

November 5, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commissioner Remick

FROM: Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary

SUBJECT: COMFR-92-004 - SECY-92-272, RE-EXAMINATION OF
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
ASSOCIATED WITH THE INTERNAL THREAT

This memorandum is to inform you that all Commissioners have concurred in your proposal to return SECY-92-272 to the staff for reconsideration. The attached SRM provides staff direction on this issue and returns SECY-92-272 to the staff.

This completes action on COMFR-92-004.

Attachment:
As stated

cc: The Chairman
Commissioner Rogers
Commissioner Curtiss
Commissioner de Planque
EDO
OGC

November 5, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: James M. Taylor
Executive Director for Operations

FROM: Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary

SUBJECT: SECY-92-272 - RE-EXAMINATION OF NUCLEAR POWER
PLANT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH
THE INTERNAL THREAT

The Commission (with all Commissioners concurring) has agreed that the staff should reconsider the details of SECY-92-272 and should work with NUMARC, as necessary, to fully understand the goals of their proposed Alternate Protection Strategy as a stepping-off point for exploring alternatives. The Commission believes that an opportunity and justification exists to explore a less prescriptive approach to current security requirements which were driven by concern over employee trustworthiness.

As part of this re-examination, the Chairman and Commissioners Curtiss and de Planque would like the staff to consider and specifically present its conclusions on the following matters:

First, an underlying assumption in the staff's rationale for two of its recommendations -- relaxation of compensatory measures for mechanical lock failures for vital area doors (recommendation 1) and relaxation of requirements for access lists for vital areas (recommendation 2) -- is that most persons granted access to the protected area also have access to the vital areas. While this may be true during normal plant operations, it may not be the case during outages, when many contractor employees are brought onsite. In the outage situation, where effective behavioral observation for contractor personnel may be more difficult, it may be appropriate for licensees to limit contractor access to vital areas to reduce any potential for sabotage. Therefore, the staff should carefully evaluate the basis for the recommendations it is making, to ensure that NRC accounts for the fact that the

SECY NOTE: THIS SRM, SECY-92-272, AND THE VOTE SHEETS OF THE CHAIRMAN AND COMMISSIONER ROGERS WILL BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE 10 WORKING DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS SRM

above assumption underlying its two recommendations in this area may not always be valid. The staff should address this point.

Second, if we are to assume that the internal threat has been reduced through implementation of the fitness-for-duty and access authorization rules, it may be appropriate to consider permitting licensee employees to carry their security badges home at the end of the work day, much as we do with our badges here at the NRC. This approach would eliminate the need for employees to first check-in with security personnel solely for the purpose of obtaining a badge. Such a procedure could reduce the time it takes for employees to process into the protected area when they report for work each day. It may additionally allow a reduction in the number of security personnel required at protected area access control points. For these reasons, the staff should evaluate this option, and present its conclusions.

The staff should inform the Commission of the results of its re-examination.

(EDO)

(SECY Suspense: 3/5/93)

cc: The Chairman
Commissioner Rogers
Commissioner Curtiss
Commissioner Remick
Commissioner de Planque
OGC
OIG
Office Directors, Regions (via E-Mail)
OP, SDBU/CR, ASLBP (via FAX)