

50-394/412



**UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

May 27, 1998

Mr. J. E. Cross  
President-Generation Group  
Duquesne Light Company  
Post Office Box 4  
Shippingport, PA 15077

**SUBJECT: BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 (TAC NOS. MA1247  
AND MA1248)**

Dear Mr. Cross:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 214 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-66 and Amendment No. 91 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-73 for the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. These amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated March 17, 1998, as supplemented May 14, 1998, which submitted License Amendment Request Nos. 249 and 118.

These amendments revise Action 34 of TS Table 3.3-3, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation." Action 34 is applicable to Functional Units 6.b., "Grid Degraded Voltage (4.16 kV Bus)," and 6.c., "Grid Degraded Voltage (480 v Bus)." Revised Action 34 requires that with one degraded grid voltage monitoring channel inoperable, the inoperable channel be placed in the tripped condition within one hour; otherwise, immediately enter the applicable action statement(s) for the associated emergency diesel generator made inoperable by the degraded voltage start instrumentation. The revision to Action 34 also requires that with two degraded grid voltage monitoring channels inoperable, within one hour restore at least one of the channels to operable status and place the other channel in the tripped condition; otherwise, the associated emergency diesel generator would be declared inoperable and its applicable action statement(s) entered. Corresponding changes have also been made in the bases for TS 3/4.3.2 and the BVPS-2 TS Index pages.

Your application for this amendment was complete and addressed the relevant issues as submitted. The application's no significant hazards consideration determination was suitable for use without changes and the environmental consideration was appropriate.

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A copy of our safety evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/s/

Donald S. Brinkman, Senior Project Manager  
Project Directorate I-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-334 and 50-412

- Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 214 to DPR-66
- 2. Amendment No. 91 to NPF-73
- 3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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
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J. E. Cross

- 2 -

A copy of our safety evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,



Donald S. Brinkman, Senior Project Manager  
Project Directorate I-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-334 and 50-412

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 214 to DPR-66  
2. Amendment No. 91 to NPF-73  
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

**J. E. Cross  
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**Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 & 2**

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**UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

OHIO EDISON COMPANY

PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-334

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No.214  
License No. DPR-66

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Duquesne Light Company, et al. (the licensee) dated March 17, 1998, as supplemented May 14, 1998, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-66 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 214, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, to be implemented within 60 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Robert A. Capra, Director  
Project Directorate I-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 27, 1998

**ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.214**

**FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-66**

**DOCKET NO. 50-334**

Replace the following pages of Appendix A Technical Specifications, with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

**Remove**

**3/4 3-21**

**B 3/4 3-1b**

**Insert**

**3/4 3-21**

**B 3/4 3-1b**

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)ACTION STATEMENTS

- ACTION 33 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, the Emergency Diesel Generator associated with the 4kv Bus shall be declared inoperable and the ACTION Statements for Specification 3.8.1.1 or Specification 3.8.1.2, as appropriate, shall apply.
- ACTION 34 - a. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Number of Channels, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 1 hour; otherwise, immediately enter the applicable ACTION statement(s) for the associated Emergency Diesel Generator made inoperable by the degraded voltage start instrumentation.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE channels two less than the Minimum Number of Channels, restore at least one of the two channels to OPERABLE status and place the other in the tripped condition within 1 hour; otherwise, immediately enter the applicable ACTION statement(s) for the associated Emergency Diesel Generator made inoperable by the degraded voltage start instrumentation.
- ACTION 36 - The block of the automatic actuation logic introduced by a reset of safety injection shall be removed by resetting (closure) of the reactor trip breakers within one hour of an inadvertent initiation of safety injection providing that all trip input signals have reset due to stable plant conditions. Otherwise, the requirements of ACTION statement 13 shall have been met.
- ACTION 37 - Not applicable.
- ACTION 38 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within one hour determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window(s) (bistable status lights or computer checks) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.

INSTRUMENTATIONBASES3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 PROTECTIVE AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF)  
INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

Below the setpoint P-11 allows the manual block of safety injection actuation on low pressurizer pressure, allows manual block of safety injection and steamline isolation on low steamline pressure (with Loop Stop Valves Open) and enabling steamline isolation on high steam pressure rate, automatically disables auto actuation of the pressurizer PORVs unless the Reactor Vessel Over Pressure Protection System is in service.

P-12 Above the setpoint P-12 automatically reinstates an arming signal to the steam dump system. Below the setpoint P-12 blocks steam dump and allows manual bypass of the steam dump block to cooldown condenser dump valves.

Table 3.3-1 Action 2 has been modified by two notes. Note (4) allows placing the inoperable channel in the bypass condition for up to 4 hours while performing: a) routine surveillance testing of other channels, and b) setpoint adjustments of other channels when required to reduce the setpoint in accordance with other technical specifications. The 4 hour time limit is justified in accordance with WCAP-10271-P-A, Supplement 2, Revision 1, June 1990. Note (5) only requires SR 4.2.4 to be performed if a Power Range High Neutron Flux channel input to QPTR becomes inoperable. Failure of a component in the Power Range High Neutron Flux channel which renders the High Neutron Flux trip function inoperable may not affect the capability to monitor QPTR. As such, determining QPTR using the movable incore detectors once per 12 hours may not be necessary.

The following discussion pertains to Table 3.3-3, Functional Units 6.b and 6.c and the associated ACTION 34. The degraded voltage protection instrumentation system will automatically initiate the separation of the offsite power sources from the emergency buses. This action results in an automatic diesel generator start signal being generated as a direct result of the supply breakers opening between the normal and emergency buses. The failure of the degraded voltage protection system results in a loss of one of the automatic start signals for the diesel generator. Therefore, the ACTION statement requires the affected diesel generator to be declared inoperable if the required actions cannot be met within the specified time period.



**UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001**

**DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY**

**OHIO EDISON COMPANY**

**THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY**

**THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY**

**DOCKET NO. 50-412**

**BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT 2**

**AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE**

Amendment No. 91  
License No. NPF-73

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Duquesne Light Company, et al. (the licensee) dated March 17, 1998, as supplemented May 14, 1998, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-73 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 91, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto are hereby incorporated in the license. DLCO shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, to be implemented within 60 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Robert A. Capra, Director  
Project Directorate I-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 27, 1998

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 91

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-73

DOCKET NO. 50-412

Replace the following pages of Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

<u>Remove</u>	<u>Insert</u>
x	x
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B 3/4 3-4	B 3/4 3-4
B 3/4 3-5	B 3/4 3-5
B 3/4 3-6	B 3/4 3-6

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BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2	X
	Amendment No. 91

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)ACTION STATEMENTS

- ACTION 33 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, the Emergency Diesel Generator associated with the 4kv Bus shall be declared inoperable and the ACTION Statements for Specifications 3.8.1.1 or 3.8.1.2, as appropriate, shall apply.
- ACTION 34 - a. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Number of Channels, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 1 hour; otherwise, immediately enter the applicable ACTION statement(s) for the associated Emergency Diesel Generator made inoperable by the degraded voltage start instrumentation.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE channels two less than the Minimum Number of Channels, restore at least one of the two channels to OPERABLE status and place the other in the tripped condition within 1 hour; otherwise, immediately enter the applicable ACTION statement(s) for the associated Emergency Diesel Generator made inoperable by the degraded voltage start instrumentation.
- ACTION 36 - The block of the automatic actuation logic introduced by a reset of safety injection shall be removed by resetting (closure) of the reactor trip breakers within one hour of an inadvertent initiation of safety injection providing that all trip input signals have reset due to stable plant conditions. Otherwise, the requirements of ACTION Statement 13 shall have been met.
- ACTION 37 - (This ACTION is not used)
- ACTION 38 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within one hour determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window(s) (bistable status lights or computer checks) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.
- ACTION 41 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or declare the associated valve inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.5.

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATIONBASES3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

Table 3.3-1 Action 2 has been modified by two notes. Note (4) allows placing the inoperable channel in the bypass condition for up to 4 hours while performing: a) routine surveillance testing of other channels, and b) setpoint adjustments of other channels when required to reduce the setpoint in accordance with other technical specifications. The 4 hour time limit is justified in accordance with WCAP-10271-P-A, Supplement 2, Revision 1, June 1990. Note (5) only requires SR 4.2.4 to be performed if a Power Range High Neutron Flux channel input to QPTR becomes inoperable. Failure of a component in the Power Range High Neutron Flux channel which renders the High Neutron Flux trip function inoperable may not affect the capability to monitor QPTR. As such, determining QPTR using the movable incore detectors once per 12 hours may not be necessary.

The following discussion pertains to Table 3.3-3, Functional Units 6.b and 6.c and the associated ACTION 34. The degraded voltage protection instrumentation system will automatically initiate the separation of the offsite power sources from the emergency buses. This action results in an automatic diesel generator start signal being generated as a direct result of the supply breakers opening between the normal and emergency buses. The failure of the degraded voltage protection system results in a loss of one of the automatic start signals for the diesel generator. Therefore, the ACTION statement requires the affected diesel generator to be declared inoperable if the required actions cannot be met within the specified time period.

3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION3/4.3.3.1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring channels ensures that: 1) the radiation levels are continually measured in the areas served by the individual channels; 2) the alarm or automatic action is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is exceeded; and 3) sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," October, 1980.

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATIONBASES

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3/4.3.3.2 MOVABLE INCORE DETECTORS

The OPERABILITY of the movable incore detectors with the specified minimum complement of equipment ensures that the measurements obtained from use of this system accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the reactor core. The OPERABILITY of this system is demonstrated by irradiating each detector used and determining the acceptability of its voltage curve.

For the purpose of measuring  $F_Q(Z)$  or  $F_{\Delta H}^N$ , a full incore flux map is used. Quarter-core flux maps, as defined in WCAP-8648, June 1976, may be used in re-calibration of the excore neutron flux detection system, and full incore flux maps or symmetric incore thimbles may be used for monitoring the Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio when one Power Range Channel is inoperable.

3/4.3.3.3 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the seismic instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluate the response of those features important to safety. This capability is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for the facility and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.12, "Instrumentation for Earthquakes."

3/4.3.3.4 METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the meteorological instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data is available for estimating potential radiation doses to the public as a result of routine or accidental release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere. This capability is required to evaluate the need for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the public and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.23, "Onsite Meteorological Programs."

3/4.3.3.5 REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of HOT STANDBY of the facility from locations outside of the control room. This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criteria 19 of 10 CFR 50.

3/4.3.3.6 (This Specification number is not used).

BASES

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3/4.3.3.7 CHLORINE DETECTION SYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of the chlorine detection systems ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly detect and initiate protective action in the event of an accidental chlorine release. This capability is required to protect control room personnel and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.95, "Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators Against an Accidental Chlorine Release," January 1977.

3/4.3.3.8 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables during and following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1975 and NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations."

3/4.3.3.11 EXPLOSIVE GAS MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

This instrumentation includes provisions for monitoring (and controlling) the concentrations of potentially explosive gas mixtures in the waste gas holdup system. The OPERABILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63 and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

3/4.3.4 TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION

This specification is provided to ensure that the turbine overspeed protection instrumentation and the turbine speed control valves are OPERABLE and will protect the turbine from excessive overspeed. Protection from turbine excessive overspeed is required since excessive overspeed of the turbine could generate potentially damaging missiles which could impact and damage safety related components, equipment or structures.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 214 AND 91 TO FACILITY OPERATING

LICENSE NOS. DPR-66 AND NPF-73

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

OHIO EDISON COMPANY

PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY

THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-334 AND 50-412

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated March 17, 1998, as supplemented May 14, 1998, the Duquesne Light Company (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (BVPS-1 and BVPS-2) Technical Specifications (TSs). The requested changes would revise Action 34 of TS Table 3.3-3, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation." Action 34 is applicable to Functional Units 6.b., "Grid Degraded Voltage (4.16 kV Bus)," and 6.c., "Grid Degraded Voltage (480 v Bus)." The proposed revision to Action 34 would require that with one degraded grid voltage monitoring channel inoperable, the inoperable channel be placed in the tripped condition within one hour; otherwise, the applicable action statement(s) for the associated emergency diesel generator (EDG) made inoperable by the degraded voltage start instrumentation be immediately entered. The proposed revision Action 34 would also require that with two degraded grid voltage monitoring channels inoperable, within one hour at least one of the channels be restored to operable status and the other channel be placed in the tripped condition; otherwise, the associated EDG would be declared inoperable and its applicable action statement(s) entered. Corresponding changes would also be made in the bases for TS 3/4.3.2 and BVPS-2 TS Index page x. The May 14, 1998, letter provided minor editorial changes to the TS pages that did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination or expand the amendment request beyond the scope of the April 22, 1998, Federal Register notice.

2.0 EVALUATION

The 4160-volt emergency buses (and their associated emergency loads) are each protected from degraded voltage conditions by two undervoltage relays per bus. Items 6.b. and 6.c. of TS Table 3.3-3 require that the minimum channels operable is two per bus. The undervoltage relays are connected in series to provide a 2-out-of-2 logic. The undervoltage relays actuate to disconnect the emergency buses from their normal supply if the bus voltage decreases below

90% of the nominal bus voltage. The 2-out-of-2 logic is provided to preclude inadvertent disconnection of the buses from their normal supply. The undervoltage relays are also provided with time delays to prevent unnecessary actuations in the event of short duration voltage transients. Upon actuation of these undervoltage relays, loads are shed from the emergency bus and the associated EDG is started. When the EDG achieves rated voltage and frequency, the EDG output breaker closes and the emergency loads are loaded on it by the load sequencer. The EDG then provides electrical power to the emergency loads.

The 480-volt emergency buses are provided with degraded voltage protection logic similar to that provided for the 4160-volt emergency buses.

Action 34 of TS Table 3.3-3 is provided to specify the actions to be taken in the event one of these undervoltage relays is inoperable. Currently, Action 34 (which was revised by License Amendment Nos. 181 (BVPS-1) and 61 (BVPS-2) issued on August 8, 1994) states that with the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the total number of channels (2 per bus), STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied: a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per TS 4.3.2.1.1. However, the current version of Action 34 is inappropriate for Items 6.b. and 6.c. of TS Table 3.3-3 since as noted above, there are only two channels per bus and therefore with one inoperable channel, the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement of two channels cannot be met. Therefore, the licensee proposed to modify Action 34 to read as follows:

- a. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Number of Channels, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 1 hour; otherwise, immediately enter the applicable ACTION statement(s) for the associated Emergency Diesel Generator made inoperable by the degraded voltage start instrumentation.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE channels two less than the Minimum Number of Channels, restore at least one of the two channels to OPERABLE status and place the other in the tripped condition within 1 hour; otherwise, immediately enter the applicable ACTION statement(s) for the associated Emergency Diesel Generator made inoperable by the degraded voltage start instrumentation.

The proposed revision to part a. of Action 34 requires that with one channel inoperable, the inoperable channel be placed in the tripped condition within one hour. Placing the one inoperable channel in the tripped condition completes one half of the 2-out-of-2 logic and the trip function could then be completed if the remaining operable channel detected a degraded grid voltage condition. Since part of the function of the degraded grid voltage instrumentation and logic is to automatically initiate separation of the offsite power sources from the emergency buses (which results in an automatic restart of the associated EDG) it is necessary to consider the associated EDG inoperable if this automatic separation feature cannot perform its intended function. Therefore, it is also necessary to enter the applicable action statements(s) for the associated EDG if the inoperable channel is not placed in the tripped condition.

The proposed revision to part b. of Action 34 requires that with two channels inoperable, at least one channel be restored to operable status and the other channel be placed in the tripped condition within one hour. This is necessary to prevent a loss of function. Upon restoring one channel to operable status and placing the second channel in the tripped condition, the situation reverts to that described in part a. of Action 34. Otherwise it is again appropriate to enter the applicable action statement(s) for the associated EDG.

The proposed revisions to Action 34 are consistent with current NRC staff guidance for actions to be taken for inoperable grid voltage monitoring channels in similar 2-out-of-2 logic arrangements as reflected in the NRC's Improved Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Plants (NUREG-1431, Revision 1). Therefore, the proposed revisions to Action 34 are acceptable.

The proposed revision to the bases for TS 3/4.3.2 provides additional clarification on the connection between the failure of the degraded grid voltage protection system and the resultant inoperability of the affected EDG. Therefore, the NRC staff offers no objection to the proposed bases change.

The proposed revision to the BVPS-2 TS Index page x is editorial in nature only and is therefore acceptable.

### 3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Pennsylvania State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

### 4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (63 FR 19969). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

### 5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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