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SOUTHERN COMPANY
Energy to Serve Your World℠

September 25, 2000

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
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NOG- 01163

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE REVISION

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.4, as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Part V, Southern Nuclear hereby submits the following revision(s) to the Vogtle Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure(s):

Procedure	Revision	Effective Date
91001-C	20	09/12/00

By copy of this letter, the NRC Region II Administrator and the Site NRC Senior Resident Inspector will receive one copy each of the revision(s).

Please contact Angel Cardona at (706) 826-3114 if you have questions.

Sincerely,

Jeffrey T. Gasser
General Manager

JTG:AEC:jmm

Enclosure: Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure(s)

A045

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e indicated by a mark in the SE column.

9/12

Document Number	Rev	SE	Document Description
91001-C	20		"Emergency Classification and Implementation Instructions"
			3 pages of documentation

NORMS

RECEIVED
SEP 14 2000

Remarks: Printed copies compared to originals in Document Control.

Robert J. Anderson
Submitted By:

Ronda Jarrard
Received By: (Document Control)

Emergency Preparedness
Department

09/14/2000
Date

9/14/00
Date

Figure 2 (Example)

PRB REVIEW REQUIRED

1.0 PURPOSE

1.1 The purpose of this procedure is to provide instructions in the classification of off-normal events into one of four emergency classification levels.

2.0 DEFINITIONS

2.1 CREDIBLE THREAT

A threat is considered credible when (1) physical evidence supporting the threat exists, or (2) information independent from the actual threat message exists that support the threat, or (3) a specific group or organization claims responsibility for the threat, or (4) a message (written or verbal) is received that contains specific information about plant locations, systems or device description an average person would most likely not know. The determination of credibility should be made by the Shift Superintendent with input from the Shift Captain or their designated representatives.

3.0 RESPONSIBILITIES

3.1 The Shift Superintendent is responsible for initial classification of events. The Shift Superintendent shall assume the responsibilities of the Emergency Director (ED) until relieved. The Shift Superintendent then becomes responsible for recognizing changes in plant conditions and advising the ED concerning classification of events.

3.2 The ED has the following non-delegable responsibilities relative to emergency classification:

3.2.1 Classifying and declaring the emergency.

3.2.2 Declaring changes in the emergency classification, including downgrading and terminating.

3.3 The Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Managers are responsible for:

3.1.1 Providing recommendations on emergency classifications to the ED.

4.0 PREREQUISITES

An off-normal event has occurred, or is in progress.

5.0 PRECAUTIONS

5.1 This procedure establishes minimum requirements for emergency classifications. The ED may use judgement as the final criterion for determining the classifications of off-normal events that are not included in this procedure.

6.0 PROCEDURE

6.1 CLASSIFICATION

6.1.1 Personnel and plant safety must be addressed as the highest priority; if necessary, prior to emergency classification.

NOTE

Classification should not be delayed in anticipation of either events being terminated or the threat to safety ending. The emergency should be assessed and classified within 15 minutes after it is recognized that the emergency action level has been exceeded.

6.1.2 Classify the event on Data Sheet 1, "Classification Determination".

6.1.2.1 Use Figure 1 to determine if the fuel cladding integrity is "Loss" or "Potential Loss". Enter loss, potential loss, or intact as applicable on Data Sheet 1, part 1a.

6.1.2.2 Use Figure 2 to determine if the reactor coolant system integrity is "Loss" or "Potential Loss". Enter loss, potential loss, or intact as applicable on Data Sheet 1, part 1b.

6.1.2.3 Use Figure 3 to determine if the containment is "Loss" or "Potential Loss". Enter loss, potential loss, or intact as applicable on Data Sheet 1, part 1c.

6.1.2.4 Use Figure 4, evaluate and determine the highest emergency classification level based on events which are in progress, considering past events, and their impact on the current plant conditions. Check-mark the applicable emergency classification level on Data Sheet 1, Part 2. For those events which are corrected, or the threat to the level of safety of the plant has ended prior to completion of classification/notification processes, it is permissible to classify the event and terminate the event with the initial emergency notification message. In this circumstance termination does not require consultation with off-site authorities.

6.1.2.5 Verify your assumption of the ED position by signing Data Sheet 1, part 4, and list the date and time of the emergency declaration.

6.1.3 The ED shall complete the Plant Page Announcement Checklist in Procedure 91002-C, "Emergency Notifications" and shall proceed with the appropriate checklist found in Procedure 91102-C, "Duties Of The Emergency Director".

6.2 PERIODIC REVIEW OF THE CLASSIFICATION LEVEL

6.2.1 The ED shall periodically review current or projected plant conditions to determine if the emergency should be upgraded or downgraded.

6.2.2 The TSC Manager shall periodically review plant conditions, determine if the emergency should be upgraded or downgraded based on current or projected status, and make recommendations to the ED.

6.2.3 The EOF Manager shall periodically review offsite radiological conditions, determine if the emergency should be upgraded or downgraded based on current field surveys or projected releases, and make recommendations to the ED.

6.3 DOWNGRADING THE CLASSIFICATION

6.3.1 For an NOUE or Alert, the ED may downgrade or terminate the Emergency when plant conditions have stabilized and the reason for the NOUE or ALERT have been corrected.

6.3.2 For a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency, the ED may downgrade or terminate the Emergency after discussions with plant management, applicable members of the VEGP emergency organization, the NRC, GEMA, Burke County EMA director, South Carolina EPD director and SRS emergency staff do not result in the identification of a valid reason for not downgrading or terminating the emergency. (Reference Procedure 91501-C, "Recovery").

6.3.3 After the decision has been made to downgrade, the ED shall proceed with the appropriate checklist found in "Procedure 91102-C, "Duties Of The Emergency Director".

7.0 <u>REFERENCES</u>

7.1 VEGP EMERGENCY PLAN

7.2 PROCEDURES

7.2.1 91002-C "Emergency Notifications"

7.2.2 91102-C "Duties Of The Emergency Director"

7.2.3	91304-C	"Estimating Offsite Dose"
7.2.4	91305-C,	"Protective Action Guidelines"
7.2.5	91501-C,	"Recovery"
7.2.6	00152-C,	"Federal And State Reporting Requirements"
7.2.7	00655-C,	"Bombs Or Other Overt Threats"

7.3 VEGP Technical Specifications

END OF PROCEDURE TEXT



FIGURE 1 - FUEL CLADDING INTEGRITY



FIGURE 2 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) INTEGRITY



FIGURE 3 - CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

	ELECTRICAL POWER	RADIOACTIVITY	PLANT SYSTEMS	NATURAL PHENOMENON	HAZARDS	SECURITY	BARRIERS	SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS	OTHER
GENERAL	Modes 1-4: Loss of AC power to BOTH AA02 AND BA03 ***AND*** EITHER: Restoration of at least one emergency bus NOT likely within 4 hrs of time of loss, OR Loss or Potential Loss of FUEL CLAD BARRIER determined from Fission Product Barrier EAL's (Figure 1/Data sheet 1)	Valid reading on RE-12444 that is > 30E+0 µci/cc for > 15 min. ***OR*** this value is expected to be exceeded for > 15 min. *(Note 1)* Valid site boundary dose assessment of release indicates > 1000 mrem TEDE ***OR*** > 5000 mrem CDE thyroid ***OR*** field survey results indicate > 1000 mrem/hr that is expected to continue for > 1 hr ***OR*** field survey samples indicate thyroid dose of 5000 mr CDE for 1 hr of inhalation				Loss of physical contro of the control room due to a security event ***OR*** loss of physical control of remote shutdown capability due to a security event	Loss of THREE barriers Loss of ANY TWO barriers ***AND*** Potential Loss of the THIRD barrier Modes 1-2: Subcritically CSFST is RED ***AND*** EITHER Core Cooling OR Heat Sink CSFST is RED		Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the EMERGENCY DIRECTOR indicate potential for uncontrolled radionuclide releases that can reasonably be expected to exceed 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem CDE thyroid dose levels outside the site boundary ***OR*** Actual or imminent substantial core degradation with potential for loss of containment
SITE AREA	Modes 1-4: Loss of AC power on BOTH AA02 ***AND*** BA03 for > 15 min. Modes 1-4: Unplanned loss of voltage on ALL Vital DC buses (AD1, BD1, CD1, and DD1) for > 15 min.	Valid reading on RE-12444 that is > 3E+0 µ ci/cc for > 15 min. ***OR*** on RE-12839 that is > 5E+2 µ ci/cc for > 15 min. ***OR*** these values are expected to be exceeded for > 15 min. *(Note 1)* Valid site boundary dose assessment of release indicates > 100 mrem TEDE ***OR*** > 500 mrem CDE thyroid ***OR*** field survey results indicate > 100 mrem/hr that is expected to continue for > 1 hr ***OR*** field survey samples indicate thyroid dose of 500 mrem CDE for 1 hr of inhalation	Mode 1-2: Automatic reactor trip set point was exceeded ***AND*** an automatic reactor trip did NOT occur ***AND*** a successful manual trip did NOT occur from the control room. Modes 1-4: Significant transient is in progress and ESF annunciators needed to monitor the transient are not available ***AND*** ESF control board AND compensatory non-alarming indications are NOT available		Control room evacuation has been initiated ***AND*** control of the plant CANNOT be established from remote shutdown panels within 15 min.	Intrusion into a plant vital area by a hostile force (e.g., confirmed bomb device discovered within Vital area)	Loss of TWO barriers Loss of ONE barrier ***AND*** Potential Loss of a SECOND barrier Potential Loss of BOTH Fuel Clad ***AND*** RCS barriers Modes 1-4: The reactor is tripped ***AND*** Subcriticality CSFST is RED	Modes 5-6: Loss of reactor vessel water level as indicated by loss of RHR cooling as determined by AOP 18019-C ***AND*** any ONE of the following: Vessel level < 183 ft (< 62% RVLIS), OR Containment area rad monitors RE-002/003 valid high alarm (15 mr/hr) with vessel head removed, OR Core exit temperatures > 711° F with vessel head installed. Modes 1-4: Complete loss of function needed to achieve or maintain Hot Shutdown (EITHER Core Cooling OR Heat Sink CSFST is RED) ***AND*** no other Heat Sink available.	Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the EMERGENCY DIRECTOR indicate actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public.
ALERT	Modes 1-4: Loss of voltage on EITHER AA02 OR BA03 for > 15 min. ***AND*** the remaining energized 1-E bus does not have a backup power supply available. Modes 5, 6, or Defueled: Loss of AC power on BOTH AA02 AND BA03 for > 15 min.	Valid reading on RE-12444 that is > 2E-1 µci/cc for > 15 min. ***OR*** on RE-12839 that is > 6E+0 µci/cc for > 15 min. ***OR*** on RE-018 that is > 8E-1 µci/cc for > 15 min. *(Note 1)* Confirmed sample analysis for gaseous ***OR*** liquid release indicates concentrations or release rates > 200X ODCM limits for > 15 min. Radiation levels higher than normal in Fuel Handling or Containment Bldg ***AND*** irradiated fuel is uncovered, OR < 194 feet water level in refueling cavity, spent fuel pool, or fuel transfer canal that results in uncovering irradiated fuel. *(Note 2)* Damage to irradiated fuel causing a valid high alarm on one or more of the following: RE-008 (2.5 mr/hr), RE-2532/2533 A/B (5E-4 µci/cc), OR during Mode 6 fuel transfer RE-002/003 (15 mr/hr) Valid rad levels >15 mr/hr in the Control room ***OR*** >100 mr/hr in areas requiring infrequent access to maintain plant safety functions (e.g.., local charging station)	Modes 1-3: Automatic reactor trip setpoint was exceeded ***AND*** an automatic reactor trip did NOT occur ***AND*** a successful manual trip occurred from the control room. Modes 1-4: Unplanned loss of most or all annunciators or indicators in the control room for plant safety systems ***AND*** EITHER a significant transient is in progress or compensatory non-alarming indications are NOT available.	Tornado striking plant vital area ***OR*** sustained hurricane force winds of 100 mph or greater on site as verified by meteorological instrumentation (15 minute average). Seismic monitoring system confirms seismic event > 0.12 g.	Aircraft crash confirmed to affect plant vital areas. Report or detection of toxic, flammable, or asphyxiant gasses within a facility structure in concentrations that requires evacuation of a room or area needed for safe operation of the plant. Major fire or explosion in a vital area ***AND*** affected safety system parameters show degraded performance or there is visible damage to permanent safety related structures or safety related equipment within the specified area. Report of visible structural damage (caused by natural or destructive phenomena) which threatens the ability of the structure to perform its safety related function to ANY of the following plant structures: Containment Auxiliary Building Control Building Fuel Handling Building Diesel Generator Building Condensate Storage Tank AFW Pumphouse NSCW Cooling Tower RWST Control Room evacuation has been initiated	Intrusion into the Protected area by a hostile force (e.g., unauthorized vehicle penetrates protected area in a hostile manner)	Loss or Potential Loss of Fuel Clad barrier Loss or Potential Loss of RCS barrier	Modes 5-6: Unplanned loss of RHR cooling ***AND*** EITHER RCS temperature is > 200° F OR RCS temperature is increasing uncontrolled toward 200° F.	Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the EMERGENCY DIRECTOR indicate plant safety systems may be substantially degraded and that increased monitoring of plant functions is warranted.
NOUE	Loss of Off-Site power to BOTH AA02 AND BA03 for > 15 min. (neither bus is connected to an energized Off-Site source) ***AND*** BOTH AA02 AND BA03 are powered by Diesel Generators Modes 5-6: Unplanned loss of voltage on ALL Vital DC buses (AD1, BD1, CD1, and DD1) for > 15 min.	Valid reading on RE-12444/12442 that is > 2E-3 µci/cc for > 60 min. ***OR*** on RE-12839 that is > 6E-2 µci/cc for > 60 min. ***OR*** on RE-018 that is > 8E-3 µci/cc for > 60 min. *(Note 1)* Confirmed sample analysis for gaseous ***OR*** liquid release indicates concentrations or release rates > 2X ODCM limits for > 60 min. Radiation levels higher than normal in Fuel Handling or Containment Bldg ***AND*** uncontrolled water level decrease in refueling cavity, spent fuel pool, or fuel transfer canal, BUT all irradiated fuel assemblies remain covered with water. *(Note 2)* Valid area rad monitor readings increase 1000X over normal levels. *(Note 2)*	Modes 4-5: Automatic reactor trip setpoint was exceeded ***AND*** an automatic reactor trip did NOT occur ***AND*** a successful manual trip occurred from the control room. Modes 1-4: Unplanned loss of most or all annunciators or indicators in the control room for plant safety systems for > 15 min. ***AND*** compensating non-alarming indicators are available Loss of ALL of the following On-Site communications systems: In-plant telephone, Gaitronics, Sound powered phone, and Plant radio communications Loss of ALL of the following Off-Site communications systems: ENN and Telephone capability to Off-Site network	Report of tornado striking within protected area. Hurricane force winds of 74 mph or greater forecast by the National Weather Service (NWS- Columbia S.C. office) to be at the plant site in the next four hours. Seismic monitoring system indicates seismic event ***OR*** plant operators report an earthquake was "felt".	Aircraft crash causes damage to safety related plant structures or safety related systems within the protected area. Report or detection of toxic, flammable, or asphyxiant gasses that could enter the site area in amounts > life-threatening or flammable concentrations that could affect normal operation of the plant. Report of turbine failure resulting in casing penetration or damage to turbine or generator seals. Fire in an area contiguous or adjacent to a vital area that is not extinguished within 15 min. of control room notification by fire alarm or personnel report. Unanticipated explosion within protected area resulting in visible damage to permanent structures or equipment.	Confirmed Security Event which indicates a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant. (i.e..) 1. Bomb device in Protected Area but outside Vital area. 2. Hostage situation inside Protected Area. 3. Civil disturbance on plant site outside Protected Area. 4. Credible Bomb threat *(Note 3)* 5. Credible Attack threat *(Note 3)* Notification by Local, County, or State officials of potential for evacuation of site personnel based on an Off-Site event.	Loss or Potential Loss of Containment barrier RCS Chemistry analysis indicates Dose equivalent I-131 > 1 µci/gm for > 48 hrs. or in excess of Tech Spec. figure 3.4.16-1 ***OR*** RCS specific activity > 100/E µci/gm gross radioactivity. RCS Unidentified leakage > 10 gpm ***OR*** RCS Pressure boundary leakage > 10 gpm ***OR*** RCS identified leakage > 25 gpm		Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the EMERGENCY DIRECTOR indicate potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Modes 1-4: Plant NOT brought to required operating mode within Tech Spec LCO ***OR*** TRM Technical Requirement required action completion time limit. Modes 1-4: Uncontrolled depressurization of one or more steam generators.

NOTE 1: Classification should be based on ODCM or Off-site Dose Calculation computer program results; however, if the monitor reading(s) is sustained for longer than the period indicated and release assessment has NOT or CANNOT be completed within this period, then declaration MUST be made based on the valid reading.

NOTE 2: "Normal levels" are the highest reading in the last 24 hours prior to the emergency, excluding the current peak value.

NOTE 3: See section 2.0 of this procedure.

Figure 4 - EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL DETERMINATION

DATA SHEET 1
CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION

1. Considering events which are in progress, past events, and their impact on current plant conditions, evaluate the status of the fission product barriers.

NOTE

A situation could occur in which the loss or potential loss of one or more barriers has not yet happened, but appears to be IMMINENT (i.e.., likely to occur within 2 hours). In this situation, classify the event AS IF the loss or potential loss of the barrier has already occurred.

a.	Fuel Cladding Integrity (See Figure 1)	☐ LOSS	☐ POTENTIAL LOSS	☐ INTACT
b.	Reactor Coolant System Integrity (See Figure 2)	☐ LOSS	☐ POTENTIAL LOSS	☐ INTACT
c.	Containment Integrity (See Figure 3)	☐ LOSS	☐ POTENTIAL LOSS	☐ INTACT

2. Use Figure 4, evaluate and determine the highest emergency classification level based on events which are in progress, considering past events, and their impact on current plant conditions .

Check ☑ One:

☐ Notification Of Unusual Event

☐ Alert

☐ Site Area Emergency

☐ General Emergency

Comments: _____

_____

3. Maintain a log of the incident. (This may be delegated).

4. Assume the position of Emergency Director.

Signature: _____
Emergency Director

Date: ____/____/____

Time: _____