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PSEG Nuclear LLC

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

MONTHLY OPERATING REPORT
SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1
DOCKET NO. 50-272

In compliance with Section 6.9, Reporting Requirements for the Salem Unit 1 Technical Specifications, the operating statistics for **August 2000** are being forwarded. Also being forwarded, pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.59(b), is a summary of changes, tests, and experiments that were implemented in **August 2000.**

Sincerely,

9-13-00

Mark B. Bezilla
Vice President - Operations

RBK
Attachments

C Distribution

IE24

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DOCKET NO.: 50-272
UNIT: Salem 1
DATE: 9/15/00
COMPLETED BY: R. Knieriem
TELEPHONE: (856) 339-1782

Reporting Period **August 2000**

OPERATING DATA REPORT

Design Electrical Rating (MWe-Net)	**1115**		
Maximum Dependable Capacity (MWe-Net)	**1106**		
	Month	**Year-to-date**	**Cumulative**
No. of hours reactor was critical	**708**	**5570**	**124114**
No. of hours generator was on line (service hours)	**700**	**5489**	**119740**
Unit reserve shutdown hours	**0**	**0**	**0**
Net Electrical Energy (MWH)	**741609**	**5892266**	**120513601**

UNIT SHUTDOWNS

NO.	DATE	TYPE F=FORCED S=SCHEDULED	DURATION (HOURS)	REASON (1)	METHOD OF SHUTTING DOWN THE REACTOR (2)	CORRECTIVE ACTION/ COMMENT
4	000809	F	44	A	3	Control Rod Bank Failure

(1) Reason

A - Equipment Failure (Explain)
B - Maintenance or Test
C - Refueling
D - Regulatory Restriction
E - Operator Training/License Examination
F - Administrative
G - Operational Error (Explain)
H - Other

(2) Method

1 - Manual
2 - Manual Trip/Scram
3 - Automatic Trip/Scram
4 - Continuation
5 - Other (Explain)

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Summary Of Monthly Operating Experience

- Salem Unit 1 began the month of August operating at full power.
- On August 9, Salem Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor trip as a result of a failure in the Rod Control System.
- Salem Unit 1 returned to service on August 11. The ascension to full power was suspended at 80% from August 12, until August 13, in response to a solar magnetic disturbance.
- Salem Unit 1 returned to full power on August 14, and operated at full power for the remainder of the month.

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SUMMARY OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS FOR THE SALEM GENERATING STATION – UNIT 1

MONTH August 2000

The following items completed during **August 2000** have been evaluated to determine:

1. If the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report may be increased; or

2. If a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report may be created; or

3. If the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification is reduced.

The 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluations showed that these items did not create a new safety hazard to the plant nor did they affect the safe shutdown of the reactor. These items did not change the plant effluent releases and did not alter the existing environmental impact. The 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluations determined that no unreviewed safety or environmental questions are involved.

Design Changes Summary of Safety Evaluations

Replacement of Instrumentation for 11 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (Design Change 80006696) and 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (Design Change 80006726) Run-out Protection

These design changes replaced the obsolete instrumentation used to provide run-out protection for the 11 and 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps. The instrumentation was replaced with up-to-date instrumentation because replacement components are not available. Additionally, a gain module was added to the instrument loop to adapt the replacement instrumentation to the range covered by the currently installed instrumentation.

Review of this design change under 10CFR50.59 was required because the modification constitutes a change to the facility as described in the SAR. The

replacement instrumentation provides the same functionality as the originally installed instrumentation to protect the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps from a run-out condition. Therefore, this design change would not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed. Additionally, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. This change would not create any new accidents or malfunctions since no new failure modes were introduced. In addition the Technical Specification Bases were not affected and no changes to the Technical Specifications were required.

Deletion of Radiation Monitoring System Process Filter Channels (Design Change 80004814)

This design change deleted process filter area radiation monitors that were originally installed to provide an indication of when filters should be replaced based upon dose rate. The need for filter replacement is normally determined by filter differential pressure and routine radiation surveys are performed on the filters. Therefore the radiation monitors are no longer required.

Review of this design change under 10CFR50.59 was required because the modification constitutes a change to the facility as described in the SAR. The deleted radiation monitors are not safety-related and only provide indication of the need for filter replacement. Therefore, this design change would not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed. Additionally, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. This change would not create any new accidents or malfunctions since no new failure modes were introduced. In addition the Technical Specification Bases were not affected and no changes to the Technical Specifications were required.

Temporary Modifications Summary of Safety Evaluations

There were no reportable changes in this category implemented during August 2000.

Procedures Summary of Safety Evaluations

Boric Acid Addition to Safety Injection Accumulators, SC.CH-AD.RC-1135(Q) – Rev. 0

This procedure provides direction to inject borated water into the bottom of any Safety Injection Accumulator via existing sample lines. This provides a means by which the boron concentration in the accumulator can be increased to maintain Technical Specification concentration requirements during plant operation.

Review of this procedure under 10CFR50.59 was required because the addition of borated water to the accumulators via the sample lines constitutes a change to the

facility as described in the SAR. This procedure will not affect the capability of the accumulators to perform as designed since they will remain operable throughout the procedure. Therefore, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed. Additionally, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. This change would not create any new accidents or malfunctions since no new failure modes were introduced. In addition the Technical Specification Bases were not affected and no changes to the Technical Specifications were required.

UFSAR Change Notices Summary of Safety Evaluations

UFSAR Change Notice SCN00-025, Segmented Refueling Cavity Seal

This change involves the use of a new design compression type refueling cavity seal in place of the current inflatable cavity seal for use during refueling outages. This seal is used to seal the gap between the reactor vessel flange and the refueling cavity floor during flood-up of the refueling cavity.

Review of this change under 10CFR50.59 was required because the use of the new seal design constitutes a change to the facility as described in the SAR. The proposed Reactor Cavity seal design is functionality equivalent to the current design, and will not affect plant accident response. Therefore, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed. Additionally, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. This change would not create any new accidents or malfunctions since no new failure modes were introduced. In addition the Technical Specification Bases were not affected and no changes to the Technical Specifications were required.

Other - Summary of Safety Evaluations

Criticality Accident Monitoring (70003203)

This evaluation changed the licensing basis for criticality accident monitoring from 10CFR70.24 to 10CFR50.68(b), which exempts power reactor licensees from the requirement for criticality accident monitoring provided certain other criteria are met. These criteria are related to plant procedures, design features, and fuel enrichment that power reactor licensees must meet in lieu of maintaining a criticality monitoring system as described in 10CFR70.24.

Review of this change under 10CFR50.59 was required because the change constitutes a change to the facility as described in the SAR. The proposed change changes the basis for compliance with regulatory requirements for criticality accident monitoring and does not affect any initiating events, system availability, performance,

physical parameters, or operator actions. Therefore, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed. Additionally, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. This change would not create any new accidents or malfunctions since no new failure modes were introduced. In addition the Technical Specification Bases were not affected and no changes to the Technical Specifications were required.

Technical Specification Bases Change, Section 3/4.4.9, Reactor Coolant System Pressure/Temperature Limits

This change revised the Technical Specification Bases for the Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System to clarify the electrical support system requirements for Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System operability.

Review of this change under 10CFR50.59 was required because the change constitutes a change to the facility as described in the SAR. The proposed change clarified electrical support system requirements for Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System operability and did not affect the capability or response of the Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System. Therefore, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed. Additionally, this change would not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. This change would not create any new accidents or malfunctions since no new failure modes were introduced. In addition the Technical Specification Bases were not affected and no changes to the Technical Specifications were required.