

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Spring City, Tennessee 37381-2000

William R. Lagergren, Jr.
Site Vice President, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

SEP 29 2000

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

10 CFR 50.73

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of
Tennessee Valley Authority


) Docket No. 50-390
)

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) - UNIT 1 - FACILITY OPERATING
LICENSE NPF-90 - LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 50-390/2000-003

The enclosed report provides details of a missed response time
test involving a reactor trip breaker. This condition is
reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

If you should have any questions, please contact P. L. Pace at
(423) 365-1824.

Sincerely,


W. R. Lagergren

Enclosure
cc: See page 2

IE22

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cc (Enclosure):

INPO Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
700 Galleria Parkway
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Atlanta, Georgia 30303

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50.0 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the information and Records Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20603. In an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may no conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

FACILITY NAME (1) Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000390	PAGE (3) 1 OF 4
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TITLE (4)
Discovery of a Missed Response Time Test for Reactor Trip Breakers

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
08	31	00	2000	003	00	10	2	00		05000
										05000

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	POWER LEVEL (10) 100	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more) (11)								
		20.2201(b)	20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)				
		20.2203(a)(1)	20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)				
		20.2203(a)(2)(i)	20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	73.71				
		20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	OTHER				
20.2203(a)(2)(iii)				50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(v)	Specify in Abstract below			
20.2203(a)(2)(iv)				50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	or in NRC Form 366A			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Rickey A. Stockton, Licensing Engineer	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (423)-365-1818
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On August 31, during a review of post maintenance tests scheduled for the upcoming Unit 1 Cycle 3 refueling outage, it was discovered that no documented evidence could be found that a reactor trip breaker response time test had been performed for reactor trip breaker B during the Unit 1 Cycle 2 refueling outage. At 1555 on August 31, Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.0.3 was entered which provides 24 hours for completion of the missed test. The response time test was successfully completed and the results accepted on September 1, 2000, at 1523.

The cause was determined to be an inadequate work order which only notified another group to perform the response time test and did not verify completion. Corrective actions included performance of the missed test and a revision to the upcoming Unit 1 Cycle 3 work orders to include a verification of test completion.

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Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1	05000	2000	- 003	- 00	2 OF 4
	05000390				

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

I. PLANT CONDITIONS:

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 was in Mode 1 operating at approximately 75 percent reactor power while coasting down for a refueling outage scheduled to begin on September 10, 2000.

II. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

A. Event

On August 31, during a review of post maintenance tests scheduled for the upcoming Unit 1 Cycle 3 refueling outage, it was discovered that no documented evidence could be found that a reactor trip breaker (Energy Industry Identification System (EII) Code RCT/BKR) response time test had been performed for reactor trip breaker B during the Unit 1 Cycle 2 refueling outage. At 1555 on August 31, Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.0.3 was entered which provides 24 hours for completion of the missed test. The response time test was successfully completed and the results accepted on September 1, 2000, at 1523.

B. Inoperable Structures, Components, or Systems that Contributed to the Event

There were no inoperable structures, components or systems that contributed to this event.

C. Dates and Approximate Times of Major Occurrences

Date/Time (EDT)	
August 31, 2000 @ 1555	Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.0.3 was entered.
September 1, 2000 @ 1523	Response time test completed and results accepted.

D. Other Systems or Secondary Functions Affected

There were no other systems or secondary functions affected by this missed response time test.

E. Method of Discovery

This condition was identified during a schedule review of post maintenance testing for the upcoming Unit 1 Cycle 3 refueling outage.

F. Operator Actions

Once discovered, the operators entered SR 3.0.3 and initiated actions to perform the required response time test.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

G. Automatic and manual safety system responses

There were no automatic or manual safety system responses and none were required.

III. CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of this event is an inadequate work order. During Unit 1 Cycle 2 refueling outage, a newly tested breaker was installed in Unit 1 Reactor Trip Breaker (RTB) B position under work order (WO) 99-002212-015. This WO listed the correct Surveillance Instructions (SIs) 1-SI-99-1, 1-SI-99-10-B, and 1-SI-99-201-B to be performed to satisfy technical specification requirements. The post maintenance test section of the WO specified only that the electrician "notify" the Maintenance Instrument Group (MIG) that the required SIs were needed. The performer complied with the "notification" and closed the WO. It was determined that 1-SI-99-1 and 1-SI-99-10-B were performed as required, however, the breaker was not response time tested in accordance with 1-SI-99-201-B.

IV. ANALYSIS OF EVENT - ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement SR 3.3.1.10 requires a response time test on a 18 month staggered test basis. Upon discovery of the deficiency, the response test was performed and the acceptance criteria was met. Therefore, there were no safety consequences as a result of this missed response time test.

V. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

A. Immediate Corrective Actions

Upon discovery of the deficiency, the response test was performed and the acceptance criteria was met. This action was completed on September 1, 2000. The post maintenance sections of the Unit 1 Cycle 3 work orders which perform similar breaker swaps have been revised to ensure that the testing is performed and documented before the work orders are closed.

B. Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence - (TVA does not consider these items to constitute regulatory commitments. TVA's corrective action program tracks completion of these actions.)

A review of open Unit 1 Cycle 3 work orders was performed to determine if any additional work orders contained inappropriate statements to notify another group to perform a return to operability testing without ensuring that the testing was successfully completed. No new or additional work orders were identified. A review of the closed Unit 1 Cycles 1 and 2 work orders was performed to determine if any additional work orders contained inappropriate statements as described above. No additional work orders were identified other than the reactor trip breaker work order. A full text search of 277 maintenance instructions (MIs) revealed 20 MIs which may require additional evaluation and changes if deemed necessary. This action is being tracked under the corrective action program.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

VI. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

A. Failed Components

1. Safety Train Inoperability

There was no safety train inoperability due to a failed component.

2. Component/System Failure Information

a. Method of Discovery of Each Component or System Failure:

This event did not involve a failed component.

b. Failure Mode, Mechanism, and Effect of Each Failed Component:

This event did not involve a failed component.

c. Root Cause of Failure:

This event did not involve a failed component.

d. For Failed Components With Multiple Functions, List of Systems or Secondary Functions Affected:

This event did not involve a failed component.

e. Manufacturer and Model Number of Each Failed Component:

This event did not involve a failed component.

B. Previous Similar Events

A review of the previous WBN LERs was performed. Although WBN has had previous LERs involving missed surveillance requirements, none of those LERs involve the issue of the notification of one group by another group to perform a test. Therefore, no further action or review is considered necessary.

C. Additional Information: - None.

D. Safety System Functional Failure:

This event did not involve a safety system functional failure as defined in NEI-99-02, Revision 0.

VII. COMMITMENTS - None.