

**A. Alan Blind**  
Vice President

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.  
Indian Point Station  
Broadway & Bleakley Avenue  
Buchanan, NY 10511  
Telephone (914) 734-5340  
Fax: (914) 734-5718  
blinda@coned.com

September 8, 2000

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2  
Docket No. 50-247  
NL-00-111

Document Control Desk  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Mail Station P1-137  
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject: Reply to a Notice of Violation, Emergency Preparedness Program

Reference: NRC Inspection Report 05000247/2000-006, and NRC Letter to Mr. A. A. Blind from Mr. H. J. Miller, Final Significance Determination and Notice of Violation, dated August 9, 2000.

Attachment 1 to this letter contains the Consolidated Edison Company of New York (Con Edison) reply to the subject Notice of Violation included with your letter of August 9, 2000, concerning the inspection conducted from May 15, 2000 through June 2, 2000.

Commitments made by Con Edison contained in this letter are listed in Attachment 2.

Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. John F. McCann, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing.

Sincerely,



Subscribed and sworn to  
before me this 8<sup>th</sup> day  
of September 2000.

  
Notary Public

Attachments  
cc: next page

KAREN L. LANCASTER  
Notary Public, State of New York  
No. 60-4643659  
Qualified In Westchester County  
Term Expires 9/30/01

IE35

cc: Mr. Hubert J. Miller  
Regional Administrator-Region I  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
475 Allendale Road  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Mr. Patrick D. Milano, Project Manager  
Project Directorate I-1  
Division of Reactor Projects I/II  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Mail Stop O-8-2C  
Washington, DC 20555

Senior Resident Inspector  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
PO Box 38  
Buchanan, NY 10511

ATTACHMENT 1 TO NL-00-111

REPLY TO A NOTICE OF VIOLATION  
INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000247/2000-006

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC  
INDIAN POINT UNIT NO. 2  
DOCKET NO. 50-247

## NOTICE OF VIOLATION

1. 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) requires that timely augmentation of response capabilities be available.

The Indian Point 2 (IP2) Emergency Plan (E-Plan), dated April 24, 1996, sections 7.1.5, 7.1.6, 7.1.7 and Figure 5.2-1 (Minimum Staffing for Emergencies, in the Emergency Plan for Indian Point Unit Nos. 1 & 2) requires that the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) be minimally staffed within 60 minutes of an Alert.

Contrary to the above, as of February 15, 2000, the licensee's EP program did not ensure timely augmentation of response capability in that procedures, training, and equipment were deficient to ensure minimal staffing at the response facilities within 60 minutes. Specific deficiencies that contributed to the failure to meet the planning standard were problems with: (a) the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) notification process, including inadequate procedures for using the communication system which added time delays, and some pagers and the Community Alert Network System did not operate properly which created difficulties in achieving the minimum staffing of the ERO; (b) the security force's procedures and training which resulted in security personnel not knowing where to send individual responders, which resulted in delays in ERO personnel obtaining site access; and (c) training of some ERO personnel who did not know where to report onsite which also resulted in delays. These deficiencies contributed to the licensee's inability to respond within 60 minutes during an Alert declaration on February 15, 2000, for a steam generator tube failure event. During that event, it took in excess of 60 minutes (actual time was 100 minutes) to complete the minimum augmentation staffing for the TSC, OSC, and EOF.

This violation was of low to moderate safety significance because of the failure to meet an NRC emergency planning standard (White).

## CON EDISON'S RESPONSE

### 1.1 Reason for the Violation

Full staffing and activation did not occur because pager notification of the ERO was delayed, and because security personnel were uncertain about where to direct responders for accountability and Emergency Response Facility (ERF) assignments. During the event some ERO pagers failed to activate and the Community Alert Notification System (CANS) did not operate properly.

Due to a training and procedure deficiency, Security personnel were uncertain about where to direct responders for accountability and Emergency Response Facility (ERF) assignments. The procedure has been revised and Security personnel have received further training on directing emergency responders.

Due to equipment problems during the event, some emergency response pagers failed to activate. An in-depth assessment of pager performance and coverage found the failures were related to the types of pagers utilized and pager vendor problems of inadequate transmission range and dead zones. As a result digital pagers have been replaced with alphanumeric pagers and transmission frequencies selected which provide optimal coverage. Previously, two vendors supplied the pagers. Indian Point Unit 2 (IP2) has selected a single pager vendor, based on the assessment.

Due to insufficient training, some responders were not familiar with where to report onsite during the event. ERO Team Members have received further training on where to report during an emergency.

During the event, personnel discovered the outgoing CANS message was incorrect and had to be revised. During the assessment that followed the event, Emergency Preparedness personnel reviewed the pre-recorded CANS message, re-recorded the message, and verified the message is correct.

Although a process was in place to periodically test the ERO pagers, the results of those tests were not effectively used to track and resolve equipment reliability problems. Also, activation of the pagers by the corporate Central Information Group (CIG), contributed to the delay by requiring additional coordination between site and corporate organizations. The pager equipment reliability issues were related to the types of pagers utilized and vendor system problems, such as inadequate range and dead zones.

The causal factors for the notification performance deficiencies included deficiencies with procedures and training. In addition, the periodic exercising of the notification process was primarily a hardware test. It did not test the procedural aspects of the activation process, nor did it address system reliability issues based on test results.

## 1.2 Corrective Steps That Have Been Taken and Results Achieved

Responsibility for activation of pagers has been transferred to the IP2 Security Section to consolidate responsibility and improve coordination. New ERO activation procedures have been issued and the security staff trained on the activation process for the pagers and CANS. The pre-recorded CANS message was revised, re-recorded and verified correct. Security personnel have been trained on providing proper directions to emergency responders. ERO Team Members have been trained on where to report during an emergency. The type of pager equipment utilized has been improved and a single pager vendor selected. Weekly pager activations are being conducted to establish and track reliability and to identify and resolve any sporadic equipment deficiencies. Con Edison successfully demonstrated augmentation of the emergency response organization during the April 17, 2000 off-hours call-in exercise and subsequent exercises.

1.3 Corrective Steps That Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violations

Both Con Edison and the pager service vendor have assessed pager capabilities and identified transmission frequencies that provide increased reliability. As a hardware enhancement, Emergency Response Organization digital pagers have been replaced with alphanumeric pagers, which utilize the new frequencies. Pager activations are being conducted weekly to identify and resolve specific equipment deficiencies and to track reliability.

1.4 Date When Full Compliance Will be Achieved

Indian Point 2 fully demonstrated its capability to augment the emergency response organization within 60 minutes on April 17, 2000 and remains in full compliance.

## NOTICE OF VIOLATION

2. 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) requires that a range of protective actions have been developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public.

The licensee meets the above requirement by maintaining control of the site at all times and accounting for workers. The IP2 E-Plan, dated April 24, 1996, section 6.4.1.d and Implementing Procedure 1027, section 5.1.2.f, require, in part, that individuals go to their pre-established assembly areas where accountability is performed by the Accountability Office. Within approximately 30 minutes of initiation, lists of personnel not accounted for are to be compiled.

Contrary to the above, as of February 15, 2000, the licensee's EP program did not ensure adequate development of a range of protective actions for emergency workers in an emergency in that the program did not ensure the accountability of workers could be performed within 30 minutes. Specific problems that contributed to the failure to meet the planning standard were: (a) individuals assigned to perform accountability had deficient knowledge of the accountability process and did not know when the accountability process was complete, and (b) there were no security procedures in place for ensuring site control of personnel at all times during an emergency event in that personnel could enter the Indian Point Unit 2 site through the Indian Point Unit 3 site. These problems contributed to the licensee taking 138 minutes to complete the accountability process and to identify the personnel not accounted for during the February 15, 2000 Alert declaration.

This violation was of low to moderate safety significance because of the failure to meet an NRC emergency planning standard (White).

## CON EDISON'S RESPONSE

### 2.1 Reason for the Violation

Initial accountability was completed in 75 minutes, but was not maintained as some personnel had entered and exited the protected area while initial accountability was in progress. A second accountability was completed 138 minutes from Alert declaration. The access gate from Indian Point Unit 3 (IP3) was not initially controlled, allowing some ERO staff to bypass the main gate and enter from IP3. There was no procedure in place to ensure the access gate from IP3 to IP2 was controlled.

The procedural guidance for personnel conducting accountability was less than fully effective. The process relied on personnel reporting to designated assembly areas and accountability officers responsible for documenting and reporting the personnel present at each area. Training for the accountability officers was incomplete in that the officers did not have clear direction for determining when accountability was accomplished. In drills conducted prior to the February 15, 2000 event, the extent of the problems with the accountability process had not been fully identified. These factors contributed to the overall delay in achieving accountability within 30 minutes.

## 2.2 Corrective Steps That Have Been Taken and Results Achieved

IP2 has revised the accountability procedures, including steps to control personnel access via the gate from IP3 to IP2.

Accountability for non-essential personnel is now centralized, rather than relying on accountability officers at various assembly locations within the protected area. Non-essential personnel are now directed to exit the protected area, thereby enabling accountability to be performed using the security card readers. ERO personnel continue to report to their assigned emergency response facility. Accountability clerks, assigned to the Operations Support Center (OSC), conduct accountability by compiling the sign-in sheets for ERO personnel and the security data for non-essential personnel.

ERO Teams and security personnel have been trained on the new requirements. Accountability was successfully demonstrated during drills conducted on May 10, 2000, May 24, 2000 and June 1, 2000.

## 2.3 Corrective Steps That Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violations

Periodic drills continue to be conducted to reinforce the new accountability procedures. ERO teams receive continuing training on procedure revisions, as well as lessons learned from previous drills. An accountability card reader system is being evaluated as a further enhancement.

## 2.4 Date When Full Compliance Will be Achieved

IP2 is presently in full compliance with the emergency plan accountability process.

## NOTICE OF VIOLATION

3. 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7) requires that procedures for coordinated dissemination of information to the public are established.

The IP2 E-Plan, dated April 24, 1996, section 5.2.3, requires, in part, that factual and consistent information be released through the functions of the Public Information Department and the Emergency (Joint) News Center for emergencies.

Contrary to the above, as of June 1, 2000, the licensee's EP program did not ensure adequate procedures and training for the dissemination of factual and consistent information to the public in an emergency. Procedures and training problems included minimal training or guidance for personnel regarding what information should be disseminated to the public, and a wrong number in the media relations procedure for notifying local officials. These problems contributed to: (a) inconsistent information being provided to the public via a press release and a press briefing regarding the status of a radiological release during the February 15, 2000, Alert event; (b) one local official not being contacted during the February 15, 2000, Alert declaration; (c) inconsistent statements made regarding the status of the radiological release during the June 1, 2000, exercise; and (d) information about the location of the plume was not available during the June 1, 2000, exercise.

This violation was of low to moderate safety significance because of the failure to meet an emergency planning standard (White).

## CON EDISON'S RESPONSE

### 3.1 Reason for the Violation

During the February 15, 2000 event there was a lack of coordination of information conveyed from the Joint News Center (JNC) to the counties and state. Historically, the JNC has been somewhat independent of the IP2 site organization, with the Con Edison corporate Media Relations organization responsible for JNC staffing, training and procedures. Further, as a result of reorganizations and personnel transfers, the responsibility for the JNC was not always effectively maintained. During periodic emergency plan drills, the JNC was infrequently staffed, and thus, there were limited opportunities to demonstrate performance.

JNC procedure deficiencies, as well as insufficient training and drills contributed to the inconsistent news releases during the February 15, 2000 event and the June 1, 2000 exercise. The JNC procedure has been revised. However, subsequent drill performance indicate that further enhancement is desirable. An additional revision of the JNC procedure is in-progress. Further training will be conducted for the JNC staff, based on the revised procedure.

### 3.2 Corrective Steps That Have Been Taken and Results Achieved

The IP2 Emergency Preparedness organization has assumed responsibility for management of the JNC functions as they pertain to Emergency Plan Implementation. A review of the Joint News Center operation, following the Alert on February 15, 2000, identified staffing, procedural, computer support, and drill participation deficiencies. Subsequent procedure reviews led to a better definition of roles and responsibilities, the development of position-specific checklists, and phone list verifications. A review of staffing resulted in the qualification of additional personnel. The JNC has had additional computers installed with access to the Indian Point 2 network, the internet, and plant data from the Emergency Data Display System.

In addition, the JNC now participates each time a full emergency plan drill is conducted. Since February 15, 2000, the JNC has participated in drills and has held training sessions to train incumbents and new personnel. Industry experts have been used to evaluate performance during drills. The exercise conducted on June 1, 2000 identified improvements in performance; however, weaknesses in information dissemination were still noted. Additional drills have been run since June 1, 2000 to demonstrate a focus on the accurate dissemination of information. Areas for continued improvement include: clarification of public information policy and processes, improved JNC procedures and guidelines, expanded training for the personnel who interact with the media, and JNC facility upgrades.

### 3.3 Corrective Steps That Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violations

JNC drills will continue to be conducted to assess effectiveness of implemented corrective actions. The following corrective actions have been identified to further improve performance:

- the current media relations procedure will be rewritten as an Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure. This rewrite will comply with the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure format and content requirements. The procedure will be fully implemented by November 1, 2000;
- the development of a manual for the JNC containing guidance on preparation of news releases, conduct of news briefs, and information on topics such as radiation health effects. This manual will be in place and associated training completed by November 1, 2000; and
- training sessions, for Corporate Spokespersons and JNC Directors, to enhance their abilities to disseminate information and handle media interface situations. These sessions will be completed by November 1, 2000.

### 3.4 Date When Full Compliance Will be Achieved

IP2 is in full compliance. The above mentioned improvements will be achieved by November 1, 2000.

**ATTACHMENT 2 TO NL-00-111**

**REPLY TO A NOTICE OF VIOLATION  
INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000247/2000-006**

**CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC  
INDIAN POINT UNIT NO. 2  
DOCKET NO. 50-247**

The following list identifies those actions committed to by Con Edison in this document, NL-00-111. No further regulatory commitments are contained herein.

<u>Commitment</u>	<u>Due Date</u>
1. The current media relations procedure will be rewritten as an Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure. This rewrite will comply with the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure format and content requirements. The procedure will be fully implemented by the due date.	November 1, 2000
2. The development of a manual for the JNC containing guidance on preparation of news releases, conduct of news briefs, and information on topics such as radiation health effects. This manual will be in place and associated training completed by the due date.	November 1, 2000
3. Training sessions, for Corporate Spokespersons and JNC Directors, to enhance their abilities to disseminate information and handle media interface situations. These sessions will be completed by the due date.	November 1, 2000