectors were manufactured under a quality assurance program complying with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. This modification does not add any new combustibles, and does not alter any fire barriers. The upper limit of the monitors is the same as the ones replaced. The monitors will not adversely affect plant operation during normal or accident conditions.
DCP B-97-0-9333-0-002, DCP B-97-0-9333-1-004	This DCP constructed an old steam generator storage facility (OSGSF) to provide long-term, on-site storage and shielding of the old steam generators after replacement. The FSAR is revised to reflect the addition of the OSGSF.	The OSGSF is classified as a non-safety related structure and is designed as a seismic Category II structure. The massive weight of the steam generators and concrete wall sections will not become tornado missiles. No airborne release from the OSGSF is assumed during normal operation.
DCP B-97-0-9337-0-002	This DCP constructs a permanent outage support building (OSB) in support of the steam generator replacement project. The FSAR is revised to reflect the addition of the OSB.	The OSB is a non-safety related, seismic Category II structure. External missiles caused by tornado induced failure of Category II structures not designed for tornado loads will not adversely affect the ability of Category I structures to perform their functions. Failure of the building due to external events will not adversely affect any important-to-safety SSCs and will not result in new radiological paths.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
DCP B-97-1-9315-2-002	This DCP reflects changes associated with the removal and installation of the steam generators, such as the pipe support modifications. The FSAR is revised to reflect these changes.	These change were performed during Modes 5, 6 and defuled and do not adversely impact the ability of the plant to maintain core cooling and containment integrity. These changes do not introduce any new malfunction initiators and the plant will be returned to a condition consistent with the original design basis.
DCP B-97-1-9317-0-003, DCP B-97-1-9317-2-005, DCP B-97-1-9317-3-006 - 008	This DCP temporarily cuts and removes sections of the main steam (MS) and feedwater (FW) piping connected to the old steam generators and connects the original/replacement MS and FW piping sections to the replacement steam generators (RSGs). The FSAR is revised to reflect the changes.	The MS and FW piping modified will be restored to their current seismic design requirements. These modifications will not interfere with fuel handling operations inside containment. The probability of a line break is not increased as a result of this modification. No new accident initiators are introduced. The effects of a water hammer event remains unchanged.
DCP B-97-1-9319-3-001, DCP B-97-1-9319-5-002	This DCP modifies the steam generator shell drain pipe to add two additional upper steam generator nozzles, and a connection point to the blowdown line for future use. The FSAR was revised to reflect these changes.	All pipe stresses and pipe support/restraint loads remain within Code allowable limits. The design and qualification of the modifications remain consistent with the original plant licensing basis. Since these changes will be performed while in Modes 5, 6 and defueled, the piping/tubing will not adversely impact existing SSCs in the event of a seismic event. No new failure modes are created.
DCP B-97-1-9321-0-003, DCP B-97-1-9321-1-004 - 005 & 008 - 009	This DCP revised the FSAR to reflect modifications to and structural evaluations of structures, systems, and components (SSC) inside containment during the Unit 1 steam generator replacement.	Biowall cutting, core drilling, and chipping activities may occur during Modes 5, 6 and defueled. There is no change in the capability of the biowall to withstand seismic events and design basis accidents or transients. There are no new accident initiators or failure types associated with the coating systems or cutting/drilling operations.
DCP B-97-1-9323-0-002 & 004, DCP B-97-1-9323-1-005	This DCP incorporated the Unit 1 design for steam generator (SG) rigging activities inside and outside of the containment and SG transportation activities inside and outside of the containment. These alterations made to the plant by this design change are temporary and do not result in a physical change to the FSAR.	Altered structures, systems, and components was restored to their original condition at the conclusion of the SG replacement activities. The rigging systems and SG transporter alterations will not change the design criteria of the interfacing plant systems, structures, or components important to safety. Material handling of heavy loads in the containment is administratively restricted to appropriate safe load paths. Outside of containment, the riggings systems and transporter is administratively restricted to protect equipment important to safety.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
DCP B-98-2-9345-0-003 - 004	This DCP replaces a selected number of baffle bolts used to attach horizontal supports to the baffle plates around the reactor core. The FSAR was revised to reflect these changes.	The bolt locking mechanism for the replacement bolts prevents the bolts from vibrating or breaking loose from their holes. The baffle plate, core barrel, and bolt stresses are within acceptable limits. The replacement bolts are equivalent, or superior to the original bolts in mechanical properties. Replacement of the baffle bolts does not adversely affect the control of radiological consequences or the fission product barrier integrity. Replacement of bolts to an acceptable bolting distribution ensures that the design basis functionality of the baffle plates will be maintained without crediting non-replaced bolts.
DCP P-99-1-9512-0-001	This DCP installs a spool piece upstream of the R18 radiation monitor to facilitate decontamination of the low level radiation. This design change revises a FSAR project drawing to reflect the installation of the spool piece.	The installation of the spool piece eliminates the need to disconnect and move the radiation monitor to decontaminate the R18 sample chamber. This modification will not alter the function of the radiation monitor nor the liquid waste processing system. These changes have no adverse effect on radiological accidents. No failure modes are created for the liquid waste processing system as a result of this change. These changes do not alter the anticipated operational transients nor the design basis accidents postulated to occur at the plant.
DCP P-99-1-9534-0-001	This design change package (DCP) revises an FSAR project drawing to document the installation of flanges upstream of the radiation monitor sample chamber. This creates a removable spool piece for cleaning the screen located inside the spent fuel pool demineralizer.	Installing the flanges will not have any adverse effect on any plant, system, or component. The spent fuel pool demineralizer is a low pressure system. The installed flanges meet all requirements for this system. These changes do not introduce new hazards or expose any plant system, structure, or component to conditions beyond design limits.
DCP S-84-1-2914, R45	This PCN installs vent and drain connections on the service water supply and return piping for the 1C charging pump room cooler and the battery charger room coolers. This design change also removes small bore pipe supports and assigns line numbers to service water header vents and drains. FSAR referenced drawings have been revised.	The additional of vent and drain lines meets applicable standards and has no adverse effect on the system, structure, or components. The addition of vent and drain lines will not degrade the operational reliability or availability of the service water system. These changes do not introduce new hazards nor expose any plant system, structure, or component to conditions beyond design limits.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
DCP S-84-2-2915, R37 & 40	This PCN approves the deletion of the vent valve that was scheduled to be added on the containment spray pump room cooler service water line for Q2E16H002A and modifies the vent and drain configuration and relocates one of the break flanges for the RHR/LHSI pump room cooler Q2E16H003A. This design change revises an FSAR project drawing to reflect the implementation.	The vent and drain line modification meets the applicable standards and has no adverse effect on the system, structure, or components. Stainless steel piping provides adequate strength for the service water system piping while minimizing corrosion. The safety function of the service water system is not altered. No new failure modes are created for the service water system as a result of this change.
DCP S-90-1-6986-0-008 - 009	This DCP replaced the cooling coils and deleted the vents and drains from charging pump room cooler Q1E16H001C and battery charger room coolers Q1E16H006A, B, and C. The FSAR is revised to reflect these changes.	These modifications will not adversely affect the intended operation of the room coolers, and will not impact the safety of the plant. The vent and drain function will be maintained by relocating the vents and drains from the coolers to the service water supply and return piping. Replacement of the coils with a more corrosion resistant material will improve the service and reliability of the coolers.
DCP S-90-2-6726-0-003	Waste monitor tank discharge flow loops provide indication and recording of discharge from waste monitor tanks. This DCP replaced these pneumatic instrument loops with electronic loops. This design change revises an FSAR project drawing to reflect this modification.	This modification replaced the pneumatic flow loops with electronic circuits in accordance with the same design criteria applied to the previous flow loops. This modification will have no adverse effect on the function, operation, or reliability of the liquid waste system. The fire severity rating is not affected by this modification. The failure modes of the electronic flow loops are the same as the pneumatic loops replaced.
DCP S-91-2-7267-0-010	This design change package (DCP) clarifies the description of the compressed air system air compressors in the FSAR and documents that they may be controlled by either a sequence controller or by remote hand switches.	These changes meet applicable standards and have been evaluated to have no adverse effects on the design function or performance of the instrument air and service water system. The additional electrical load added by the new compressors has been evaluated and will have no adverse impact on any class 1E loads.
DCP S-93-0-8687-1-003	This DCP adds a Biometrics Access Control System to the Primary Access Point (PAP) building and to the Secondary Access Point (SAP) building to control access of personnel into and out of the protected area of the Main Power Block. The FSAR is revised to reflect these changes.	These changes will have no adverse effect on the operation or function of the security plan or the emergency plan. The Biometrics Access Control System is non-1E and seismic category II. This change will not affect any equipment which could prevent or mitigate an accident previously evaluated. These changes will have no adverse effect on the operation or function of any plant equipment.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
DCP S-93-1-8587-1-007	This DCP installs zinc addition system components in the boron thermal regeneration system chiller room and connects these components to previously installed interface connections. This design change revises FSAR project drawings to show connection of the zinc addition system.	The addition of the zinc addition system will not affect the reliability or operability of any plant system, structure or component. Zinc addition system components installed via this change are non-safety related. The connections to these systems are in accordance with applicable codes and standards and are of a quality consistent with the associated systems. These connections have been designed such that the capability of these systems to perform their safety functions is not adversely impacted. The seismic aspects of this modification have been reviewed and found to be acceptable. These changes will have no adverse affect on any systems or structures required for safe shutdown nor the Appendix R requirements for safe shutdown of the plant.
DCP S-95-0-8835-1-001	This DCP upgraded and expanded the Local Area Network (LAN) at Farley Nuclear Plant to allow employees the ability to access computer based software without leaving the work environment. This design change revises the combustible materials associated with the computers and printers for the affected fire areas. The FSAR is revised to reflect these changes.	These changes will have no adverse affect on any systems or structures required for safe shutdown nor the Appendix R requirements for safe shutdown of the plant. The operation and reliability of the communication system will not be adversely affected. No plant equipment will be adversely affected by these changes.
DCP S-95-0-8849-1-002	This DCP installs metal ramps on the auxiliary building for transporting heavy equipment eliminating the need to lift the equipment over existing obstacles. This DCP also removes the chain link fence and gates from the top of the auxiliary building. This is a design change to FSAR project drawings denoting the removal of the fence.	This modification will have no adverse effects on any plant system, structure, or component. This modification will not adversely affect the fire protection program nor the Appendix R requirements for safe shutdown. The adequacy of the lightning protection is maintained.
DCP S-95-0-8863-1-002 & 004	This DCP incorporates changes to give additional cooling to the Shift foreman's office, Kitchen, and Storage area within the Control Room pressure boundary. The FSAR is revised to reflect these changes.	These modifications will not affect the normal Control Room HVAC and will not adversely affect any emergency cooling, ventilating, or pressurization functions of the system. The Control Room pressure boundary will be maintained. The maximum fire severity limits in the FSAR will not be exceeded. There will be no adverse impact to any 1E power supply. No new failure modes are introduced.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
DCP S-95-1-8887-1-001, 002, 007, & 011	This DCP replaces three Gardner-Denver compressors with two Atlas Copco compressors. The associated power supply and controls and instrumentation have also been modified along with a modification to the control circuit for air compressor 1C feeder breaker. This design change revises the FSAR and FSAR project drawings to reflect this modification.	These non-seismic compressors are required for normal operation, but not for safe shutdown of the plant. The compressors and other components modified do not perform a safety function. The electrical load changes will not have an adverse impact on the capability of the electrical power supply for any class 1E loads. These modifications will not adversely affect the original design function of the subject systems nor will they impact functional requirements or operational capabilities of any safe shutdown component.
DCP S-96-0-9012-1-003 - 004, DCP S-96-0-9012-2-006	The component cooling water heat exchangers experienced corrosion on the tube side of the inlet and outlet tube sheets and erosion at the tube inlets. Several tubes had been plugged due to tube leaks and/or fretting. This design change gives repair solutions, including applying epoxy coating material to the tubesheets, to prevent further corrosion of the tube sheet base and eliminate possible leakage between the tubes and tube sheet. The FSAR is revised to reflect these changes.	The solutions documented in this design change will not adversely affect the reliability or operability of any plant system, structure, or component. The heat exchangers will continue to be able to transfer the designed heat load. The epoxy coating material that has been applied to the tubesheets is 100% solid and will not introduce particulates into the water.
DCP S-96-0-9088-0-002	This DCP gives Farley Nuclear Plant the ability to operate without switchboard operators in the high voltage switchyard. This design change removes the requirement of a switchboard operator in the high voltage switchyard. The FSAR is revised to reflect these changes.	These changes have no adverse seismic impact on the main control board. The function of the high voltage switchyard will not change. All existing trouble alarms will be available in the plant control room. Activities necessary to maintain the high voltage switchyard in an operating condition will not be compromised as a result of the automation of the high voltage switchyard.
DCP S-96-1-9071-0-001	This DCP installed three pressure switches for the monitoring of essential air header pressure. This is a design change to the FSAR to indicate that 2 of 3 pressure switches must operate to cause the essential air header to be isolated. The FSAR is revised to reflect these changes.	This implementation will increase the reliability of the compressed air system by preventing the possibility of one pressure switch malfunction isolating the essential air header. The actuation of the essential air isolation valve is unchanged. There are no adverse effects on any of the accidents that may have radiological consequences, nor will it change the radiation limits for the plant as currently licensed. The instrument air system will not be adversely affected.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
DCP S-96-1-9078-0-001	This DCP replaced the lever handles on the Unit 1 air receiver discharge isolation valves with gear operators and a chainwheel that allows operation from the floor. This design change requires a modification to FSAR project drawings.	This modification does not adversely affect the original design function of the valves. No plant system, structure, or component will be exposed to conditions beyond design limits. This change has no adverse effects on any of the accidents that may have radiological consequences, nor will it change the radiation limits for the plant as currently licensed. The instrument air system is not adversely affected.
DCP S-96-1-9091-0-001 (ABN 00-1-1807)	This DCP reduces the quantity of snubbers in the residual heat removal/safety injection piping system analyzed in stress calculation packages #N11, #N12, and #N13. The analysis covers seismic Category 1 piping. The affected FSAR figures will be revised per this design change to indicate the snubbers to be removed.	The piping system re-analysis maintain stresses within code limits. This reduction will result in significant savings in inspections and maintenance costs by eliminating the possibility that a snubber, which is not required by design, will be found inoperable and cause or extend a reactor shutdown. This modification is limited to pipe supports only and does not change system function, pipe routing, equipment or components.
DCP S-96-2-9079-0-001	This DCP replaced the lever handles on the Unit 2 air receiver discharge isolation valves with gear operators and a chainwheel that allows operation from the floor. This design change requires a modification to FSAR project drawings.	This modification does not adversely affect the original design function of the valves. No plant system, structure, or component will be exposed to conditions beyond design limits. This change has no adverse effects on any of the accidents that may have radiological consequences, nor will it change the radiation limits for the plant as currently licensed. The instrument air system is not adversely affected.
DCP S-97-0-9222-1-001	This DCP revises the FSAR to reflect the replacement of a 7.5 kW capacity heater in the control room pressurization filtration unit with a 2.5 kW heater.	The 2.5 kW heater capacity will continue to provide sufficient heat to limit humidity within the control room pressurization filter units. Failure mechanisms have been reduced by removing non-essential components from the heater controls. The replacement heater does not change the control room emergency filtration system design basis function or requirements. No new failure modes or new system interfaces are being introduced by this change.
DCP S-97-0-9251-0-001 & 003	This DCP removes and replaces the existing Unit 1 and 2 auxiliary building built-up roof. This DCP also removes portions of the chain link fence and associated grounding connections that existed on the roof. These are design changes to FSAR project drawings to reflect the removal.	The built-up roof and fence are not part of any postulated accident scenarios. The replacement of the roof does not alter the control room habitability pressure boundary. These changes will have no adverse affects on any structure, system, or component required for safe shutdown. The FNP fire protection program, the FNP radiation protection program, nor the Appendix R requirements for safe shutdown are affected by the removal and installation of the roofing materials.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
DCP S-97-0-9253-1-005	This DCP installed a new feature called the DCT 1900 cordless telephone system which provides wireless communication in several areas of the plant using the existing telephone system. The FSAR is revised to reflect these changes.	The new communication system will be powered from non-essential power sources and will not be required to continue operating during or following a design bases accident or during loss of power for any reason. These changes will have no adverse impact on any equipment, systems, or Appendix R requirements for safe shutdown of the plant. Assumptions previously made in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident are not altered.
DCP S-97-0-9331-0-001	This DCP provided the required utilities to the outage support building (OSB) and addressed the removal of the contractor staging building. This is design change to the FSAR to show the six inch connection to the OSB and caps the line going to the contractor staging building	The modification to the fire protection system to add the six inch diameter connection from the yard loop piping to the OSB will have no adverse effect on the systems ability to perform within the design and licensing basis. None of the utilities being supplied to the OSB are required for safe shutdown. The power to the OSB will not affect onsite power systems or affect any degraded grid voltage studies. No new hazards are introduced as a result of this implementation.
DCP S-97-1-9184-0-001	This DCP removes two service water differential pressure switches mounted outside the diesel generator building. This eliminates the automatic closure of the service water valves increasing the reliability of flow to the diesel generators. An FSAR project drawing will be revised to reflect the removal of the switches.	This modification will not adversely impact the ability of the diesel generators or the service water system to perform their intended functions. Line breaks or critical cracks are not postulated for Seismic Category I service water lines and the automatic closure function of these MOV's is not required. The removal of these switches will eliminate unneeded functions from this system. These modifications will have no adverse impact on any of the accidents or transients which have radiological consequences.
DCP S-97-1-9218-2-002 & 004	This DCP changes the Unit 1 penetration room filtration (PRF) suction valves from fail open to fail close, eliminates air flow into the PRF filtration housings, and modifies the exhaust fan discharge damper controls. The FSAR is revised to reflect these changes.	These changes do not alter the PRF system's capability to minimize the radioactive release from the PRF boundary to the environment. No plant system, structure, or component (SSC) required for accident mitigation will be adversely affected by this modification.
DCP S-97-1-9281-0-002 & 004	This DCP adds test connections for the Unit 1 service water inservice dye injection for collection capability. The samples are analyzed to determine the service water flow and pressure characteristics. The FSAR is revised to reflect these changes.	No plant system, structure, or component will be exposed to conditions beyond design limits as a result of implementation of this design change. These changes have no adverse effect on the design function or performance of the service water system or any plant system. The connections will not adversely impact the seismic integrity of the system. There are no new failure mechanisms.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
DCP S-97-1-9325-1-001	This DCP incorporates permanent platforms below the existing lower manway platforms at each of the three steam generators. The FSAR is revised to reflect these changes.	The erection and removal of temporary scaffolding in these areas each outage is costly and time consuming. These platforms will have no adverse impact of any systems, structures, or components required for safe shutdown of the plant. These platforms do not support any equipment important to safety and are designed to withstand the effects of a seismic event.
DCP S-97-2-9185-0-001	This DCP removes two service water differential pressure switches mounted outside the diesel generator building. This eliminates the automatic closure of the service water valves increasing the reliability of flow to the diesel generators. An FSAR project drawing will be revised to reflect the removal of the switches.	This modification will not adversely impact the ability of the diesel generators or the service water system to perform their intended functions. Line breaks or critical cracks are not postulated for Seismic Category I service water lines and the automatic closure function of these MOV's is not required. The removal of these switches will eliminate unneeded functions from this system. These modifications will have no adverse impact on any of the accidents or transients which have radiological consequences.
DCP S-97-2-9208-0-001	This DCP reduces the quantity of snubbers on the high head safety injection system (HHSI) piping from the auxiliary building to the containment building analyzed in stress calculation package #682. The analysis covers seismic category I low energy lines. The FSAR is revised to reflect these changes.	The piping system re-analysis maintain stresses within code limits. Pipe whip and impingement analyses are not affected. No new pipe supports or relocation of any existing supports are required. This modification is limited to pipe supports only and does not change system function or operation, pipe routing, equipment or components.
DCP S-97-2-9217-0-001	This DCP revises FSAR figures due to the reduction in the quantity of snubbers on the reactor coolant and chemical and volume control piping systems inside the containment building. Analysis uses the N-411 damped response spectra. The analysis covers seismic category I low energy lines.	The piping system re-analysis maintain stresses within code limits. Pipe whip and impingement analyses are not affected. The design criteria continue to be met by this design change. No new pipe supports or relocation of any existing supports are required. This modification is limited to pipe supports only and does not change system function or operation, pipe routing, equipment or components.
DCP S-97-2-9219-2-002 & 004	This DCP changes the Unit 2 penetration room filtration (PRF) suction valves from fail open to fail close, eliminates air flow into the PRF filtration housings, and modifies the exhaust fan discharge damper controls. The FSAR is revised to reflect these changes.	These changes do not alter the PRF system's capability to minimize the radioactive release from the PRF boundary to the environment. No plant system, structure, or component (SSC) required for accident mitigation will be adversely affected by this modification.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
DCP S-97-2-9242-1-001	This DCP relocated the ladder on the roof of the Component Cooling Water (CCW) Surge Tank Room from the south exterior wall to the east exterior wall of the room. An FSAR project drawing is impacted as a result of this change.	Relocating the ladder will have no adverse effect on any system, structure, or component required for safe shutdown of the plant.
DCP S-97-2-9282-0-002, 003 & 005	This DCP added a dye injection test connection for each Unit 2 service water pump for collection capability in addition to a 3/8" tee and end cap for checking pressure during service water inservice testing. The samples are analyzed to determine the service water flow and pressure characteristics. An FSAR project drawing is impacted as a result of this change.	No plant system, structure, or component will be exposed to conditions beyond design limits as a result of the implementation of this design change. These changes have no adverse effect on the design function or performance of the service water system or any plant system. The connections will not adversely impact the seismic integrity of the system. There are no new failure mechanisms.
DCP S-98-0-9368-0-001	This DCP installed transformers and various sizes of 480V distribution switches to provide power during the steam generator replacement (SGR) effort. This power system will remain permanent to provide power for temporary loads during future refueling outages also. An FSAR project drawing was revised to reflect the transformer locations.	The installation of these transformers will have no adverse impact to any structures, systems, or components nor the FNP fire protection program. The power being supplied to the transformers is not required for safe shutdown, and will not affect on-site or off-site power systems or affect any degraded grid voltage studies. The transformers are considered non-seismic and their locations do not affect any existing seismic structures, systems, or components.
DCP S-98-0-9386-2-001	This DCP provided a parking lot and craft entry area to support the steam generator replacement project (SGRP). An FSAR project drawing is impacted as a result of this change.	This modification does not have any adverse effect on any plant system, structure, or component required for safe shutdown of the plant. There is no adverse impact to the FNP fire protection program nor the Appendix R requirements for safe shutdown. This change helps control flow paths for storm water runoff and reduces erosion in the area. There is no degradation to any equipment important to safety.
DCP S-98-0-9434-0-001	This DCP re-routes the well water supply due to leaking beneath the Unit 1 circulating water chemical addition facility. After re-routing around the foundation, the new piping will reconnect with the existing well water supply piping. This is a design change to an FSAR project drawing that denotes the affected piping.	Temporary isolation of the well water system does not increase the probability of an accident. The service water system remains available to meet the requirement to fill the 300,000 gallon fire protection storage tank. The capability of the fire protection system to mitigate the consequences of a fire and to prevent dose releases is not affected. There are no direct or indirect impacts to the design basis of any other system, structure, or component. No plant system, structure, or component will be exposed to conditions beyond design limits.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
DCP S-98-1-9346-0-002	This DCP temporarily utilizes a 4.16kV Bus 1A feeder breaker/cable to supply power in support of steam generator replacement (SGR) and installs a temporary transformer to supply power to the 400 ton capacity temporary lifting device (TLD) for heavy lifting activities. There are no physical changes to the FSAR.	These changes will be made in Modes 5 and 6 and while de-fueled. The changes to the Polar Crane will be removed and crane configuration restored to normal before re-fueling begins. The safety and non-safety related electrical distribution systems will not be adversely affected. The cable and transformer are remotely located from the fuel handling equipment and transfer canal.
DCP S-98-1-9357-2-005	This DCP incorporates FSAR changes for the physical removal of the hardware associated with the use of turbine impulse as an input for steam generator (SG) level control. The replacement steam generators utilize a fixed level setpoint, therefore this hardware is no longer needed.	These hardware changes meet the original design standards, do not increase inaccuracies, and will not affect other systems. These changes delete unneeded system interfaces, removes unneeded indicators from the main control board, and reduces the number of components that could fail. The modification to the input for the SG level control loops does not affect their ability to control feedwater within the required range, nor does it degrade any control or protection function. No new failure modes or limiting single failures have been identified.
DCP S-98-1-9390-0-001, & 009	The Hot Machine Shop (HMS) is being used for steam generator activities. This DCP renovated the existing circulating water chlorination building (Snubber Test Building) to house the equipment previously in the HMS including the snubber testing equipment. The FSAR was revised to reflect these changes.	Tornado missiles that may be formed by the failure of the Snubber Test Building are bounded by the design basis missiles and will not adversely affect the ability of any Category I system, structure, or component to perform their design function. These changes do not result in a significant increase in any adverse radiological environmental impact. The power being supplied to the Snubber Test Building is not required for safe shutdown, and will not affect on-site or off-site power systems or affect grid voltages.
DCP S-98-1-9399-0-001	This DCP was incorporated to install a system for injecting ammonium chloride into the condensate and feedwater system as an alternate method of sodium-to-chloride molar ratio control. This change updates an FSAR Project Drawing.	The ammonium chloride injection system does not perform a safety function and is classified as seismic category II. A failure of the injection system will have no adverse effect on structures, systems, or components important to safety. These changes will not adversely affect the original design function of the secondary systems, nor will they impact the functional requirements or operational capabilities of any safe shutdown component.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
DCP S-98-1-9437-0-001, 002, & 006	This DCP installed a 90 MVAR capacitor bank in the 230KV switchyard. The FSAR is revised per this design change to reflect the addition of the capacitor bank, circuit switcher, and disconnect switch for the shunt reactor.	These changes provide adequate dampening to assure that switching transients will not adversely affect sensitive equipment in the plant. There are no adverse effects on system stability since the cases for which the capacitor bank would be placed into service are also conditions where the system will be in a more stable state. There is no change in the capability of plant equipment to perform their safe shutdown functions nor is there any change in the plant response to a loss of offsite power or restoration of offsite power.
DCP S-98-1-9446-0-002	This DCP revised the breaker settings associated with the 1A, 1B, and 1C Battery Charger AC load center to prevent inadvertent tripping. This design change updates an FSAR Project Drawing to denote the new breaker settings.	These changes do not adversely impact previous design assumptions for breaker setting tolerances or breaker coordination. These changes will mitigate the tripping problem and will not affect the ability of the 600 V load centers or the battery chargers to perform their intended design functions. The function of the breakers and battery chargers will be unaffected by this change.
DCP S-98-2-9378-0-004	This DCP replaced the coils for containment coolers Q2E12H001C-B and Q2E12H001D-B due to erosion/corrosion. The FSAR is revised to reflect the replacement stainless steel tubes instead of the copper-nickel tubes.	Installation of the replacement coils does not affect seismic qualification of the coolers. The replacement coils are equal to or better than the existing coils in form, fit, and function. There is no adverse effect on any system, structure, or component. The replacement coils meet the applicable standards. Thermal performance of the replacement coils is equivalent to that of the coils being replaced.
DCP S-98-2-9421-2-005	This DCP replaced the D3 relay installed in the exciter switchgear with a alarm/trip unit that has two new time delay relays. This is a design change to a FSAR project drawing to note the correct relay setpoints.	No new types of trips are introduced that will indirectly cause a turbine generator trip. This modification will not cause additional challenges to the reactor trip system and will not have an adverse effect on any equipment important to safety. The generator exciter system is not required for safe shutdown of the plant.
DCP S-98-2-9447-0-002	This DCP revised the breaker settings associated with the 2A, 2B, and 2C Battery Charger AC load center to prevent inadvertent tripping. This design change updates an FSAR Project Drawing to denote the new breaker settings.	These changes do not adversely impact previous design assumptions for breaker setting tolerances or breaker coordination. These changes will mitigate the tripping problem and will not affect the ability of the 600 V load centers or the battery chargers to perform their intended design functions. The function of the breakers and battery chargers will be unaffected by this change.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
DCP S-99-0-9490-0-001 & 002	This DCP installs two temporary closure plates on the HVAC supply duct in order to isolate the control room while the supply duct entering the control room was being reworked. There is no physical change to the FSAR.	The HVAC system entering the control room was restored to its original configuration after the installation of the access door for control room damper inspection. These changes enhance fire damper maintenance and inspection. These modifications do not adversely affect safety limits or settings for equipment and components essential to nuclear safety. These changes utilized applicable codes and standards that meet or exceed original design requirements.
DCP S-99-1-9461-0-001 & 004, DCP S-99-1-9461-1-005	This DCP re-routs SGFP bearing bracket drip drains, removes steam dump condenser high point vent valves, adds air bleed-off lines, replaces the two piece generator gas cooler explosion cover with a one piece cover, and relocates the generator bearing drain vapor extractor isolation damper from the discharge to the suction side of the extractor. These design changes to the turbine/generator system impact an FSAR project drawing to reflect the removal of the high point vent valves.	The main steam dump lines, generator seal oil system, generator cooler, generator bearing drains nor the steam generator feed pump (SGFP) bearing bracket drains are required for safe shutdown of the plant. No plant system, structure, or component required for accident mitigation will be adversely affected. Applicable codes and standards are used to fulfill design basis requirements.
DCP S-99-2-9457-0-001	This DCP updates the FSAR due to modifications to several turbine and generator auxiliary systems to provide improvements to system reliability and improved maintenance.	The removal of the vent valves on the steam dump lines and other modifications do not adversely affect safety limits or settings for equipment and components essential to nuclear safety. The fire suppression and detection systems remain adequate for the increase in floor area values, combustible material, maximum fire loading, and maximum fire severity. These changes utilize applicable codes and standards that meet or exceed original design requirements. There is no adverse impact on the function of the main steam system, the steam generator feedwater pump or generator/turbine trip.
DCP S-99-2-9462-1-002	This DCP removes the mechanical stem retention device and installs a modified yoke on the Unit 2, Loop "B" downstream main steam isolation valve (MSIV). This design change removes a note added to the FSAR to reflect the mechanical stem retention device.	This change will have no adverse effect on the function of the valve or the limit switches. The valve will continue to function as it did prior to installation of the stem retention device and will continue to act as a containment isolation valve during a main steam line break. This change has no adverse effects on any of the accidents that may have radiological consequences, nor will it change the radiation limits for the plant as currently licensed.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
DCP S-99-2-9491-1-003 & 010	This DCP resolves the problem of fatigue failure of the base plate bolts caused by excessive vibration in the Unit 2 main steam bypass system piping. This design change revises the FSAR to indicate the additional combustibles and a new pipe line classification.	The modified support and drain lines continue to meet the applicable code requirements. The addition of the combustible is enveloped into the maximum permissible fire loading and maximum fire severity classification. The operation of the main steam dump system remains unchanged by this modification. These changes do not introduce new hazards nor expose any plant system, structure, or component to conditions beyond its design limits.
FNP-0-AP-3, R13	The plant organizational structure is being changed, including combining the responsibilities and organizations of the Plant Modifications and Maintenance Support (PMMS) Manager and the Outage and Planning Supervisor and to show that the PMMS Manager reports to the General Manager-Support. The FSAR was revised to reflect these changes.	These changes are administrative in nature. All management, administrative, and leadership functions will continue to be performed effectively. Management review and oversight of all accident mitigation will continue as before. There will be no degradation in any programs or management functions. There will be no decrease in the state of readiness or the effectiveness of equipment important to safety.
FNP-0-CCP-330, R10A	This modification connects the construction well water system to the production well water system as a backup while repairs are completed to a production well. This is only a temporary change until repairs are accomplished. No changes were made to the FSAR.	The use of chlorinated water as a temporary backup source will have no adverse effect on the sanitary tank since it is treated with chlorine anyway. The addition of small levels of chlorine to the fire protection tanks will not have any effect on this system since it is carbon steel just like the sanitary water system. The use of ground water to fill the fire protection tank and the sanitary water tank is already covered in the FSAR.
FNP-0-M-011, R19	This SECL revises the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) by adding a reference to NUREG-1301, clarifies actions in the event of liquid or gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation inoperability, and expands reporting requirements pertaining to instrumentation inoperability.	These changes clarify actions to be taken in the event instrumentation inoperability extends beyond 30 days. These changes do not change the programmatic controls for radioactive effluents. These changes to the ODCM are administrative in nature. These changes will not degrade the ability of any system, structure, or component to perform its designated function.
FNP-0-M-07, R7 (S)	This SECL documents the removal of the plant analytical data management system (ADMS) from the FSAR and replaces it with current computer technology.	These changes are the result of hardware and software used to evaluate emergency offsite dose. These changes will not increase the possibility of any on-site or off-site personnel receiving a radiological dose above the acceptable limit as currently licensed. There are no new system interactions and there are no changes in the way a safety system is operated or maintained. There are no new failure modes or limiting single failure.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
FNP-0-TCP-33, R0 (S)	This SECL revises the FSAR to allow the use of multi-media techniques such as computer aided training in addition to traditional lectures for providing employee training.	This change allows the use of computers as presentation media for training support. These changes do not affect plant equipment or actual plant operational activities. The same testing and evaluation criteria exist to assure proper qualification. No change is being made to the standard required for assuring competence or qualification of individuals.
FNP-1-SOP-16.2, R10	This SECL revises SOP-16 to realigns the Unit 1 steam generator blowdown flowpath through the demineralizers as described in the FSAR.	This system is not essential to nuclear plant safety downstream of the blowdown isolation valves. This realignment does not introduce a new failure mode effect or limiting single failure. There is no degradation of any system, structure, or component as a result of this realignment.
FNP-2-SOP-16.2, R12	This SECL revises SOP-16 to realigns the Unit 2 steam generator blowdown flowpath through the demineralizers as described in the FSAR.	This system is not essential to nuclear plant safety downstream of the blowdown isolation valves. This realignment does not introduce a new failure mode effect or limiting single failure. There is no degradation of any system, structure, or component as a result of this realignment.
FVP-064, R0 (S) (REA 98-1843)	This SECL revises FSAR Section 7.5, Post Accident Monitoring Display Instrumentation, to correct discrepancies noted with the Regulatory Guide 1.97 Compliance Report.	These changes clarify post accident commitments and are consistent with Technical Specification requirements. Surveillance procedures and Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) guidance is not impacted. No physical changes to the plant are required. No safety limits, limiting conditions for operation, or design parameters are impacted by these changes. New failure modes or system/component interfaces are not created since there is no physical modification.
FVP-204, R0 (S)	This SECL revises portions of FSAR Chapter 7, Instrumentation and Control, to correct or clarify information to be consistent with the as-built configuration and the current safety analysis.	These changes do not involve a physical change to the plant nor a change to instrument setpoints or operating parameters. These changes do not degrade the ability of any system, structure, or component to perform its designed function. These changes do not alter any conditions or assumptions on which the FSAR accident analysis is based. These changes will not adversely affect a structure, system, or component which is required to mitigate the radiological consequences of an accident.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
FVP-250, R0 (S)	This SECL modifies the FSAR description of the operation of the Gaseous Waste System. This change primarily addresses the operation of the compressed gas storage mode.	The waste gas system design pressure bounds the pressure in the compressed gas storage mode of operation. Operation of the system in the compressed gas mode does not change any assumptions about accident initiation. This change does not involve a physical modification to the plant nor a change to instrument setpoints or operating parameters outside the original design basis. This change does not introduce a new failure mode or limiting single failure.
MD 99-2573, R0 (1)	This minor departure adds blank flanges to the duct work around the 1B radwaste exhaust fan while the fan is removed for repairs. This is a temporary change since the fan will be reinstalled after repaired. No changes to the FSAR is required.	The 1B radwaste exhaust fan is inoperable while in the system and its removal will not increase the probability of an accident. The exhaust fan being removed is not safety related. The blank flanges will be built to the same structural specifications as the permanent ductwork.
MD 99-2582, R0 (1)	This minor departure adds blank flanges to the duct work around the 1A radwaste exhaust fan while the fan is removed for repairs. This is a temporary change since the fan will be reinstalled after repaired. No changes to the FSAR is required.	The 1A radwaste exhaust fan is inoperable while in the system and its removal will not increase the probability of an accident. The exhaust fan being removed is not safety related. The blank flanges will be built to the same structural specifications as the permanent ductwork.
MD 99-2603, R0 (S)	This minor departure jumpers the limit switches and warning bell associated with the cask crane due to damage by lightning. This is a temporary change since the items will be returned back to its original condition. No changes to the FSAR is required.	The cask crane will be restricted to not move outside of its safe load path and will not be used to lift safety related equipment. The cask crane will not be used to move fuel. The consequences of an accident are not increased. This minor departure will not create an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.
PDE QC 00-0-0611, R1	This procurement deviation evaluation approved the replacement of 1/8" needle valves on the containment air cooler condensate drains. A figure in the FSAR will be revised to remove the 3/8" size designation for these valves.	These valves are part of the waste processing system which is classified non-safety related. There are no safety or seismic considerations associated with this change. From a design perspective, the valve is equivalent in fit, form, and function. The operation of the system is not affected.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
REA 00-2278, R0 (1)	This Request for Engineering Assistance (REA) approved the use of temporary fluorescent and high pressure sodium (HPS) lighting inside containment for plant outages provided adequate administrative controls are in place. There is no physical change to the FSAR.	The fluorescent / HPS bulbs will be contained with a sealed protective fixture. Administrative controls will prevent using fluorescent / HPS lighting over fuel cavities or other areas where mercury could be introduced into the reactor coolant system. No detrimental effects will be conveyed to any plant components by the use of these temporary light fixtures. If breakage should occur, any small amount of gaseous mercury released will dissipate and be removed with containment ventilation.
REA 94-0645, R0 (S)	This REA eliminates the need for hydrogen recombiners by storing waste gases in the waste gas decay tanks until the radioactivity levels in the gases have reduced below the acceptable levels for discharge into the environment. This design change revises the FSAR to document the increased combustible loading for fire areas 1-1, 1-4, 2-1 and 2-4.	The combustible load due to the stored hydrogen has been evaluated and determined to not adversely affect the maximum fire severity in the affected fire areas. The fire protection provided for these fire areas remain adequate. The storage of waste gases in the waste gas decay tanks remain below the tank's design pressure.
REA 96-1326, R0 (S) (ABN 98-0-1349)	This REA updates the FSAR to provide the technical description for radiation monitors RE-35A and RE-35B and corrects the FSAR to note that isokinetic sampling is not required, nor provided for these monitors.	Isokinetic nozzles are not required to be installed for the Airborne Radioactivity Monitors to be in conformance with ANSI N13.1-1969. The monitors continue to function to provide indication of increased airborne radioactivity, and the sensitivity of these monitors is not affected. The monitors design remains consistent with their design basis. There are no physical changes to the plant, and the interfaces with existing plant equipment remains the same.
REA 97-1638, R0 (S)	This REA revises the FSAR to reflect the replacement of Westinghouse model 51 steam generators (SGs) with Westinghouse model 54F steam generators.	The replacement of the steam generators do not affect the integrity of the fuel assembly or reactor internals such that their function in the control of radiological consequences is affected. No new failure modes for the safety-related equipment is created. No new equipment malfunctions have been introduced that will affect fission product barrier integrity. The model 54F steam generators will have minimal impact on the main feedwater or auxiliary feedwater supporting systems. No new performance requirements are imposed.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
REA 98-1680, R0 (S) (ABN 98-0-1363, R1)	This REA revises the FSAR to reflect the recently revised Post LOCA Hydrogen Generation Analysis calculation for the Post Accident Combustible Gas Control Systems.	The combustible gas control systems are only used in post-accident hydrogen control. The electric hydrogen recombiners and the change to the hydrogen recombiner model will not contribute to offsite dose. No new system performance requirements or failure modes are being introduced. No physical changes to the hydrogen recombiner has been made so that there are any additional system interactions or any new failure mechanisms.
REA 98-1745, R0 (S) (ABN 98-0-1368)	This REA supersedes the fire zone data sheets currently listed in the FSAR with new fire zone data sheets which will better assist the plant's fire brigade in establishing fire fighting strategies.	There are no physical changes to safety related systems, structures, or components. The commitments will continue to be met as presented in Appendix 9B. The fire protection program is not adversely impacted by these changes. These changes will not impact the operation of the plant nor impair the ability of the operators to effectively operate the plant.
REA 98-1754, R0 (S) (ABN 99-0-1342)	This REA has reviewed the impact of including VCT level transmitters LT0112 and LT0115 and their associated circuits in the Appendix R program and their impact on Appendix R compliance. This REA also utilized an ABN to revise the Appendix R Compliance Report referenced in the FSAR to include the transmitters and circuits.	This ABN does not affect the design, function, or method of performing the function of a structure, system, or component described in the FSAR. There are no physical changes to the Plant Farley facility. No set point of any instruments is changed. No design or installation is modified or altered.
REA 98-1823, R0 (S)	This REA revises the FSAR to denote using the Solidification/Dewatering Facility (SDF) for decontamination activities associated with the Steam Generator Replacement (SGR).	Decontamination activities in the SDF will not result in a response of any safety-related system or component to accident scenarios that is different from that postulated in the FSAR. Potential radioactive releases are bounded by previously evaluated activities. Using the SDF for decontamination activities does not introduce any new equipment important to safety or new failure modes of existing equipment.
REA 98-1885, R0 (S) (ABN 99-0-1463)	This REA revises the FSAR to reflect that emergency lighting units with at least an 8-hour battery power supply have not been provided in all areas of the main control room.	Control room lighting is not an accident initiator. There is no physical change to the plant. This change does not add new equipment to the plant, nor does it create new system interactions.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
REA 98-1909, R0 (S)	One of the steam generator biowalls requires removal due to the steam generator replacement. After replacement, the wall will require coating. This REA specifies new coatings since the original coatings are no longer available. The FSAR will be revised to add the new coating system.	The new coatings do not affect the containment environment. Testing has shown that the coatings will not generate any debris during a DBA/LOCA event. The new coatings are equivalent to the original coatings and meet the design requirements for coatings. The new coatings are equivalent in combustible characteristics and thermal properties of the existing coatings so there is no affect to the fire analyses or heat sink evaluations.
REA 99-2022, R0 (S)	This REA denotes the temporary removal of the service water wetpit level circuitry controlled by level switch QSP25LS511-A tc preclude spurious tripping of the Train A river water (RW) pumps. There is no physical change to the FSAR.	The river water system provides no safety-related functions. Temporarily defeating the RW pump auto circuitry will not adversely impact the ability of any plant, structure, or component to perform their safety-related functions. The manual mode of operation for the Train A river water pumps remain available for use as needed. This temporary removal will not affect the required automatic tripping and blocking of the RW pump breakers during LOSP events.
REA 99-2033, R0 (S)	The material being removed from the auxiliary building roof is slightly contaminated with asbestos fibers and low levels of radioactivity and will need to be staged for decay. This SECL evaluated the impact of staging this material in the Complex III warehouse and revises the FSAR.	A review of the containers for storage of the roofing materials including construction, contents, and staging conditions concluded the containers are expected to retain their integrity for five years or more. Staging of these containers is physically remote from all structures, systems, or components (SSCs) important to safety. No releases of radioactive material are expected.
REA 99-2112, R0 (S) (ABN 00-0-1709)	This REA revises the FSAR to clarify analyzed dose equivalent iodine 131 as a function of letdown flow. This 50.59 is limited in scope to implementation of the adjustment factors as a compensatory interim action to ensure the results of the dose analyses are less than or equal to those reported to the NRC.	Implementation of the adjustment factors to DEI has no impact on any precursor to any event in the FSAR. There are no changes to equipment performance or requirements. The adjustment factors do not impact the function, operation, maintenance, or testing of any safety related systems, structures, or components. There is no reduction in the margin of safety.
SCS FS PS SECL, R0 (1) (REA 97-1638, FP 00-0508)	During the Unit 1 Replacement Steam Generator (RSG) heatup to hot standby, piping contact was noted at main whip restraint MSR-1S on C loop. This SECL evaluated re-setting the Main steam (MS) hanger MS5-H18 to a lower setting to relieve the whip restraint interference. FSAR Table 3.6-1 is revised to reflect the new spring can settings.	No new break locations have been identified due to the new stress values. The piping will continue to meet the seismic design requirements. The pipe restraint loads and reaction loads on structures have been evaluated and found to be acceptable. The pipe whip and jet impingement forces are unaffected. The ability of the main steam system to remove decay heat from the reactor has not been changed or reduced.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
SCS FS PS SECL, R0 (1) (REA 97-1638, FP 00-0517)	During the Unit 1 Replacement Steam Generator (RSG) heatup to hot standby, piping contact was noted at main whip restraint MSR-1S on C loop. Main steam (MS) hanger MS5-H18 was set to a lower setting to relieve the whip restraint interference, but the interference was not relieved. This SECL revises the FSAR to returns the spring cans to the original settings.	Stress values in the FSAR have been revised to account for the main steam piping stress analysis. No new break locations have been identified due to the new stress values. These changes will not alter the plant's susceptibility to a seismic event. The design criteria of the main steam system will not change. No new accident initiators are introduced and a new type of accident is not created.
SNC FS LS SECL, R0 (S)	This SECL increases the dose equivalent iodine limits to account for reduced projected end of life (EOL) steam generator tube leakage in the event of a main steam line break. The FSAR is revised to reflect these changes.	The current projected end of cycle steam line break leakage is 8.2 and 2.4 gpm for Unit 1 and 2. These values are well below the limit of 23.8 gpm. The existing margin can be recovered without impacting offsite dose analysis. Calculated offsite dose will remain within regulatory limits at 29.56 rem. at the low population zone boundary. No physical changes to the plant are being made.
SNC FS LS SECL, R0 (S)	This SECL revises the FSAR as a result of changes to the filtration systems Technical Specification approved by the NRC per amendment 145 for Unit 1 and 136 for Unit 2.	The consequences of an accident will not be affected since the proposed changes will continue to ensure the appropriate and required surveillance testing for FNP filtration systems will be performed consistent with the revised accident analyses. No new system design or testing configuration is required for the changes being made. Relocating specific testing requirements to the FNP FSAR has no effect on the probability or consequences of any equipment malfunction previously evaluated since required testing will continue to be performed.
SNC FS LS SECL, R0 (S)	This SECL adds the Quality Assurance (QA) program associated with the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) to the FSAR to assure conformance with regulatory requirements and design bases.	This addition conforms to the NRC requirements for QA programs for ISFSI and essentially adopts the current FNP Appendix B programs for ISFSI with modifications to component classifications. No installed plant equipment is impacted by this change. This change is administrative and only adds additional QA program controls.
SNC FS LS SECL, R0 (S)	This SECL is for evolutions that remove or replace equipment or items in the Unit 1 or Unit 2 spent fuel pool (SFP) areas that cause a SFP area boundary to be breached. No changes to the FSAR is required.	During an evolution requiring the SFP boundary to be breached, no irradiated fuel will be moved in the SFP. No loads of any kind will be moved over the SFP. There are no active or passive activities that will act on an irradiated fuel assembly. Tornado generated missiles will not be a factor since the evolutions will not be done in weather conductive to tornadoes. No equipment important to safety will be impacted by a dropped SFP roof plug because of the plug design.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
SNC FS LS SECL, R15 (S)	This SECL revises the description of accumulator isolation in the FSAR to minimize the potential for overpressurizing the reactor coolant system (RCS).	This change brings the FSAR in agreement with the bases of the Improved Technical Specifications and to describe the more restrictive administrative controls that minimize the potential for RCS overpressurization. These changes do not increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.
SNC FS OPS SECL, R0 (S)	The bleedoff dampers associated with a control room containment isolation signal may be tagged in a de-energized and closed position only during outage maintenance activities. Since this change is only used during outages, no permanent change to the FSAR is required.	Failing these dampers in a closed position would remove the possibility of their failure in an open position. The control room emergency filtration system is designed for accident mitigation and is not a design basis accident initiator. No new failures or failure modes will be introduced by this configuration.
SNC FS OPS SECL, R15 (S)	This SECL removes the specified reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure range required for reactor coolant pump (RCP) operation from the FSAR and replaces it with a description of how the appropriate range is selected for inclusion in individual operating procedures.	Plant operating experience will be used to determine the appropriate RCS pressure ranges needed for procedural changes. This change improves operating flexibility while maintaining the existing margin of safety and equipment protection. RCP operation at lower RCS pressure will have no impact on the fission product inventory available for release. The RCPs will not be adversely affected by operation at lower RCS pressures.
SNC FS TS SECL, R0 (S)	This SECL incorporates appropriate QA classifications for dry storage activities into the quality assurance (QA) program of the FSAR and specifies record retention requirements for records associated with dry storage activities.	These changes are administrative in nature. These changes do not impact the Part 50 Appendix B program as it is applied to Plant Farley. No installed equipment will be impacted by these changes. There are no physical changes to the plant.
W SECL 00-028, R0 (S)	This SECL revises the FSAR to clarify the basis of the Mode 6 boron concentration, and the relationship to the Mode 6 boron concentration assumed in the Mode 6 boron dilution event.	These changes do not impact any of the assumptions or conclusions of the safety analyses. There are no changes to any equipment installed in the plant, no new equipment is added to the plant, and no changes in the manner the plant is operated. The NRC approved methodologies are not being changed.
W SECL 00-029, R0 (S)	This SECL revises the FSAR due to updated nuclear fuel peak clad temperatures (PCT) calculated for both the small break LOCA and the large break LOCA.	The resultant PCT values do not change any LOCA dose assumption. No dose consequences are affected by these changes. No new failure modes for safety-related equipment is created. The safety functions of safety-related systems and components have not been altered. Fission product barrier integrity is not affected.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
W SECL 00-062, R1 (1)	This SECL confirms that the post-accident recirculation flowrate of 4500 gpm is adequate NPSH from the containment sump. The FSAR requires no change since the centrifugal charging pump (CCP) cold leg throttle valves and the residual heat removal (RHR) system butterfly valves will be configured to limit the maximum runout flow from the RHR pumps to 4400 gpm. No FSAR changes are required.	The change in predicted RHR pump runout flow does not adversely affect the ability of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) to respond to accident scenarios. Operation of the RHR pump is acceptable. No RHR pump or system modification is required. No new failure modes have been identified for any system or component important to safety nor has any new limiting single failure been identified.
W SECL 98-071, R1 (S)	This SECL revises the FSAR to clarify FNP compliance considering the smaller flow path clearances of the protective bottom grid/debris filter bottom nozzle (DFBN) interface per Regulatory Guide 1.82.	Although some blockage at the protective bottom grid may occur after switchover following a LOCA, sufficient flow to the core will be maintained. The flow will remain well in excess of the flow required to remove decay heat from the core. The protective bottom grid provides added margin against flow-induced fuel rod vibration and fretting failures within the bottom structural grid. The 10 CFR 50.46 ECCS acceptance criteria will continue to be met.
W SECL 99-003, R1 (S)	This SECL approves the use of fully enriched bottom annular pellets in fuel rods containing Integral Fuel Burnable Absorbers (IFBA). The FSAR was revised to reflect these changes.	There are no detrimental effects associated with annular pellets in the bottom six inches of the fuel stack in IFBA rods. The use of bottom annular pellets, in addition to top annular pellets will not increase the magnitude of the small break LOCA penalty. The bottom annular pellets are an economic benefit compared to alternatives for addressing fuel rod internal pressure margin. The axial blankets will not increase the possibility of fuel failure. The thermal hydraulic characteristics are virtually unchanged.
W SECL 99-007, R1 (S)	This SECL revises the FSAR to reflect the performance of the accumulator discharge check valve test and the branch line flow balance test as periodic tests, in addition to the integrated ECCS test.	Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) integrated or flow balance testing is only performed during refueling or defueled conditions. The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary is unaffected. The structural integrity of the safety-related components and systems is maintained. These tests do not result in modifying any systems or components.
W SECL 99-024, R0 (S)	This SECL impacts the FSAR by reflecting an updated nuclear fuel peak clad temperatures (PCT) calculated for a LBLOCA due to an error from a previous analysis.	No dose consequences are affected by these changes. The resultant PCT value does not change any LOCA dose assumption. No fission product barrier is affected by these changes. No new failure modes for safety-related equipment are created. No new performance requirements are imposed on any safety-related equipment.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
W SECL 99-064, R0 (S)	An evaluation of the Plant Farley non-LOCA analysis modeling versus plant configuration and test methods has resulted in a change to the response time acceptance criteria for the OTdeltaT and OPdeltaT reactor trip functions located in the FSAR.	The purpose of this evaluation is to develop response time testing acceptance criteria based on enveloping values for the temperature sensors to yield sufficient margin for the remaining parts of the system that provides the function. Implementation of the new acceptance criteria for response time testing ensures that the plant complies with the analysis assumptions and does not impact the probability of an event occurring. These changes do not impact the performance of any safety-related equipment.
W SECL 99-130, R1 (S)	This SECL determined the equivalency of using a replacement reconstitutable top nozzle (RRTN) to replace an original reconstitutable top nozzle (RTN) on an irradiated fuel assembly. The FSAR was revised to reflect these changes.	The use of the RRTN design on irradiated fuel assemblies meets the original structural design basis. The reactor coolant system components and reactor internals are not changed by the use of RRTNs. The use of RRTNs will not change the likelihood of an initiating event nor adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the plant's capability to safely shutdown. The RRTN meets all functional and design requirements and does not adversely impact the form, fit, or function of the fuel assembly.
W SECL 99-145, R0 (S)	Emergency core cooling is accomplished by means of the charging/safety injection and residual heat removal pumps following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). This safety evaluation documents the acceptability of eliminating the requirement to alternate flow delivery between the hot legs and cold legs, ensuring there is no boron precipation in the reactor following boiling in the core, if the systems are aligned to deliver flow simultaneously to the cold legs and hot legs. The FSAR was revised to reflect these changes.	Simultaneous hot/cold leg recirculation provides adequate core cooling and boron precipitation control. No changes in assumptions for dose consequences for a LOCA are required. This change will not create any new accident scenarios. No new equipment failures have been identified. No continual exercising of equipment is required, as was required in the alternating hot and cold leg injection.
W SECL 99-155, R0 (S)	The loss of normal feedwater, loss of all AC power to station auxiliaries, and inadvertent operation of emergency core cooling system (ECCS) analyses were re-analyzed to address a modeling deficiency associated with pressurizer heaters and sprays, and to ensure consistency with steam generator replacement (SGR) analyses modeling and input assumptions. The FSAR was revised to reflect these changes.	No dose consequence accidents are affected by these revised assumptions and the subsequent re-analyses. The steam releases for dose calculations are not affected by this re-analyses. No new functions for the heaters or sprays are required. There are no changes to dose analysis mitigation barriers or equipment. No new limiting single failures have been identified. All equipment still meet its design basis.

Identifier	Description	Safety Evaluation Summary
W SECL, R0 (1)	This Cycle 17 reload safety evaluation forms the basis for licensing the Unit 1 Cycle 17 reload core design. The safety evaluation documents that the Unit 1 Cycle 17 reload design and its associated fuel design changes, including the use of the replacement reconstitutable top nozzles to address concerns about fractured top nozzle spring screws, and the use of four Region 15 assemblies inserted in the core to replace four region 18 assemblies, is licensable under 10 CFR 50.59. The FSAR was revised to reflect these changes.	This Cycle 17 design meets all applicable design criteria and ensures that all pertinent licensing basis acceptance criteria are met. Overall reactor system performance is not adversely affected by the reload design. The core overload is not considered an initiator for any FSAR transient. The core design does not have a direct role in mitigating the radiological consequences of any accident, and does not affect any of the current bases for the current analyses as described in the updated FSAR. No additional mass release or fuel failures should result from this reload.

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP)
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Enclosure 2

Technical Specifications Bases Changes

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Enclosure 2
Technical Specifications Bases Changes

No changes were made to the FNP Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases during this reporting period.

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Enclosure 3

Revised NRC Commitments Report

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Enclosure 3

Revised NRC Commitments Report

NRC Commitments Number 3440

This commitment is found in the NRC December 15, 1987 response to Alabama Power Company on the resolution of vendor interface programs, GL 83-23.

Old: The licensee has described a continuing interface with Westinghouse, their NSSS supplier, that includes acknowledgement of receipt of technical information issued in that year so that the licensee can be assured that they possess all pertinent technical information. The licensee has established interfaces similar to that established with their NSSS vendor with Colt Industries, the vendor for their diesel generators, and General Electric. These interfaces include written acknowledgement of receipt of technical information, and, in addition, include issuance of an annual listing of all information issued in that year so that the licensee can be assured that they possess all pertinent technical information.

New: Farley will continue to have a formal program with the NSSS supplier (Westinghouse). The program will contain yearly verification that all applicable technical information has been received during that year.

Basis for Change: Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) is currently participating in the emergency diesel generator owners group that includes FNP's emergency diesel generator original equipment manufacturer (OEM). The OEM has committed to release applicable technical information through the owners group and the 10CFR21 reporting criteria when appropriate. This will continue to insure pertinent information is being reviewed by FNP.

General Electric is the NSSS supplier for SNC – Hatch Nuclear Plant (HNP) and currently has a formal program similar to FNP for their NSSS supplier. FNP will continue to review the pertinent information received by HNP from General Electric.

The current FNP methods of identifying vendor technical information are adequate and combined with the implementation of the Maintenance Rule (10CFR50.65) will minimize the risk of pertinent information not being reviewed for FNP.

NRC Commitments Number 6853

This commitment was originally made in the Alabama Power Company September 9, 1980 response to NRC Power Systems Branch question O40.5.

Old: A sample from each fuel oil storage tank is taken every three months and analyzed for water and sediment in accordance with ASTM D-270-65. Before sampling, the contents of each tank are recirculated for a period of at least two hours. In the event that sample analyses do not meet ASTM D-975-78, the contents of the tank are discharged and fuel oil meeting the requirements of Federal Specification VV-F-800B and ASTM D-975-78 is loaded into the tank.

New: The contents in the bottom of the EDG Fuel Oil Storage tank will be monitored quarterly for water and sediment. If monitoring indicates an unacceptable accumulation of water, the water will be removed or a tank cleaning scheduled. If monitoring indicates an accumulation of unacceptable concentrations of sediment, a tank cleaning will be scheduled.

Basis for Change: The Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) fuel oil storage tanks are currently sampled for water and sediments to meet the requirements of FNP Technical Specifications.

The current commitment takes credit for recirculating the EDG fuel oil storage tank, prior to sampling, to provide assurance that mixing of sediment by filling operations would not cause degradation of the fuel oil quality.

The intent of the commitment was to ensure that EDG fuel quality would be maintained during filling operations of the fuel oil storage tank by ensuring that water and sediment did not accumulate in the bottom of the tank.

The revised commitment is simplified by stating that the tank will be monitored for water and sediment, which will be removed as required. Thus the intent of the commitment is maintained, but the specific details of the method are removed allowing the FNP staff the flexibility to select an appropriate method.

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP)
Revision 16 To The Updated FSAR, 10 CFR 50.59 Report, Technical Specification Bases Change Report, and Revised NRC Commitments Report

Enclosure 4

FNP Updated FSAR, Revision 16

BEFORE THE
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

UNIT NUMBER 1 -- DOCKET NUMBER 50-348
UNIT NUMBER 2 -- DOCKET NUMBER 50-364

REVISION NUMBER 16
TO
THE UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
FOR
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT
UNIT NUMBERS 1 AND 2
UNDER THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954

Southern Nuclear Operating Company hereby files Revision 16 to its Updated Final Safety Analysis Report for Farley Units 1 and 2. The information accurately presents changes made since the previous submittal, necessary to reflect information and analyses submitted to the Commission or prepared pursuant to Commission requirement.

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY

By _____
Dave Morey
Vice President

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME

THIS 10th DAY OF November, 2000

_____
Notary Public

My Commission Expires: November 1, 2001

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP)
Revision 16 To The Updated FSAR, 10 CFR 50.59 Report, Technical Specification Bases Change Report, and Revised NRC Commitments Report

Enclosure 5

Project Drawings