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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
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Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

**MONTHLY OPERATING REPORT  
SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1  
DOCKET NO. 50-272**

In compliance with Section 6.9, Reporting Requirements for the Salem Unit 1 Technical Specifications, the operating statistics for September 2000 are being forwarded. Also being forwarded, pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.59(b), is a summary of changes, tests, and experiments that were implemented in September 2000.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. F. Garchow".

D. F. Garchow  
Acting Vice President – Operations

RBK  
Attachments

C Distribution

IE24

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DOCKET NO.: 50-272  
 UNIT: Salem 1  
 DATE: 10/15/00  
 COMPLETED BY: R. Knieriem  
 TELEPHONE: (856) 339-1782

Reporting Period September 2000

**OPERATING DATA REPORT**

Design Electrical Rating (MWe-Net)  
 Maximum Dependable Capacity (MWe-Net)  
 No. of hours reactor was critical  
 No. of hours generator was on line (service hours)  
 Unit reserve shutdown hours  
 Net Electrical Energy (MWH)

1115		
1106		
Month	Year-to-date	Cumulative
720	6290	124834
688	6176	120428
0	0	0
712750	6605016	121226351

**UNIT SHUTDOWNS**

NO.	DATE	TYPE F=FORCED S=SCHEDULED	DURATION (HOURS)	REASON (1)	METHOD OF SHUTTING DOWN THE REACTOR (2)	CORRECTIVE ACTION/ COMMENT
5	9/23/00 - 9/24/00	S	32	B	5	Main generator backup voltage regulator. Reactor not shut down.

(1) Reason

- A - Equipment Failure (Explain)
- B - Maintenance or Test
- C - Refueling
- D - Regulatory Restriction
- E - Operator Training/License Examination
- F - Administrative
- G - Operational Error (Explain)
- H - Other

(2) Method

- 1 - Manual
- 2 - Manual Trip/Scram
- 3 - Automatic Trip/Scram
- 4 - Continuation
- 5 - Other (Explain)

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**Summary Of Monthly Operating Experience**

- Salem Unit 1 began the month of September operating at full power.
- On September 6, power was reduced to 43% to repair a Circulating Water System traveling screen. The unit returned to full power on September 7.
- On September 22, power was reduced to 15% to perform maintenance on the Main Generator backup voltage regulator. Full power operation was restored on September 25.
- On September 28, power was reduced to 92% to address a leak associated with the 15C Feedwater Heater.
- Salem Unit 1 returned to full power on September 29, and operated at full power for the remainder of the month.

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**SUMMARY OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS**  
**FOR THE SALEM GENERATING STATION – UNIT 1**

**MONTH September 2000**

The following items completed during September 2000 have been evaluated to determine:

1. If the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report may be increased; or
2. If a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report may be created; or
3. If the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification is reduced.

The 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluations showed that these items did not create a new safety hazard to the plant nor did they affect the safe shutdown of the reactor. These items did not change the plant effluent releases and did not alter the existing environmental impact. The 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluations determined that no unreviewed safety or environmental questions are involved.

**Design Changes Summary of Safety Evaluations**

**Modification 1EE-0407, Circulating Water System, Traveling Screen Pressure Regulator Valves**

This modification removed the Circulating Water System Traveling Screen Pressure Regulating Valves, which were used to control screen wash spray pressure, and instituted manual pressure control using existing valves. This action was taken to address the unsatisfactory operating performance of the existing pressure regulating valves caused by the valve design as it applies to the conditions in the Circulating Water System.

**SUMMARY OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS**  
**FOR THE HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION – Cont'd**

Review of this modification under 10CFR50.59 was required because the removal of the Traveling Screen Pressure Regulating Valve constituted a change to the facility as described in the UFSAR. This modification will provide more reliable Circulating Water System operation by enhancing the performance of the traveling screens. Therefore, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed. Additionally, this change did not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. This change would not create any new accidents or malfunctions since no new failure modes were introduced. In addition the Technical Specification Bases were not affected and no changes to the Technical Specifications were required.

**Temporary Modifications Summary of Safety Evaluations**

There were no reportable changes in this category implemented during September 2000.

**Procedures Summary of Safety Evaluations**

**Procedure SC.MD-CM.CAV-0006(Q), Rev 0, Temporary Blank Installation for Switchgear Penetration Area Ventilation System (SPAV) Exhaust Fans**

This procedure was developed to support the installation of a blank flange to isolate a SPAV Exhaust Fan from the remainder of the system to facilitate maintenance to that fan. Installation of the blank flange will permit operation of the system while a fan is removed.

Review of this procedure under 10CFR50.59 was required because the installation of a blank flange to isolate a SPAV Exhaust Fan constitutes a change to the facility as described in the UFSAR, and a change to procedures described in the UFSAR. During the installation of the blank flange, temperatures of areas cooled by the SPAV system will be monitored so that corrective actions can be taken, if necessary, to prevent exceeding temperature limits in those areas. Therefore, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed. Additionally, this change did not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. This change would not create any new accidents or malfunctions since no new failure modes were introduced. In addition the Technical Specification Bases were not affected and no changes to the Technical Specifications were required.

**SUMMARY OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS**  
**FOR THE HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION – Cont'd**

**UFSAR Change Notices Summary of Safety Evaluations**

**UFSAR Change Notice SCN00-034, Engineering Evaluation S-C-CVC-NSE-0911 - Use of PRC-01 Media in Chemical Volume Control System Mixed Bed Demineralizers**

This evaluation considered the use of PRC-01 media in the Chemical Volume Control System mixed bed demineralizers. PRC-01 media was developed to remove extremely fine CO<sup>58</sup> particles as well as the soluble species transported in the Reactor Coolant System, especially when the unit is shutdown for refueling.

Review of this change under 10CFR50.59 was required because the change constitutes a change to the facility as described in the UFSAR and would change procedures as described in the UFSAR. The proposed change will incorporate a more efficient resin for removal of fine particulate material from the letdown stream. The use of PRC-01 will not affect the functionality of the Chemical Volume Control System demineralizers. Therefore, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed. Additionally, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. This change would not create any new accidents or malfunctions since no new failure modes were introduced. In addition the Technical Specification Bases were not affected and no changes to the Technical Specifications were required.

**Other - Summary of Safety Evaluations**

**Change to Commitment Associated With NRC Generic Letter 88-17 to Close the Containment Equipment Hatch Prior to Operation With Reduced Reactor Coolant Inventory (Mid-loop Operation)**

As a part of its response to NRC Generic Letter 88-17, PSEG Nuclear LLC committed to procedurally require that the Containment Equipment Hatch would remain closed during mid-loop operation unless the core would remain covered for at least four hours if Residual Heat Removal System flow is lost. PSEG Nuclear LLC further committed that any deviation from that position would be justified by a Safety Evaluation. This safety evaluation considered an alternative to that commitment. The alternative involves the use of a temporary Outage Equipment Hatch that can be closed to provide containment closure prior the onset of core boiling following a loss of Residual Heat Removal System flow during mid-loop operation.

This commitment change was reviewed under 10CFR50.59 to satisfy the commitment to do so in PSEG Nuclear LLC's response to NRC Generic Letter 88-17. The temporary Outage Equipment Hatch is fully capable of being closed to provide containment closure prior to core boiling in the event of a loss of Residual Heat

**SUMMARY OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS**  
**FOR THE HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION – Cont'd**

Removal System flow during mid-loop operation. Establishment of containment closure prior to core boiling satisfies the requirement of NRC Generic Letter 88-17. Therefore, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed. Additionally, this change did not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. This change would not create any new accidents or malfunctions since no new failure modes were introduced. In addition the Technical Specification Bases were not affected and no changes to the Technical Specifications were required.