

SURRY POWER STATION POST EXAMINATION COMMENT RESOLUTION

1. RO and SRO Question # 30

Comment partially accepted. The additional information provided by the licensee indicates the only correct answer should be "a." The provided reference material states "On a loss of SVB (Semi-Vital Bus), control of the SG PORVs will shift to the control unit in the Relay Room...." Additionally, the licensee, in their argument states "In addition, "Local" in normal terminology for controllers means control would be in the racks, which would also indicate (a) would be the correct answer." The stem of the question does not leave suspect on how the question should be answered. The stem provides conditions and asks the status of the PORVs. It does not direct the applicant to try to determine if the question elicits the default position of the controller or from where it would be required to be controlled. The NRC determined that this is one in the same. Based on this information the NRC has determined that "a" is the only correct answer. The answer key will be changed and credit will be given for only answer "a."

2. RO and SRO Question # 74

Comment not accepted. The additional information provided by the licensee indicates that there is no correct answer to this question. The question places the unit initially at 100% reactor power. When Vital Bus II was de-energized the unit tripped. This caused the operators to enter AP-10.02, "Loss of Vital Bus II" and perform the immediate operator actions. AP-10.02 step 3 (immediate operator action) directs entry into E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." At that time AP-10.02 is set aside until the immediate operator actions of E-0 are completed. At step 4 of E-0 entry into ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response" is warranted, as was stated in the stem of the question. At that time, the crew should perform the first six steps of ES-0.1. Simultaneously the crew should implement the remainder of AP-10.02 which requires stopping the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP). While AP-10.02 is not the highest priority procedure, ES-0.1 would be, however, AP-10.02 would be more applicable in addressing the Vital Bus loss. AP-10.02 step 4 simply states to stop the RCP. AP-10.02 does not provide a time frame the RCP should be stopped. Once you reach step 4 the crew should stop the applicable RCP. The distractors were developed from either an Annunciator Response procedure or AP-9.0, "RCP Abnormal Conditions." Those procedures, in this instance, have a lesser priority and would be reviewed when time permitted. Based on this information the NRC has determined that there is not time frame defined for the conditions in the question therefore there is no correct answer to this question. The answer key will be changed by deleting this question from the examination and adjusting the total points for the examination.

3. RO Question # 86

Comment accepted. The review revealed that the stem of the question was changed removing the identifier of which Main Feed Water Pump was running. Depending on assumption of which pump was running the applicant could have selected the pump that did not have an answer. If the other pump was assumed to be the one running then the applicant would have had two possible answers. Because of this uncertainty and the need for the use of an assumption to answer the question, the NRC has decided this

question should be deleted from the examination. The answer key will be changed by deleting this question from the examination and adjusting the total points for the examination. .

4. RO Question # 87

Comment partially accepted. The review revealed that the stem of the question, as stated, placed the radiation worker in a position where he exceeded the 1.8 rem quarterly and the 3.8 rem yearly administration dose limit requirements. Since the radiation worker had already entered the buffer zone (within 200 mR of the quarterly or annual limit), one should have assumed that the extension request was prepared and authorized. The Radiation Controlled Area (RCA) access computer system will only allow additional dose to be received within the initial 1.8 rem limit. The only way the radiation worker could have exceeded his administrative requirements without prior approval was to remain in the Radiation Controlled Area with a Digital Alarming Dosimeter (DAD) in alarm. This would have violated plant procedures. Therefore, the question, as written, implies that the authorization was granted and the only additional requirement was to have a Radiation Work Permit. Based on this information the NRC has decided that the answer "b" allowing no additional information but an RWP is the only correct answer. The answer key will be changed to allow answer "b" as the only correct answer.