

July 25, 1994

Docket No. 50-289

Mr. T. Gary Broughton, Vice President
and Director - TMI-1
GPU Nuclear Corporation
Post Office Box 480
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Dear Mr. Broughton:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT - TSCR NO. 228 (TAC NO. M89055)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 189 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-50 for the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1 (TMI-1), in response to your letter dated March 2, 1994.

The amendment revises the TMI-1 Technical Specifications to modify Operational Safety Instrumentation requirements to specify completion time which allows for performance of maintenance or surveillance within a reasonable time and to be consistent with the allowable outage time for other safety-related equipment when only one train is affected.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by Alexander W. Dromerick

for: Ronald W. Hernan, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-4
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 189 to DPR-50
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

OFFICE	LA:PDI-4	PDI-4	BC:HICB	D:PDI-4	OGC
NAME	SNorris	RHernan:bf	JWermiel	JStolz	R Bachmann
DATE	5/20/94	5/23/94	1/94	5/23/94	6/16/94

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Mr. T. Gary Broughton
GPU Nuclear Corporation

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,
Unit No. 1

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY

JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-289

THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 189
License No. DPR-50

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by GPU Nuclear Corporation, et al. (the licensee), dated March 2, 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.c.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-50 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.189, are hereby incorporated in the license. GPU Nuclear Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, to be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



John F. Stolz, Director
Project Directorate I-4
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: July 25, 1994

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 189

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-50

DOCKET NO. 50-289

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove

3-27
3-27a
3-29
3-30
--
3-31
3-32
3-32a
3-32b
--
4-5

Insert

3-27
3-27a
3-29
3-30
3-30a
3-31
3-32
3-32a
3-32b
3-32c
4-5

3.5 INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEMS

3.5.1 OPERATIONAL SAFETY INSTRUMENTATION

Applicability

Applies to unit instrumentation and control systems.

Objective

To delineate the conditions of the unit instrumentation and safety circuits necessary to assure reactor safety.

Specifications

- 3.5.1.1 The reactor shall not be in a startup mode or in a critical state unless the requirements of Table 3.5-1, Column "A" and "B" are met, except as provided in Table 3.5-1, Column "C". Specification 3.0.1 applies.
- 3.5.1.2 The key operated channel bypass switch associated with each reactor protection channel may be used to lock the reactor trip module in the untripped state as indicated by a light. Only one channel shall be locked in this untripped state at any one time. Unit operation at rated power shall be permitted to continue with Table 3.5-1, Column "A". Only one channel bypass key shall be kept in the control room.
- 3.5.1.3 In the event the number of protection channels operable falls below the limit given under Table 3.5-1, Column "A", operation shall be limited as specified in Column "C". Specification 3.0.1 applies.
- 3.5.1.4 The key operated shutdown bypass switch associated with each reactor protection channel shall not be used during reactor power operation (except for required maintenance or testing).
- 3.5.1.5 During START-UP when the intermediate range instruments come on scale, the overlap between the intermediate range and the source range instrumentation shall not be less than one decade.
- 3.5.1.6 During START-UP, HOT STANDBY or POWER OPERATION, in the event that a control rod drive trip breaker is inoperable, within one hour place the breaker in trip. Specification 3.0.1 applies.
- 3.5.1.7 During START-UP, HOT STANDBY or POWER OPERATION, in the event that one of the control rod drive trip breaker diverse trip features (shunt trip or undervoltage trip attachment) is inoperable:
- a. Restore to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or
 - b. Within one additional hour place the breaker in trip.
- Specification 3.0.1 applies.

- 3.5.1.7.1 Power may be restored through the breaker with the failed trip feature for up to two hours for surveillance testing per T.S. 4.1.1.
- 3.5.1.8 During STARTUP, HOT STANDBY or POWER OPERATION, in the event that one of the two regulating control rod power SCR electronic trips is inoperable, within one hour:
- a. Place the inoperable SCR electronic trip in the tripped condition or
 - b. Remove the power supplied to the associated SCRs. Specification 3.0.1 applies.
- 3.5.1.8.1 Power may be restored through the SCRs with the failed electronic trip for up to two hours for surveillance testing per T.S. 4.1.1.
- 3.5.1.9 The reactor shall not be in the Startup mode or in a critical state unless both HSPS actuation logic trains associated with the Functional units listed in Table 3.5-1 are operable except as provided in Table 3.5-1,D.
- 3.5.1.9.1 With one HSPS actuation logic train inoperable, restore the train to OPERABLE or place the inoperable device in an actuated state within 72 hours or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours. With both HSPS actuation logic trains inoperable, restore one train to OPERABLE within 1 hour or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours.

Bases

Every reasonable effort will be made to maintain all safety instrumentation in operation. The reactor trip, on loss of feedwater may be bypassed below 7% reactor power. The bypass is automatically removed when reactor power is raised above 7%. The reactor trip, on turbine trip, may be bypassed below 45% reactor power (Reference 1). The safety feature actuation system must have two analog channels functioning correctly prior to startup.

The anticipatory reactor trips on loss of feedwater pumps and turbine trip have been added to reduce the number of challenges to the safety valves and power operated relief valve but have not been credited in the safety analyses.

Operation at rated power is permitted as long as the systems have at least the redundancy requirements of Column "B" (Table 3.5-1). This is in agreement with redundancy and single failure criteria of IEEE 279 as described in FSAR Section 7.

There are four reactor protection channels. Normal trip logic is two out of four. Minimum required trip logic is one out of two.

TABLE 3.5-1
INSTRUMENTS OPERATING CONDITIONS

Functional Unit	(A) Minimum Operable Channels	(B) Minimum Degree of Redundancy	(C) Operator Action if Conditions of Column A and B Cannot be Met
A. <u>Reactor Protection System</u>			
1. Manual pushbutton	1	0	(a)
2. Power range instrument channel	2	1	(a)
3. Intermediate range instrument channels	1	0	(a) (b)
4. Source range instrument channels	1	0	(a) (c)
5. Reactor coolant temperature instrument channels	2	1	(a)
6. (Deleted)	--	--	-----
7. Flux/imbalance/flow	2	1	(a)
8. Reactor coolant pressure			
a. High reactor coolant pressure instrument channels	2	1	(a)
b. Low reactor coolant pressure instrument channels	2	1	(a)

TABLE 3.5-1 (Cont'd)

INSTRUMENTS OPERATING CONDITIONS

Functional Unit	(A) Minimum Operable Channels	(B) Minimum Degree of Redundancy	(C) Operator Action if Conditions of Column A and B Cannot Be Met
A. <u>Reactor Protection System (cont'd)</u>			
9. Power/number of pumps instrument channels	2	1	(a)
10. High reactor building pressure channels	2	1	(a)

(a) Restore the conditions of Column (A) and Column (B) within one hour or place the unit in HOT SHUTDOWN within an additional 6 hours.

(b) When 2 of 4 power range instrument channels are greater than 10 percent full power, intermediate range instrumentation is not required.

(c) When 1 of 2 intermediate range instrument channels is greater than 10^{-10} amps, or 2 of 4 power range instrument channels are greater than 10 percent full power, source range instrumentation is not required.

TABLE 3.5-1 (Cont'd)
INSTRUMENTS OPERATING CONDITIONS

Functional Unit	(A) Minimum Operable Channels	(B) Minimum Degree of Redundancy	(C) Operator Action if Conditions of Column A and B Cannot Be Met
B. <u>Other Reactor Trips</u>			
1. Loss of Feedwater (c)	2	1	(a)
2. Turbine Trip (c)	2	1	(b)

(a) Restore the conditions of Column (A) and Column (B) within one hour or reduce indicated reactor power to less than 7% within an additional 6 hours.

(b) Restore the conditions of Column (A) and Column (B) within one hour or reduce indicated reactor power to less than 45% within an additional 6 hours.

(c) Trip may be defeated during low power physics tests.

TABLE 3.5-1 (Cont'd)
INSTRUMENTS OPERATING CONDITIONS

Functional Unit	(A) Minimum Operable Channels	(B) Minimum Degree of Redundancy	(C) Operator Action if Conditions of Column A and B Cannot Be Met
C. Engineered Safety Features			
1. Makeup and Purification System (high pressure injection mode)			
a. Reactor Coolant Pressure Instrument Channels	2	1(b)	(a)
b. Reactor Building 4 psig Instrument Channels	2	1(b)	(a)
c. Manual Pushbutton (also actuates Low Pressure Injection)	2	N/A	(g)
2. Decay Heat System (low pressure injection mode)			
a. Reactor Coolant Pressure Instrument Channels	2	1(b)	(a)
b. Reactor Building 4 psig Instrument Channels	2	1(b)	(a)
c. Reactor Coolant Pressure D.H. Valve Interlock Bistable	1	0	Open circuit breaker at MCC for DH-V1 or DH-V2 with the affected valve in the closed position within 4 hours or maintain R.C. pressure less than 350 psig.

TABLE 3.5-1 (Cont'd)
INSTRUMENTS OPERATING CONDITIONS

Functional Unit	(A) Minimum Operable Channels	(B) Minimum Degree of Redundancy	(C) Operator Action if Conditions of Column A and B Cannot Be Met
C. <u>Engineered Safety Features (cont'd)</u>			
3. Reactor Building Isolation and Cooling System			
a. Reactor Bldg. 4 psig Instrument Channel	2	1(b)	(a)
b. Manual Pushbuttons			
i. 4 psig feature	2	N/A	(g)
ii. 30 psig feature	2	N/A	(g)
c. RPS Trip	2	1(b)	(a)
d. Reactor Building 30 psig pressure switches	2	1	(c)
e. RCS Pressure less than 1600 psig	2	1(b)	(a)
f. Reactor Building Purge Line Isolation (AHV-1A and AHV-1D) High Radiation	1	0	(f)
4. Reactor Building Spray System			
a. Reactor Building 30 psig pressure switches	2	1	(d)
b. Spray Pump Manual Switches	2	N/A	(g)
5. 4.16KV ES Bus Undervoltage Relays			
a. Degraded Grid Voltage Relays	2	1	(e)
b. Loss of Voltage Relay	2	1	(e)

TABLE 3.5-1 (Cont'd)

INSTRUMENTS OPERATING CONDITIONS

C. Engineered Safety Features (cont'd)

- (a) Restore the conditions of Column (A) and Column (B) within one hour or place the reactor in HOT SHUTDOWN within an additional 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- (b) The minimum degree of redundancy may be reduced to 0 up to 8 hours for surveillance testing.
- (c) The Operability requirement is two out of three pressure switches in each train, with a minimum degree of redundancy of one, in each train.
 1. If the minimum conditions are not met on one train, restore the function to OPERABLE within 48 hours, or place the reactor in HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours.
 2. If the minimum conditions are not met on either train, then place the reactor in HOT SHUTDOWN in 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- (d) The Operability requirement is two out of three pressure switches in each train, with a minimum degree of redundancy of one, in each train.
 1. If the minimum conditions are not met on one train, restore the function to OPERABLE within 72 hours, or place the reactor in HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours.
 2. If the minimum conditions are not met on either train, then place the reactor in HOT SHUTDOWN in 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- (e) If a relay fails in the untripped state, it shall be placed in a tripped state within 12 hours to obtain a degree of redundancy of 1. The relay may be removed from the tripped state for up to 2 hours for functional testing pursuant to Table 4.1-1.
- (f) Discontinue Reactor Building purging and close AHV-1A, 1B, 1C, and 1D within eight hours.

TABLE 3.5-1 (Cont'd)

INSTRUMENTS OPERATING CONDITIONS

C. Engineered Safety Features (cont'd)

- (g) The Operability requirement is for the manual actuation switch for the specified feature on each train to be OPERABLE.
 - 1. If the manual actuation switch on one train is inoperable, restore the switch to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours.
 - 2. If both manual actuation switches for that feature are inoperable, then place the reactor in HOT SHUTDOWN in 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

TABLE 3.5-1 (Cont'd)
INSTRUMENTS OPERATING CONDITIONS

Functional Unit	(A) Minimum Operable Channels	(B) Minimum Degree of Redundancy	(C) Operator Action if Conditions of Column A and B Cannot Be Met
D. <u>Heat Sink Protection System</u>			
1. EFW Auto Initiation			
a. Loss of both Feedwater pumps	N/A(b)	N/A(b)	(a)
b. Loss of all RC Pumps	N/A(b)	N/A(b)	(a)
c. OTSG A Low Level	2	1	(a)
d. OTSG B Low Level	2	1	(a)
e. High Reactor Building Pressure	2	1	(a)
2. MFW Isolation			
a. OTSG A Low Pressure	2	1	(a)
b. OTSG B Low Pressure	2	1	(a)
3. EFW Level Control			
a. OTSG A Level Control	N/A(b)	N/A(b)	(a)
b. OTSG B Level Control	N/A(b)	N/A(b)	(a)

(a) Restore the conditions of Column (A) and Column (B) within 72 hours, or place the unit in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

(b) Operability requirements are specified in Section 3.5.1.9.

Amendment No. 24, 78, 136, 137, 178, 189

TABLE 4.1-1 (Cont'd)

<u>CHANNEL DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>CHECK</u>	<u>TEST</u>	<u>CALIBRATE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
19. Reactor Building Emergency Cooling and Isolation System Analog Channels				
a. Reactor Building 4 psig Channels	S(1)	M(1)	F	(1) When CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is required.
b. RCS Pressure 1600 psig	S(1)	M(1)	NA	(1) When RCS Pressure > 1800 psig.
c. RPS Trip	S(1)	M(1)	NA	(1) When CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is required.
d. Reactor Bldg. 30 psig pressure switches	S(1)	M(1)	F	(1) When CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is required.
e. Reactor Bldg. Purge Line High Radiation (AH-V-1A/D)	W(1)	M(1)	F	(1) When CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is required.
f. Line Break Isolation Signal (ICCW & NSCCW)	W(1)	M(1)	R	(1) When CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is required.
20. Reactor Building Spray System Logic Channel	NA	Q	NA	
21. Reactor Building Spray 30 psig pressure switches	NA	M	F	
22. Pressurizer Temperature Channels	S	NA	R	
23. Control Rod Absolute Position	S(1)	NA	R	(1) Check with Relative Position Indicator.
24. Control Rod Relative Position	S(1)	NA	R	(1) Check with Absolute Position Indicator.
25. Core Flooding Tanks				
a. Pressure Channels	S(1)	NA	F	(1) When Reactor Coolant system pressure is greater than 700 psig.
b. Level Channels	S(1)	NA	F	
26. Pressurizer Level Channels	S	NA	R	

4-5



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 189 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-50

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY

JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION

THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-289

1.0 INTRODUCTION

On February 25, 1993, GPU Nuclear Corporation (GPUN or the licensee) submitted Licensee Event Report (LER) 93-001 concerning the failure of a pressure switch during performance of a monthly surveillance. The assessment of the safety consequences and implications of the event stated that Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.5-1, "Instruments Operating Conditions," does not provide for an allowable outage time for the listed instrumentation, nor does it account for the redundant trains of instrumentation. The LER also found that the requirements of TS Table 3.5-1 were inappropriate and inconsistent with the requirements of TS 3.3.2, where it specifies an allowable outage time of 72 hours for mechanical components in one train and the redundant train is assumed to be fully operational. Part of the corrective action planned included reviewing and requesting changes to the requirements in TS Table 3.5-1. The licensee requested changes to Table 3.5-1 in a letter on March 2, 1994.

2.0 EVALUATION

(1) Pages 3-27a, 3-29, 3-30 and 3-30a

Column (C) of Table 3.5-1 is revised to replace the term "Maintain hot shutdown" with a new footnote (a). The footnote (a) states that if the conditions of Columns (A) and (B) cannot be restored within 1 hour, the unit must be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN within an additional 6 hours. The staff finds that the change to Column (C) provides sufficient time to place an inoperable instrumentation channel in either the trip or bypass condition and also specifies a clear allowed outage time for action required by the TS. In addition, the 1-hour allowed outage time is sufficient to correct minor problems. The staff also finds that the change is consistent with NUREG-1430, "Standard Technical Specifications" for Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) plants and is, therefore, acceptable.

The second sentence of the Bases for TS 3.5.1 on page 3-27a is deleted. Since this discussion merely repeats the requirements of TS 3.5.1.1, the staff finds the change to be administrative.

The minimum number of required operable power range instrumentation channels on page 3-29 is revised from three to two. There are four reactor protection channels and normal trip logic is two-out-of-four. If one or more function in two protection channels become inoperable, one of two inoperable channels must be placed in trip and the other in bypass. This will place the reactor protection system (RPS) in a one-out-of-two logic. In this configuration, the RPS can still perform its safety functions in the event of a single channel failure. The staff finds that the change is consistent with NUREG-1430 and is, therefore, acceptable.

On page 3-30a, the unit is required to maintain indicated reactor power less than 7% if minimum conditions for operation are not met for the loss of feedwater instrument and less than 45% if minimum conditions for operation are not met for the turbine trip instrument. However, there is no allowed outage time specified to attain the reduced power condition if reactor power is above these limits and the minimum conditions are not met. The licensee has proposed an allowed outage time of 1 hour and an additional 6 hours to reduce power in an orderly manner to remove any uncertainty regarding compliance with this requirement. The staff finds that the change is consistent with NUREG-1430 and is, therefore, acceptable.

(2) Pages 3-31, 3-32, 3-32a and 3-32b

Footnote (a) replaces some of the required Operator Actions in Column (C). It provides a 1 hour allowed outage time to reestablish the conditions of Columns (A) and (B). If the conditions of Columns (A) and (B) cannot be restored within 1 hour, the unit must be in HOT SHUTDOWN within an additional 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours. The staff finds that the change is consistent with the completion times specified in NUREG-1430 and is, therefore, acceptable.

Footnote (b) allows reduction of the degree of redundancy for surveillance testing during which the Engineered Safety Actuation System (ESAS) channels have a two-out-of-two trip logic. This allowance is based on the inability to perform the surveillance within the time allowed in Footnote (a). The staff finds that the 8-hour allowance is reasonable and the change is consistent with the associated completion time and surveillance allowance specified in NUREG-1430. The staff finds the change, therefore, acceptable.

Column (C) of the ESAS manual actuation instrument channels is revised to specify an allowed outage time for this function. The revision provides a 72-hour period to restore one inoperable manual initiation channel and clarify that there are separate manual actuation switches for the 4 psig and 30 psig Reactor Building high pressure isolation features. The change is consistent with NUREG-1430 and the staff, therefore, finds it to be acceptable.

The Reactor Building (RB) spray system (BS) consists of two redundant trains of three pressure switches each, in a two-out-of-three logic circuit, to actuate BS and RB isolation when RB pressure reaches a predetermined setpoint.

The licensee has concluded that the present TS for operability regarding these systems are inappropriate because they do not recognize the independence of the two channels of actuation. Therefore, an allowed outage time of 72 hours has been proposed consistent with TS 3.3.2 and 3.3.4, which allow components to be removed from service for 72 hours provided the redundant component is verified to be operable. This change is consistent with NUREG-1430 and the staff, therefore, finds it to be acceptable.

The license has proposed adding footnote (c) to Table 3.5-1 to allow restoration of the minimum number of operable pressure switches in the 30 psig Reactor Building isolation circuitry. The footnote allows 48 hours if one train is affected and 6 hours if both trains are affected before shutdown completion times are invoked. The proposed times are consistent with TS 3.3.6 which allows 48 hours to restore an inoperable RB isolation valve. Therefore, the staff finds this change to be acceptable.

Footnote (f) on page 3-32a is revised to supply an allowed outage time period for radiation detector RMA-9. This instrument provides a backup signal to shut the RB purge valves when high radiation levels are detected in the RB. These purge valves have redundant safety-grade automatic actuation from both the ESAS and reactor trip signals. The licensee concluded that it was acceptable to allow an 8-hour time period for RMA-9 to be out of service to allow confirmation of the alarm and minor troubleshooting, if necessary. This conclusion was based on the redundant nature of RMA-9's function, since it is not the primary signal relied upon to shut the RB purge valves. The staff agrees with the licensee's determination and, therefore, finds the change to be acceptable.

(3) Pages 3-27, 3-32c and 4-5

Changes on page 3-27 provide clarification on Column (C) guidance and allowed use of the key operated channel bypass switch. Changes on page 3-32c delete a footnote which states that it is only applicable for Cycle 6 and modify Column (C) and Footnote (a) to be consistent with the format of other changes made in the licensee's submittal. Changes on page 4-5 provide clarification for the description of the reactor building pressure switches and make a grammatical correction on item 20. The staff finds that these changes are administrative in nature and are acceptable.

2.1 SUMMARY

The proposed amendment permits time to restore instrumentation channels to operable status consistent with times presently allowed for outage of other safety-related equipment affecting one train. The staff concludes that the changes are consistent with NUREG-1430 and would not significantly reduce a margin of safety and are, therefore, acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Pennsylvania State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes requirements with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts or types of effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (59 FR 17600). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: C. Chung

Date: July 25, 1994