

December 28, 1999

Mr. Robert M. Bellamy
Site Vice President
Entergy Nuclear Generation Corporation
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
600 Rocky Hill Road
Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360-5599

SUBJECT: PILGRIM INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000293/99007

Dear Mr. Bellamy:

This refers to the inspection conducted on October 18, 1999, through November 28, 1999, at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power facility. The enclosed report presents the results of this inspection.

During the six weeks covered by this inspection period, the conduct of activities at the Pilgrim facility was generally characterized by safe plant operations. This was especially evident during the planned down power to 50% reactor power to repair the "C" main feed pump. Good planning and oversight of the power change and conduct of the maintenance work activity contributed to the successful operation.

Performance in the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) area was found to be effective. An effective program for the collection and analysis of environmental media, land use, and quality assurance of analytical measurements has been established and implemented. Implementation of the program to calibrate and maintain meteorological monitoring instrumentation was adequate. Audits of the REMP and meteorological monitoring program were appropriately conducted. The REMP was capable of ensuring independent validation of the integrity of the effluent release program.

Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that one severity level IV violation of NRC requirements occurred. This violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy, dated November 9, 1999; (a 64 FR61142). The NCV involved a surveillance test failure of a main steam isolation valve for excessive leakage. The NCV is further described in the subject inspection report. If you contest the violation or severity level of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date

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of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region 1, and the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

Sincerely,

Original Signed by:

Clifford J. Anderson, Chief
Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No.: 05000293

License No.: DPR-35

Enclosure: Inspection Report 0500050293/99007

cc w/encl:

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J. Alexander, Director, Nuclear Assessment Group
D. Tarantino, Nuclear Information Manager
S. Brennon, Regulatory Affairs Department Manager
J. Fulton, Assistant General Counsel
R. Hallisey, Department of Public Health, Commonwealth of Massachusetts
The Honorable Therese Murray
The Honorable Vincent DiMacedo
T. MacGregor, Mass. Dept. of Public Comm. & Energy
Chairman, Plymouth Board of Selectmen
Chairman, Duxbury Board of Selectmen
Chairman, Nuclear Matters Committee
Plymouth Civil Defense Director
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Office of the Commissioner, Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality Engineering
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Commonwealth of Massachusetts, SLO Designee

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REGION I

License No.: DPR-35

Report No.: 99007

Docket No.: 05000293

Licensee: Entergy Nuclear, Inc.
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
600 Rocky Hill Road
Plymouth, MA 02360

Facility: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

Inspection Period: October 18, 1999, through November 28, 1999

Inspectors: R. Laura, Senior Resident Inspector
R. Arrighi, Resident Inspector
L. Peluso, Health Physicist
S. Dennis, Operations Engineer

Approved by: C. Anderson, Chief
Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
NRC Inspection Report 05000293/99007

This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers resident inspection for the period of October 18, 1999, through November 28, 1999; and includes the results of an announced inspection by a radiation safety specialist conducted November 15 through November 18, 1999.

Operations

- Good operator performance was observed during the oversight of dredging operations in the intake canal and also during the insertion of the feed water correction factor into the thermal limit calculation. (Section O1.1)
- Changes were made to the operating shift schedule in an attempt to improve human performance. The senior reactor operators were changed from a 12 hour shift to an 8 hour shift to be consistent with the reactor operator shift. (Section O1.1)
- Operations personnel performed well during a planned down power to 50% core thermal power. Communications between operators and reactor engineering personnel were clear and crisp. The power maneuvering plan was detailed and closely followed by reactor operators. (Section O4.1)
- A quality assurance surveillance of the down power activities provided good assessment information on operations human performance. The licensee surveillance found some missed notifications to radiation protection and chemistry personnel during planned power changes. (O4.1)
- Operator crew performance during the annual licensed operator requalification exam was satisfactory. Good teamwork and command and control were displayed during the simulator exam. (Section O5.1)

Maintenance

- Good pre-job briefs and procedure adherence were displayed during maintenance and surveillance activities. The activities observed and reviewed were performed safely and in accordance with approved procedures. (Section M1.1)
- The work area for the seal replacement on the "C" feed pump was well lit with temporary lighting. Work benches and a dedicated parts storage area were erected to facilitate the work activity. The post-work test was successfully completed indicating good worker craftsmanship. (Section M1.1)
- The material condition of the plant was good. Most of the identified equipment deficiencies had been identified by the licensee and were properly captured in their work request system. (Section M2.1)

Executive Summary (cont'd)

Engineering

- Corrective actions developed for the August 1997 seaweed intrusion/dredging evolution were comprehensive and properly implemented. The safety evaluation for the dredging of the intake canal was of good quality. (Section E2.1)

Plant Support

- The licensee effectively maintained and implemented the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP). The licensee collected, analyzed, and evaluated radiological data using appropriate procedures. The annual report contained an accurate assessment of the data and a comprehensive summary of the REMP. The licensee implemented an effective program to validate the quality of the analytical results. The REMP was capable of ensuring independent validation of the integrity of the effluent release program. (Section R1.1)
- The calibration program for the meteorological monitoring program was adequate. The meteorological monitoring instrumentation was effectively maintained and calibrated in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.23 and the calibration procedure. (Section R1.2)
- The licensee met the quality assurance audit requirements. The audits and self-assessments of the REMP and MMP were appropriately conducted. (Section R7.1)

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ATTACHMENTS

- Attachment 1 - Inspection Procedures Used
- Items Opened, Closed, and Updated
- List of Acronyms Used

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) began the period at approximately 100% core thermal power. On November 16, operators lowered reactor power to 50% to facilitate a planned down power outage to repair the "C" main feed pump, perform a main condenser thermal back wash, and to perform individual control rod scram time testing. Further details of the down power are contained in Section 04.1 of this inspection report. After completion of the planned activities, operators restored the unit to full power operations where it operated until the end of this inspection period.

I. OPERATIONS

O1 Conduct of Operations¹

O1.1 General Comments (71707)

Using inspection procedure 71707, the inspector conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations including: inspections of main control board panels and reviews of daily problem reports generated by plant workers. The inspector observed proper control room staffing and generally effective shift turnover briefings. Plant behavior was appropriate for the plant configuration and activities in progress. Any questions or concerns identified by the inspector during tours of the control room and plant areas were discussed with the shift supervisor.

Operations management made changes to the licensed operator rotating shift schedule to improve human performance. Reactor operators (RO) were previously on 8 hour shifts while senior reactor operators (SRO) were on 12 hour work shifts. As a result, the ROs and SROs did not share a dedicated shift. During this period, the SROs were changed back to an 8 hour shift to allow the whole crew to rotate together. Also, the shifts were reduced from a six shift rotation to a 5 shift rotation due to reduced manning. The inspector noted these changes to the operating shift composition and rotation had no obvious adverse effect.

Operators installed the feed water correction factor to adjust the core thermal power calculations to account for feed water flow inaccuracies. A test procedure was developed and used to slowly increase core thermal power to minimize the chance of opening a turbine bypass valve due to vortexing in the recirculation system. The increase in power was administratively limited to 1988 megawatts thermal which was 10 megawatts thermal less than the licensed limit. The inspector observed that this activity was well controlled in a conservative manner and had no adverse impact on the turbine pressure control system.

Operators closely coordinated the dredging activities of the intake canal using procedure 2.1.40, Administrative Controls For Intake Canal Dredging. The inspector reviewed the

¹Topical headings such as O1, M8, etc., are used in accordance with the NRC standardized reactor inspection report outline. Individual reports are not expected to address all outline topics.

implementation of the controls to prevent any adverse intake events. Traveling screens were in continuous operation during dredging operations. Also, an operator was stationed at the intake structure with diverse means of communications with the barge operators and control room. The inspector determined that good controls were used by operations personnel during dredging activities.

O4 Operator Knowledge and Performance

O4.1 Reactivity Controls During Down Power

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector monitored licensed operator and reactor engineer performance during a planned power change from 100% to approximately 50% core thermal power. The power change began on November 16, 1999, and the unit was returned to full power on November 19, 1999. Activities conducted during reduced power operations included control rod scram time testing, corrective maintenance on the "C" main feed pump mechanical seals and a thermal backwash of the condenser water boxes. The inspector observed activities in progress in the control room and in the plant, reviewed procedures in use and interviewed various plant personnel.

b. Observations and Findings

Reactor engineering personnel prepared a detailed power maneuver plan in accordance with procedure 2.1.114. The power maneuver plan was followed and, in one instance, the plan was modified to resolve a question raised by the shift superintendent (SS). The plan change moved the final area of the power-to-flow map to a point outside of the monitored area in the less restrictive area of the map. Operators carefully reduced reactor power by decreasing reactor recirculation system flow and by inserting control rods. A dedicated licensed senior reactor operator functioned as the reactivity control manager to provide additional management oversight of reactivity manipulations. The plant manager was also in the control room monitoring portions of the down power. Effective communication was observed between operators and reactor engineers. The SS limited personnel in the control room which helped to minimize distractions. No problems or concerns were identified by the inspector.

The inspector observed that a licensee quality assurance (QA) inspector also monitored portions of the down power activities in the control room. The NRC inspector interviewed the QA inspector and reviewed the subsequent QA surveillance report. The surveillance report noted that overall operations performance was very good. The QA surveillance identified some lower level problems relative to meeting the expectations of operations management. For example, one problem related to the notification of radiation protection and chemistry personnel during power changes. The QA surveillance identified that the notification was missed several times during power changes. Operations management did not take sufficient corrective actions to correct this immediately. The inspector has no further questions or concerns in this regard. The inspector determined that the quality assurance surveillance provided good assessment information on operations human performance.

A quality assurance surveillance of the down power activities provided good assessment information on operations human performance. The licensee surveillance found some missed notifications to radiation protection and chemistry personnel during planned power changes.

O8 Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901)

O8.1 (Closed) IFI 50-293/99-06-01; Unsatisfactory Crew and Individual Performance

The licensee identified an unsatisfactory crew and individual performance during the simulator exam the week of October 4, 1999. The operating crew in the previous exam week (September 27, 1999 to October 1, 1999) was also evaluated as unsatisfactory in the simulator. The details of this issue were previously described in NRC Inspection Report 50-293/99-06 and the licensee subsequently wrote problem report (PR) 99.2445 to determine the root cause of the issue and subsequent corrective actions.

The inspectors attended the simulator portion of the annual licensed operator requalification exam for two subsequent operating crews. Each crew was given two simulator scenarios administered by the licensee's training staff. Crew performance was determined to be good and operators successfully passed the examination. The inspectors noted good command and control and teamwork during the exams. During one scenario, an operator at one control panel identified an anomaly at another panel; in another, the nuclear operations supervisor ensured operators were attentive to their panels and duties and did not focus on one major equipment problem.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee root cause evaluation for PR 99.2445 which identified contributing causes which included: failure to provide adequate training in a timely manner for previously identified weaknesses and lack of oversight due to loss of personnel in both the training and operations departments. The root cause was determined to be the lack of a mechanism to recognize or measure the effects of the requalification training program to manage changes. The inspectors also reviewed ongoing licensee corrective actions which included: development of a process to manage organizational changes, procedure upgrades which reflect management expectations regarding the control room command and control function, and review of the operations department mission and manning requirements. The inspectors agreed with the licensee root cause evaluation and found the corrective actions to be acceptable.

The inspectors also observed selected crew and individual performances during the remainder of the 1999 requalification examination period and found no additional issues similar to those previously identified and observed that no other crew or individual exam failures occurred.

The inspectors review of licensee root cause and corrective actions resulting from issues identified during the 1999 licensed operator requalification examination period were found to be acceptable. IFI 50-293/99-06-01 is **closed**.

II. MAINTENANCE

M1 Conduct of Maintenance

M1.1 General Maintenance and Surveillance

a. Inspection Scope (61726/62707)

The inspector observed portions of selected maintenance and surveillance activities to verify that the applicable procedures and technical specifications were satisfied.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspector observed all or portions of the following activities:

8.3.2, "Control Rod Exercise"

The inspector monitored the performance of surveillance 8.3.2. The inspector noted good procedure use and attention to detail by the operators. For each rod manipulation, two operators verified that the correct rod was selected prior to rod movement. No unusual problems were experienced during the evolution.

9.9, "Control Rod Scram Insertion Time Evaluation"

The inspector attended the brief for surveillance 9.9 and reviewed the surveillance data to ensure scram times were in accordance with technical specification performance criteria. The brief was determined to be good. Rod scram times were in accordance with technical specification requirements. No discrepancies were identified.

MR 19902170, "C" Feed Pump Seal Replacement

The inspector monitored the performance of maintenance activity MR 19902170 and reviewed the tagout for proper isolation and draining of the system. Both the inner and outer feed pump seals were replaced due to identified leakage.

The inspector verified the adequacy of the tag out using plant and instrumentation drawings. Plant operators were observed to properly establish the required isolation in accordance with the sequence established by the senior reactor operator. The inspector observed that there was excellent working conditions established for the work activity. Specifically, a dedicated parts storage and inspection area was established, and temporary lighting and work tables were erected to facilitate the work activity. The maintenance activity was performed safely. The post-work test verified the seal replacement was successful.

c. Conclusions

Good pre-job briefs and procedure adherence were displayed during maintenance and surveillance activities. The activities observed and reviewed were performed safely and in accordance with approved procedures.

The work area for the seal replacement on the “C” feed pump was well lit with temporary lighting, and work benches and a dedicated parts storage area were erected to facilitate the work activity. The post-work test was successfully completed indicating good worker craftsmanship.

M1.2 Maintenance Weekly Meetings

The inspector attended several maintenance weekly morning meetings conducted by the Maintenance Department Manager. Items discussed during the meeting included: industry events, upcoming major work activities and recent human performance problems at the plant. The inspector noted that the meeting was well attended by the maintenance staff and there was good discussion between the craft and the maintenance manager regarding craft concerns.

M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment

M2.1 Plant Tour (62707)

The inspectors performed periodic tours of reactor plant spaces including the reactor building, turbine building, diesel generator rooms and the intake structure to assess the plant material condition. Overall, the material condition of the plant was good. Several minor equipment deficiencies were observed during the tour including oil leaks on the recirculation pump and high pressure coolant injection pump. These deficiencies had previously been identified by the licensee and correctly captured in their work request system. The inspectors identified two lower level degraded equipment conditions that had not been identified by the licensee. These included:

- air leak on the “A” emergency diesel turbo assist air valve T-150C
- air leak on the reactor water cleanup pre-coat flow control valve control air tubing

These leaks could be heard from several feet away from the degraded component. In each case, the inspector notified the nuclear watch engineer and the condition was promptly entered into the licensee’s work control system for corrective action. Neither deficiency resulted in an operability problem.

M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (92902)

M8.1 (Closed) LER 50-293/99-03: Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) Results Exceeding Allowable Technical Specification (TS) Leakage Rates

This LER documented that the inboard and outboard containment isolation valves for the "C" main steam line penetration exceeded the TS allowable leakage rates during Appendix "J" Local Leak Rate Testing. The valves were found to have leakage of 280 standard liters per minute (SLM) and 255 SLM. This is in excess of the maximum allowed leakage for all four main steam lines combined (21.7 SLM), and the one percent per day total allowable leak rate for all primary containment leakage sources (210.5 SLM). Leakage less than one percent per day is necessary to limit radioactive releases to less than 10 CFR 100 limits during a design basis accident. Problem report 99.9216 was written to document and evaluate this condition.

The LER also documented that the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system turbine exhaust check valve CK-1301-64 did not meet its Appendix "J" leakage criteria. This line terminates in the torus (suppression pool). The valve failed its seat leakage test because the piping could not be pressurized. The acceptance criteria for check valves located in piping that terminates below the surface of the suppression pool is 10.1 gpm total. This criteria is based on ensuring the lines remain submerged when exposed to a constant primary containment pressure of 45 psig for 30 days following a design basis accident. Problem report 99.9266 was written to document this condition.

The inspector conducted an on-site review of the LER and verified that the "C" main steam line valves and check valve CK-1301-64 were repaired and tested satisfactorily. A review of draft calculation PNPS-1-ERHS-XI.N-30 indicated that the resultant 10 CFR 100 off-sight dose limits and the 10 CFR 19 control room dose limits from the main steam line leakage would not be compromised when using the design basis accident realistic source term presented in PNPS Appendix R, Section R.3.3 of the Final Safety Analysis Report. Although the problem with the RCIC check valve could present a degradation of primary containment, the licensee indicated that the problem would not reasonably represent an unanalyzed condition because the primary containment pressure profile is not a constant 45 psig for 30 days, and the emergency operating procedures direct operators to maintain torus water level. Based on the contingency actions, the inspector determined that the actual risk significance for these conditions remained low.

The licensee considered the leakage from the "C" main steam line valves and check valve CK-1301-64 occurred as a result of gradual degradation and therefore, not just at the time of testing. Therefore, although the conditions were discovered while shut down, the 24 hour action statement specified by TS 3.7.A.6 was assumed to have been exceeded in violation of TS. This Level IV violation of NRC requirements is being treated as a non-cited violation (NCV) in accordance with Section VII.B.1.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy (**NCV 50-293/99-07-01**). This LER is **closed**.

III. ENGINEERING

E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment

E2.1 Intake Canal Dredging Operation

a. Inspection Scope (37551/40500)

The inspector reviewed the safety evaluation for the dredging of the intake canal and the corrective actions implemented as a result of problems experienced during the August 1997 dredging evolution.

b. Observations and Findings

On August 23, 1997, the unit experienced fouling of the intake structure due to seaweed intrusion. This was caused when the tug boat used to reposition the scow swung the boat around, with the stern of the boat facing the intake structure, and drove a seaweed mat into the traveling screens. Problem report 97.9528 was generated to document the problem.

The inspector reviewed the problem report and the corrective actions for adequacy and to ensure they were implemented prior to commencing the second phase of dredging which commenced on October 27, 1999. Corrective actions included developing a dredging controls procedure. The inspector verified that a procedure was written and controls were put in place to restrict the tug boat movement near the intake structure. The inspector also attended the brief between the licensee and the tug boat operator and verified that the restrictions were clearly conveyed to the boat operator.

The inspector reviewed the safety evaluation for the dredging and found it to be acceptable. Controls specified in the safety evaluation were met, such as having an operator stationed at the screen house to monitor for any intake of sand or unusual conditions and removal of the barge upon a threat of a storm.

c. Conclusions

Corrective actions developed for the August 1997 seaweed intrusion/dredging evolution were comprehensive and properly implemented. The safety evaluation for the dredging of the intake canal was determined to be adequate.

IV. PLANT SUPPORT

R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls

R1.1 Implementation of the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP)

a. Inspection Scope (84750-2)

The following areas of the REMP were reviewed, assessed, and observed:

- Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM);
- Technical Specifications (TS) (Sections 5.5 and 5.6.2);
- Selected sampling and analysis procedures;
- Selected sampling techniques through observations and discussion;
- Analytical data from January to September 1999;
- 1998 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report (AREOR);
- Operability and calibration of continuous air samplers and water compositors;
- REMP discrepancy reports and Problem Reports (PR) for 1998 and 1999;
- 1998 and 1999 land use census results; and
- quality assurance and quality control program (June 1998-September 1999)

b. Observations and Findings

Changes to the ODCM included the transfer of the REMP TS to the ODCM. The changes were performed according to Generic Letter 89-01.

The REMP procedures provided appropriate guidance to perform sample collection and analysis of environmental media as required in the ODCM. Sampling techniques were appropriate to collect environmental sample media. The automatic air sampling equipment and water compositors were operable during 1999, with few exceptions. The air sampling equipment calibration results were within the established tolerances, and calibrations were performed within the frequency specified in the procedure.

The annual land use census was implemented according to the ODCM requirements. The census included residence, milk and garden and was performed in 1998 and 1999 during the growing season, as required.

The 1998 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report provided a comprehensive summary of the analytical results, program discrepancies, land use census results, and quality assurance program results. The licensee met TS, Section 5.6.2, reporting requirements.

The Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC) program for analyses of REMP samples continues to be conducted effectively. The results for 1998 and 1999 QC program were within the acceptance criteria established in the procedures. The licensee continues to maintain oversight of the quality of the QA/QC program through frequent checks of analytical data against acceptance criteria, and procedural and ODCM requirements.

c. Conclusions

The licensee effectively maintained and implemented the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP). The licensee collected, analyzed, and evaluated radiological data using appropriate procedures. The annual report contained an accurate assessment of the data and a comprehensive summary of the REMP. The licensee implemented an effective program to validate the quality of the analytical results. The REMP was capable of ensuring independent validation of the integrity of the effluent release program.

R1.2 Implementation of the Meteorological Monitoring Program (MMP)

a. Inspection Scope (84750-2)

The following areas of the MMP were reviewed, assessed, and observed to verify if the meteorological monitoring instrumentation has been effectively maintained and calibrated in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.23, "Meteorological Monitoring Programs in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," Proposed Revision 1, September 1980:

- Procedure EP-AD-421, "Surveillance, Maintenance, and Calibration of MEDAP Equipment Procedure," Revision 2A;
- Channel calibration results and Site Operation Log sheets for the period of June 1998 to September 1999;
- Operations Surveillance Log for daily channel checks from November 1 to 17, 1999;
- Problem Reports.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors noted that the licensee followed the procedure regarding meteorological monitoring. Weekly and quarterly calibrations were performed within the required frequencies. In addition, operations surveillance logs were appropriately maintained and sufficiently detailed. Issues identified in problem reports were appropriately addressed.

c. Conclusion

The calibration program for the meteorological monitoring program was adequate. The meteorological monitoring instrumentation was effectively maintained and calibrated in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.23 and the calibration procedure.

R7 Quality Assurance in RP&C Activities

R7.1 Quality Assurance Audit Program

a. Inspection Scope (84750-2)

The inspector reviewed the most recent audit reports and self-assessment reports for the REMP and MMP and discussed the results of the audit and self-assessments with cognizant personnel. The following reports were reviewed:

- QA Oversight Program Review 99-02, dated October 27, 1999
- QA Oversight Program Review 98-02, dated October 30, 1998
- Chemistry Self-Assessments
- QA Surveillance, 98-151, Emergency Preparedness: Meteorological Towers, dated November 8 - December 22, 1998;

b. Observations and Findings

Quality Assurance (QA) conducted audits 98-02 and 99-02 for the REMP and surveillance 98-151 for the MMP. The audits incorporated several QA surveillance reports conducted throughout the year and provided an overall program assessment with emphasis on performance trends and effectiveness of program implementation. The surveillance for the meteorological instrumentation identified program deficiencies. Findings and program deficiencies identified in the above audits and surveillance were entered into the corrective action program as problem reports (PRs).

Chemistry self-assessments focused on collection and analysis of samples, review of data and data reporting, procedure adherence, and laboratory quality.

c. Conclusion

The licensee met the QA audit requirements. The audits and self-assessments of the REMP and MMP were appropriately conducted.

S2 Status of Securities Equipment and Facilities

S2.1 Security Diesel Generator

The inspector monitored the performance of surveillance 8.9.14, "Security Diesel Generator Surveillance." The surveillance tests the diesel performance and checks for proper crankcase oil, fuel oil, and engine coolant level, and to ensure that the diesel is properly aligned for automatic start.

The inspector reviewed the Security Plan to ensure specified test requirements were captured in the surveillance procedure. The test frequency for the security diesel is consistent with that of the emergency diesel generator. The inspector considered the test frequency to be adequate. No discrepancies were identified during the diesel run.

V. MANAGEMENT MEETINGS

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on December 23, 1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

ATTACHMENT 1

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

- IP 37551: Onsite Engineering
- IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems
- IP 61726: Surveillance Observation
- IP 62707: Maintenance Observation
- IP 71707: Plant Operations
- IP 71750: Plant Support Activities
- IP 82301: Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors
- IP 84750-02: Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
- IP 92700: Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities
- IP 92901: Followup - Operations
- IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance
- IP 92903: Followup - Engineering
- IP 92904: Followup - Plant Support
- IP 93702: Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND UPDATED

Closed

IFI 50-293/99-06-01	Unsatisfactory Crew and Individual Performance
LER 50-293/99-03	Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) Results Exceeding Allowable Technical Specification (TS) Leakage Rates.
NCV 50-293/99-07-01	Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) Results Exceeding Allowable Technical Specification (TS) Leakage Rates.

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

BECo	Boston Edison Company
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CRHEAF	Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration
DRP	Division of Reactor Projects
EDG	Emergency Diesel Generator
FSAR	Final Safety Analysis Report
IFI	Inspection Follow-Up Item
IR	Inspection Report
LCO	Limiting Condition of Operation
LER	Licensee Event Report
MMP	Meteorological Monitoring Program
MR	Maintenance Request
MSIV	Main Steam Isolation Valve
NCV	Non-Cited Violation
NOV	Notice of Violation
NPO	Nuclear Plant Operator
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRR	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
ODCM Offsite	Dose Calculation Manual
PDR	Public Document Room
PNPS	Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
PR	Problem Report
PWT	Post Work Test
QA	Quality Assurance
QC	Quality Control
RCA	Radiologically Controlled Areas
REMP	Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
RFO	Refueling Outage
RP	Radiological Protection
SBLC	Standby Liquid Control
SBO	Station Blackout
TS	Technical Specification
UFSAR	Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
VIO	Violation