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This form is to be filled out (typed or hand-printed) by the person who announced the meeting (i.e., the person who issued the meeting notice). The completed form, and the attached copy of meeting handout materials, will be sent to the Document Control Desk on the same day of the meeting; under no circumstances will this be done later than the working day after the meeting.
Do not include proprietary materials.

DATE OF MEETING

10/24/00

The attached document(s), which was/were handed out in this meeting, is/are to be placed in the public domain as soon as possible. The minutes of the meeting will be issued in the near future. Following are administrative details regarding this meeting:

Docket Number(s) 50-335

Plant/Facility Name St. Lucie Unit 1

TAC Number(s) (if available) MA7205

Reference Meeting Notice Meeting Notice dated 10/6/2000

Purpose of Meeting (copy from meeting notice) Meeting held at the request of Florida

Power + Light Company to discuss the gen

fire risk issues related to the

emergency diesel generator Allowed

outage time extension from 3 to 14 Days

NAME OF PERSON WHO ISSUED MEETING NOTICE

KAHTAN N. JABBOUR

TITLE

Senior Project Manager

OFFICE

NRR

DIVISION

DLPM

BRANCH

PDII / section 2


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Docket File/Central File
PUBLIC

DF01



St. Lucie Unit 1
Meeting with the USNRC/NRR
Proposed License Amendment
Emergency Diesel Generator AOT
PSA Considerations
October 24, 2000



St. Lucie Unit 1

Emergency Diesel Generator AOT


- The staff's estimate of the increase in risk due to fire does not meet R.G. 1.177
 - Staff's estimate based on St. Lucie's IPEEE submittal
 - The IPEEE submittal used the FIVE methodology
 - Results in an unrealistically high core damage frequency for the CR and CSR
- FPL has proposed an alternate means of estimating the increase in risk
- This meeting is to review the basis of the fire risk for the CR and CSR for a 14-day AOT for St. Lucie Unit 1



St. Lucie Unit 1

Emergency Diesel Generator AOT

- Based on the latest analysis, the estimated increase in risk is:
 - For the Cable Spread Room
 - ICCDP 4.0E-8
 - ICLERP 4.0E-9
 - For the Control Room
 - ICCDP 5.7E-8
 - ICLERP 5.7E-9




St. Lucie Unit 1

Emergency Diesel Generator AOT

Cable Spread Room

- The CSR was reviewed for:
 - Ignition Sources
 - Cable Tray and Cable Arrangement
 - Location of Critical Cables (EDG, SBO Cross Tie, Offsite Power)
 - Transient Combustible Control




St. Lucie Unit 1

Emergency Diesel Generator AOT

Ignition Sources

- The main ignition sources of concern are the pressurizer heater transformers
 - Transformers have 4 kV primary and 480 v secondary
 - Transformers are dry type with vented metal enclosure
 - 4 kV cables enter from the bottom and are not exposed in the room
 - Cables exit directly to attached switchgear
 - Cables exiting the switchgear are in conduit



St. Lucie Unit 1

Emergency Diesel Generator AOT

Ignition Sources (cont.)

- The power programmer cabinets are also a concern
 - These cabinets have a ventilation fan near the top of the cabinet
 - Ventilation louvers exist at the lower part of cabinet
 - A credible fire propagation pathway exists
 - A fault in these cabinets would likely trip the reactor
 - A reactor trip de-energizes the cabinets removing energy source




St. Lucie Unit 1

Emergency Diesel Generator AOT

Ignition Sources (cont.)

- Additional ignition sources considered include 480 v load centers, DC distribution panels, and reactor trip switchgear
 - All of these cabinets are enclosed
 - Most with solid tops
 - All cables exiting the cabinets are in conduit
 - Cabinets are well separated with no continuity of combustibles at floor level



St. Lucie Unit 1

Emergency Diesel Generator AOT

Cable Tray and Cable Arrangement

- In most cases the lowest tray has a solid bottom and cover
- Most cable tray stacks have at least one solid tray with a solid cover
- All non-qualified cables are heavily coated in fire retardant material
- Due to fire retardant coatings, most vented trays will act as solid trays
- Vertical cable tray runs have solid tops and bottoms




St. Lucie Unit 1

Emergency Diesel Generator AOT

Location of Critical Cables (EDG, SBO Cross Tie, Offsite Power)

- Control Cables for offsite power and EDG for Train A and B are well separated
 - Area under RTGB 101 has these cables in relatively close proximity
 - Cables from the control room are in enclosed wireway or conduit
- Control Cables for Station Blackout Cross Tie have some separation from EDG cables



St. Lucie Unit 1

Emergency Diesel Generator AOT

Transient Combustible Control

- Transient combustibles are under strict administrative control
- Cable trays are located greater than 9 feet above the floor
- Based on train separation a transient fire would be expected to affect only one train
- Based on cable tray location, cable tray construction and fire retardant
 - Unlikely that a transient fire would cause significant cable damage



St. Lucie Unit 1

Emergency Diesel Generator AOT

Results

- Transformer fire
 - A fire in transformer for bus 1A3 would affect only “A” train power
 - A fire in transformer for bus 1B3 would affect only “B” train power
 - ICCDP estimated at $6.06E-9$ for both transformers
- Power Programmer Cabinet
 - Cables from main Control Board for EDG and offsite power directly above these cabinets
 - ICCDP is estimated at $3.07E-8$
- Cumulative ICCDP for CSR is estimated at $3.68E-8$




St. Lucie Unit 1

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Control Room

- Severe and non-severe fires considered
- RTGB 101 sections represent a linear weighting factor of 2 with a linear weighting factor of 90 for all control room cabinets
- Non-severe fire ICCDP estimated at $4.37E-8$
- Severe fire ICCDP estimated at $1.34E-8$
- Cumulative ICCDP estimated at $5.71E-8$



St. Lucie Unit 1

Emergency Diesel Generator AOT

Summary

- The estimated ICCDP for fire risk with a 14-day AOT for the EDG is 9.39E-8 for the CR and CSR
- This estimate does not take credit for additional compensatory measures in the CSR
- Additional compensatory measures would lower the risk
- Difficult to estimate the affect on risk of the compensatory measures
- The risk assessment represented above shows that the increase in risk from a fire for a 14-day EDG AOT is not significant
- This information will be submitted in answer to the RAI