

July 28, 2000

MEMORANDUM TO: James W. Clifford, Chief, Section 2
Project Directorate I
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

FROM: John Harrison, Project Manager, Section 2 */RA/*
Project Directorate I
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT: HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION, FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION,
ISSUES DISCUSSED DURING THE JULY 19, 2000, CONFERENCE
CALL WITH PSE&G (TAC NO. MA8279)

The attached information was transmitted by facsimile on July 13, 2000, to Mr. J. Priest of Public Service Electric & Gas Company (PSE&G). This information was transmitted to facilitate a conference call that took place on July 19, 2000, in order to clarify the licensee's submittal dated February 24, 2000, which requested approval of an unreviewed safety question related to PSE&G's revised radiological analysis of Hope Creek's design basis Control Rod Drop Accident.

This memorandum and the attachment do not convey a formal request for information or represent an NRC staff position. It was originally intended to have the attached information placed on the docket by inclusion in the licensee's docketed response (per the third option in Office Letter 803) . However, because of the delay in resolving the subject issues, this information is being added to the docket via this memo in order to provide more timely information to the public.

Docket No. 50-354

Attachment: Issues Discussed During Telephone Conference

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Issues Discussed During the July 19, 2000 Telephone Conference with PSE&G
Related to PSE&G Letter LR-N990511, dated February 24, 2000
Request for Approval of Unreviewed Safety Question
Radiological Consequences of a Control Rod Drop Accident
Hope Creek Generating Station

The staff has reviewed the information on radiological consequences that was included in your submittal. The staff is unable to duplicate your reported results using the data in the submittal and the UFSAR. The following information is needed to support the staff's review:

- a. Basis for the core inventory assumed for the MVP analysis; e.g., power level, peaking factor, etc. The numeric difference between the staff analysis and those provided in the PSE&G submittal suggests that the core inventory may have been based on an assumed power of 5%. Please confirm that the inventory is based on the rated thermal power. If you did perform this analysis at a lower reactor power, please justify why you believe that assumption is adequately bounding for (1) a CRDA event that occurs during a shutdown following extended operation at full power, or (2) for a CRDA event that occurs during a return from power following a brief shutdown in which I-131 decay wouldn't be significant (e.g., quick return to power following an inadvertent trip). Your submittal indicates that the MVPs are used to evacuate the main condenser during startup or shutdown conditions at power levels less than or equal to 5%.
- b. The main condenser volume used in conjunction with the assumed 200 cfm MVP flow to arrive at the leakage rate assumed in your TACT5 runs, or another basis for assigning a value for this transport.
- c. The X/Q (EAB, LPZ, CR) values assumed for this release path and that for the isolated condenser pathway. The UFSAR discusses X/Q values for various release points, but only the values for the FRVS are tabulated.
- d. A confirmation that the MVP release path was analyzed to ensure that the LOCA would still be limiting with regard to control room habitability. This is a significant unfiltered pathway that continues for 1 hour at 200 cfm, whereas the LOCA pathway is largely filtered. The qualitative analysis in the UFSAR based on comparative source terms may not be adequate for this pathway.
- e. Any credit taken for mitigation of the release, beyond the assumptions shown in the proposed Table 15.4-6.
- f. A copy of the xxxxT5A.TAB file generated by HABIT with your inputs.