

October 5, 1984

Docket No. 50-289

DCR 016

Mr. Henry D. Hukill, Vice President
and Director - TMI-1
GPU Nuclear Corporation
P. O. Box 480
Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057

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Dear Mr. Hukill:

SUBJECT: LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.101 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-50

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.101 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-50 for the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station (TMI-1). This amendment adds Technical Specifications (TSs) covering changed and additional fire protection features in the plant.

Your letters of December 1, 1983, and July 12, 1984, transmitted Technical Specification Change Request (TSCR) 97, Rev. 1, which modified TSCR 97 submitted by your letter of January 26, 1981, and which superseded TSCRs 83 and 96. In addition, your staff informed us on May 8, 1984, that you had inadvertently used the phrase "fire zone boundaries" instead of "rated fire boundaries" in the Applicability sections of TSs 3.18.7 and 4.18.7. We concur that the former was inappropriate and that the latter is acceptable and have made that change in the TSs. You confirmed this information by letter dated May 30, 1984.

A copy of our Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next Monthly Federal Register Notice.

Sincerely,

/s/

John F. Stolz, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 4
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 101
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

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PDR

GPU Nuclear Corporation

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Mr. R. J. Toole
O&M Director, TMI-1
GPU Nuclear Corporation
P. O. Box 480
Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057

Jordan D. Cunningham, Esq.
Fox, Farr and Cunningham
2320 North 2nd Street
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17110

Board of Directors
P. A. N. E.
P. O. Box 268
Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057

Ms. Louise Bradford
TMIA
1011 Green Street
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17102

Docketing and Service Section
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Ms. Marjorie M. Aamodt
R. D. #5
Coatesville, Pennsylvania 19320

Chauncey Kepford
Judith H. Johnsrud
Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power
433 Orlando Avenue
State College, Pennsylvania 16801

Earl B. Hoffman
Dauphin County Commissioner
Dauphin County Courthouse
Front and Market Streets
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17101

Judge Reginald L. Gotchy
Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Ellyn R. Weiss
Harmon, Weiss & Jordan
20001 S Street
Suite 430
Washington, D.C. 20009

Mr. Thomas E. Hurley, Regional Administrator
U. S. N. R. C., Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Ivan W. Smith, Esq., Chairman
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

ANGRY/TMI PIRC
1037 Maclay Street
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17103

Gary J. Edles, Chairman
Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal
Board
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

John Levin, Esq.
Pennsylvania Public Utilities
Commission
Box 3265
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120

Mr. Thomas M. Gerusky, Director
Bureau of Radiation Protection
Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Resources
P. O. Box 2063
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120

Marvin I. Lewis
6504 Bradford Terrace
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19149

G. F. Trowbridge, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

J. S. Wetmore
Manager, PWR Licensing
GPU Nuclear Corporation
100 Interpace Parkway
Parsippany, New Jersey 07054

Ms. Virginia Southard, Chairman
Citizens for a Safe Environment
264 Walton Street
Lemoyne, Pennsylvania 17043

Dr. David Hetrick
Professor of Nuclear Energy
University of Arizona
Tucson, Arizona 85721

Mr. David D. Maxwell, Chairman
Board of Supervisors
Londonderry Township
RFD#1 - Geyers Church Road
Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057

Regional Radiation Representative
EPA Region III
Curtis Building (Sixth Floor)
6th and Walnut Streets
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106

Mr. Richard Conte
Senior Resident Inspector (TMI-1)
U.S.N.R.C.
P. O. Box 311
Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057

General Counsel
Federal Emergency Management Agency
ATTN: Document Clerk
1725 I Street, NW
Washington, DC 20472

Karin W. Carter, Esq.
505 Executive House
P. O. Box 2357
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120

Dr. James Lamb
313 Woodhaven Road
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514

Dauphin County Office Emergency
Preparedness
Court House, Room 7
Front & Market Streets
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17101

Christine N. Kohl, Esq.
Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal
Board
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Ms. Lennie Prough
U. S. N. R. C. - TMI Site
P. O. Box 311
Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057

Mr. Robert B. Borsum
Babcock & Wilcox
Nuclear Power Generation Division
Suite 220, 7910 Woodmont Avenue
Bethesda, Maryland 20814

Mr. Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. C. W. Smyth
TMI-1 Licensing Manager
GPU Nuclear Corporation
P. O. Box 480
Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057

Governor's Office of State Planning
and Development
ATTN: Coordinator, Pennsylvania
State Clearinghouse
P. O. Box 1323
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120

GPU Nuclear Corporation

- 3 -

Sheldon J. Wolfe, Esq., Chairman
Atomic Safety & Licensing Board
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mrs. Jane Perkins
City Government Center
10 North Market Square
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17101

Jane Lee
183 Valley Road
Etters, Pennsylvania 17319

Bruce Molholt
Haverford College
Haverford, Pennsylvania 19041

Norman Aamodt
R. D. #5, Box 428
Coatesville, Pennsylvania 19320

Michael McBride, Esq.
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & McRae
Suite 1100
1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY

JERSEY CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-289

THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 101
License No. DPR-50

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by GPU Nuclear Corporation, et al (the licensees) dated January 26, 1981, as revised December 1, 1983, and corrected May 30, 1984, and July 12, 1984, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.c.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-50 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 101, are hereby incorporated in the license. GPU Nuclear Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


John F. Stolz, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 4
Division of Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: October 5, 1984

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 101

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-50

DOCKET NO. 50-289

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove

3-86
3-87

3-89
3-90
3-91
3-92
3-93
3-94
4-72
4-75
4-76a

Insert

3-86
3-87
3-87a
3-89
3-90
3-91
3-92
3-93
3-94
4-72
4-75
4-76a

3.18 FIRE PROTECTION

3.18.1 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

Applicability: At all times when equipment in that fire detection zone is required to be operable. Fire detection instruments located within the Reactor Building are not required to be operable during the performance of Type A Containment Leakage Rate Test.

Objective: To insure adequate fire detection capability.

Specification:

3.18.1.1 The minimum fire detection instrumentation for each fire detection zone shown in Table 3.18-1 shall be operable or action shall be taken as described in specification 3.18.1.2.

3.18.1.2 With the number of OPERABLE fire detection instruments less than required by Table 3.18-1.

a. Within 1 hour, establish a fire watch patrol to inspect the zone with the inoperable instrument(s) at least once per hour unless the instrument(s) is located inside the containment, then inspect the containment at least once per 8 hours or monitor containment air temperature at least once per hour at the locations listed in Specification 3.17.3.

b. Restore the inoperable instrument(s) to OPERABLE status within 14 days or prepare and submit a special report to the Commission within the next 30 days outlining the actions taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedules for restoring the instrument(s) to OPERABLE status.

Bases

OPERABILITY of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that adequate warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires. This capability is required in order to detect and locate fires in their early stages. Prompt detection of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program.

In the event that a portion of the fire detection instrumentation is inoperable, the establishment of frequent fire patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is restored to operability.

TABLE 3.16-1

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS

Instrument Location	Total Number of Detectors		Minimum Instruments Operable	
	Heat	Smoke	Heat	Smoke
1. Control Building Elev. 355'				
Control Room	0	17	NA	8
Computer Room	0	10	NA	5
HCV Panel	0	2	NA	1
CC & CR Panel	0	3	NA	2
PC & PCR Panel	0	3	NA	2
PL Panel	0	1	NA	1
2. Control Building Elev. 338'				
1D 4160 V SWGR	0	1	NA	1
1E 4160 V SWGR	0	1	NA	1
ESAS Cabinets (CB-3C)	0	3	NA	2
Relay Room	4	1	2	1
3. Control Building Elev. 322'				
1P 480 V SWGR	0	1	NA	1
1S 480 V SWGR	0	1	NA	1
Battery Room A	0	1	NA	1
Battery Room B	0	1	NA	1
Inverter Room A	0	1	NA	1
Inverter Room B	0	1	NA	1
Remote Shutdown Panel	0	1	NA	1
4. Diesel Generators				
Diesel A	1	0	1	NA
Diesel B	1	0	1	NA
5. Screen House				
General Area (HVAC)	2	0	1	NA
Zone 1	0	6	NA	3
Zone 2	0	6	NA	3
6. Fuel Handling Bldg. Elev. 281'				
General Cable Area (Zone 8)	0	9	NA	5
Lubricant & Storage Area (Zone 9)	0	3	NA	2

TABLE 3.18-1 Cont'd

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS

Instrument Location	Total Number of Detectors		Minimum Instruments Operable	
	Heat	Smoke	Heat	Smoke
7. Auxiliary Building Elev. 261'				
Decay Heat Removal Pump A (Zone 6)	0	3	NA	2
Decay Heat Removal Pump B (Zone 7)	0	4	NA	2
8. Auxiliary Building Elev. 281'				
Pipe Penetration Area (Zone 1)	0	5	NA	3
Makeup & Purification Pumps (Zone 2)	0	3	NA	2
Valve Gallery (Zone 3)	0	1	NA	1
Cable Gallery (Zone 4)	0	4	NA	2
9. Auxiliary Building Elev. 305'				
Decay Heat & Nucl. Service Pumps and MCC 1A, 1B (Zone 5)	0	7	NA	4
Ventilation Room	1	1	1	1
10. Intermediate Building Elev. 295'				
EF-P-24B Rooms (Zone 1)	0	6	NA	3
Cable Area (Zone 2)	0	2	NA	1
EF-P-1 Room (Zone 3)	0	2	NA	1
Valve Gallery (Zone 4)	0	2	NA	1
11. Intermediate Building Elev. 305'				
Tank Room (Zone 5)	0	1	NA	1
12. Reactor Building Elev. 281';				
Exhaust Ducts (Zone 1)	0	3	NA	2
Decay Heat Valve 1 (Zone 2)	0	1	NA	1
Decay Heat Valve 2 (Zone 2)	0	1	NA	1
Cable Tray at Let Down Cooler (Zone 3)	0	1	NA	1
13. Reactor Building Elev. 305'				
Exhaust Ducts (Zone 4)	0	5	NA	3
Purge Exhaust (Zone 5)	0	1	NA	1
Cable Tray at Personnel Hatch (Zone 6)	0	2	NA	1
14. Reactor Building Elev. 346'				
D-Ring 1d (Zone 7)	0	6	NA	4
D-Ring 1e (Zone 8)	0	6	NA	4
15. Reactor Building Elev. 382'				
Cable Tray (Zone 9)	0	2	NA	1
16. Reactor Building Elev. 382'				
Elevator Room (Zone 10)	0	1	NA	1

3.18.3

DELUGE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS

Applicability: At all times when equipment in the area is required to be operable.

Objective: To assure adequate fire suppression capability.

Specification:

3.18.3.1

The Deluge and/or Sprinkler Systems located in the following areas shall be operable or action shall be taken as described in specification 3.18.3.2.

- a. Diesel Generator and Radiator Rooms
- b. Diesel Generator Combustion Air Intakes
- c. Diesel Generator Cooling Air Intake
- d. Control Building Filter (AH-F3A, AH-F3B) Rooms
- e. Air Intake Tunnel (3 zones)
- f. Charcoal Filter (AH-F10, AH-F11)
- g. Intake Screen Pump House
- h. Diesel driven fire pump areas
- i. Control Building at elevation 306'
- j. Control Building ESAS Relay Room at elevation 338'6" (Manual system)
- k. Fuel Handling Building at elevation 281'0"
- l. Auxiliary Building containment penetration area at elevation 281'0" (Manual system)

3.18.3.2

With any of the above deluge and/or sprinkler systems in any room or zone inoperable:

- a. Establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment for the unprotected area(s), within one hour except that no fire watch is required in the air intake tunnel.
- b. Restore the system to OPERABLE status within 14 days or prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission within the next 30 days outlining the actions taken, the cause of inoperability and the plans and schedules for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.

3.18.4 CO₂ SYSTEM

Applicability: At all times when the equipment in the area is required to be operable.

Objective: To insure adequate fire suppression capability.

Specification:

3.18.4.1 The CO₂ system for the Cable Spreading Room shall be operable with a minimum level corresponding to 8500 lbm at a minimum pressure of 285 psig in the storage tank.

3.18.4.2 With the CO₂ system for the Cable Spreading Room inoperable:

- a. Establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment for the unprotected area within one hour.
- b. Restore the system to OPERABLE status within 14 days or prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission within the next 30 days outlining the action taken the cause of inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.

3.18.5

HALON SYSTEMS

Applicability:

The Air Intake Tunnel Halon System shall be functional at all times except when the Control Building ventilation is on recirculation. The Computer Room Halon System shall be functional at all times except when the halon-protected computer equipment in the Control Room is not energized.

Objective:

To assure adequate fire suppression capability.

Specification:

3.18.5.1a.

The Halon System shall be operable having at least 90% of full charge pressure and 95% full charge weight or action shall be taken as described in specification 3.18.5.2.

3.18.5.1b.

The Air Intake Tunnel Halon System may be removed from service for periods up to 48 hours when the air tunnel must be occupied for testing or maintenance.

3.18.5.2

If the Halon system in any zone is inoperable:

- a. Restore the system to OPERABLE status within 14 days or, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to operable status.

3.18.6

FIRE HOSE STATIONS

Applicability:

At all times when the equipment in the area is required to be operable.

Objectives:

To insure adequate fire suppression capability.

Specifications:

3.18.6.1

The fire hose stations listed in Table 3.18-2 shall be operable or an additional hose must be routed to the unprotected area from an operable hose station within one (1) hour.

BASES:

The OPERABILITY of the fire suppression systems ensures that adequate fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where safety related equipment is located. The fire suppression system consists of the water system, spray and/or sprinklers, CO₂, Halon and fire hose stations. The collective capability of the fire suppression systems is adequate to minimize potential damage to safety related equipment and is a major element in the facility fire protection program.

Technical Specification 3.18.4.1 has been changed to reflect a minimum pressure of 285 psig in the CO₂ storage tank. Actual plant CO₂ discharge tests have verified that there is an ample system design margin at this setpoint (i.e. 100%).

In the event that portions of the fire suppression systems are inoperable, alternate backup fire fighting equipment is required to be made available in the affected areas until the inoperable equipment is restored to service.

In the event the fire suppression water system becomes inoperable, immediate corrective measures must be taken since this system provides the major fire suppression capability of the plant.

Table 3.18-2

HOSE STATIONS

Intermediate Building

1. Fire hose near northeast piping chamber stairway at elev. 309' (2 stations).

Auxiliary Building

1. Fire hose near stairway at northeast end of building near valve room at elev. 285'.
2. Fire hose near waste evaporator condensate tank and auxiliary steam condensate return unit elev. 285'.
3. Fire hose near stairway at northeast end of auxiliary building and engineered safeguards control center, elev. 309'.
4. Fire hose near radioactive waste control center, elev. 309'.
5. Fire hose in heat exchanger vault, elev. 286'.

Turbine Building

1. Fire hose along west side of building near 12th stage extraction feedwater heaters, elev. 326'.
2. Fire hose along west side of building near 10th stage extraction feedwater heaters, elev. 359'.

Fuel Handling Building

1. Fire hose along west wall north end, elev. 326'.
2. Fire hose along west wall south end, elev. 326'.
3. Fire hose along west wall north end, elev. 342'.
4. Fire hose along west wall south end, elev. 342'.
5. Fire hose along east wall north end, elev. 359'.
6. Fire hose along east wall south end, elev. 359'.
7. Fire hose middle west wall, elev. 384'.

Reactor Building (Note 1)

1. Fire hose near personnel access hatch, elev. 312'.
2. Fire hose near southeast stairway, elev. 285'.
3. Fire hose near southeast stairway, elev. 350'.
4. Fire hose at top east D-Ring, elev. 369'.
5. Fire hose at door to D-Ring, elev. 285'.
6. Fire hose near west stairway, elev. 285'.
7. Fire hose near equipment access hatch, elev. 312'.
8. Fire hose near west stairway, elev. 350'.
9. Fire hose at top west D-Ring, elev. 369'.

Note 1: Only required to be operable during plant shutdown conditions that do not require establishing containment integrity per T.S. 3.6.

3.18.7

FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION SEALS

Applicability:

All fire barrier penetration seals (including cable and pipe penetration barriers, fire doors and fire campers) in rated fire boundaries protecting safety related areas shall be functional at all times when equipment on either side of the barrier is required to be operable.

Objective:

To assure the effectiveness of fire barriers.

Specifications:

3.18.7.1

All fire barrier penetration seals protecting safety related areas shall be functional or action shall be taken as described in 3.18.7.2.

3.18.7.2a

With one or more of the above required fire barrier penetration seals non-functional, establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration within one hour.

3.18.7.2b

Restore the penetration seal to an OPERABLE status within 14 days or prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission within the next 30 days outlining the action to be taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to an OPERABLE status.

BASES:

The functional integrity of the fire barrier penetration seals ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility. This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire rapidly involving several areas of the facility prior to detection and extinguishment. The fire barrier penetration seals are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections.

During periods of time when the seals are not functional, a roving or continuous fire watch is required to be maintained in the vicinity of the affected seal until the seal is restored to functional status as described in specification 3.18.7.2.

4.18

FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

4.18.1

FIRE PROTECTION INSTRUMENTS

Applicability:

Instruments listed in Table 3.18-1

Objective:

To insure operability of fire detection instruments.

Specification:

4.18.1.1

Each of the fire detection instruments listed in Table 3.18-1 which are accessible during plant operation shall be demonstrated operable at least once per 6 months by performance of a Channel Functional Test. Instruments listed on Table 3.18-1 which are not accessible during plant operation shall be demonstrated operable by the performance of a Channel Functional Test during each cold shutdown exceeding 24 hours unless performed in the previous 6 months.

4.18.1.2

The non-supervised circuits between the instrument and the control room and between local panels and the control room shall be demonstrated operable at least once per month for the instruments listed in Table 3.18-1.

4.18.1.3

The NFPA Standard 72 D supervised circuits associated with the detector alarms for Table 3.18-1 instruments shall be demonstrated operable at least once per 6 months.

4.18.5

HALON SYSTEMS

Applicability: Halon Systems described in Specification 3.18.5.

Objective: To insure system operability.

Specification:

4.18.5.1

The Halon System shall be verified operable:

- a. At least once per 6 months by verifying each Halon storage tank weight and pressure.
- b. At least once per 18 months by:
 1. Verifying that the system, including associated ventilation dampers, actuates automatically to a simulated test signal.
 - 2: Functional test of the ultraviolet detectors, test of the pressure wave detectors, and replacement of the explosive actuators for the Air Intake Tunnel Halon System.

4.18.7

FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION SEALS

Applicability:

All fire barrier penetration seals (including cable and pipe penetration barriers, fire doors and fire dampers) in rated fire boundaries protecting safety related areas shall be functional at all times when equipment either side of the barrier is required to be operable.

Objective:

To assure that the effectiveness of fire barriers protecting safety-related areas is maintained.

Specification:

4.18.7.1

Fire barrier penetration seals and fire dampers shall be verified to be functional by a visual inspection:

- a. At least once each refueling interval; and
- b. Prior to declaring a fire barrier penetration seal or fire damper functional following repairs, maintenance, or initial installation.

4.18.7.2

Fire doors shall be verified to be functional by a visual inspection:

- a. At least weekly for doors that are locked closed to verify that they are locked closed and free of obstructions.
- b. At least daily for doors held open by automatic release mechanisms to verify that the doorway is free of obstructions.
- c. At least daily for doors neither locked nor supervised to verify that they are in a closed position.
- d. Prior to declaring a fire door functional following repairs, maintenance, or initial installation.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 101 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-50

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION

THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-289

1.0 Introduction

By letters dated December 1, 1983, May 30, and July 12, 1984, GPU Nuclear Corporation (the licensee) requested an amendment to the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Technical Specifications for the following:

1. The inclusion of additional numbers and locations of fire protection systems throughout the plant. This supplementary information reflects the additional fire protection systems which have been recently installed.
2. Additional administrative controls, surveillance requirements, and limiting conditions for operation (LOCs), on fire detection and suppression systems to conform with the Standard Technical Specifications.
3. Revisions to the surveillance requirements on the carbon dioxide system in the Cable Spreading Room and the halon fire suppression systems in the Air Intake Tunnel.

2.0 Evaluation

The proposed changes to the tables, which identify number and location of fire protection systems, have no safety significance other than to permit the Technical Specifications to accurately reflect conditions as they now exist in the plant, subsequent to the installation of additional fire protection. These changes do not affect our evaluation of the fire protection systems.

The additional administrative controls, surveillance requirements, and LOCs conform with the requirements of the Standard Technical Specifications and are therefore acceptable.

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The licensee proposes to change the surveillance requirements on the carbon dioxide fire suppression system in the Cable Spreading Room. The minimum storage tank pressure will be lowered from 300 psig to 285 psig. The modification is intended to more accurately reflect the design capabilities of the system and to avoid the implementation of a fire watch while the system is fully capable of suppressing a fire.

The system is designed to operate in the normal mode between 295 and 305 psig, according to the system technical manual. Discharge tests on the system have verified that the minimum design concentration of carbon dioxide (50%) was exceeded with a residual pressure in the tank of 270 psig. Therefore, a minimum storage tank pressure of 285 psig, as proposed, provides reasonable assurance that the system will perform its intended function when needed.

The licensee proposed to change the surveillance requirements of the halon fire suppression systems in the Air Intake Tunnel. The requirement for operability of the deluge system in the same area will be deleted when the halon systems are inoperable. The surveillance requirements for the Deluge System in Section 3.18.3 will not be changed.

The fire hazard in the tunnel for which the fire suppression systems have been provided is an explosion of jet fuel-air mix caused by a crash into the Air Intake Tunnel. The halon systems used are for explosion suppression. These systems operate on the principle that there is a short but measurable time delay between the ignition of a flame front and the buildup of destructive pressure (shock wave). The halon systems are designed to react quickly enough to prevent such an explosion.

There are no fixed combustibles in the Air Intake Tunnel that require protection by these deluge systems. The deluge systems in the Air Intake Tunnel serve to cool the tunnel, wash the fuel contaminants from the air, and prevent reignition of jet fuel after the Halon Systems have suppressed the incipient explosion. With the Halon Systems inoperable, the deluge system is not capable of reacting quickly enough to suppress an explosion, but would still provide protection for a conventional fire, tunnel cooling and fuel washdown. The operability of the deluge system is covered under Section 3.18.3 of the Technical Specifications. Therefore, decoupling the deluge system operability requirements from those for Halon Systems in the Air Intake Tunnel has no safety significance.

Our review indicated that the licensee changed areas of the Technical Specifications which were not identified by change bars on the Technical Specification pages nor were the changes addressed in the licensee's safety evaluation of the proposed change request (TSCR 97, Rev. 1). These changes, involving the fire barrier penetration seals, TS 3.18.7.2.a (P.3-94), the deluge and sprinkler systems, TS 3.18.3.2.a (P.3-89) and the fire hose stations, TS 3.18.6.1 (P.3-92), were brought to the licensee's attention. The licensee, by letter dated July 12, 1984, responded to our concerns regarding this matter. For changes involving TS 3.18.7.2.a and TS 3.18.3.2.a, the licensee claims these changes were unintentional errors that occurred when the change bars were incorrectly carried through to this proposed change (TSCR 97, Rev. 1) from

earlier proposed changes associated with TSCR 83, 96 and 97. We never acted upon these earlier proposed changes, but they were used internally by the licensee in preparing the proposed change TSCR 97, Rev. 1, now being considered. However, the licensee intends to request and provide a safety justification for changes to TS 3.18.3.2.a and TS 3.18.7.2.a at a later date. Although these errors appear to be an oversight on the part of the licensee, they have never resulted in lowering the level of plant safety since the errors never appeared in the Technical Specification document used by the plant personnel. On this basis, we conclude that these changes do not appear in the amended Technical Specifications and therefore have no affect on this amendment.

The apparent change to TS 3.18.6.1 was a clerical error that occurred when the amended page was observed to be of a poor quality for reproduction and was retyped by the licensee. The licensee has since discontinued this practice. In our judgment, this error appears as an oversight on the part of the licensee, and the plant would have been in a somewhat reduced level of safety if plant operations required the action of TS 3.18.6.1 with the error in place. The error involved a two-hour limit for routing an additional fire hose instead of the normal one-hour requirement (standard) accepted by the NRC staff. A review by the licensee indicates that at no time had the one-hour requirement been exceeded, and therefore the level of plant safety was never reduced while the error existed in Technical Specifications. Upon identification of the error, the licensee corrected all controlled copies and affected procedures to reflect the one-hour requirement. These corrections were also verified by the resident inspector. We conclude (1) that the licensee has adequately corrected the error, (2) the licensee has taken remedial action to assure such an error will not occur in the future, and (3) the error does not affect the issue being considered in TSCR 97, Rev. 1. On this basis, we consider this matter resolved.

Based on our evaluation, we find that the licensee's proposed changes to the Technical Specifications reflect appropriate surveillance requirements and administrative controls, and are acceptable.

3.0 Environmental Consideration

This amendment involves changes in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and in surveillance requirements and administrative procedures. We have determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) and (10). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

4.0 Conclusion

We have concluded based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and
(2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: October 5, 1984

Principal Contributors: Dennis Kubicki, Harley Silver, Domenic DiIanni