

February 22, 1985

Docket No. 50-334

DISTRIBUTION

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SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT (LICENSING ACTIONS TAC 55458,  
57068, 57069 AND 57070)

Dear Mr. Carey:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 91 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-66 for the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated October 10, 1984.

The amendment changes the Technical Specifications for Beaver Valley Unit No. 1 to eliminate the Tables listing all mechanical and hydraulic snubbers, to add a new surveillance requirement on the recirculation spray subsystem, and to clarify a number of existing specifications.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular monthly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/s/PTam

Peter S. Tam, Project Manager  
Operating Reactors Branch No. 1  
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 91 to DPR-66
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:  
See next page

ORB#1:DL  
CParrish  
2/1/85

ORB#1:DL  
PTam  
2/7/85

C-ORB#1:DL  
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2/8/85

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Beaver Valley Power Station  
Unit 1

- 2 -

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY  
OHIO EDISON COMPANY  
PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY  
DOCKET NO. 50-334

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1  
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 91  
License No. DPR-66

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Duquesne Light Company, Ohio Edison Company, and Pennsylvania Power Company (the licensees) dated October 10, 1984, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-66 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 91, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This amendment is effective on issuance, to be implemented no later than 30 days after issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

*Donald C. Frocher /sv*

Steven A. Varga, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #1  
Division of Licensing

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical --  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 22, 1985

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 91 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-66

DOCKET NO. 50-334

Revise Appendix A as follows:

<u>Remove Pages</u>	<u>Insert Pages</u>
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3/4 3-57	3/4 3-57
3/4 3-58	3/4 3-58
3/4 6-14	3/4 6-14
3/4 7-26	3/4 7-26
3/4 7-28	3/4 7-28
3/4 7-29	3/4 7-29
3/4 7-30 thru 3/4 7-33a	---
6-24	6-24
3/4 10-1	3/4 10-1

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### 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

#### 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL

SHUTDOWN MARGIN -  $T_{avg} > 200^{\circ}F$

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be  $\geq 1.77\% \Delta k/k$ .

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2\*, 3, and 4.

#### ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN  $< 1.77\% \Delta k/k$ , immediately initiate and continue boration at  $\geq 30$  gpm of 7000 ppm boric acid solution or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be  $\geq 1.77\% \Delta k/k$ :

- a. Within one hour after detection of an inoperable control rod(s) and at least once per 12 hours thereafter while the rod(s) is inoperable. If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be increased by an amount at least equal to the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod(s).
- b. When in MODES 1 or 2, # at least once per 12 hours by verifying that control bank withdrawal is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.
- c. When in MODE 2, ## at least once during control rod withdrawal and at least once per hour thereafter until the reactor is critical.
- d. Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, by consideration of the factors of e below, with the control banks at the maximum insertion limit of Specification 3.1.3.6.

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\* See Special Test Exception 3.10.1

# With  $K_{eff} \geq 1.0$

## With  $K_{eff} < 1.0$

TABLE 4.3-12

**RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT MONITORING  
INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS**

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>SOURCE CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>	<u>CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST</u>
<b>1. Gross Beta or Gamma Radioactivity Monitors Providing Alarm and Automatic Termination of Release</b>				
a. Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line (RM-LW-104)	D	P(5)	R(3)	Q(1)
b. Liquid Waste Contaminated Drain Line (RM-LW-116)	D	P(5)	R(3)	Q(1)
c. Auxiliary Feed Pump Bay Drain Monitor (RM-DA-100)	D	D	R(3)	Q(6)
<b>2. Gross Beta or Gamma Radioactivity Monitors Providing Alarm but not providing Automatic Termination of Release</b>				
a. Component Cooling - Recirculation Spray D Heat Exchangers River Water Monitor (RM-RW-100)		M(5)	R(3)	Q(2)
<b>3. Flow Rate Monitors</b>				
a. Liquid Radwaste Effluent Lines  (1) FR-LW-103/RM-LW-116 (2) FR-LW-104/RM-LW-104	D(4)	NA	R	Q
b. Cooling Tower Blowdown Line (FT-CW-101, 101-1)	D(4)	NA	R	Q

TABLE 4.3-12 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION

- (1) - The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that automatic isolation of this pathway and Control Room Alarm Annunciation occurs if any of the following conditions exist:
1. Instrument indicates measured levels above the alarm/trip setpoint.
  2. Downscale failure.
  3. Instrument controls not set in operate mode.
- (2) - The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that control room alarm annunciation occurs if any of the following conditions exist:
1. Instrument indicates measured levels above the alarm/trip setpoint.
  2. Downscale failure.
  3. Instrument controls are not set in operate mode.
- (3) - The initial CHANNEL CALIBRATION for radioactivity measurement instrumentation shall be performed using one or more of the reference standards certified by the National Bureau of Standards or using standards that have been obtained from suppliers that participate in measurement assurance activities with NBS. These standards should permit calibrating the system over its intended range of energy and rate capabilities. For subsequent CHANNEL CALIBRATION, sources that have been related to the initial calibration should be used, at intervals of at least once per eighteen months. This can normally be accomplished during refueling outages. (Existing plants may substitute previously established calibration procedures for this requirement).
- (4) - CHANNEL CHECK shall consist of verifying indication of flow during periods of release. CHANNEL CHECK shall be made at least once daily on any day on which continuous, periodic, or batch releases are made.
- (5) - A source check may be performed utilizing the installed means or flashing the detector with a portable source to obtain an upscale increase in the existing count rate to verify channel response.
- (6) - The Channel Functional Test shall also demonstrate that automatic isolation of this pathway and Control Room Alarm Annunciation occurs when the instrument indicates measured levels above the Alarm/Trip Setpoint.
- The Channel Functional Test shall also demonstrate that Control Alarm Annunciation occurs if any of the following conditions exists:
1. Downscale Failure
  2. Instrument controls are not set in operate mode.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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- b. At least once per 18 months by verifying that on a Containment Pressure-High-High signal, the recirculation spray pumps start automatically as follows:
- |                     |                      |
|---------------------|----------------------|
| RS-P-1A and RS-P-2B | 210 ± 5 second delay |
| RS-P-2A and RS-P-1B | 225 ± 5 second delay |
- c. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by verifying, that on recirculation flow, each outside recirculation spray pump develops a discharge pressure of  $\geq 115$  psig at a flow of  $\geq 2000$  gpm.
- d. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by:
1. Cycling each power operated (excluding automatic) valve in the flow path not testable during plant operation, through at least one complete cycle of full travel.
  2. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a test signal.
  3. Initiating flow through each River Water subsystem and its two associated recirculation spray heat exchangers, and verifying a flow rate of at least 8000 gpm.
- e. At least once per 5 years by performing an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.

PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.12 SNUBBERS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.12 All snubbers shall be OPERABLE. The only snubbers excluded from this requirement are those installed on non safety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed, would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. (MODES 5 and 6 for snubbers located on systems\*\* required OPERABLE in those MODES).

ACTION:

With one or more snubbers inoperable, within 72 hours replace or restore the inoperable snubber(s) to OPERABLE status and perform an engineering evaluation per Specification 4.7.12.c on the supported component or declare the supported system inoperable and follow the appropriate ACTION statement for that system.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.12 Each snubber shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following augmented inservice inspection program and the requirements of Specification 4.0.5.

a. Visual Inspections

The first inservice visual inspection of snubbers shall be performed after four months but within 10 months of commencing POWER OPERATION and shall include all snubbers. If less than two (2) snubbers are found inoperable during the first inservice visual inspection, the second inservice visual inspection shall be performed 12 months  $\pm$  25% from the date of the first inspection. Otherwise, subsequent visual inspections shall be performed in accordance with the following schedule:

<u>No. Inoperable Snubbers per Inspection Period</u>	<u>Subsequent Visual Inspection Period* #</u>
0	18 months $\pm$ 25%
1	12 months $\pm$ 25%
2	6 months $\pm$ 25%
3,4	124 days $\pm$ 25%
5,6,7	62 days $\pm$ 25%
8 or more	31 days $\pm$ 25%

The snubbers may be categorized into two groups: those accessible and those inaccessible during reactor operation. Each group may be inspected independently in accordance with the above schedule.

\* The inspection interval shall not be lengthened more than one step at a time.

# The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

\*\* These systems are defined as those portions or subsystems required to prevent releases in excess of 10 CFR 100 limits.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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Snubbers that are especially difficult to remove or in high radiation zones during shutdown shall also be included in the representative sample\*

If a spare snubber has been installed in place of a failed snubber, the spare snubber shall be retested. Test results of this snubber may not be included for the re-sampling.

If any snubber selected for functional testing either fails to lockup or fails to move, i.e., frozen in place, the cause will be evaluated and if caused by manufacturer or design deficiency all snubbers of the same design subject to the same defect shall be functionally tested. This testing requirement shall be independent of the requirements stated above for snubbers not meeting the functional test acceptance criteria.

For the snubber(s) found inoperable, an engineering evaluation shall be performed on the components which are supported by the snubber(s). The purpose of this engineering evaluation shall be to determine if the components supported by the snubber(s) were adversely affected by the inoperability of the snubber(s) in order to ensure that the supported component remains capable of meeting the designed service.

#### d. Hydraulic Snubbers Functional Test Acceptance Criteria

The hydraulic snubber functional test shall verify that:

1. Activation (restraining action) is achieved within the specified range of velocity or acceleration in both tension and compression.
2. Snubber bleed, or release rate, where required, is within the specified range in compression or tension. For snubbers specifically required to not displace under continuous load, the ability of the snubber to withstand load without displacement shall be verified.

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\* Permanent or other exemptions from functional testing for individual snubbers in these categories may be granted by the Commission only if a justifiable basis for exemption is presented and/or snubber life destructive testing was performed to qualify snubber operability for all design conditions at either the completion of their fabrication or at a subsequent date.

PLANT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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e. Mechanical Snubbers Functional Test Acceptance Criteria

The mechanical snubber functional test shall verify that:

1. The force that initiates free movement of the snubber rod in either tension or compression is less than the specified maximum drag force.
2. Activation (restraining action) is achieved within the specified range of velocity or acceleration in both tension and compression.
3. Snubber release rate, where required, is within the specified range in compression or tension. For snubbers specifically required not to displace under continuous load, the ability of the snubber to withstand load without displacement shall be verified.

f. Snubber Service Life Monitoring\*

A record of the service life of each snubber, the date at which the designated service life commences and the installation and maintenance records on which the designated service life is based shall be maintained as required by Specification 6.10.2.m.

Concurrent with the first in-service visual inspection and at least once per 18 months thereafter, the installation and maintenance records for each snubber shall be reviewed to verify that the indicated service life has not been exceeded or will not be exceeded prior to the next scheduled snubber service life review. If the indicated service life will be exceeded prior to the next scheduled snubber service life review, the snubber service shall be reevaluated or the snubber shall be replaced or reconditioned so as to extend its service life beyond the date of the next scheduled service life review. This reevaluation, replacement or reconditioning shall be indicated in the records.

- \* For purposes of establishing a baseline for the determination of service life monitoring, this program will be implemented over 3 successive refueling periods.

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

6.10.2 The following records shall be retained for the duration of the Facility Operating License:

- a. Records and drawing changes reflecting facility design modifications made to systems and equipment described in the Final Safety Analysis Report.
- b. Records of new irradiated fuel inventory, fuel transfers and assembly burnup histories.
- c. Records of facility radiation and contamination surveys.
- d. Records of radiation exposure for all individuals entering radiation control areas.
- e. Records of gaseous and liquid radioactive material released to the environs.
- f. Records of transient or operational cycles for those facility components designed for a limited number of transients or cycles.
- g. Records of training and qualification for current members of the plant staff.
- h. Records of in-service inspections performed pursuant to these Technical Specifications.
- i. Records of Quality Assurance activities required by the QA Manual.
- j. Records of reviews performed for changes made to procedures or equipment or reviews of tests and experiments pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.
- k. Records of meetings of the OSC and the ORC.
- l. Records for Environmental Qualification which are covered under the provisions of paragraph 6.13.
- m. Records of the service lives of all hydraulic and mechanical snubbers including the date at which the service life commences and associated installation and maintenance records.
- n. Records of analyses required by the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program.

### 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS

#### SHUTDOWN MARGIN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.10.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 may be suspended for measurement of control rod worth and shutdown margin provided the reactivity equivalent to at least the highest estimated control rod worth is available for trip insertion from OPERABLE control rod(s).

APPLICABILITY: MODE 2

ACTION:

- a. With the reactor critical ( $K_{eff} \geq 1.0$ ) and with less than the above reactivity equivalent available for trip insertion, immediately initiate and continue boration at  $\geq 30$  gpm of 7000 ppm boric acid solution or its equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is restored.
- b. With the reactor subcritical ( $K_{eff} < 1.0$ ) by less than the above reactivity equivalent, immediately initiate and continue boration at  $\geq 30$  gpm of 7000 ppm boric acid solution or its equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is restored.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.10.1.1 The position of each full length rod either partially or fully withdrawn shall be determined at least once per 2 hours.

4.10.1.2 Each full length rod not fully inserted shall be demonstrated capable of full insertion when tripped from at least the 50% withdrawn position within 24 hours prior to reducing the SHUTDOWN MARGIN to less than the limits of Specification 3.1.1.1.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 91 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-66

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

OHIO EDISON COMPANY

PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-334

Introduction

NRC Generic Letter 84-13, dated May 3, 1984, discussed revised technical specifications for snubbers and recommended that licensees amend their technical specifications to be consistent with the revised guidance. By letter dated October 10, 1984, Duquesne Light Company (the licensee) submitted a proposed amendment to the Technical Specifications (Appendix A of Operating License No. DPR-66) for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1, to accomplish this. Further, the proposed amendment contains changes to correct certain editorial errors and to revise certain surveillance requirements. We have reviewed the requested changes and the results are as follows.

Evaluation and Discussion

Currently, Tables 3.7-4a and 3.7-4b of Specification 3.7.12 list all snubbers required to be operable. The licensee proposes to delete the Tables and to simply require that all snubbers be operable except those snubbers on nonsafety-related systems whose failure would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system. Further, the licensee proposes to delete references to the Tables in Specifications 4.7.12 and 6.10.2.m. These proposed changes are intended to reduce the number of changes that have been needed to accurately maintain the tabular listings, and are in conformance with the recommended changes of NRC Generic Letter 84-13. The deletion of the Tables is acceptable.

Currently, note (1) to Table 4.3-12 requires that the quarterly channel functional test of instrument 1.c. (Auxiliary Feed Pump Bay Drain Monitor, RM-DA-100) demonstrate that automatic pathway isolation occurs for both instrument downscale failure and instrument controls not set in operate mode. The licensee proposes to delete this requirement, and to add a new note (6) which specifies the remaining requirements of demonstrating automatic pathway isolation and Control Room Annunciation when the instrument levels are above the alarm/trip setpoint, and Control Room Alarm Annunciation when instrument fails downscale or instrument controls are not set in the operate mode. The licensee states that the monitor does not have

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the capability of automatic pathway isolation for downscale failure or controls not in operate mode and that the existing technical specification cannot be met. Further, the licensee states that operator action in response to the Control Room Alarm Annunciation is acceptable for downscale failure or controls not set in operate mode for this radioactivity monitor due to the very low contamination levels in the auxiliary feed pump bay. In a January 16, 1985 telephone conversation, a licensee representative, R. Ireland, agreed to editorial changes for clarification of the proposed requirements. The proposed change, as modified, is acceptable.

The licensee proposes to add an additional surveillance requirement for the Containment Recirculation Spray System as Specification 4.6.2.2.d.3. This would require the licensee to verify that, at least once per 18 months during shutdown, sufficient river water flow exists through the containment recirculation spray heat exchangers. In a January 17, 1985 telephone discussion, a licensee representative, K. Grada, agreed to editorial changes for clarification of the proposed requirement. The proposed change, as modified, is acceptable.

The licensee proposes to correct editorial errors in Specifications 3.10.1 (delete "and") and 4.1.1.1.b and d (correct reference). The proposed corrections are acceptable.

We have evaluated the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications and conclude that these changes are administrative and do not involve any physical change to the plant's safety-related structures, systems or components. Further, these changes do not increase the likelihood of a malfunction of safety-related equipment, or increase the consequences of an accident previously analyzed or create the possibility of a malfunction different from those previously evaluated. Therefore, as stated above, we find the licensee's requested changes to be acceptable.

#### Environmental Consideration

This amendment involves a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Sec 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

#### Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:  
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the

public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: February 22, 1985

Principal Contributors:

Glenn W. Meyer