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Docket No. 50-334

Mr. J. J. Carey, Vice President
Duquesne Light Company
Nuclear Division
Post Office Box 4
Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077

Dear Mr. Carey:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 62 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-66 for the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application transmitted by letter dated October 27, 1978, supplemented by letter dated November 3, 1982.

The amendment changes the Technical Specification such that the anticipatory reactor trip on turbine trip may be bypassed when the plant is at 50% rated power or below.

Additionally, we conclude that the guidelines of the TMI Action Item II.K.3.10, "Proposed Anticipatory Trip Modification," are satisfied.

Copies of the Safety Evaluation and the Notice of Issuance are also proposed.

Sincerely,

~~ORIGINAL SIGNED~~

Peter S. Tam, Project Manager
Operating Reactors Branch #1,
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:

- 1. Amendment No. 62 to DPR-66
- 2. Safety Evaluation
- 3. Notice of Issuance

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

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Mr. J. J. Carey
Duquesne Light Company

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Mr. J. J. Carey
Duquesne Light Company

cc: Regional Radiation Representatives
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

OHIO EDISON COMPANY

PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-334

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 62
License No. DPR-66

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Duquesne Light Company, Ohio Edison Company, and Pennsylvania Power Company (the licensees) dated October 27, 1978, supplemented by letter dated November 3, 1982, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-66 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 62, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Steven A. Varga, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: January 26, 1983

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 62 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-66

DOCKET NO. 50-334

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages

B2-7

3/4 3-7

3/4 3-8

Insert Pages

B2-7

3/4 3-7

3/4 3-8

LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

BASES

reliability of the Reactor Protection System. This trip is redundant to the Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low trip. The Steam/Feedwater Flow Mismatch portion of this trip is activated when the steam flow exceeds the feedwater flow by $\leq 1.55 \times 10^6$ lbs/hour. The Steam Generator Low Water level portion of the trip is activated when the water level drops below 25 percent, as indicated by the narrow range instrument. These trip values include sufficient allowance in excess of normal operating values to preclude spurious trips but will initiate a reactor trip before the steam generators are dry. Therefore, the required capacity and starting time requirements of the auxiliary feedwater pumps are reduced and the resulting thermal transient on the Reactor Coolant System and steam generators is minimized.

Undervoltage and Underfrequency - Reactor Coolant Pump Busses

The Undervoltage and Underfrequency Reactor Coolant Pump bus trips provide reactor core protection against DNB as a result of loss of voltage or underfrequency to more than one reactor coolant pump. The specified set points assure a reactor trip signal is generated before the low flow trip set point is reached. Time delays are incorporated in the underfrequency and undervoltage trips to prevent spurious reactor trips from momentary electrical power transients. For undervoltage, the delay is set so that the time required for a signal to reach the reactor trip breakers following the simultaneous trip of two or more reactor coolant pump bus circuit breakers shall not exceed 0.9 seconds. For underfrequency, the delay is set so that the time required for a signal to reach the reactor trip breakers after the underfrequency trip set point is reached shall not exceed 0.3 seconds.

Turbine Trip

A Turbine Trip causes a direct reactor trip when operating above P-9. Each of the turbine trips provide turbine protection and reduce the severity of the ensuing transient. No credit was taken in the accident analyses for operation of these trips. Their functional capability at the specified trip settings is required to enhance the overall reliability of the Reactor Protection System.

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

- ACTION 9 - With a channel associated with an operating loop inoperable, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 2 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; however, one channel associated with an operating loop may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1.
- ACTION 10 - Not applicable.
- ACTION 11 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, operation may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour.
- ACTION 12 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and/or open the reactor trip breakers.

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INTERLOCKS

<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>CONDITION AND SETPOINT</u>	<u>FUNCTION</u>
P-6	With 2 of 2 Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Channels $< 6 \times 10^{-11}$ amps.	P-6 prevents or defeats the manual block of source range reactor trip.
P-7	With 2 of 4 Power Range Neutron Flux Channels $\geq 11\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER or 1 of 2 Turbine impulse chamber pressure channels ≥ 80 psia.	P-7 prevents or defeats the automatic block of reactor trip on: Low flow in more than one primary coolant loop, reactor coolant pump under-voltage and under-frequency, pressurizer low pressure, and pressurizer high level.
P-8	With 2 of 4 Power Range Neutron Flux channels $\geq 31\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER.	P-8 prevents or defeats the automatic block of reactor trip on low coolant flow in a single loop.

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>CONDITION AND SETPOINT</u>	<u>FUNCTION</u>
P-9	With 2 of 4 power range neutron flux channels $\geq 51\%$ of rated thermal power	P-9 prevents or defeats the automatic block of reactor trip on turbine trip.
P-10	With 3 of 4 power range neutron flux channels $< 9\%$ of rated thermal power	P-10 prevents or defeats the manual block of: Power Range low setpoint reactor trip, intermediate range reactor trip, and intermediate range rod stops. Provides input to P-7.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 62 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-66

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

OHIO EDISON COMPANY

PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-334

Introduction

By letter dated October 27, 1978 (Reference 1) Duquesne Light (the licensee) submitted a proposed amendment to the Technical Specifications for Beaver Valley Power Station. The amendment consists of deleting the requirement for the reactor trip on turbine trip whenever the plant is operated below 50 percent of its rated power. The licensee requested this change because deletion of this trip would lead to an increase in plant availability by reducing the length of time needed to restart a unit following a readily correctable turbine trip at low power. The licensee has provided an analysis indicating that the proposed change would not degrade safe operation of the plant.

In addition, by letter dated November 3, 1982, the licensee shows that the probability of a small-break LOCA, resulting from a stuck-open PORV, is substantially unaffected by such modification. This addresses the concern of TMI Action Plan Item II.K.3.10, "Proposed Anticipatory Trip Modification."

Evaluation

1. Reactor Safety

The existing Technical Specifications for Beaver Valley Power Station require that the reactor scrams on turbine trip whenever the plant is operating at a power level higher than 10 percent of its rated power. The change requested by the licensee extends this limit to 50 percent of the rated power. In the analysis provided in support of this change the licensee has shown that when the reactor operating at < 50 percent of its rated power (≤ 1326 MWt) fails to scram on turbine trip, the resultant transient would not cause the plant to exceed its safety limits before other reactor protection systems would trip the reactor and bring the plant to the safe shutdown condition. The licensee has presented the analyses for the four cases corresponding to four different sets of assumptions covering the most limiting conditions which could occur after a turbine trip. In two of

them the licensee assumes that the spray system and the safety relief valves in the pressurizer remain operative and the pressurizer pressure is fully controlled. In these cases it is assumed that the reactor scram occurs at 30 seconds after a turbine trip and is caused by the pump undervoltage resulting from a failure of the network bus transfer which switches the power to the pumps from the generator to the external power source. In the other two cases it is assumed that the pressurizer spray system and the safety relief valves are inoperative and the reactor scrams on high pressurizer pressure. In both these cases the analyses were performed with a minimum reactivity feedback in one case and a maximum feedback in the other. The change in reactivity feedback was achieved by postulating zero moderator density coefficient for the minimum feedback and a very large moderator coefficient for the maximum feedback. Doppler power coefficients were adjusted to provide consistent minimum and maximum reactivity feedbacks. The values of these coefficients are shown below:

Moderator Density Coefficient:

0 to $0.43 \Delta\rho/g/cc$

Doppler Power Coefficient:

- 0.84 to $-1.57 \times 10^{-4} \Delta\rho/\% \text{ power at } 52\% \text{ power}$

In the analysis no credit was taken for steam dump, auxiliary feedwater flow or operation of the safety relief valves in the steam generators. The analysis was performed using three Westinghouse computer codes: LOFTRAN, FACTRAN and THINC. The LOFTRAN code determined system parameters, the FACTRAN code was used to calculate the heat flux transient based on the previously determined nuclear power and the THINC code was employed for computing DNBR values during the transient.

Each analysis was performed for two power levels corresponding to 52 percent and 72 percent of reactor rated power.

The results of the analysis have indicated that the highest primary system pressure is reached when no credit is taken for the pressurizer pressure control and a minimum reactivity feedback is assumed. The transient is terminated by the reactor scram on high pressurizer pressure before the primary system pressure could exceed its maximum allowable limit.

The lowest value of DNBR occurs when the pressurizer pressure is fully controlled and a minimum reactivity feedback is assumed. In this case a significant decrease in the DNBR is observed, but the DNBR never drops below 1.3 and the reactor scrams safely on pump undervoltage. The above analyses demonstrate therefore that all the pertinent plant parameters remain within their safety limits. After reviewing the proposed change to the Technical Specifications we find that the licensee has presented sufficient evidence indicating that whenever a turbine trip occurs in the plant operating at <50 percent of its rated power, it is safe for the reactor to remain operating and there is no need for its scram on the signal generated directly by the turbine trip. We conclude therefore that the proposed change of the turbine-trip setting is acceptable from the reactor safety standpoint.

2. Plant System Performance

Based on our review of our consultant's Technical Evaluation Report (attached), we agree with his findings that: (1) the licensee analyses show that the requested Technical Specification changes do not degrade the other reactor safety systems or change their mode of operation; and (2) since the system has the design capability to accept a 50 percent load rejection, a reactor trip is not necessary because of a turbine trip until at or above 50 percent power. The proposed license amendment request is, therefore, acceptable from the plant system performance standpoint.

3. TMI Action Plan Item II.K.3.10

In a November 3, 1982 letter, Duquesne Light states that an analysis was performed by Westinghouse Electric Corporation for bypassing the anticipatory trip on turbine trip below 70 percent power for the Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit 2. The analysis showed that turbine trip without a direct or immediate reactor trip represents no hazard to the integrity of the reactor coolant system. The analysis used for Unit 2 indicated that, following a turbine trip with the reactor at 70 percent power, the maximum primary system pressure was 2308 psia. With the PORV actuation setpoint at 2350 psia, this results in a 42 psi margin.

The above analysis, performed for Unit 2, used the same assumptions that would apply to an evaluation for Unit 1 with the exception of the higher power level (70 percent versus 50 percent). Westinghouse Electric Corporation has also indicated that the analysis for Unit 2 is applicable to Unit 1.

Since the analysis for Unit 2 was performed at a higher power level than the 50 percent trip setpoint proposed for Unit 1 and with the same assumptions, we concluded that the Unit 2 analysis envelopes conditions which would be applicable to an analysis for Unit 1 with reactor trip on turbine trip being bypassed up to 50% power.

Based on the results obtained for the Unit 2 analysis and the enveloping aspect of this analysis for Unit 1, we conclude that operation of Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit 1 at 50 percent rated power or below with the anticipatory reactor trip on turbine trip bypassed will not significantly change the probability of a small-break LOCA due to a stuck-open PORV. Therefore, we conclude that the guidance of this TMI Action Plan item is satisfied and the proposed modification can be implemented for Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit 1.

Environmental Consideration

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, does not create the possibility of an accident of a type different from any evaluated previously, and does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: January 26, 1983

Principal Contributors

K. Parczewski
P. Shemanski
F. Burrows

TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION UNIT 1
Deletion of Reactor Trip on
Turbine Trip Below 50 Percent Power

Docket Number 50-334

August 1979

Prepared By:

Wayne E. Reeves

Lawrence Livermore Laboratory

1.0 INTRODUCTION:

The Duquesne Light Co., the holder of License #35, in its letter dated October 27, 1978, submitted a license amendment request for the deletion of reactor trip on turbine trip below 50% power for the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1. Their present criteria states that they will trip the reactor any time the power turbine trips when they are operating above 10% of rated power.

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGES:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59, the holders of operating license 35 propose the following changes to Appendix A Technical Specifications:

1. Add Section 7, 3.3-1, which reads

"P-9 - With 2 of 4 power range neutron flux channels > 51% of rated thermal power, P-9 prevents or defeats the automatic blocks of reactor trip on turbine trip."

2. Add on limiting safety settings B2-7, which reads,

"Turbine Trip - A turbine trip causes a direct reactor trip when operating above P-9. Each of the turbine trips provide turbine protection and reduces the severity of the ensuing transient. Their functional capability at the specified trip settings is required to enhance the overall reliability of the reactor protection system.

3.0 REASON FOR CHANGES:

Presently, the reactor protection system provides for a reactor trip upon a turbine trip when above 10% power. Since both units will accept a 50% load rejection, a reactor trip is not necessary because of a turbine trip until at or above 50% power. A pending design change will initiate a reactor trip upon a turbine trip when at or above 50%. Two-of-four channels logic will be used to detect 50% power and yield permissive P-9. This permissive will be developed in the reactor protection logic racks, and will be wired into the reactor trip matrices. The P-9 logic will be testable, using the same design techniques as for other protection logic relays. An associated logic change will modify the steam dump logic.

4.0 REVIEW OF LICENSEE'S SUBMITTAL

The review showed that:

1. The proposed P-9 interlock would block a reactor trip due to turbine trip when the unit is below the setpoint. The block action occurs when three out of four neutron flux power range signals are below the setpoint. Thus, below P-9, the reactor will be allowed to operate and the turbine trip transient will ride out as a load rejection and with reactor power dissipated by steam dump. When two out of four signals measure above the P-9 setpoint, the reactor would be tripped.

4.0 REVIEW OF LICENSEE'S SUBMITTAL:

2. The low feedwater flow trip is actuated by steam/feedwater flow mismatch (one out of two logic). No interlocks are associated with this trip.
3. The low-low steam generator water level trip (two out of three logic) will initiate a low feedwater flow reactor trip.
4. The turbine trip-reactor trip is actuated by two out of three logic from low autostop oil pressure signals or by all closed signals from the turbine steam stop valves. Therefore, a turbine trip causes a direct reactor trip above P-9 (50% thermal power).
5. A reactor trip occurs when the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) is actuated.
6. The manual trip has no interlocks to block the reactor trip operation.
7. The power range high flux reactor trip provides safety from reactivity excursions during startup.
8. The high and low pressure trips limit the pressure operating range of the system.
9. The overtemperature Δt reactor trip provides for core protection against DNB for combination of pressure, power, coolant, temperature, and power distribution excursions.
10. The system is designed with a steam dump function which is capable of bypassing up to 50% of rated load steam.
11. The safety analysis does not take the credit for the steam dump system.

5.0 CONCLUSION:

I have reviewed the technical aspects of the licensee's submittal which shows:

1. No degradation of the engineered safety features occurs due to this change.
2. The system has the capability to bypass 50% of rated power steam around the turbine.
3. No credit is taken for the steam dump system in the FSAR.

Based on this review, I recommend that NRC approve this proposed change.

August 4, 1979

6.0 REFERENCES:

1. Letter, C. Dunn of Duquesne Light to A. Schwencer of DOR, October 27, 1978
2. Enclosed submittal
 - a. Beaver Valley Power Station Unit I FSAR amended draft July 27, 1978
 - b. Deletion of reactor trip on turbine trip below 50 percent power analysis - G. Narasimhan
 - c. Section 7 - Changes to the Technical Specifications
Section 8 - Precautions, Limitation and Setpoints document

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONDOCKET NO. 50-334DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANYOHIO EDISON COMPANYPENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANYNOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY
OPERATING LICENSE

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 62 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-66 issued to Duquesne Light Company, Ohio Edison Company, and Pennsylvania Power Company (the licensees), which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 (the facility) located in Beaver County, Pennsylvania. The amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

The amendment changes the Technical Specifications such that anticipatory reactor trip on turbine trip may be bypassed when the plant is at 50% rated power or below.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Prior public notice of this amendment was not required since the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.


The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR 51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of this amendment.

- 2 -

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated October 27, 1978, supplemented by letter dated November 3, 1982, (2) Amendment No. 62 to License No. DPR-66 and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. and at the B. F. Jones Memorial Library, 663 Franklin Avenue, Aliquippa, Pennsylvania 15001. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Licensing.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 26th day of January, 1983.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Steven A. Varga, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Licensing