PSEG Nuclear LLC
P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236

SEP 13 2000

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LRN-00-0352

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

MONTHLY OPERATING REPORT
SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 2
DOCKET NO. 50-311

In compliance with Section 6.9, Reporting Requirements for the Salem Unit 2 Technical Specifications, the operating statistics for **August 2000** are being forwarded. Also being forwarded, pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.59(b), is a summary of changes, tests, and experiments that were implemented in **August 2000.**

Sincerely,

for 9-13-00

Mark B. Bezilla
Vice President - Operations

RBK
Attachments

C Distribution

IE24

INDEX

DOCKET NO.: 50-311
UNIT: Salem 2
DATE: 9/15/00
COMPLETED BY: R. Knieriem
TELEPHONE: (856) 339-1782

Reporting Period **August 2000**

OPERATING DATA REPORT

Design Electrical Rating (MWe-Net)	**1115**		
Maximum Dependable Capacity (MWe-Net)	**1106**		
	Month	**Year-to-date**	**Cumulative**
No. of hours reactor was critical	**744**	**5855**	**101960**
No. of hours generator was on line (service hours)	**744**	**5855**	**98637**
Unit reserve shutdown hours	**0**	**0**	**0**
Net Electrical Energy (MWH)	**802452**	**6330909**	**99253127**

UNIT SHUTDOWNS

NO.	DATE	TYPE F=FORCED S=SCHEDULED	DURATION (HOURS)	REASON (1)	METHOD OF SHUTTING DOWN THE REACTOR (2)	CORRECTIVE ACTION/ COMMENT

(1) Reason

A - Equipment Failure (Explain)
B - Maintenance or Test
C - Refueling
D - Regulatory Restriction
E - Operator Training/License Examination
F - Administrative
G - Operational Error (Explain)
H - Other

(2) Method

1 - Manual
2 - Manual Trip/Scram
3 - Automatic Trip/Scram
4 - Continuation
5 - Other (Explain)

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Summary Of Monthly Operating Experience

- Salem Unit 2 operated at full power throughout the month of August 2000.

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SUMMARY OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS FOR THE SALEM GENERATING STATION – UNIT 2

MONTH August 2000

The following items completed during **August 2000** have been evaluated to determine:

1. If the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report may be increased; or

2. If a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report may be created; or

3. If the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification is reduced.

The 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluations showed that these items did not create a new safety hazard to the plant nor did they affect the safe shutdown of the reactor. These items did not change the plant effluent releases and did not alter the existing environmental impact. The 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluations determined that no unreviewed safety or environmental questions are involved.

Design Changes Summary of Safety Evaluations

Replacement of Instrumentation for 21 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (Design Change 80006697) and 22 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (Design Change 80006698) Run-out Protection

These design changes replaced the obsolete instrumentation used to provide run-out protection for the 21 and 22 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps. The instrumentation was replaced with up-to-date instrumentation because replacement components are not available. Additionally, a gain module was added to the instrument loop to adapt the replacement instrumentation to the range covered by the currently installed instrumentation.

Review of this design change under 10CFR50.59 was required because the modification constitutes a change to the facility as described in the SAR. The replacement instrumentation provides the same functionality as the originally installed instrumentation to protect the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps from a run-out condition. Therefore, this design change would not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed. Additionally, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. This change would not create any new accidents or malfunctions since no new failure modes were introduced. In addition the Technical Specification Bases were not affected and no changes to the Technical Specifications were required.

Deletion of Radiation Monitoring System Process Filter (Design Change 80004831) and Waste Gas Decay Tank Channels (Design Change 80005320)

The design changes deleted process filter area radiation monitors that were originally installed to provide an indication of when filters should be replaced based upon dose rate. The need for filter replacement is normally determined by filter differential pressure and routine radiation surveys are performed on the filters. Therefore the radiation monitors are no longer required. The Waste Decay Tank radiation monitor channels used to monitor radiation levels in the area adjacent to the Waste Decay Tank were also deleted. These monitors are also not used. Access to the Waste Decay Tank Room is administratively controlled and surveys are required prior to entry.

Review of this design change under 10CFR50.59 was required because the modification constitutes a change to the facility as described in the SAR. The deleted radiation monitors are not safety-related and only provide indication of the need for filter replacement or indication of radiation levels adjacent to the Waste Decay Tank. Therefore, this design change would not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed. Additionally, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. This change would not create any new accidents or malfunctions since no new failure modes were introduced. In addition the Technical Specification Bases were not affected and no changes to the Technical Specifications were required.

Replacement of Bleed Steam Coil Drain Tank Pump (2EC-3571, Pkg. 3)

This design change replaced the impeller of the 22 Bleed Steam Coil Drain Tank Pump and drain control valves 21RD27 and 22RD27 to increase the capacity of the pumped drain system. This modification was necessary to accommodate the increased drain flow that resulted from the replacement of the 21E and 21W Moisture Separator Reheater tube bundles.

Review of this design change under 10CFR50.59 was required because the modification constitutes a change to the facility as described in the SAR. The components affected by this change are not safety-related and will not change the functionality of the drain system other than to provide increased capacity. Therefore, this design change would not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed. Additionally, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. This change would not create any new accidents or malfunctions since no new failure modes were introduced. In addition the Technical Specification Bases were not affected and no changes to the Technical Specifications were required.

Temporary Modifications Summary of Safety Evaluations

Temporary Modification 00-016, Hot Taps for Bypass Line Around Gagged Valve 2ST901

This temporary modification provided hot taps for the bypass line around valve 2ST901, Discharge Pressure Control Valve, for the cooling water side of the Main Turbine Lube Oil Coolers and the Steam Generator Feed Pump Turbine Lube Oil Coolers. The temporary modification is necessary to augment cooling water flow to the affected coolers since 2ST901 cannot be fully opened.

Review of this temporary modification under 10CFR50.59 was required because the modification constitutes a change to the facility as described in the SAR. The temporary modification will not affect the capability of the Service Water System, the affected lube oil systems, or any other safety-related system to function as designed. Therefore, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed. Additionally, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. This change would not create any new accidents or malfunctions since no new failure modes were introduced. In addition the Technical Specification Bases were not affected and no changes to the Technical Specifications were required.

Procedures Summary of Safety Evaluations

Boric Acid Addition to Safety Injection Accumulators, SC.CH-AD.RC-1135(Q) – Rev. 0

This procedure provides direction to inject borated water into the bottom of any Safety Injection Accumulator via existing sample lines. This provides a means by which the boron concentration in the accumulator can be increased to maintain Technical Specification concentration requirements during plant operation.

Review of this procedure under 10CFR50.59 was required because the addition of borated water to the accumulators via the sample lines constitutes a change to the facility as described in the SAR. This procedure will not affect the capability of the accumulators to perform as designed since they will remain operable throughout the procedure. Therefore, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed. Additionally, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. This change would not create any new accidents or malfunctions since no new failure modes were introduced. In addition the Technical Specification Bases were not affected and no changes to the Technical Specifications were required.

UFSAR Change Notices Summary of Safety Evaluations

UFSAR Change Notice SCN00-025, Segmented Refueling Cavity Seal

This change involves the use of a new design compression type refueling cavity seal in place of the current inflatable cavity seal for use during refueling outages. This seal is used to seal the gap between the reactor vessel flange and the refueling cavity floor during flood-up of the refueling cavity.

Review of this change under 10CFR50.59 was required because the use of the new seal design constitutes a change to the facility as described in the SAR. The proposed Reactor Cavity seal design is functionality equivalent to the current design, and will not affect plant accident response. Therefore, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed. Additionally, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. This change would not create any new accidents or malfunctions since no new failure modes were introduced. In addition the Technical Specification Bases were not affected and no changes to the Technical Specifications were required.

Other - Summary of Safety Evaluations

Salem Unit 2 Cycle 12 Reload Safety Evaluation in All Modes (DS.8-0014)

This Safety Evaluation considered the Salem Unit 2 Cycle 12 reload specific evaluation of safety parameters required to confirm the validity of the existing safety analysis.

Review of this analysis under 10CFR50.59 was required because the Cycle 14 reload specific evaluation of safety parameters constituted a change to the facility as described in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and changes to procedures described in the SAR. The review determined that the change did not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR, did not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety, and did not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type from any previously evaluated. Because the change did not affect the existing analysis that forms the basis for the Technical Specifications, and did not violate Technical Specification and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) requirements, the change did not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications.

Criticality Accident Monitoring (70003203)

This evaluation changed the licensing basis for criticality accident monitoring from 10CFR70.24 to 10CFR50.68(b), which exempts power reactor licensees from the requirement for criticality accident monitoring provided certain other criteria are met. These criteria are related to plant procedures, design features, and fuel enrichment that power reactor licensees must meet in lieu of maintaining a criticality monitoring system as described in 10CFR70.24.

Review of this change under 10CFR50.59 was required because the change constitutes a change to the facility as described in the SAR. The proposed change changes the basis for compliance with regulatory requirements for criticality accident monitoring and does not affect any initiating events, system availability, performance, physical parameters, or operator actions. Therefore, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed. Additionally, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. This change would not create any new accidents or malfunctions since no new failure modes were introduced. In addition the Technical Specification Bases were not affected and no changes to the Technical Specifications were required.

Technical Specification Bases Change, Section 3/4.4.10, Reactor Coolant System Pressure/Temperature Limits

This change revised the Technical Specification Bases for the Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System to clarify the electrical support system requirements for Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System operability.

Review of this change under 10CFR50.59 was required because the change constitutes a change to the facility as described in the SAR. The proposed change clarified electrical support system requirements for Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System operability and did not affect the capability or response of the Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System. Therefore, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed. Additionally, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. This change would not create any new accidents or malfunctions since no new failure modes were introduced. In addition the Technical Specification Bases were not affected and no changes to the Technical Specifications were required.