AmerGen
A PECO Energy/British Energy Company

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September 12, 2000
2130-00-20243

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington DC 20555

Dear Sir:

Subject: Oyster Creek Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report 2000-008;
A Degradation in Secondary Containment Resulted
In the Completion of a Plant Shutdown

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report LER 2000-008. This event did not affect the health and safety of the public.

If any additional information or assistance is required, please contact Mr. John Rogers of my staff at 609.971.4893.

Very truly yours,

Kevin Mulligan
for Ron J. DeGregorio
Vice President, Oyster Creek

RJD/JJR
cc: Administrator, Region I
NRC Project Manager
Senior Resident Inspector

IE22

NRC FORM 366 (4-95)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 04/30/98

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

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TITLE (4)

A Degradation in Secondary Containment Resulted in the Completion of a Plant Shutdown

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000
08	14	00	00	-- 008 --	00				FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER 05000

OPERATING	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR □: (Check one or more) (11)							
			20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)
POWER	100		20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)
			20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		73.71
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		OTHER
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		
			20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
John Rogers	609.971.4893

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)			EXPECTED	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
	YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On August 14, 2000 at approximately 07:04 AM, it was determined that Secondary Containment was degraded because the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) could not maintain design negative pressure. A walkdown of the plant was conducted to find the source of the leak. After several unsuccessful attempts to isolate the leak, it was determined that the Secondary Containment ventilation system exhaust valves were leaking. The cause of leakage was age-related degradation of the valve seats. The reactor was shutdown and placed in a condition in which Secondary Containment integrity is not required.

The safety significance of this discovery was minimal. Secondary Containment is required to ensure that any primary system leakage into the Secondary Containment will be properly filtered and elevated prior to release to the environment. As a negative pressure was always achieved, only minimal leakages to the environment would have been possible. The vast majority of any leakage would have been processed through the SGTS filters.

The identified valves were repaired and a routine maintenance task will be generated to detect future degradation. Additionally, valves of similar characteristics will be inspected for generic implications.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV	
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TEXT *(If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)* (17)

DATE OF OCCURRENCE

This event occurred on August 14, 2000 at approximately 07:04 AM.

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

It was determined that Secondary Containment could not be maintained within the design bases. Additionally a reactor shutdown was completed and plant conditions were established in which Secondary Containment integrity is not required. This action is considered reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i).

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

The plant was operating at approximately 75% power, due to Feedwater System maintenance, with all reactor plant temperatures and pressures normal. The SGTS was placed in service to allow for trouble shooting on various ventilation system relays. The system was placed in operation to assure system operability as these relays are in the auto start logic.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On Monday, August 14, 2000, at 3:05 AM, while testing various Secondary Containment ventilation system relays, the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) II (EIIS: BH), was put into service and a "RB [Reactor Building] DP LO [Low]" alarm was received. It was determined the differential pressure (D/P) between Secondary Containment and the outside atmosphere was less than the design basis 0.25" water vacuum. The Technical Specifications provides a 4 hour window in which to identify and correct the deficiency. An action plan was developed to determine the source of leakage into Secondary Containment. SBTS trains were individually operated and various door gaskets on major containment penetrations were inspected and/or replaced. These actions were unsuccessful in determining the source of leakage. Next the SGTS was operated with the manual isolation damper for the Secondary Containment ventilation exhaust line closed. This restored secondary containment D/P to design and confirmed leakage to be through the automatic isolation valves in the Secondary Containment ventilation exhaust line.

On August 15, 2000, at 1:40 AM, a reactor shutdown was commenced. At 6:41 AM a manual scram was performed and the mode switch was placed in the shutdown position. The plant was then placed in a condition in which Secondary Containment is not required.

Once in this condition, the ductwork in which the isolation valves (air operated butterfly valves) are contained was entered for inspection. It was observed that the rubber seat (EIIC: SEAL) mounted on the valve body had completely separated from the body.

APPARENT CAUSE

The cause of the degradation in Secondary Containment was age-related degradation of the automatic ventilation exhaust valve seals. This degradation was not noticed earlier because a routine maintenance program did not exist on these components.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT

The safety significance of this discovery was minimal. Secondary Containment is required to ensure that any primary system leakage into the Secondary Containment will be properly filtered and elevated prior to release to the environment. As a negative pressure was always achieved, about .17" water vacuum vice .25", only minimal leakage to the environment would have been possible. The vast majority of any primary system leakage would have been processed through the SGTS filters.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Immediate Corrective Actions

Upon discovery of the degradation of Secondary Containment, a reactor shutdown was completed and the plant was placed in a condition in which Secondary Containment Integrity is not required.

Short Term Corrective Actions

A repair was designed and installed to utilize a retaining bracket to re-attach the seat to the valve body. The seats were re-attached and treated to further ensure leak tightness. Both valves were tested for leak tightness and on August 19, 2000, at 4:11 AM, they were declared operable.

Long Term Corrective Actions

These valves will be reinspected per a routine maintenance program that will be developed. Additionally, other valves of similar design will be inspected to determine if the seat aging is a generic concern or isolated to this one penetration.

SIMILAR EVENTS

None