U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Revision 1
December 1977

REGULATORY GUIDE

OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT

REGULATORY GUIDE 3.40

DESIGN BASIS FLOODS FOR FUEL REPROCESSING PLANTS AND FOR PLUTONIUM PROCESSING AND FUEL FABRICATION PLANTS

A. INTRODUCTION

Paragraph (a)(1) of §50.34, "Contents of Applications: Technical Information," of 10 CFR Part 50, "Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," requires, among other things, that each application for a construction permit for a production or utilization facility, including fuel reprocessing plants, include a description and safety assessment of the site on which the facility is to be located, with appropriate attention to features affecting facility design. Paragraph 70.22 (f) of 10 CFR Part 70, "Special Nuclear Material," requires that each application for a license to possess and use special nuclear material in a plutonium processing and fuel fabrication plant contain, among other things, a description and safety assessment of the design bases of the principal structure, systems, and components of the plant, including provisions for protection against natural phenomena. Paragraph 70.23 (b) of 10 CFR Part 70 provides that the Commission will approve construction of the principal structures, systems, and components of a plutonium processing and fuel fabrication plant when it has determined, among other things, that the design bases of the principal structures, systems, and components provide reasonable assurance of protection against natural phenomena and the consequences of potential accidents.

This guide describes methods of determining the design basis floods that fuel reprocessing plants and plutonium processing and fuel fabrication plants[1] should be designed to withstand without loss of safety-related functions. It does not identify structures, systems, and components that should be designed to withstand the effects of floods or discuss the design requirements for flood protection.

ANSI N170-1976, "Standards for Determining Design Basis Flooding at Power Reactor Sites,"[2] presents standards to establish design basis flooding for safety-related features at power reactor sites. ANSI N170-1976 also contains, among other things, methodology for estimating probable maximum surges and seiches at estuaries and coastal areas on oceans and large lakes. Appendix B to Regulatory Guide 1.59, "Design Basis Floods for Nuclear Power Plants," gives timesaving alternative methods of estimating the probable maximum flood along streams. Appendix C to Regulatory Guide 1.59 gives a simplified method of estimating probable maximum surges on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts. It is the consensus of the NRC staff that ANSI N170-1976 and Appendices B and C to Regulatory Guide 1.59 are also applicable to nuclear facilities, and therefore they are referenced in this guide. *

The methods described in this guide result from review of and action on specific cases, and as such, reflect the latest general approaches to the problem that are acceptable to the NRC staff. If an applicant desires to employ new information that may be developed or to use an alternative method, the NRC staff will review the proposal and approve its use, if found acceptable.

The flood analysis described in this guide need not be considered by applicants in their submittals in connection with applications for special nuclear material licenses, operating licenses, or construction permits for nuclear facilities located at sites above the design basis flood level where it can be demonstrated

[1]The term "nuclear facility" will be used in this guide to refer to fuel reprocessing plants and to plutonium processing and fuel fabrication plants.

*Lines indicate substantive changes from the previous issue.

[2]Copies of ANSI N170-1976 may be purchased from the American Nuclear Society, 555 N. Kensington Avenue, La Grange Park, IL 60525.

that safety-related structures, systems, and components are not affected by flooding.

B. DISCUSSION

Nuclear facilities should be designed to prevent a release of radioactivity resulting from the effects of the most severe flood conditions that can reasonably be predicted to occur at a site as a result of severe hydrometeorological conditions, seismic activity, or both.

The Corps of Engineers for many years has studied conditions and circumstances relating to floods and flood control. As a result of these studies, it has developed a definition for a Probable Maximum Flood (PMF)[3] and attendant analytical techniques for estimating, with an acceptable degree of conservatism, flood levels on streams resulting from hydrometeorological conditions. An acceptable degree of conservatism, for estimating seismically induced flood levels and for evaluating the effects of the initiating event, is provided in Appendix A, "Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 100, "Reactor Site Criteria."

The conditions resulting from the worst site-related flood probable at the nuclear facility (e.g., PMF, seismically induced flood, seiche, surge, severe local precipitation) with attendant wind-generated wave activity constitute the design basis flood conditions that safety-related structures, systems, and components, whose failure during such conditions would constitute a threat to the public health and safety, should be designed to withstand and remain functional.

For sites along streams, the PMF generally provides the design basis flood. For sites along lakes or seashores, a flood condition of comparable severity could be produced by the most severe combination of hydrometeorological parameters reasonably possible, such as may be produced by a Probable Maximum Hurricane (Refs. 1, 2) or by a Probable Maximum Seiche. On estuaries, a Probable Maximum River Flood, a Probable Maximum Surge, a Probable Maximum Seiche, or a reasonable combination of less severe phenomenologically caused flooding events should be considered in arriving at design basis flood conditions comparable in frequency of occurrence with a PMF on streams.

In addition to floods produced by severe hydrometeorological conditions, the most severe seismically induced floods reasonably possible should be considered for each site. Along streams and estuaries, seismically induced floods may be produced by dam failures or landslides. Along lakeshores, coastlines, and estuaries, seismically induced or tsunami-type flooding should be considered. Consideration of seismically induced floods should include the same range of seismic events as is postulated for the design of the nuclear facility. For instance, the analysis of floods caused by dam failures, landslides, or tsunami requires consideration of seismic events equivalent in severity to the Safe Shutdown Earthquake[4] occurring at the location that would produce the worst such flood at the nuclear facility site.

In the case of seismically induced floods along rivers, lakes, and estuaries that may be produced by events less severe than a Safe Shutdown Earthquake, consideration should be given to the coincident occurrence of floods due to severe hydrometeorological conditions. This combination of events, however, should be considered only where the effects on the nuclear facility are worse than and the probability of such combined events may be greater than an individual occurrence of the most severe event of either type. ANSI N170-1976 contains combinations of such events acceptable to the NRC staff. For the specific case of seismically induced floods due to dam failures, an evaluation should be made of flood waves that may be caused (1) by domino-type dam failures triggered by a seismically induced failure of a critically located dam and (2) by multiple dam failures in a region where dams may be located close enough together that a single seismic event can cause multiple failures.

Each of the severe flood types discussed above should represent the upper limit of all potential phenomenologically caused flood combinations considered reasonably possible. Analytical techniques are available and should generally be used for prediction at individual sites. Those techniques applicable to PMF and seismically induced flood estimates on streams are presented in ANSI N170-1976 and Appendix B to Regulatory Guide 1.59. For sites on coasts, estuaries, and large lakes, techniques are presented in ANSI N170-1976 and in Appendix C to Regulatory Guide 1.59.

Analyses of only the most severe flood conditions may not indicate potential threats to safety-related systems that might result from combinations of flood conditions thought to be less severe. Therefore, reasonable combinations of less-severe flood conditions should also be considered to the extent needed for a consistent level of conservatism. Such combinations should be evaluated in cases where the probability of their existing at the same time and having significant consequences is at least comparable to that associated with the most severe hydrometeorological or seismi-

[3]The Corps of Engineers' Probable Maximum Flood definition appears in many publications of that agency such as Engineering Circular EC 1110-2-27, Change 1, "Engineering and Design—Policies and Procedures Pertaining to Determination of Spillway Capacities and Freeboard Allowances for Dams," February 19, 1968. The Probable Maximum Flood is also directly analogous to the Corps of Engineers' "Spillway Design Flood" as used for dams whose failures would result in a significant loss of life and property. A similar definition for Probable Maximum Flood is given in ANSI N170-1976.

[4]Determined as outlined for nuclear power plants in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100.

cally induced flood. For example, a failure of relatively high levees adjacent to a nuclear facility could occur during floods less severe than the worst site-related flood but would produce conditions more severe than those that would result during a greater flood (where a levee failure elsewhere would produce less severe conditions at the nuclear facility site).

Wind-generated wave activity may produce severe flood-induced static and dynamic conditions either independent of or coincident with severe hydrometeorological or seismic flood-producing mechanisms. For example, along a lake, reservoir, river, or seashore, reasonably severe wave action should be considered coincident with the probable maximum water level conditions.[5] The coincidence of wave activity with probable maximum water level conditions should take into account the fact that sufficient time can elapse between the occurrence of the assumed meteorological mechanism and the maximum water level to allow subsequent meteorological activity to produce substantial wind-generated waves coincident with the high water level. In addition, the most severe wave activity at the site that can be generated by distant hydrometeorological activity should be considered. For instance, coastal locations may be subjected to severe wave action caused by a distant storm that, although not as severe as a local storm (e.g., a Probable Maximum Hurricane), may produce more severe wave action because of a very long wave-generating fetch. The most severe wave activity at the site that may be generated by conditions at a distance from the site should be considered in such cases. In addition, assurance should be provided that safety systems are designed to withstand the static and dynamic effects resulting from frequent flood levels (i.e., the maximum operating level in reservoirs and the 10-year flood level in streams) coincident with the waves that would be produced by the Probable Maximum Gradient Wind[6] for the site (based on a study of historical regional meteorology).

C. REGULATORY POSITION

1. The conditions resulting from the worst site-related flood probable at a nuclear facility (e.g., PMF, seismically induced flood, hurricane, seiche, surge, heavy local precipitation) with attendant wind-generated wave activity constitute the design basis flood conditions that structures, systems, and components important to safety must be designed to withstand without impairing their capability to perform safety functions.

a. The standards for determining design basis flooding at power reactor sites contained in ANSI N170-1976 are considered by the NRC staff to be generally acceptable for nuclear facilities, subject to the following:

(1) Footnote 1 and the list of safety-related structures, systems, and components in Section 3.1.3 of ANSI N170-1976 are not applicable to nuclear facilities. A list of pertinent elevations of safety-related structures should be provided for comparison with design basis flood levels. It should be referenced to maps and drawings of such facilities.

(2) Footnote 2 in Section 4.3.1 of ANSI N170-1976 is not applicable to nuclear facilities. The words "safe shutdown" in Section 4.3.1 of ANSI N170-1976 should be interpreted to mean "safe curtailment of operations."

(3) Sections 5.5.4.2.3 and 5.5.5 of ANSI N170-1976 contain references to methods for evaluating the erosion failure of earthfill or rockfill dams and determining the resulting outflow hydrographs. The staff has found that some of these methods may not be conservative because they predict slower rates of erosion than those that have historically occurred. Modifications to the models may be made to increase their conservatism. Such modifications will be reviewed by the NRC staff on a case-by-case basis.

(4) Instead of Section 7.4.5.1 of ANSI N170-1976, the following should be used:

"7.4.5.1 Structure Being Considered. In general, the structures that need to be considered for the wave activities are protective dikes, waterfront banks and shores, auxiliary and control buildings, and other safety-related facilities, and non-safety-related facilities whose failure could adversely affect safety-related facilities."

(5) The terms "safe shutdown earthquake (SSE)" and "operating basis earthquake (OBE)" are used in Section 9.2.1.2 of ANSI N170-1976. For the purposes of this guide, the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) and the operating basis earthquake (OBE) should be determined as outlined for nuclear power plants in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100.

(6) Instead of Section 10.1 of ANSI N170-1976, the following should be used:

"10.1 General. Guidance is available if canals, reservoirs, and related structures are used."

(7) Instead of Section 10.3 of ANSI N170-1976, the following should be used:

"10.3 Reservoirs. Guidance is available if a reservoir is used."

b. The PMF on streams, as defined in ANSI N170-1976 and based on the analytical techniques summarized in ANSI N170-1976 and Appendix B to

[5] Probable Maximum Water Level is defined by the Corps of Engineers as "the maximum still water level (i.e., exclusive of local coincident wave runup) which can be produced by the most severe combination of hydrometeorological and/or seismic parameters reasonably possible for a particular location. Such phenomena are hurricanes, moving squall lines, other cyclonic meteorological events, tsunami, etc., which, when combined with the physical response of a body of water and severe ambient hydrological conditions, would produce a still water level that has virtually no risk of being exceeded."

[6] Probable Maximum Gradient Wind is defined as a gradient wind of designated duration, which there is virtually no risk of exceeding.

Regulatory Guide 1.59, provides an acceptable level of conservatism for estimating flood levels caused by severe hydrometeorological conditions.

c. Along lakeshores, coastlines, and estuaries, estimates of flood levels resulting from severe surges, seiches, and wave action caused by hydrometeorological activity should be based on criteria comparable in conservatism to those used for PMFs. Criteria and analytical techniques providing this level of conservatism for the analysis of these events are summarized in ANSI N170-1976. Appendix C to Regulatory Guide 1.59 presents an acceptable method for estimating the stillwater level of the Probable Maximum Surge (PMS) from hurricanes at open-coast sites on the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico.

d. Flood conditions that could be caused by dam failures from earthquakes should also be considered in establishing the design basis flood. Analytical techniques for evaluating the hydrologic effects of seismically induced dam failures discussed herein are presented in ANSI N170-1976. Techniques for evaluating the effects of tsunami will be presented in a future appendix to Regulatory Guide 1.59.

e. Where upsteam dams or other features that provide flood protection are present, in addition to the analyses of the most severe floods that may be induced by either hydrometeorological or seismic mechanisms, reasonable combinations of less-severe flood conditions and seismic events should also be considered to the extent needed for a consistent level of conservatism. The effect of such combinations on the flood conditions at the nuclear facility site should be evaluated in cases where the probability of such combinations occurring at the same time and having significant consequences is at least comparable to the probability associated with the most severe hydrometeorological or seismically induced flood. For relatively large streams, examples of acceptable combinations of runoff floods and seismic events that could affect the flood conditions at the nuclear facility are contained in ANSI N170-1976. Less-severe flood conditions, associated with the above seismic events, may be acceptable for small streams that exhibit relatively short periods of flooding.

f. The effects of coincident wind-generated wave activity to the water levels associated with the worst site-related flood possible (as determined from paragraphs a, b, c, d, or e above) should be added to generally define the upper limit of flood potential. Acceptable procedures are contained in ANSI N170-1976.

2. As an alternative to designing *hardened protection*[7] for all safety-related structures, systems, and components as specified in regulatory position 1 above, it is permissible to curtail operation of the facility and initiate suitable protective measures provided that:

a. Sufficient warning time is shown to be available to curtail operations and implement adequate emergency procedures;

b. Those structures, systems, and components necessary for confinement of radioactivity during the emergency are designed with hardened protective features to remain functional while withstanding the entire range of flood conditions up to and including the worst site-related flood probable (e.g., PMF, seismically induced flood, hurricane, surge, seiche, heavy local precipitation), with coincident wind-generated wave action as discussed in regulatory position 1 above.

3. During the economic life of a nuclear facility, unanticipated changes to the site environs that may adversely affect the flood-producing characteristics of the environs are possible. Examples include construction of a dam upstream or downstream of the nuclear facility, or comparably, construction of a highway or railroad bridge and embankment that obstructs the floodflow of a river, and construction of a harbor or deepening of an existing harbor near a coastal or lake site nuclear facility.

Significantly adverse changes in the runoff or other flood-producing characteristics of the site environs, as they affect the design basis flood, should be identified and used as the basis to develop or modify emergency operating procedures, if necessary, to mitigate the effects of the increased flood.

4. Proper utilization of the data and procedures in Appendices B and C to Regulatory Guide 1.59 will result in PMF peak discharges and PMS peak stillwater levels that will in many cases be approved by the NRC staff with no further verification. The staff will continue to accept for review detailed PMF and PMS analyses that result in less conservative estimates than those obtained by use of Appendices B and C to Regulatory Guide 1.59. In addition, previously reviewed and approved detailed PMF and PMS analyses will continue to be acceptable even though the data and procedures in Appendices B and C to Regulatory Guide 1.59 result in more conservative estimates.

D. IMPLEMENTATION

The purpose of this section is to provide information to applicants regarding the NRC staff's plans for using this regulatory guide.

This guide reflects current NRC staff practice. Therefore, except in those cases in which the applicant proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with specified portions of the Commission's regulations, the methods described herein are being and will continue to be used in the evaluation

[7]*Hardened protection* means structural provisions incorporated in the nuclear facility design that will protect safety-related structures, systems, and components from the static and dynamic effects of floods. In addition, each component of the protection must be passive and in place, as it is to be used for flood protection, during normal facility operation.

of submittals for operating license or construction permit applications for fuel reprocessing plants and for license applications submitted pursuant to 10 CFR Part 70 authorizing possession and use of special nuclear material at plutonium processing and fuel fabrication plants until this guide is revised as a result of suggestions from the public or additional staff review.

REFERENCES

1. U.S. Army Coastal Engineering Research Center, "Shore Protection Manual," Second Edition, 1975.

2. U.S. Weather Bureau (now U.S. Weather Service, NOAA), "Meteorological Characteristics of the Probable Maximum Hurricane, Atlantic and Gulf Coasts of the United States," Hurricane Research Interim Report, HUR 7-97 and HUR 7-97A, 1968.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

OFFICIAL BUSINESS
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION

U.S. MAIL