

Mr. J. A. Scalice
Chief Nuclear Officer and
Executive Vice President
Tennessee Valley Authority
6A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801

September 13, 2000

SUBJECT: WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT
REGARDING PHYSICS TESTS EXCEPTIONS (TS-00-08) (TAC NO. MA9519)

Dear Mr. Scalice:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 28 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1. This amendment is in response to your application dated July 10, 2000. The application proposed changes to the Technical Specifications regarding the need to conduct channel operational tests within 12 hours prior to a physics tests and the placing of a reactor trip instrumentation channel used in physics tests in a bypassed condition instead of a tripped condition. These changes were based on Technical Specification Task Force Travelers 108 and 315.

A copy of the safety evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,
/RA/

Robert E. Martin, Senior Project Manager, Section 2
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-390

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 28 to NPF-90
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures: See next page

DISTRIBUTION:

PUBLIC
PDII-2 Reading
RidsNrrDlpmLpdii
RidsNrrDlpmLpdii2
RidsNrrPmRMartin
BClayton (Hardcopy)
RidsOgcRp
RidsAcrsAcnwMailCenter
GHill (2)
RidsNrrWBeckner
RidsNrrRTjader
RidsRgn2MailCenter

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\PDII-2\Watts Bar\WBMA9519AMD.wpd

OFFICE	PDII-2/PM	PDII-2/LA	OGC	PDII-2/SC	TSB
NAME	RMartin <i>JM</i>	BClayton <i>BC</i>	<i>Wick</i>	RCorreia <i>RC</i>	WBeckner <i>WB</i>
DATE	8/10/00	8/12/00	8/15/00	8/12/00	8/18/00

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

September 13, 2000



CHAIRMAN

Mr. J. A. Scalice
Chief Nuclear Officer and
Executive Vice President
Tennessee Valley Authority
6A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801


SUBJECT: WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT
REGARDING PHYSICS TESTS EXCEPTIONS (TS-00-08) (TAC NO. MA9519)

Dear Mr. Scalice:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 28 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1. This amendment is in response to your application dated July 10, 2000. The application proposed changes to the Technical Specifications regarding the need to conduct channel operational tests within 12 hours prior to a physics tests and the placing of a reactor trip instrumentation channel used in physics tests in a bypassed condition instead of a tripped condition. These changes were based on Technical Specification Task Force Travelers 108 and 315.

A copy of the safety evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,


Robert E. Martin, Senior Project Manager, Section 2
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-390

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 28 to NPF-90
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures: See next page



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-390

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 28
License No. NPF-90

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated July 10, 2000, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 28 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. TVA shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, and shall be implemented no later than prior to startup following the Unit 1, Cycle 3 refueling outage.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Richard P. Correia, Chief, Section 2
Project Directorate II
Division of Project Licensing Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: **September 13, 2000**



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

ATTACHMENT TO AMENDMENT NO. 28

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-90

DOCKET NO. 50-390

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove Pages

3.1 - 23
3.1 - 24
B 3.1 - 67
B 3.1 - 68
B 3.1 - 69

Insert Pages

3.1 - 23
3.1 - 24
B 3.1 - 67
B 3.1 - 68
B 3.1 - 69

3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

3.1.10 PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions-MODE 2

LCO 3.1.10 During the performance of PHYSICS TESTS, the requirements of

LCO 3.1.4, "Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC)";
LCO 3.1.5, "Rod Group Alignment Limits";
LCO 3.1.6, "Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits";
LCO 3.1.7, "Control Bank Insertion Limits"; and
LCO 3.4.2, "RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality"

may be suspended, and the number of required channels for LCO 3.3.1, "RTS Instrumentation," Functions 2, 3, 6, and 16.e, may be reduced to "3" required channels provided:

- a. RCS lowest loop average temperature is $\geq 541^{\circ}\text{F}$; and
- b. SDM is $\geq 1.6\% \Delta k/k$.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 2 during PHYSICS TESTS.

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. SDM not within limit.	A.1 Initiate boration to restore SDM to within limit.	15 minutes
	<u>AND</u> A.2 Suspend PHYSICS TESTS exceptions.	1 hour
B. THERMAL POWER not within limit.	B.1 Open reactor trip breakers.	Immediately

(continued)

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
C. RCS lowest loop average temperature not within limit.	C.1 Restore RCS lowest loop average temperature to within limit.	15 minutes
D. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C not met.	D.1 Be in MODE 3.	15 minutes

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.1.10.1 Perform a CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST on power range and intermediate range channels per SR 3.3.1.7, SR 3.3.1.8, and Table 3.3.1-1.	Prior to initiation of PHYSICS TESTS
SR 3.1.10.2 Verify the RCS lowest loop average temperature is $\geq 541^{\circ}\text{F}$.	30 minutes
SR 3.1.10.3 Verify SDM is $\geq 1.6\% \Delta k/k$.	24 hours

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

problems, may require the operating control or process variables to deviate from their LCO limitations.

The FSAR defines requirements for initial testing of the facility, including PHYSICS TESTS. Table 14.2-2 summarizes the zero, low power, and power tests. Requirements for reload fuel cycle PHYSICS TESTS are defined in ANSI/ANS-19.6.1-1985 (Ref. 4). Although these PHYSICS TESTS are generally accomplished within the limits for all LCOs, conditions may occur when one or more LCOs must be suspended to make completion of PHYSICS TESTS possible or practical. This is acceptable as long as the fuel design criteria are not violated. When one or more of the requirements specified in LCO 3.1.4, "Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC)," LCO 3.1.5, LCO 3.1.6, LCO 3.1.7, and LCO 3.4.2 are suspended for PHYSICS TESTS, the fuel design criteria are preserved as long as the power level is limited to $\leq 5\%$ RTP, the reactor coolant temperature is kept $\geq 541^\circ\text{F}$, and SDM is $\geq 1.6\%$ $\Delta k/k$.

The PHYSICS TESTS include measurement of core nuclear parameters or the exercise of control components that affect process variables. Among the process variables involved are AFD and QPTR, which represent initial conditions of the unit safety analyses. Also involved are the movable control components (control and shutdown rods), which are required to shut down the reactor. The limits for these variables are specified for each fuel cycle in the COLR. PHYSICS TESTS meet the criteria for inclusion in the Technical Specifications, since the components and process variable LCOs suspended during PHYSICS TESTS meet Criteria 1, 2, and 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

Reference 6 allows special test exceptions (STEs) to be included as part of the LCO that they affect. It was decided, however, to retain this STE as a separate LCO because it was less cumbersome and provided additional clarity.

LCO

This LCO allows the reactor parameters of MTC and minimum temperature for criticality to be outside their specified limits. In addition, it allows selected control and shutdown rods to be positioned outside of their specified alignment and insertion limits. One Power Range Neutron Flux channel may be bypassed, reducing the number of required channels from "4" to "3". Operation beyond specified

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued)

limits is permitted for the purpose of performing PHYSICS TESTS and poses no threat to fuel integrity, provided the SRs are met.

The requirements of LCO 3.1.4, LCO 3.1.5, LCO 3.1.6, LCO 3.1.7, and LCO 3.4.2 may be suspended and the number of required channels for LCO 3.3.1, "RTS Instrumentation," Functions 2, 3, 6, and 16.e, may be reduced to "3" required channels during the performance of PHYSICS TESTS provided:

- a. RCS lowest loop average temperature is $\geq 541^{\circ}\text{F}$; and
- b. SDM is $\geq 1.6\% \Delta \text{ k/k}$.

APPLICABILITY

This LCO is applicable in MODE 2 when performing low power PHYSICS TESTS. The applicable PHYSICS TESTS are performed in MODE 2 at HZP. Other PHYSICS TESTS are performed in MODE 1 and are addressed in LCO 3.1.9, "PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions - MODE 1."

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2

If the SDM requirement is not met, boration must be initiated promptly. A Completion Time of 15 minutes is adequate for an operator to correctly align and start the required systems and components. The operator should begin boration with the best source available for the plant conditions. Boration will be continued until SDM is within limit.

Suspension of PHYSICS TESTS exceptions requires restoration of each of the applicable LCOs to within specification.

B.1

When THERMAL POWER is $>5\% \text{ RTP}$, the only acceptable action is to open the reactor trip breakers (RTBs) to prevent operation of the reactor beyond its design limits. Immediately opening the RTBs will shut down the reactor and prevent operation of the reactor outside of its design limits.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

C.1

When the RCS lowest T_{avg} is $< 541^{\circ}\text{F}$, the appropriate action is to restore T_{avg} to within its specified limit. The allowed Completion Time of 15 minutes provides time for restoring T_{avg} to within limits without allowing the plant to remain in an unacceptable condition for an extended period of time. Operation with the reactor critical and with temperature below 541°F could violate the assumptions for accidents analyzed in the safety analyses.

D.1

If the Required Actions cannot be completed within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the requirement does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within an additional 15 minutes. The Completion Time of 15 additional minutes is reasonable, based on operating experience, for reaching MODE 3 in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.1.10.1

The power range and intermediate range neutron detectors must be verified to be OPERABLE in MODE 2 by LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation." A CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST is performed on each power range and intermediate range channel prior to initiation of the PHYSICS TESTS. This will ensure that the RTS is properly aligned to provide the required degree of core protection during the performance of the PHYSICS TESTS.

SR 3.1.10.2

Verification that the RCS lowest loop T_{avg} is $\geq 541^{\circ}\text{F}$ (value does not account for instrument error, Ref. 7) will ensure that the unit is not operating in a condition that could invalidate the safety analyses. Verification of the RCS temperature at a Frequency of 30 minutes during the performance of the PHYSICS TESTS will ensure that the initial conditions of the safety analyses are not violated.

(continued)



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 28 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-90

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-390

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated July 10, 2000, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA or the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 (WBN), Technical Specifications (TS). Two changes were proposed to TS 3.1.10, "PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions Mode - 2" as follows.

The Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) is designed to initiate nuclear overpower reactor trip signals for the Reactor Trip System (RTS) as a result of detecting high neutron flux or a high neutron flux rate of change and to monitor the neutron flux during and following an accident. Therefore, this system offers diverse protection against fuel cladding failure and/or loss of reactor coolant system integrity. The instruments supporting the power range and intermediate range functions are determined to be operable by the performance of the testing required per Surveillance Requirements (SR) 3.3.1.7 and SR 3.3.1.8

1.1 Part A - Removal of Channel Operational Test 12 Hour Pre-Test Requirement

Channel Operational Tests (COTs) are performed for the power range and intermediate range neutron monitors in accordance with RTS SRs 3.3.1.7 and 3.3.1.8. While the unit is in Modes 1 or 2, SR 3.3.1.7 is performed for the power range monitors every 92 days. SR 3.3.1.8 is performed for the intermediate range monitors prior to startup of the reactor and at various points during power reduction and every 31 days thereafter.

In addition, SR 3.1.10.1 currently requires that a COT be performed on the power range and intermediate range neutron monitors within 12 hours prior to initiation of a physics test, even though SR 3.3.1.7 and SR 3.3.1.8 have been performed on the required frequency.

TVA proposes to eliminate the 12-hour requirement for the testing required by SR 3.1.10.1 so that the testing performed for SR 3.3.1.7 (Power Range) and SR 3.3.1.8 (Intermediate Range) can be used to satisfy SR 3.1.10.1. This issue has been previously reviewed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff and has been approved as TS Task Force (TSTF)-108, Revision 1, by Christopher Grimes' signature dated May 2, 1997 to James Davis, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI).

ENCLOSURE

The specific change proposed by TVA is to strike the words "Within 12 hours" from the frequency for SR 3.1.10.1 so that the frequency now reads "Prior to initiation of PHYSICS TESTS." An associated change is made to the Bases for SR 3.1.10.1. The proposed changes are consistent with TSTF-108, Revision 1.

1.2 Part B - Placing Reactor Trip System Channels in Bypassed Condition for Physics Test

During the performance of physics testing one power range channel is used to provide input to the reactivity computer. In preparation for the test, the fuses to the electronics drawer for the channel are removed and the channel is placed in a tripped condition and results in the NIS trip logic being in a one-out-of-three logic status. Therefore, any spurious signals received on one channel will result in a reactor trip. The changes proposed by TVA would allow the fuses to remain in the NIS channel that is connected to the reactivity computer and, thus, avoid tripping the bistables associated with the NIS channel. This configuration results in the channel being in a bypassed state and places the overall logic in a two-out-of-three logic status. The advantage of this configuration is that a single spurious signal would not result in a reactor trip. This issue has been previously reviewed by the NRC staff and has been approved as TSTF-315 by William D. Beckner's letter dated June 19, 1999 to James Davis, NEI.

The specific change is to insert into Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.1.10, the phrase "and the number of required channels for LCO 3.3.1, 'RTS Instrumentation,' Functions 2, 3, 6, and 16.e, may be reduced to '3' required channels," and to make associated changes to the Bases. The proposed changes are consistent with TSTF-315.

2.0 EVALUATION

2.1 Part A - Removal of Channel Operational Test 12-Hour Pretest Requirement

Performance of a COT on power range channels is required by LCO 3.3.1, RTS Instrumentation, every 92 days in accordance with SR 3.3.1.7. Performance of a COT on intermediate range channels is required by LCO 3.3.1, RTS Instrumentation, prior to startup, at several stages during shutdown and every 31 days thereafter. The staff finds that these required frequencies have been determined to be sufficient for verification that the power range and intermediate range monitors are properly functioning.

SR 3.1.10.1 requires a COT within 12 hours prior to initiation of physics tests regardless of whether the COT has been performed within its required frequency. The staff finds that initiation of physics tests does not impact the ability of the monitors to perform their required function, does not affect the trip setpoints or RTS trip capability, and does not invalidate previous surveillances. Therefore, an additional surveillance required to be performed prior to

this event is an unnecessary performance of a surveillance.¹ Accordingly, the staff finds its deletion to be acceptable.

2.2 Part B - Placing Reactor Trip System Channels in Bypassed Condition for Physics Test

As proposed by TVA, implementation of the requested amendment will result in one power range channel being in a bypassed state. In this configuration, there will be three available channels with a two-out-of-three logic required to actuate the neutron flux trip function. As required by LCO 3.1.10, the testing will be performed while the reactor is in Mode 2, at a power level of less than or equal to 5 percent.

There are two WBN power range control functions, rod control and steam generator level control. At a power level of 5 percent or less, rod control is in manual and is not affected by the testing configuration. Steam generator level control is not affected since its input from the NIS channel connected to the reactivity computer is placed in bypass when establishing the test configuration. Also, while in this configuration, an assumed single failure will not prevent the power range monitors from actuating as designed.

Since this change affects only the power range channels of the WBN NIS, the reactor trip function of the intermediate range detectors will be unaffected by the change and therefore, will be available to mitigate a reactivity transient at low power. Further, the trip setpoint for the WBN power range monitors is decreased during startup of the reactor from the normal 109 percent to a value less than or equal to 85 percent.

In its review of TSTF-315, the NRC staff discussed this issue with the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG). The staff requested the WOG to provide historical data of spurious signals from ex-core detectors during physics testing that resulted in reactor trips, and other back up protection during Mode 2. The staff also asked whether additional analysis had been performed to cover all accident conditions during Mode 2 operation. The WOG identified that there were four instances of trips which were caused by spurious signals. The WOG stated that there is no specific analysis of all accidents for Mode 2 operation on the basis that the Mode 2 accidents are normally bounded by the high power condition. The WOG also noted that during physics testing the LCO requires that the reactor power level be kept at less than 5 percent, the reactor coolant system average temperature be kept above a minimum value and the shutdown margin be kept above a minimum value so that the fuel design criteria are not violated. In addition, the power range low set point and intermediate range trips are in effect to provide back up protection. The plant would be held in a stable state with minimal change in steam or feed flow. This LCO is applicable for physics testing that is at the beginning of the fuel cycle, with minimum fuel burn up and decay heat. The shutdown margin is ensured via the testing process and extensive controls are put in place for monitoring plant parameters.

¹ The staff does not agree fully with TVA's statement that "The SR 3.1.10.1 requirement for the testing of the instruments within 12 hours prior to initiation of a physics test does not provide an additional measure of assurance that the instrumentation will perform its intended function." Clearly, such a test would provide some assurance of the instrumentation's integrity. The issue here is whether the incremental value of that assurance is necessary given the testing already required to be performed and the NRC staff agrees that the additional testing within 12 hours of a physics test is not necessary.

The NRC staff finds that the plant-specific information provided by TVA for WBN is consistent with that provided by the WOG for TSTF-315. The NRC staff concludes that, based on the considerations discussed above for conducting the physics testing, and the consistency of the WBN information with that provided for support of TSTF-315, the proposed changes in WBN LCO 3.1.10, PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions - Mode 2, are acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Tennessee State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (65 FR 48759 dated August 9, 2000). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: Robert E. Martin
T. Robert Tjader

Date: **September 13, 2000**

Mr. J. A. Scalice
Tennessee Valley Authority

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT

cc:

Mr. Karl W. Singer, Senior Vice President
Nuclear Operations
Tennessee Valley Authority
6A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

Mr. Paul L. Pace, Manager
Licensing and Industry Affairs
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Tennessee Valley Authority
P.O. Box 2000
Spring City, TN 37381

Mr. Jack A. Bailey, Vice President
Engineering & Technical
Tennessee Valley Authority
6A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

Mr. Larry S. Bryant, Plant Manager
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Tennessee Valley Authority
P.O. Box 2000
Spring City, TN 37381

Mr. William R. Lagergren, Site Vice President
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Tennessee Valley Authority
P.O. Box 2000
Spring City, TN 37381

Senior Resident Inspector
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
1260 Nuclear Plant Road
Spring City, TN 37381

General Counsel
Tennessee Valley Authority
ET 10H
400 West Summit Hill Drive
Knoxville, TN 37902

Rhea County Executive
375 Church Street
Suite 215
Dayton, TN 37321

Mr. Robert J. Adney, General Manager
Nuclear Assurance
Tennessee Valley Authority
5M Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

County Executive
Meigs County Courthouse
Decatur, TN 37322

Mr. Mark J. Burzynski, Manager
Nuclear Licensing
Tennessee Valley Authority
4X Blue Ridge
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

Mr. Lawrence E. Nanney, Director
Division of Radiological Health
Dept. of Environment & Conservation
Third Floor, L and C Annex
401 Church Street
Nashville, TN 37243-1532

Ms. Ann Harris
305 Pickel Road
Ten Mile, TN 37880